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Although concepts are located within individual minds, while word forms are shared
across entire language communities, words and concepts are normally deemed to be
tightly bound. But in fact, at least to the extent that concepts vary, the relationship
between words and concepts may not be as uniform or stable as is often assumed. Nev-
ertheless, language may itself mediate that relationship, through its entrenchment and
use. Psychologists have already investigated language use in referential communication,
but they have yet to focus in detail on the role of language in conceptual coordination.
One of the obstacles has been the theoretical and methodological challenges that arise
from seriously abandoning conceptual universals. To that end, an experimental frame-
work was developed based on sorting tasks in which participants freely partition a set
of stimuli into categories and an objective measure for comparing two outputs. Four
experiments were then conducted to investigate whether people were conceptually co-
ordinated before, during and after linguistic interaction.
Experiment 1 consisted of a cross-linguistic study looking at default coordination between
native speakers. Participants both sorted items into groups and named them individu-
ally. There was a relatively high degree of categorisation agreement among speakers of
the same language, but not nearly as high as for naming agreement. Experiments 2-4
inquired into conceptual coordination during or immediately after linguistic interaction.
Experimental manipulations involved the form of language use (full dialogue or only
category labels), as well as the type of feedback (category groupings, labels, both, or
neither). In particular, Experiment 2 investigated the effects of categorising a set of ob-
jects together, with or without dialogue, on subsequent individual categorisation. The
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results were inconclusive and revealed specific methodological issues, but yielded in-
teresting data and were encouraging for the general framework. Experiment 3 modified
the designwhile testing and extending the same general hypotheses. Participants carried
out a sequence of categorisation tasks in which they tried to coordinate their categories,
followed by individual categorisation and similarity tasks. The availability of dialogue
and feedback was manipulated in the interactive tasks. During interaction, they also
received both kinds of feedback, except in the control condition. Pairs that could talk
coordinated much better than the others, but feedback didn’t help. Experiment 4 looked
into the effects of the four possibilities for feedback during a longer sequence of interact-
ive tasks. In general, conceptual coordination was found to depend on grouping feed-
back only. However, by the end of the task, pairs who received both kinds of feedback
did best. All three interactive experiments also measured lexical convergence between
pairs. The results generally revealed a dissociation, with lexical alignment showingmore
convergence and occurring under a wider variety of conditions.
Togetherwith previous research, these findings show that language can bring about con-
ceptual coordination. However, it appears that the richer the form of language use, the
more conceptual convergence occurs, and the closer it gets coupled with lexical conver-
gence. The long-term effects, if any, are much weaker. These studies have implications
for the general role of language in cognition and other important issues.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Private concepts and public meanings?
A few years ago, over Christmas dinner, my father and brother had a long debate about
what constituted an empire. While neither would dispute prototypical cases like ancient
Rome, they were deeply entrenched in their positions regarding borderline cases. One
of them (I can’t remember who) kept insisting that Japan was an empire (since it has an
emperor), while the other countered with the United States (due to its wide influence in
international affairs). But after their characteristic stubbornness made them drag on for
a while, I eventually stopped gnashing my teeth and erupted, “You’re both right: it just
depends on what you mean!”
This example illustrates a fundamental tension in the relationship between public mean-
ings and private concepts. The problem is that, although concepts are located within
individual minds, word forms are shared across entire language communities. As such,
we must either claim that concepts are identical for all speakers of a given language, or
that the same wordsmay identify slightly different concepts for different people (or even
for the same person in different situations). But examples like the one above clearly fa-
vour the latter position. Concepts vary, so, assuming concepts are word meanings, word
meanings vary as well. So why is it so hard to break the intuition that the meanings of
words are fixed and public?
Indeed, the tension persists, and is one of the more difficult problems in cognitive sci-
ence. Philosophers, psychologists and linguists (among others) have dealt with it in a
1
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variety of ways (Levinson 1997). Frege (1892/1948) develops a theory which clearly dis-
tinguishes the meanings of words from the objects they refer to in the world. But he
also distinguishes fixed public meanings from variable private concepts, and makes no
effort to relate the two (Johnson-Laird 1983). Fodor (1998) collapses Frege’s latter distinc-
tion, claiming that meanings are concepts, and concepts are public. But then of course
he is confronted with facts of conceptual variation, although he does his best to dismiss
them. Putnam (1975) takes the other extreme, takingmeaning out of themind altogether,
and grounding it in truth instead. Under this view, any correspondence between mean-
ings and concepts only reflects our degree of understanding of the true nature of things
in the world. On the other hand, Johnson (1987) grounds meaning in our interaction
with the world through our bodies. While this allows for potential variation between
people, he also argues how commonalities in human biology and experience can explain
why similar concepts emerge so that we can still communicate. And Rosch (1978), as a
cognitive psychologist, explores cognitive representations underlying meaning. Never-
theless, she still abstracts away from individuals and focuses on the structure of public
categories. Finally, Barsalou (1999) proposes that perceptual representations, if prop-
erly construed, can play a much more sophisticated role in cognition than is normally
acknowledged. Although his theory embraces representational variation both between
and within people, he also shows how one of its foundational components can help ex-
plain conceptual stability.
While this is just a small sampling of theoretical positions on this controversial subject,
it highlights how the treatment of word meanings (and not just word forms) as public
resources is pervasive even in the scientific community, and how this has marked our
notion of concepts. In fact, as we will see in Section 1.3, there are actually sensible the-
oretical reasons for trying to hang on to conceptual universals, although I will need to
resist them. But first, I raise a possibility that will be the focus ofmy thesis: that language
itself may be responsible for bringing people’s concepts closer together.
1.2 Language and conceptual coordination
So far I have been implicitly talking about language as if it mirrored the mind (Chomsky
1968). In this view, words merely encode concepts (Jackendoff 1983). But that is not ne-
cessarily the case. Once we acknowledge that word-concept mappings may vary from
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person to person, however slightly, and that word forms (if not their meanings) are pub-
lic resources, the possibility arises that people might affect each other’s word-concept
mappings. Given how quickly and accurately children learn words and their meanings
(Bloom 2000), and how we are susceptible to influences from the words of others all the
way from infancy (Waxman and Markow 1995) to adulthood (Lupyan, Rakison and Mc-
Clelland 2007), we could hypothesisemore specifically that language leads to conceptual
coordination. This will be the general question I will focus on in my thesis:
Does language bring about conceptual coordination between individuals?
There are good empirical reasons for supposing that language might do so. Clark (1996)
has argued that language use is intimately involved in most forms of social interaction,
and he and his colleagues have demonstrated how dialogue in particular both depends
on and builds up mutual knowledge during interaction (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs 1986;
Schober and Clark 1989; Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark 1992). Researchers have also proposed,
based on empirical evidence, that conversation partners converge on referential expres-
sions and their underlying conceptualisations (Garrod and Anderson 1987; Brennan and
Clark 1996), and that engaging in a joint task involving dialogue can result in concep-
tual convergence that persists even after interaction (Markman and Makin 1998; Voik-
lis 2008). These experiments have fuelled theoretical proposals suggesting that inter-
locutors in dialogue align their mental representations at different levels, including lex-
ical and conceptual ones (Pickering and Garrod 2004).
Moreover, if linguistic interaction effects on conceptual coordination are not evanescent,
then they might, through repeated application, result in a more permanent transform-
ation of our concepts (Malt and Sloman 2004). If so, we might expect native speakers
of the same language to conceptualise things in relatively similar ways, even when they
are not using language. This is the basic idea behind Whorf’s (1956) influential proposal
of linguistic relativity, which states that our native language determines the way we see
the world. Although Whorf’s claim is now widely recognised as being too strong, and
even in the most studied domain controversy remains (Regier and Kay 2009), weaker
versions of Whorf’s position have taken over and gathered empirical support (Gumperz
and Levinson 1996; Gentner and Goldin-Meadow 2003b).
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However, it would be premature to conclude that language necessarily drives conceptual
coordination, because the results may be deceptive. First of all, in order to investigate the
relationship between language and conceptualisation, it is important to separate the two
phenomena (Nuyts and Pederson 1997). We cannot assume that common word choice
reflects common conceptualisation. Just because two people use the same word to refer
to the same thing, doesn’t mean that their underlying concepts match (e.g., my brother
and father still think of empires differently, even if they both consider ancient Rome to
be a good example). Our interlocutor’s words may prime us lexically, but that does not
automatically imply that we are also lining up conceptually (Schober 2005).
Similarly, we also have to be cautious about concluding that language is the causal factor
in conceptual coordination. Just as it is difficult to isolate language from conceptualisa-
tion, so it is also hard to separate it from both local interaction and general culture. It
is possible that the conceptual coordination that seems to occur in dialogue is actually
more due to other properties of interaction rather than language itself. Similarly, we
may share similar concepts to other people of our linguistic community due to cultural
factors that are confounded with language. Therefore, we need to be careful both in
designing experiments and interpreting them. While this is already a substantial chal-
lenge, it is further aggravated by theoretical and methodological complications, as I will
outline next.
1.3 Theoretical and methodological challenges
Having identified an empirical focus of investigation, it is tempting to run to the experi-
mental lab to conduct the first experiment. However, in this case, doing so would result
in theoretical chaos, and our only coping mechanism would be to either ignore theory
altogether or make a mess of it.
Why is this the case? I have already suggested how an investigation of the role of lan-
guage in conceptual coordination presupposes that we take two issues particularly seri-
ously: conceptual variation on one hand, and the separation of language from conceptu-
alisation on the other. We will soon find that while these principles may seem relatively
innocuous, they have deep theoretical consequences, and staying loyal to them is no
easy task. The fundamental issue is that they leave us without a straightforward way to
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identify concepts. If we cannot rely on convenient universals or language, then how can
we study a single person’s concepts, let alone conceptual coordination between people?
Perhaps Fodor (1998) puts the danger of conceptual variation best (following up on a
thought experiment from Putnam 1975):
“If everybody else’s concept WATER is different from mine, then it is liter-
ally true that only I have ever wanted a drink of water, and that the inten-
tional generalization ‘Thirsty people seek water’ applies only to me. (And,
of course, only I can state the generalization; words express concepts, so
if your WATER concept is different from mine, ‘Thirsty people seek water’
means something different when you say it than when I do.) Prima facie, it
would appear that any very thoroughgoing conceptual relativismwould pre-
clude intentional generalizations with any very serious explanatory power.
This holds in spades if, as seems likely, a coherent conceptual relativist has to
claim that conceptual identity can’t be maintained even across time slices of
the same individual.” (p. 29)
I disagree with Fodor (1998) that “conceptual relativism” would be so catastrophic. For
many purposes, even social ones, concepts probably don’t need to be identical, but just
similar enough (Segal 2000). And in any case, we cannot reject conceptual variation just
because it is theoretically inconvenient, especially given the variety of evidence for it (as
we’ll see in Section 2.3.1).
Nevertheless, the point stands that rejecting universal concepts or wordmeanings leaves
us without an external, objective yardstick. Methodologically, this implies that I can-
not just conduct experiments where I ask participants to categorise stimuli verbally or
according to pre-specified criteria. Without a well-defined metric, it is difficult to do
science, and concepts are no exception.
Therefore, in order to address this, I first develop a simple theoretical model incorpor-
ating the structures, processes and relationships that concepts enter into. The model is
not meant to be particularly sophisticated or to definitively resolve any issues, but it is
intended to be grounded in previous work, and to serve the foundational role that is re-
quired for the design and interpretation of my experiments. As such, it will require me
to synthesise empirical evidence and theoretical perspectives from different disciplines,
particularly when it comes to relating what’s inside the mind and what’s beyond it.
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The main point of this process is to reach a reasonable answer to the problem raised
by Fodor (1998) above, given my necessary prior commitments. How can I identify
concepts, both theoretically and methodologically? To anticipate, my solution draws
on three main ideas. First, although it requires some theoretical compromise, I identify
categories, which I distinguish from concepts, as our best proxy to concepts. As such,
categorisation tasks, provided they are of the right sort, are theway to go (Murphy 2002).
Second, I emphasise the dynamic nature of conceptualisation, and how we can take
snapshots of different people’s concepts at different times, without committing ourselves
on certain philosophical issues such as conceptual individuation (Fodor and Lepore
1992). Third, I note that the nature of my problem of investigation actually provides
a sort of conceptual yardstick for people’s categorisations: the categorisations of other
people (Markman and Makin 1998). In particular, for my purposes, I do not need to
worry about how participants conceptualise experimental stimuli directly, but only how
they compare to others. As long as we have an objective measure for comparing people’s
categorisations, we have enough of a conceptual metre stick. This does not mean, how-
ever, that I take a black box approach to categorisation: categories reflect concepts, and
studying them carefully can shed light on the relationships between language, culture
and thought (Malt 2006). Indeed, I will attempt to relate some of my experimental res-
ults to the internal constituents of concepts, as established by psychological theories of
categorisation.
To give a feeling for what my approach will involve, as well as how it will manifest itself
experimentally, imagine the following situation. You are moving into a new flat with
someone, and you share a kitchen, with a variety of tableware as in Figure 1.1. How will
you and your flatmate coordinate your organisation of the cupboards? Will you follow
the way people do it in your home country? Will you observe how your flatmate places
things, and try to adopt it yourself? Will you place labels on the cupboards to establish
the appropriate contents? Or will you discuss it directly, and even arrange the things in
the cupboard together at some point? Languagemay be involved to differing degrees for
these different approaches, and may have correspondingly different effects. But notice
that if I want to compare how you and your flatmate go about it, I don’t need to ask you
what you call the dishes, or to understand how you individually make your choices. I
just need to look into the cupboard regularly, and have a fair way of comparing the sets
of things that I find there at different times.
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Figure 1.1: Dishes.
1.4 Roadmap
As I have suggested, although largely experimental, my thesis also has a substantial the-
oretical flavour to it. I develop a simple theoretical model for my purposes, review past
work related to the role of language in conceptual coordination, develop an experimental
framework for pursuing the issues more directly, present four experiments that did so,
and discuss my findings and their theoretical implications.
Chapter 2 lays the theoretical foundations for the rest of the thesis. Although an investig-
ation considering conceptual coordination and language is intrinsically social in nature,
we must first look inside the individual in order to figure out the structures that are to be
coordinated, the processes that they engage in, and how these structures and processes
relate to language. En route, I develop a simple theoretical model which is meant to cap-
ture these relationships at an appropriate level of detail. This turns out to be surprisingly
challenging, especially if we are to take conceptual variation seriously. However, since
allowing for such variation is a logical prerequisite to my study, it is crucial that we stay
loyal to it.
Having established my theoretical ground, I move on in Chapter 3 to reviewing mostly
empirical work that is of direct significance to my research questions. I begin with what
we already know about how lexical input from others can affect our concepts and con-
ceptualisation. Then I turn to two major themes of central importance to my thesis.
First, I consider the traditional claim that our native language determines our store of
concepts. I review existing literature on this topic, focusing particularly on the widely
studied domain of colour. Second, I discuss interactive studies involving dialogue. I
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converge on two particular sets of studies: those examining conceptual coordination in-
directly through lexical coordination, and those testing for conceptual coordination after
linguistic interaction. The review in this chapter leads to the identification of more spe-
cific empirical targets for my thesis.
Chapter 4 asks what methods can be used to pursue these empirical goals. I first argue
that the use of categorisation experiments is the most suitable strategy for my empirical
investigations. However, there are many different possible categorisation paradigms,
and it is important to adopt one which is appropriate and sensitive to the theoretical
issues raised in Chapter 2. To that end, based on criteria that I lay out for my exper-
imental framework, I argue for one particular type of categorisation task, and how it
can be embedded in an interactive context involving pairs of individuals and linguistic
manipulations. I also mention considerations regarding the choice of stimulus domains,
and decide among objective measures for comparing categorisation outputs. I converge
on a general experimental framework which I use for all of my experiments.
In Chapter 5, I address the question of how coordinated people’s concepts might be
even before they interact, by virtue of their being native speakers of the same language.
I relate this question to the linguistic relativity hypothesis, and discuss a particularly
relevant cross-linguistic study from the literature in some detail. The experiment had
examined both linguistic and non-linguistic categorisation, and found that native speak-
ers of different languages tended to diverge in the former but not in the latter. However,
although the study had used the same kind of categorisation task as I recruited for my
framework, it had not addressed the issue of conceptual coordination directly. Therefore,
I then present Experiment 1, which had two aims: to replicate the original study, and to
extend its methods and analysis to address my coordination hypothesis. The replication
was successful, andmy additional analysis complemented but also qualified the original
findings.
Chapter 6 then presents the first of three experiments I conducted which involve pairs
of participants and focus on the possible effects of language use and interaction on con-
ceptual coordination. Since past work had shown how natural conversation involves a
high degree of coordination and development ofmutual knowledge, Experiment 2 asked
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whether carrying out a joint categorisation task while engaging in dialogue led to con-
ceptual convergence between people, as examined by subsequent individual categorisa-
tion tasks. I also attempted to isolate the impact of dialogue specifically from interaction
more generally by setting up an intermediate condition in which participants categor-
ised jointly together without speaking. Unfortunately, the experiment had methodolo-
gical flaws and did not resolve the issues I was after, but it did yield other interesting
data and showed that the general experimental framework had potential.
Chapter 7 therefore presents a third experiment, in which methodological improvements
were made and the scope of inquiry was expanded to consider conceptual coordination
not just during but also immediately after interaction. To that end, in Experiment 3, par-
ticipant pairs also carried out a sequence of joint categorisation tasks, while also modify-
ing the design so that I could isolate their categorisation as individuals during the inter-
action. After these joint tasks, participants individually carried out both categorisation
and similarity judgement tasks. The experiment revealed that dialogue massively facilit-
ated conceptual coordination, but simple interaction without talking did not. However,
it also showed how participants coordinated lexical choices, even without full dialogue.
On the other hand, in conflict with previous research, there was no evidence of coordin-
ation on the subsequent individual part of the experiment.
Chapter 8 presentsmy final experiment, which delves inmore detail into issues raised by
Experiment 3. In particular, Experiment 4 looked further into conceptual coordination
during dialogue-less interaction, but also places more emphasis on lexical coordination
and a comparison between the two. To that end, the experiment consisted exclusively of
a (larger) set of joint categorisation tasks, andmanipulatedwhether participants received
conceptual and/or lexical feedback after each task. The results suggested that there is a
surprising degree of dissociation between lexical and conceptual coordination. Lexical
coordination relied exclusively on lexical feedback, and conceptual coordination relied
mostly (though not only) on conceptual feedback. This also has implications for the
internal structure of concepts.
Finally, Chapter 9 brings the whole thesis together. I first summarise the results of my
four experiments. Next I evaluate the experimental framework, discussing its weak-
nesses and strengths, and showing how it could be applied to many other questions and
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domains in further research. I then return to the main questions with which I started the
thesis, discussing my results in terms of the role of language in conceptual coordination
before, during and after interaction. In the process, I also discuss the surprising results
concerning lexical coordination and the apparent dissociation between the two. After
that, I separately consider the question of linguistic relativity, followed by a reexamin-
ation of the foundational theoretical issues raised in Chapter 2. I then relate my results
to the otherwise neglected topic of the relationship between conceptual development,
language acquisition and language evolution. Finally, I review potential directions for
future work, and draw overall conclusions.
CHAPTER 2
Conceptualisation in the individual
2.1 Introduction
The study of coordination of a phenomenon requires first an understanding of the phe-
nomenon itself, especially when the latter is already an elusive subject. As a result, before
I tackle conceptual coordination and the role of language therein, it is crucial to first ad-
dress the underlying process of individual conceptualisation. Nevertheless, words are
also stored in the minds of individuals, and thus may already have a role in conceptual-
isation even before we consider language’s communicative function and use. Therefore,
this chapter focuses on the question of how a person conceptualises things in the world,
and what role words might play in this process.
The reader may question whether the length of this chapter is justified, given that these
issues are preliminary to the actual empirical hypotheses I am ultimately addressing.
Why delve so far into theoretically murky waters in a primarily experimental psycho-
logy thesis concerning categorisation? Why not just adopt a simple and commonly as-
sumed model, as shown in Figure 2.1, with isomorphic relationships between words,
concepts and objects?
Unfortunately, as I suggested in Section 1.3, I do not have that luxury here, due to the
nature of my research questions. The main problem is the central position that concep-
tual variation occupies in my thesis. In particular, investigating conceptual coordina-
tion presupposes the possibility of conceptual variation. Different people may divide
the world up in (perhaps slightly) different ways. As a result, I will have to explicitly
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Figure 2.1: An isomorphic relationship between words, concepts, and objects: Each word (e.g.,
w2) is associated with a particular concept (e.g., c2), which in turn is associated with a particular
kind of object (e.g., o2). In such an oversimplified model, the three systems mirror each other
perfectly.
reject the claim that different people necessarily have the same concepts (Fodor 1998).
Indeed, concepts might also vary intra-personally, so that a single person may concep-
tualise the same thing in different ways at different times. While this position may not
seem terribly controversial from a psychological perspective, we will see that taking
the possibility of conceptual variation seriously has surprisingly far-reaching theoretical
implications. Moreover, the problem is compounded by the fact that I am specifically ex-
ploring the role of language in conceptual coordination. As such, any hope of clinging
to words as reliable conceptual identifiers is lost, because I will need an experimental
way of explicitly separating words and concepts, from both the researcher’s and the par-
ticipant’s points of view. In practical terms, I will not be able to identify concepts by
relying on tasks with merely linguistic responses (as is often done in psychology experi-
ments; Lloyd-Jones and Humphreys 1997).
Note that these problems are by no means exclusive to this thesis, and are particularly
familiar to the developmental psychologist. As Keil (1992) points out, “it is difficult to
design and motivate empirical studies on concept acquisition without first committing
oneself to a set of assumptions about what concepts are and how they are represented”
(p. 25). While my thesis does not focus on conceptual development, some of the theor-
etical difficulties are analogous. As children learn about the world, the correspondences
between their concepts and objects in the world change; and, similarly, as they acquire
language, the correspondences between concepts and words changes. As such, it is diffi-
cult if not impossible to identify conceptual norms towhich their concepts can be reliably
related and thereby grounded.
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I could still try to downplay these issues, and leave the broader interpretation to those
more qualified. This would protect me from launching into dangerous philosophical
territory, and allow me to get straight to business. However, it would also make the
interpretation of my experiments difficult and limited. Instead, in order to theoretically
ground my experiments, I will emphatically drop the convenient idealisation of neat,
static and universal isomorphisms between words, concepts, and objects. In its place, I
will develop a more dynamic model, bringing together theoretical arguments and em-
pirical evidence.
Therefore, this chapter is necessary groundwork for engaging the actual main topic of
this thesis. As such, the review of literature relating to conceptual coordination and its
relationship to language is not taken up until Chapter 3.
The chapter is divided as follows. I begin by identifying my position on the nature of
concepts within the large interdisciplinary web of perspectives. I then list some evidence
for conceptual variation, and commit to taking conceptual variation seriously, whatever
the consequences. I then proceed to the relationships between concepts, categories and
words, keeping conceptual variation closely in mind along the way. Next, I consider the
internal structure of concepts, and how they relate to words and categories. And finally,
I consider how concepts are applied in the dynamic process of conceptualisation, and
how it relates to words and similarity. As the chapter rolls along, I develop a simple
model of conceptualisation which will serve as my guide for the rest of the thesis.
2.2 The nature of concepts
The nature of concepts is a particularly controversial topic with origins in the ancient
philosophical debate between empiricism and rationalism (Prinz 2005). Concepts remain
a central concern for modern cognitive science in general, where they are approached
from an enormous number of different perspectives in psychology, linguistics, philo-
sophy, anthropology, computer science, and neuroscience (Cohen and Lefebvre 2005).
However, the actual nature of concepts is well beyond the scope of my thesis. While
some of the basic structures, processes and relationships involving concepts will be crit-
ical, I do not need to pursue their fundamental nature. Nevertheless, it is important to
give some idea of what I understand by concepts.
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To that end, in this section I first list a few different theoretical approaches to concepts.
Then I describe Fodor’s (1998) conditions for a theory of concepts, and use it to lay out
my own position. Finally, I mention different levels of mental representation at which
we can study concepts, and specify which will constitute my focus.
2.2.1 Theoretical positions
Philosophers, linguists and psychologists have taken many different perspectives on
concepts, depending on their purposes and theoretical orientation. Here I briefly list
some of these positions, for each of these disciplines in turn. This list is not meant to do
justice to this topic, and is unavoidably chaotic. However, my only purpose here is to
demonstrate how controversial is the nature of concepts.
I begin with philosophers, since they have the most to say about the theoretical nature
of concepts. Fodor (1998) presents a strong nativist theory, according to which concepts
are universal, (mostly) innate, and have no internal structure. He acknowledges that
such a view may seem radical, but argues against other standard approaches, which
he thinks we are destined to abandon. Peacocke (1992) tackles the problem of concept
possession. In his view, for a person to have a certain concept, he must satisfy certain ob-
jective, necessary and sufficient “possession conditions”. Churchland (1989) advocates a
connectionist approach to concepts, grounded in neural networks. In this view, concepts
are changing distributed representations rather than fixed abstract symbols. Gärdenfors
(2000) proposes that concepts occupy regions in an abstract geometric space. His the-
ory attempts to reconcile the gap between symbolic and connectionist representations of
concepts. Millikan (2000) argues that humans are remarkably tolerant to large changes
in something without changing their conceptualisation of it. Based on this, she chal-
lenges the widespread assumption that the set of items subsumed by a concept can be
determined by description.
Since language concerns the expression of thoughts, linguists have also taken theoretical
positions concerning concepts. Jackendoff (1989) attempts to extend Chomsky’s (1986)
linguistic theory to concepts. In the process, he emphasises the importance of distin-
guishing “E-concepts” and “I-concepts”, which concern the way the world is and how
we grasp it, respectively. Lakoff (1987) claims that concepts are grounded in our bodily
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experience and emerge through our interaction with the world. For him, concepts are
not innate, nor do they exist externally to the mind and body. As such, meaning must be
mediated through our minds and bodies. Hurford (2007) is concernedwith the cognitive
underpinnings of the evolution of language. After comparing the conceptual capabilit-
ies of animals with ours, he proposes that human concepts were enhanced by language,
but built on pre-existing and simpler “proto-concepts”.
While psychologists are generally more interested in empirical evidence rather than ab-
stract theory, they have also made theoretical contributions to the subject. Murphy (2002)
treats concepts as mental representations of categories of things in the world. He uses
evidence from categorisation experiments to evaluate competing psychological theories
of how concepts are represented in the mind. Smith and Samuelson (1997) challenge the
common view that concepts are fixed and unchanging representations. They favour a
highly dynamic approach, where concepts are built on-line when needed out of memor-
ies and knowledge. Barsalou (1999) argues that cognition is grounded in perception,
and that concepts are no exception. He proposes a theory of “perceptual symbols”, in
which perceptual representations in memory can serve many of the functions normally
attributed to abstract concepts.
In short, theories of concepts diverge tremendously. A lot of work could be spent on
assessing their mutual inter-compatibilities, but that would constitute a separate thesis.
So what are we to make of this quagmire here? For this purpose, I recruit help from
Fodor (1998).
2.2.2 Fodor’s (1998) conditions
Although his own position is highly controversial (e.g., Landau 2000), Fodor (1998) also
puts forward five weaker conditions which he claims are “not-negotiable” (p .23) for
any sensible theory of concepts. I characterise my own position here with respect to his
conditions. This will also highlight which aspects of concepts are crucial for my thesis,
and which I can choose to remain agnostic about. In this way, I avoid the adoption or
development of any particular full theory of concepts.
Fodor’s (1998) first condition is that concepts are “mental particulars” (p. 23). From a
psychological perspective, this is obvious and important: concepts exist in the mind.
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However, it is worth emphasising because, as we have already seen in Section 1.1, con-
cepts are often merged with meaning, and theories of meaning often bypass the mind
altogether (see Section 2.4.3). Moreover, people often informally use the term “concept”
as if it was an external entity which exists independently of the mind (e.g., “The concept
of a fourth dimension is difficult to grasp”).
Another condition is that concepts are categories and are used as such. People apply
concepts to things in the world, and these things form a category. I agree that concepts
are fundamentally used for this purpose, and indeed, this thesis will investigate con-
cepts through categorisation experiments. However, although there is a direct causal
link between concepts and categories, they are not the same thing. As I will argue in
Section 2.4.1, while concepts exist in the head, and categories may be our best way of
studying them, categories themselves are not in the mind. This is a philosophical point,
and may in fact be consistent with Fodor’s (1998) condition. In any case, it will be im-
portant for my purposes.
The next condition is compositionality (p. 25), which relates to the idea of concepts being
the constituents of thoughts. Concepts can thus be combined to form more complex
concepts by putting them together. This will not be important for my thesis, so I take
an agnostic position. However, I do not take this condition as “non-negotiable”. While
many lexical concepts may be compositional, it is not a priori obvious that this is true of
all concepts. In fact, even for lexical concepts, compositionality is not as simple a matter
as it first appears, and can be highly sensitive to context (Sweetser 1999).
Fodor’s (1998) fourth condition states a lot of concepts must be learned. As he points
out, theorists differ widely in what “a lot” means, and his own theory is based on an
unusually large base of innate concepts, but this cannot apply to all concepts. I take
this condition as obvious. In fact, my work would even perhaps be compatible with
the possibility that all concepts are learned. However, I do not need to commit to this
position, which is fortunate, since it would get me into deep philosophical trouble.
Finally, Fodor (1998)’s last condition is that concepts are public. In particular, people can
share the same concepts, and they do so. This point is a critical one for my thesis, and,
like Hurford (2007), I must disagree. Concepts may be similar across different people, as
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is evidenced by how readily we communicate with language. But they are not necessar-
ily identical, and at the very least, cannot be assumed to be uniform a priori. Since I am
concerned with conceptual coordination, this point is so crucial that I take it up in more
detail in Section 2.3.
In short, I generally agree with Fodor’s (1998) characterisation of concepts, subject to
some important qualifications. I agree that concepts are mental representations, they
pick out categories of things in the world, and many, if not all, are learned. However, I
do not take a position on compositionality, and strongly refute the notion that concepts
are necessarily public and shared.
2.2.3 Levels of representation
Before continuing, there is one more important foundational issue concerning the nature
of concepts to settle: the level(s) of conceptual representation of interest. As can be seen
from the literature (including some of the positions listed above), there are many differ-
ent levels of representation which researchers address, even if the boundaries between
them are not always clear. At one end, neuroscientists have explored the neural basis
for concepts, by studying areas of brain activation during conceptual processing, of-
ten involving neuropsychological patients with brain lesions (e.g., Damasio, Grabowski,
Tranel, Hichwa and Damasio 1996; Martin 2007). Next, there is a long-standing debate
between symbolic and connectionist views of mental representations (Rumelhart and
McClelland 1986; Pinker and Prince 1987), although there are increasing efforts to re-
concile them (e.g., Gärdenfors 2000; Dale and Spivey 2005; Dale, Dietrich and Chemero
2009). Further, cognitive psychologists study the structures of mental categories, from
which they try to infer themental representations of concepts (e.g., Rosch 1975; Nosofsky
and Johansen 2000; Murphy and Kaplan 2000). And finally, philosophers and linguists
often abstract away from the internal aspects of concepts, focusing on how they relate
to the world and to language (e.g., Chomsky 1986; Peacocke 1992; Fodor 1998; Edwards
2010).
In this thesis, I do not deal with the two lower levels of representation, offering nothing
about how concepts are actually physically represented, instantiated or distributed in the
brain. Instead, I am attempting to walk the line between the higher two levels. While
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I will focus primarily on the relationship between concepts, language and the world, I
will also address the internal mental structure of concepts and the interface between the
two.
2.3 Conceptual variation
Since the outset of this thesis, I have pointed out that its aims require me to take con-
ceptual variation seriously. But is conceptual variation merely a theoretical possibility,
or is it also an empirical fact? In this section, I briefly review some evidence and argu-
ments that strongly suggest the latter, and do so at very different timescales: evolution-
ary, inter-cultural, intra-cultural, developmental, and online. Combined with theoretical
considerations, I then complete the argument that the idealisation of concepts as shared
and uniform must be dropped, at least for the purposes of my thesis.
At first glance, it may seem like a discussion of conceptual variation belongs later, once I
have developed my theoretical perspective on conceptual relationships, structures, and
processes. However, there are three reasons for placing it here. First, we will see at vari-
ous points in this chapter that developing a theoretical model is strongly affected by a
variationist view. Indeed, it is largely because most theories have not taken conceptual
variation seriously that I cannot simply adopt a standard position. Second, due to the
large variation in the timescales I will discuss, the evidence will draw from a range of
different disciplines, including cognitive and linguistic anthropology, comparative and
developmental psychology, and psycholinguistics. As such, there is even less consensus
on the already controversial nature of concepts than there is within a single discipline.
Third, this discussion is not meant to be comprehensive, or even to establish conceptual
variation as a fact. The purpose is only to show that no matter what cultural and tem-
poral granularity we look at, there is reason to believe that conceptual representations
and content may not be fixed. If so, we must not presuppose that concepts are universal
and static, and acknowledge this to be a largely empirical issue.
2.3.1 Variation at different timescales
I begin with the evolutionary timescale, and the differences between animal and human
concepts. There is a lot of debate about the nature of animal concepts among philosoph-
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ers, comparative psychologists and other researchers. Davidson (2004) claims that while
animals may behave differently towards different classes of stimuli, that is quite dis-
tinct from treating them as members of those classes. Bermúdez (2003) argues that each
species has its own conceptual ontology of the world, and that animals’ concepts have
significant limitations relative to our own. Hurford (2007) reviews empirical evidence
and suggests that animals have “proto-concepts”, which approach but are nevertheless
still quite different from human concepts. Deacon (1997) claims that hominin evolution
underwent a fundamental cognitive transformation, giving rise to a symbolic capacity in
humans which never evolved in other primates. On the other hand, Savage-Rumbaugh,
Sevcik, Brakke and Rumbaugh (1990) argue that bonobos have concepts very similar to
ours, citing evidence from the language comprehension and production abilities of en-
culturated animals. Pepperberg (1999) makes similar arguments for an evolutionarily
distant species, showing evidence that parrots can go beyond stimulus discrimination
and form categorical classes. And Barsalou (2005) argues, on the basis of neuroimaging
experiments with monkeys, for an evolutionary continuity between animal and human
conceptual capacities. Despite the differences among such views, it appears that there
are some kinds of evolutionary precursors to human concepts, however impoverished.
Given the fact that there is “large-scale variation” in the human genome (Iafrate et al.
2004), then even if human concepts are largely innate (Fodor 1998), they are unlikely to
be identical across the species.
An obvious way in which conceptual variation among humans could manifest itself is
at the cultural level: do cultures differ in their concepts of things in the world? In certain
domains, such as technology, it is fairly obvious that they do: members of isolated hunt-
ing and gathering cultures must surely think of airplanes passing overhead differently
thanmembers of modern, technologically developed cultures. In other, more universally
relevant domains, the picture is more controversial, in both anthropology and linguistics.
For instance, there is substantial anthropological evidence for cross-cultural differences
in the folk taxonomies of domains such as plants, animals, kinship and body parts (e.g.,
Berlin 1992; Ellen 2006). At the same time, there appear to be significant universal pat-
terns and principles in these classification schemes as well (e.g., Woolford 1984; Boster
2005). Similar debate exists amid linguistic investigations of variation in lexically en-
coded concepts in various domains, including colour (e.g., Regier and Kay 2009), space
(e.g., Levinson 2003), body parts (e.g., Enfield, Majid and van Staden 2006) and artifacts
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(e.g., Malt, Sloman and Gennari 2003). Nevertheless, the controversies do not generally
concern whether concepts vary between cultures, but rather the extent of the variation
and explanations for it. An influential view on these issues that is still hotly debated and
that will be an important locus in this thesis is that cultural differences exist in how the
world is conceptually partitioned and that these differences are due to language (Whorf
1956).
Having looked across cultures, we can now inquire within cultures: what kind of con-
ceptual differences exist between members of the same culture? However, this is a po-
tentially circular problem, since similarity in concepts could be taken as evidence of sim-
ilarity in culture. Indeed, this approach has been adopted in cognitive anthropology by
A. Kimball Romney and colleagues, as can perhaps best be seen from the title of one
of their papers, “Culture as shared cognitive representations” (Romney, Batchelder and
Brazill 1995). They have developed analytic tools for measuring intracultural conceptual
variation, and these techniques have been applied to verify conceptual coherence within
cultures in domains of kinship, animals, emotions and colour (e.g., Romney et al. 1995;
Romney, Boyd,Moore, Batchelder and Brazill 1996; Romney,Moore, Batchelder andHsia
2000; Gravlee 2004). Experimental categorisation studies have also revealed that parti-
cipants from the same culture tend to have similar typicality judgements and reaction
times with respect to different category members (e.g., Rosch 1975; Rosch, Simpson and
Miller 1976; Armstrong et al. 1983). However, Barsalou (1987) has criticised some of
the statistical methods that have often been used in such studies, pointing out that they
depend on sample size and yield misleadingly high values of inter-subject agreement.
Indeed, substantial category variation has been documented in more recent studies us-
ing sorting tasks (Roberson, Davies, Corbett and Vandervyver 2005; Haslam et al. 2007).
Also, conceptual differences have been documented within cultures when comparing
laymen to experts in certain domains, such as medicine, trees and birds (Medin, Lynch,
Coley andAtran 1997; Bailenson, Shum, Atran, Medin and Coley 2002). For example, ex-
perts (e.g., bird-watchers) tend to categorise at subordinate levels (e.g., “sparrow” rather
than “bird”). While these cases do not imply that people necessarily have different con-
cepts, they do suggest that a person’s level of expertise can impact how they concep-
tualise something. However, it could be argued that in these cases, the differences are
(sub)cultural. In general, there is little clear evidence for conceptual variation within
cultures. This doesn’t mean, of course, that such variation does not exist. What it does
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suggest is that such differences might not be very systematic. Indeed, the very fact that
psychological experiments usually recruit numerous participants per condition reflects
the implicit recognition that minor differences between participants are pervasive.
Until now I have discussed conceptual variation between individuals, but we can look
within a person as well. Indeed, conceptual development is a major area of study in
developmental psychology (Keil 1992; Nelson 1996; Carey 2004), and such study pre-
supposes that the conceptual repertoire of a child changes over time. There are vari-
ous controversial issues here, such as the preexisting basis for concept acquisition (e.g.,
Mandler 2004), whether conceptual systems undergo qualitative changes (Keil 1992),
and what the relationship is between conceptual development and language acquisition
(e.g., Bowerman and Levinson 2001). Nevertheless, whatever the process may be, even
strong nativists acknowledge that some conceptual concepts have to be learned (Fodor
1998). Moreover, it is not only children that undergo conceptual change: we continue
learning throughout our lives (otherwise, why have universities?). And this learning in-
volves not only the acquisition of new concepts but also development and refinement of
existing ones (Dawson-Tunik 2006). Indeed, the findings mentioned earlier that experts
conceptualise differently than novices implicate adult conceptual development, since
presumably the experts were once novices.
The final timescale I mention here is online conceptualisation. While the phenomena dis-
cussed in the previous paragraph could be the gradual result of years of enculturation,
there is also evidence that concepts are created and changed dynamically very quickly
on the fly. Children are able to learn novel words for novel objects with minimal ex-
posure, and extend them consistently to other objects of the same type (e.g., Behrend,
Scofield and Kleinknecht 2001). More generally, an enormous body of category learning
experiments has studied not only that people (both adults and children) acquire concepts
online, but also how they do so and the properties of the resulting concepts (see Murphy
2002 for a review). Barsalou (1983) showed that concepts may be more dynamic than we
think, since the well-documented properties of concepts like birds and furniture are also
found in “ad hoc” concepts like “things to take from a burning house” or “things to have
on a picnic”. Finally, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have catalogued culturally widespread
systems of metaphors and shown how the “same” abstract concept can take on different
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forms in different situations (e.g., love can be conceptualised as war, a plant, a game,
etc.).
To summarise, I have briefly presented evidence here from a variety of disciplines for
conceptual variation and change at five different timescales. While it is more convincing
for some timescales than for others, it reinforces the point that we must treat concep-
tual variation as a serious empirical issue. As we will see, this has profound theoretical
implications.
2.3.2 Abandoning conceptual universals
Concepts seem to exhibit variation at several different timescales. Despite this, as we
have seen, some theorists (e.g., Fodor 1998) explicitly insist that concepts are shared
and identical across people (see Section 2.2.2). While these may be relatively few in
number, we will see in the rest of the chapter how many other researchers implicitly
assume similar things as well. The problem is that conceptual variation creates all sorts
of theoretical complications, and is thus convenient to ignore. So the question is: are
these researchers just being lazy in ignoring conceptual variation, or are they justified in
doing so?
Well, it depends. If conceptual variation was rampant, so that there was no consistency
between different people’s concepts, then theoretical views would need to be modified.
However, the evidence from the previous section does not conclusively point to such
wide divergence: while conceptual variation does occur, it appears to be limited. It is
possible that, to a reasonable degree of approximation, concepts are consistent across in-
dividuals (Segal 2000). Therefore, the importance of the variation may depend on one’s
research questions. For many purposes, an assumption of universal concepts may be
justified and appropriate, since it greatly simplifies the theoretical picture. Nevertheless,
as I have argued, that does not apply here. Concepts may vary, and this must be incor-
porated into my theoretical view. It will be important to stick loyally to this position at
each step along the way, since it will be tempting to abandon it.
Given howmuch I am stressing this point, I should also qualify my variationist position.
Indeed, my position on conceptual variation is not particularly strong. I am not claim-
ing that people necessarily have different concepts, but only that I must allow for this
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possibility, and that I am probably wasting my experimental efforts if they don’t. It is an
empirical question whether and how much conceptual variation actually occurs.
On the other hand, my position goes further than merely rejecting a strong universalist
position, such as Fodor’s (1998) innate universal concepts. It also rejects the idealisation
that there are necessarily universal concepts which people acquire during their lifetimes,
whether gradually or suddenly. Hampton (1989) discusses the notion of “normative”
concepts, which might be thought of as “the (imagined) end goal of our present scientific
advance” (p. 40). Under such a view, with the advance of science, we get closer and
closer to true concepts, which are thus reminiscent to Plato’s abstract Ideas (Ross 1951).
Similarly, the development of an individual concept could be viewed as a convergence in
someone’s mind towards the true concept. However, as Hampton points out, even if we
were to advocate this view, any basis for classification, including science, has a purpose,
and as such cannot be said to be objectively true and unique. Moreover, since human
acts of categorisation are not performed in a vacuum but are embedded in a context and
goal (Ratneshwar, Barsalou, Pechmann andMoore 2001), there is not necessarily just one
unique and correct way of dividing up the world. And if people are only converging on
concepts, then what do we call those mental entities before they reach them (if ever)?
Nevertheless, as mentioned in Section 1.3, allowing for conceptual variation greatly com-
plicates the theoretical picture. One fundamental complication is that, in contrast to the
normative view discussed above, we must now make a strict distinction between how
the world is and howwe think of it. Since concepts thereby explicitly concern what’s in a
particular person’s mind, which may be different than what’s in another’s mind, we can
no longer take concepts to be simply reflections of how the world really is. For example,
we must now seriously appreciate the big difference between claiming that whales are
fish and claiming that whales fit a particular person’s concept of “fish”. The former is a
question for biologists, while the latter is one for psychologists. The biological question
might have one objective answer, while the psychological one depends on the particular
person under study.
It’s important to note that it is not just philosophers that tend to collapse this distinc-
tion between things in the world and our ideas about them. In fact, even psychology
often partly buys into the traditional philosophical view implicitly. For example, a
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large portion of empirical research on concepts consists of category learning experiments
(Murphy 2002). In such studies, category structure and content is normally predeter-
mined by the experimenter, and the participant’s job is to learn the category. In other
words, rather than studying what concepts people have already or what concepts they
form spontaneously, these experiments study how well people learn objective external
categories. As such, they frame concepts (at least the concepts that they are studying) as
just mental representations of objectively existing categories. This is problematic when
the focus is on conceptual variation, and as a result, the relationship between concepts
and categories will be reevaluated in Section 2.4.1.
Similarly, philosophers, psychologists and linguists all tend to treat a linguistic label as
a useful indicator of a concept. For example, the word “dog” is often taken to identify
the concept of dogs, as if there were one such concept. In psychology experiments, this
implicit assumption manifests itself when participants are asked to categorise stimuli by
selecting from a set of labels (Lloyd-Jones and Humphreys 1997). If you and I give the
same stimulus the same linguistic label (e.g., “dog”), then it seems natural to infer that
we are categorising the stimulus in the same way. But there is a circular problem here,
since this presupposes that my concept is identical to yours. If we allow for conceptual
variation, then such assumptions must be avoided. The relationship between concepts
and words will be revisited in Section 2.4.3.
A related problem concerns conceptual changes that occur within a single person. As a
child interacts with dogs and learns more about them, is it a single concept that is be-
ing developed and changed, or is it actually being replaced or supplemented by a new
concept? And similarly, if a person conceptualises the same thing in a slightly differ-
ent way from one moment to the next, does that mean that different concepts are being
used, or that the concept has changed, or that the concept is being modulated? Some re-
searchers have proposed that concepts are not stable, static entities, but are much more
dynamic in nature. Smith and Samuelson (1997) take a particularly strong position, re-
viewing evidence for online category variation and flexibility, and emphasising that acts
of categorisation themselves modify the underlying mental structures. They conclude
that a successful theory of categories must “give up timeless abstractions such as con-
cepts” (p. 190). Similarly, Croft and Cruse (2004) argue that the notion of a fixed set of
concepts is misguided, and that concepts are actually “created at the moment of use”
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(p. 75). Although these positions might be overstating the case, we will see in Section 2.6
that conceptualisation is a highly dynamic process.
Therefore, as outlined in Section 1.3, the rejection of conceptual universals forces us to
forgo reliance on objective external categories or on public linguistic labels for concep-
tual identification. Once we commit to conceptual relativism, we automatically inherit
the problem of concept individuation (Fodor and Lepore 1992), which affects both theor-
etical interpretation and methodological plausibility. Unfortunately, I have no choice but
to deal with it, and the rest of this chapter will be largely devoted to exploring the the-
oretical consequences of this position. However, as we will see by the end of Chapter 4,
plausible solutions are available at both theoretical and methodological levels, as long
as, given the inherent nature of the problem, we are willing to compromise a little.
Before going on, I offer a disclaimer that I will not be too pedantic in applying the con-
sequences of my variationist position to terminology, unless necessary. In particular,
while I am explicitly rejecting conceptual universals and the grounding of concepts in
reliable external words or categories, constantly questioning what a plate is and what
“plate” means at each step could lead to insanity.
2.4 Concepts, categories and words
In the last section, I emphasised that concepts may vary and pointed out that this has
implications for the relationships between concepts, categories and words. Therefore, in
this section, I take a closer look at these relationships, merging what is already known
about themwith a dedication to conceptual variation. I look at each of the three relation-
ships in turn: concepts and categories, concepts and words, and categories and words.
Note that this section focuses on the structural relationships between these notions. How
they are used in processing will be addressed in Section 2.6. However, the boundary
between structure and processing is not so clean, because, as Barsalou (1990) points out,
we cannot empirically study structure without relying on processing. Moreover, the
distinction breaks down further if we adopt a dynamic view of structure (e.g., Smith and
Samuelson 1997).
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2.4.1 Concepts and categories
One of the biggest consequences of taking conceptual variation seriously is the need to
fundamentally rethink the relationship between concepts and categories. However, in
order to tackle this, we need some more artillery, and for that I turn to an important idea
in the philosophy of language.
Frege (1892/1948) made an influential distinction between sense and reference. Refer-
ence concerns the object in the world that an expression refers to, while sense reveals our
perspective or attitude to the object. Thus an expression “expresses its sense, refers to or
designates its referent” (p. 214). The sense is the “mode of expression” of the reference.
The point is that, when we use an expression, we are not just singling out an object, but
also framing it in a particular way which reveals our conceptualisation of it. Frege’s clas-
sic example is that of Venus, which could also be referred to with the expressions of “the
morning star” or “the evening star”. Both expressions have the same reference, but they
identify different senses. More generally, a referent could potentially have any number
of senses that single it out, but each sense determines its referent.
Frege’s (1892/1948) view is not without controversy, and was subsequently attacked by
other philosophers, such as Russell (1905) and Kripke (1972). However, the criticisms
generally rely on the uniqueness of reference in proper names and certain other kinds of
expressions, and are very much centred on a theory of linguistic meaning, not concepts.
For instance, Kripke dispenses with sense by arguing that the meaning of a proper name
is simply the referent that it is first applied to. As such, these arguments do not concern
us here. Moreover, Frege’s distinction has been revived and defended by philosophers
more recently (Dummett 1981; Evans 1982).
So what does the distinction between sense and reference have to do with concepts? As
Hurford (2007) points out, we may be tempted to interpret Frege’s (1892/1948) sense
as something mental, but “Frege himself might have winced at such an interpretation”
(p. 118). Indeed, Frege also distinguished sense from “conception”:
The referent and sense of a sign are to be distinguished from the associated
conception. If the referent of a sign is an object perceivable by the senses,
my conception of it is an internal image, arising from memories of sense im-
pressions which I have had and activities, both internal and external, which
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I have performed. Such a conception is often saturated with feeling; the clar-
ity of its separate parts varies and oscillates. The same sense is not always
connected, even in the same man, with the same conception. The conception
is subjective. One man’s conception is not that of another. There result, as a
matter of course, a variety of differences in the conceptions associated with
the same sense. A painter, a horseman, and a zoologist will probably con-
nect different conceptions with the name “Bucephalus”. This constitutes an
essential distinction between the conception and the sign’s sense, which may
be the common property of many and therefore is not a part or a mode of the
individual mind. For one can hardly deny that mankind has a common store
of thoughts which is transmitted from one generation to another. (p. 212)
So, Frege’s (1892/1948) conceptions, in contrast to sense or reference, are private, sub-
jective, experiential, and variable. Frege claims we have both, which allows him to put
aside people’s private conceptions of things and to comfortably ground his theory of
meaning in public senses. And due to his distinction, he can still also acknowledge that
conceptions can vary between people, and even within people.
However, Johnson-Laird (1983) notes an important problem here from a psychologist’s
point of view: are senses in the mind or not? If they are not, then how can society pass
them down from individual to individual? And if they are, then how are they different
from conceptions, and how do they relate to them? It seems more parsimonious, if pos-
sible, to wed Frege’s (1892/1948) sense and conception somehow, and a commitment to
the privacy and variation of concepts would seem to demand it. To that end, why don’t
we jut throw out the idea of public senses and substitute private conceptions in their
place? This would mean that now conceptions (rather than sense) determine reference.
Frege himself wouldn’t be happy about this, and neither would some contemporary
philosophers (e.g., Fodor 1998), as it implies that the meanings of linguistic constituents
are unreliable. On the other hand, this perspective is not inconsistent with the idea that
initially variable concepts could become (relatively) uniformly conventionalised across a
linguistic community. Indeed, some linguists have embraced such an approach in devel-
oping theories of linguistic meaning (e.g., Langacker 1987; Taylor 1995; Croft and Cruse
2004).
So where does all this leave concepts and categories? At the outset of his comprehens-
ive review of psychological research on concepts, Murphy (2002) makes the following
terminological distinction between concepts and categories:
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In general, I try to use the word concepts to talk about mental representations
of classes of things, and categories to talk about the classes themselves. How-
ever, in both everyday speech and the literature in this field, it is often hard
to keep track of which of these one is talking about, because the two go to-
gether. That is, whatever my concept is, there is a category of things that
would be described by it. Thus, when talking about one, I am usually imply-
ing a corresponding statement about the other. Writers in this field often say
things like “four-year-olds have a category of animals,” meaning “four-year-
olds have formed a concept that picks out the category of animals.” How-
ever, being too fussy about saying concept and category leads to long-winded
or repetitious prose (like my example) with little advantage in clarity. (p. 5,
author’s emphasis)
While these are reasonable working definitions, they are difficult to interpret theoretic-
ally. Murphy (2002) defines concepts in terms of categories, so that categories appear to
be the more fundamental and independent units. But this raises the question of what is
the ontological status of categories.
If categories are universal objective classes of things in the world, then concepts can
just be private mental representations of these public classes. As such, any concept can
be grounded in a corresponding mind-independent, objective category. On one hand,
defining concepts in terms of categories suggests this position. On the other hand, this
suffers from the philosophical problems discussed earlier, and indeed, Murphy (2002)
doesn’t seem to advocate this, since he speaks, for example, of four-year-olds having “a”
(rather than “the”) category of animals.
Alternatively, then, categories could be in the minds of individuals, in which case differ-
ent people can have different categories. Thus, there would be a one-to-one correspond-
ence between concepts and categories, but such correspondences would be within the
mind of a particular person. However, while this would comfortably allow for concep-
tual variation between people, it also seems to equate concepts with categories (much as
we just saw with Frege’s 1892/1948 senses and conceptions): if both are in the mind and
both are about things in the world, then what is the difference between them? And this
would not be consistent with Murphy’s (2002) terms, since he is making a distinction
between concepts and categories.
Finally, categories may not exist in either the mind or the world. Categories could just
be convenient constructs for psychologists to describe and study people’s concepts. For
example, when participants carry out categorisation tasks, they produce categories of
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stimuli which reflect their concepts. However, under this interpretation, it is actually cat-
egories that depend on concepts rather than the other way around, which would make
Murphy’s (2002) definition circular.
Howdowe resolve this issue, then? Here I return to two key ideas from Frege (1892/1948)
that I discussed earlier. First, recall that Frege claimed that sense determines reference,
but that, as Johnson-Laird (1983) pointed out, this sense should be construed as private
and mental (like Frege’s conception rather than sense). Second, Frege pointed out that
sense overdetermines reference, such that there are different senses that you could at-
tach to the same reference (as with the morning and evening star). Both of these ideas
are relevant to the current dilemma concerning concepts and categories. Much like sense
determines reference, concepts determine categories. This means that given a concept,
we can study the category that it determines, rather than one that it reflects. It alsomeans
that having adopted the position that concepts can vary, we automatically need to allow
for the possibility that categories vary as well. At the same time, concepts are more than
just uniquely determined mental representations of a class of things, so that different
concepts can determine the same category, providing different perspectives on it.
This view of the status of categories and their relationship to concepts fits the mould
of the third possibility previously discussed. Categories are neither in the world nor
in the mind; instead, they are analytic (and very useful) constructs which allow us to
study people’s concepts in concrete terms. This characterisation is presented diagram-
matically in Figure 2.2. Note that although under this perspective categories do not have
an independent real existence, this does not deny that they can still tell us something
real about the world and its structure. However, it’s important to emphasise that when
concepts vary between people, categories vary as well. This diagram must therefore be
interpreted as representing a relationship for a particular person, possibly even for a
particular moment in time.
So, in contrast to Murphy (2002), I have flipped the direction of the causal relationship,
and defined categories in terms of concepts. On the other hand, I have kept what I con-
sider to be the more important parts of his characterisation: that concepts and categories
can vary between individuals, and that concepts and categories are not the same thing.
CHAPTER 2. CONCEPTUALISATION IN THE INDIVIDUAL 30
c
k
Figure 2.2: The relationship between a concept (c) and its corresponding category (k): the
concept determines its category, so both concept and category are specific to an individual, al-
though only the concept is actually in the mind. The category is represented with a box to em-
phasise that it’s a (potentially large or infinite) theoretical set, rather than a particular item.
However, unlike Murphy (2002), I am now left without a clear basis for concepts. If
we cannot define concepts in terms of the categories that correspond to them, then how
are we to define them? This is a difficult philosophical problem, but fortunately is not
critical for my purposes and I do not pursue it further. Instead, like most psychologists
investigating concepts, I will, for the most part, rely on the close relationship between
categories and concepts throughout this thesis, and will often use the terms interchange-
ably. However, sometimes the distinction will be crucial.
2.4.2 Categories and words
I have now established that concepts determine categories, and argued that the latter do
not have an independent existence. Does that mean that words and categories do not
have any direct relationship with each other?
In fact, linguistic and philosophical theories of meaning have traditionally taken the
opposite approach. Far from leaving categories out of the semantic picture, they have
grounded meaning itself in categories, and bypassed the mind instead. From this per-
spective, meaning is not concerned with conceptual structures and processes, but rather
is defined directly in terms of objective truth and reference (Davidson 2001). In partic-
ular, words get meaning by virtue of the categories of things they refer to in the world,
and the meanings of sentences are defined in terms of the sets of situations under which
they would be true (e.g., Katz and Fodor 1963).
Putnam (1975) advocated a particularly strong version of such a mind-independent view
of meaning, and defended it with an influential thought experiment. Imagine that there
is another planet just like Earth, with people just like humans, except that the chemical
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composition of its counterpart for water is XYZ rather than H20. In that case, even
though the contents of our brains and those of our counterparts from this planet might
be identical (at least at some earlier point in history), ’water’ would refer to different
things. Putnam concludes from this that meanings “just ain’t in the head” (p. 227).
While such a position has come under considerable attack from philosophers and lin-
guists (e.g., Lakoff 1987), it is particularly problematic from a psychological point of
view, especially once we take conceptual variation seriously. Notice that if past humans
were to go to this twin planet, they would also conceptualise the substance there in the
same way as they did water on Earth. They could be “wrong” that it’s the same thing,
but that would not change their conceptualisation. Moreover, locating meaning in the
world requires standardising it so that the category of water is effectively fixed across
the population. But that is in direct conflict with the position of variation in concepts
and categories that I have adopted.
Therefore, for my purposes, I need to reject the idea of meaning being grounded directly
in categories, much as I abandoned universal concepts earlier. Since concepts can vary
among individuals and categories are determined by concepts, word meaning must be
conceptually mediated by the individuals. I therefore turn in the next section to the
relationship between words and concepts.
However, it is important to point out that although words and categories do not have
any direct cognitive relationship, they do manifest themselves together in the world
whenever we actively use language to describe or refer to things immediately around
us. Every time someone points at a book and says “Pass me that book”, a word is co-
occurring with a member of some category. Moreover, this does not always occur with
one object in isolation, nor is the word’s appearance always as ephemeral as it is in
speech. For instance, when we go to the supermarket and go to a section labelled “Cer-
eal”, we will find different kinds of cereal there. However, this is only because there
were people who put them together, and they could only do so with the intervention of
their concepts. Moreover the selection that we find in the cereal section varies slightly
from store to store and country to country, reflecting the fact that concepts vary, though
not rampantly.
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The point is thus twofold. On one hand, the connection between words and categories
has no direct cognitive reality, since it is about phenomena that are outside of the mind.
As such, any relationship between them only exists by virtue of being mediated through
the mind. On the other hand, for the same reason, we can sometimes directly observe
co-occurring manifestations of the words and categories of others. Since we have no
direct access to people’s concepts, this may be the best way for us to infer their concepts
indirectly. Such considerations will be important for my thesis, especially once we begin
to look at conceptualisation in a more social context (see Chapter 3).
2.4.3 Concepts and words
The relationship between concepts and words is a large topic that plays a central role in
my thesis. To keep it manageable, I have distributedmy discussion of different aspects of
the relationship around relevant parts of the thesis, so that this section itself is relatively
limited in scope. Here I am only concerned with the private, structural relationships
between words and concepts in an individual’s mind. The role of words online in the
private process of conceptualisation is covered in Section 2.6.5, and effects due to the
public nature of words is the main theme of Chapter 3.
In order to address the structural relationship between words and concepts properly, we
need to first break words down into their basic constituents. As is captured in de Saus-
sure’s (1916/1983) basic model of the linguistic sign, a word is a psychological asso-
ciation between a (phonological) word form and a (semantic) word meaning. These
need to be distinguished from their corresponding material manifestations, which are
the acoustic sound form and (often) the physical referent in the world, respectively. But
how do word forms and word meanings relate to concepts? In the rest of this section, I
will explore the relationships between these three mental entities.
2.4.3.1 Concepts and word meanings
In exploring the relationship between concepts and word meanings, we must keep in
mind the distinction drawn between concepts and categories raised earlier (see Sec-
tion 2.4.1). By concepts, I do not mean categories of things in the world, but the mental
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forms that they correspond to. As such, we are trying to relate here two potentially dif-
ferent mental representations, “semantic” and “conceptual” (Levinson 1997). But what
is the difference?
In fact, some theorists, especially those of a universalist persuasion, argue against mak-
ing such a distinction. Fodor (1975) takes this position, with meanings being conflated
with concepts in an underlying and universal language of thought. Jackendoff (1983) is
quite explicit, stating that “The terms semantic structure and conceptual structure denote
the same level of representation” (p. 95). If we adopt such a view, then the relationship
between words and concepts is simplified, with concepts simply being the meanings of
words.
On the other hand, some theorists have argued that this is an oversimplification, insisting
on a distinction between semantic and conceptual representations. For instance, Levin-
son (2003) argues that the vocabularies of languages, being finite and learnable, are ne-
cessarily more underspecified than concepts. For example, languages have lexical gaps,
without implying that their speakers lack certain concepts. Moreover, Levinson argues
that, unlike conceptual representations, semantic ones are supplemented by pragmatics
and context during usage to obtain meaning. Bierwisch and Schreuder (1991) offer sim-
ilar arguments from a psycholinguistic point of view. In developing a version of Levelt’s
(1989) general theory of lexical production, in which the first step is conceptualisation,
they argue that semantic representations are more limited than conceptual ones. In their
model, the two forms of representation play distinctly different roles.
Nevertheless, although such arguments insist on a semantic-conceptual distinction, they
also maintain a close correspondence between the two representations. Levinson (2003)
argues that they are “rather close”, with conceptual representations necessarily support-
ing semantic ones (p. 296), while for Bierwisch and Schreuder (1991) the semantic repres-
entation is much like a substructure of a corresponding conceptual one, only “somewhat
more flexible”(p. 33). Therefore, unless our goal was to identify different stages of lan-
guage production, for example, we lose very little by collapsing the distinction.
But what about universalism? At first glance, it seems that equating conceptual and se-
mantic structure means embracing a universalist position, so that not only concepts are
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universal, but so are word meanings. However, that is only the case if conceptual struc-
ture is universal, which I have explicitly rejected. If concepts can vary between people,
then so can word meanings, regardless of whether we collapse the distinction between
them or not. This is a mirror image of the collapse we encountered in Section 2.4.1,
where keeping both the notions of sense and conception from Frege (1892/1948) turned
out unnecessary and confusing.
Therefore, since conceptual representations are taken to be the more independent and
broad, I will subsume semantic representations within them and will not discuss the
latter further. This is also consistent with Murphy (2002), who, while pointing out that
psychologists have not addressed word meaning in much depth, argues that it must be
concept-based. I will henceforth follow this view. Moreover, I will use the term “word”
to refer to word forms specifically.
Collapsing the distinction between concepts and word meanings has another clean ad-
vantage beyond simplicity. In particular, it means that we can automatically recruit lin-
guistic perspectives concerning the relationship between word forms and meanings into
a psychological understanding of the relationship between word forms and concepts. I
therefore turn to this topic next.
However, before ending this section, it is worth pointing out that claiming that word
meanings are concepts is not the same as claiming that word meanings and concepts are
synonymous. As I will discuss in Section 2.4.3.3, we can have concepts that aren’t closely
associated with words, and even words that are not associated with well-developed con-
cepts (Bermúdez 2003; Hurford 2007). Therefore, eliminating the distinction does not
make the two terms interchangeable. I will use “concept” in general, but will sometimes
resort to “word meaning” when explicitly dealing with the concept associated with a
particular word.
2.4.3.2 Word forms and word meanings
Semantic relations betweenword forms andwordmeanings are an elementary andwell-
established topic in linguistics. The pervasiveness of these relations shows that, even if
there were a universal language (Fodor 1975), word forms and meanings do not sit in
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a simple one-to-one correspondence. However, the picture gets significantly more com-
plicated still when we throw away the idealisation of fixed connections between words
and concepts across speakers of a language. In this section, I consider the implications
of taking conceptual variation seriously for a couple of basic semantic relations, and
converge on a dynamic view of word-concept associations.
One of the most basic semantic relations is synonymy, whereby two words have the
same meaning. However, the existence of absolute synonyms with identical meanings
is disputed. For instance, “woods” and “forest” could be synonym candidates, but they
do differ subtly in terms of size, wildness, and proximity to civilisation, so they are not
entirely equivalent (Room 1981). According to Clark’s (1987) Principle of Contrast, dif-
ferent forms are always associatedwith different meanings. Such ameaning contrast can
correspond to different categories, but it can just as well be due to stylistic aspects, such
as dialect, register or emotional connotation (in Frege’s 1892/1948 terms, the contrast
may be in reference, or just in sense). Clark claims that such differences can always be
found if we look hard enough: “While two terms may be interchangeable in many con-
texts, they are not so in all, and it is the contexts where they are not equivalent that reveal
their often subtle contrasts in meaning” (p. 4). Similarly, Cruse (1986) points out that the
meanings of words are constantly changing and adapting, and that “natural languages
abhor absolute synonyms just as nature abhors a vacuum” (p. 270).
The issue of whether two words are synonymous or merely nearly synonymous may be
a practically intractable one in general, and I do not pursue it further here. However,
it does highlight the fact that the meanings of words can substantially overlap without
being equivalent. This mirrors the earlier discussion of conceptual variation, and how
people’s concepts may differ slightly from each other (see Section 2.3). Indeed, consid-
ering these issues together raises the question of which differences will tend to be larger.
Is there a larger difference between your meaning of “woods” and “forest”, or between
your meaning of “forest” and mine? In general, this surely will depend on the words,
people and contexts involved.
The flip side of synonymy is polysemy, whereby one word has multiple related mean-
ings. For instance, “book” may refer to either a single physical object (e.g., “Pass me that
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red book”) or an abstract cultural product (e.g., “Eco’s new book is amazing”). Alternat-
ively, a word may be homonymous, having multiple unrelated meanings (e.g., “crane”),
or monosemous, with just one meaning (e.g., “cat”). Importantly, as with synonymy,
there may be subtle inter-personal differences in the range of meanings covered by a
single word. For instance, my meaning of “book” may be quite similar to yours, but
may be a little broader, including things like pamphlets and brochures.
It’s important to note that the lines drawn between polysemy, homonymy and mono-
semy are often blurry, and indeed, one could easily quibble with the examples above
as well. Theorists debate about what is the best way a given word’s meaning should
be analysed or even whether the distinctions above are coherent (e.g., Ravin and Lea-
cock 2000). Moreover, the picture gets further complicated when we consider the role
of context in word meaning. Geeraerts (1993) discusses the relation of polysemy to the
notion of vagueness. While a polysemous word locates variation in meaning in the lex-
ical item’s intrinsic semantics, a word is vague if its meaning (possibly a single meaning)
needs to be pragmatically supplemented by context. Geeraerts discusses several tests for
distinguishing the two phenomena, but shows that they often give contradictory results.
He concludes that “the instability of the distinction between vagueness and polysemy
precludes a strict dichotomy between intercategorial and intra-categorial semantic mul-
tiplicity” (p. 258). In short, there may be no principled way to draw a fixed box around
the meanings of a word. Geeraerts captures this effectively with an alternative theoret-
ical view of word meaning:
The tremendous flexibility that we observe in lexical semantics suggests a
procedural (or perhaps ‘processual’) rather than a reified conception ofmean-
ing; instead of meanings as things, meaning as a process of sense creation
would seem to be the primary focus of attention. The image I would like
to propose to make this conception more graspable, is that of a floodlight:
words are search-lights that highlight, upon each application, a particular
subfield of their domain of application. If this domain of application is seen,
in model-theoretical fashion, as a set, each time the word is used a particular
subset is selected. But while our traditional view of the distinction between
vagueness and polysemy entails that the number of subsets that can be lit is
fixed and restricted, we now have evidence that the verbal searchlight has
much more freedom. The freedom is not absolute, surely, and there will be
preferential subsets for each word; even so, the distinction between what can
and what cannot be lit up at the same time is not stable. (p. 259)
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Notice that Geeraerts’s (1993) dynamic view of wordmeaning can be relatedwith Clark’s
(1987) Principle of Contrast. If wordmeanings are highly context-dependent, then under
some situations, two near-synonyms may be associated with the same (or nearly the
same) range ofmeanings, while in others, theymay diverge. This possibility is visualised
in Figure 2.3. Again, to the extent that there is conceptual variation between people,
these relationships may also differ. Indeed, Geeraerts’s dynamic view may be just what
is needed sometimes for people to come to understand each other if they start off with





Figure 2.3: Context-dependent view of near-synonyms: under one context (left), two words
(w1,w2) might have the same meaning (m0), while in another context (right), they might have
different (though overlapping) meanings (m1,m2).
2.4.3.3 Concepts and word forms
I return now to psychological research concerning concepts and word forms. A close
relationship between conceptual and lexical knowledge is supported by neuropsycholo-
gical experiments. Warrington (1975) studied three patients with impairments in object
and word identification. The patients performed poorly on a series of tasks including
word recognition, object recognition, and picture-word matching tasks. Moreover, per-
formance was normal on general intelligence and perception tests, suggesting a specific
deficit. Hodges, Patterson, Oxbury and Funnell (1992) found similar results with five
additional patients. Tests demonstrated impairments with conceptual knowledge and
a severe loss of vocabulary. In contrast, other aspects of language, including syntactic
and phonological processing, appeared to be preserved. Following Snowden, Goulding
and Neary (1989), Hodges et al. called this condition “semantic dementia” (p. 1798).
Nakamura, Nakanishi, Hamanaka, Nakaaki and Yoshida (2000) extended these find-
ings through semantic priming experiments. Semantic dementia patients, Alzheimer’s
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patients, and control participants were first primed with a word from one semantic cat-
egory and then carried out a timed lexical decision task on another word. For all the nor-
mal participants and Alzheimer’s patients, decision speeds were faster when the word
was of the same semantic category as the prime word, whereas no such effect was found
with any of the semantic dementia patients.
However, while such studies suggest a tight bond between word forms and concepts,
there is also neuropsychological evidence of their decoupling. Indeed,Warrington (1975)
had noted that the correspondence between conceptual and verbal deficits was far from
perfect. For example, one of her patients had performed relatively well on visual recog-
nition of objects, while another had relatively good performance on verbal recognition.
Kay and Ellis (1987) studied one patient in more detail with a more marked contrast in
this respect. Their patient didn’t seem to have any conceptual difficulties, but was im-
paired in naming objects, although he was often able to partially access the phonological
form of the word. This effect is reminiscent of the well-documented “tip-of-the-tongue”
phenomenon, in which normal language users have difficulty accessing the full form of
a word they are trying to mentally access (Brown and McNeill 1966). These effects seem
to stem from aweak link betweenword form and concept for rare words, perhaps due to
infrequent use and aging (Burke, MacKay, Worthley and Wade 1991). There is also some
evidence for dissociations in the opposite direction: impaired cognitive functions with
relatively preserved language abilities. Bellugi, Marks, Bihrle and Sabo (1988) found
that children withWilliams Syndrome had severe deficits in visuospatial processing and
reasoning, while maintaining relatively sophisticated linguistic abilities. This could be
seen, for instance, in drawing tasks: when asked to draw a bicycle, they could produce
the bicycle’s different components and label them, but the parts were disjoint and did
not integrate into a coherent whole. While subsequent research has detected unusual
developmental trajectories concerning certain other aspects of language, most studies
that have focused on vocabulary and word fluency in Williams Syndrome patients have
confirmed a conceptual (without lexical) deficiency (Martens, Wilson and Reutens 2008).
Therefore, it seems that although word forms and concepts may be intimately related,
they are not inextricably locked together. This is consistent with my conclusion in the
previous section that word forms and meanings are not in an isomorphic 1-to-1 relation-
ship. Indeed, it is also easy to construct intuitive examples showing how words and
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concepts appear to be independent of each other, especially if we focus on the relations
in the mind of a single person, rather than in the language or population as a whole. For
instance, when I go into a bicycle shop to havemy bicycle repaired, I often indicate which
part is broken by pointing, because I do not have the word for it. Of course, there may or
may not be a standard word for it among bike technicians, but that doesn’t change the
fact that I personally have word-less concepts for these things. More generally, devel-
opmental and comparative psychologists have shown that animals and human infants
have plenty of concepts, even if they are not as rich as those of human adults (Bermúdez
2003). Conversely, if I flipped through a good English-Thai dictionary, I would surely
find some rare English words that I don’t know. I may remember some of these words
and recognise them as English words in the future, even though I may continue to have
no clue what they mean (having absolutely no knowledge of Thai). Again, other people
may know these words, but that doesn’t change my mental knowledge.
These dissociations between words and concepts should not be taken too far, however.
Although we may not have words for some concepts, we are still very capable of ex-
pressing them with longer phrases or even coining new words or expressions on the fly
(Baayen 1994). Therefore, not having a word for a concept does not prevent lexicalisa-
tion of the concept. Conversely, even if we don’t know what a word means, storing it
in our minds may make a “place” for an associated concept. Indeed, the dependence
of semantic on conceptual representations discussed earlier would seem to imply this.
Consistent with this, some studies with prelinguistic infants have suggested that words
act as “invitations to form categories” (e.g., Waxman and Markow 1995). Moreover, as
I mentioned in Section 2.3, acquiring a concept is not necessarily an instantaneous pro-
cess, and studies of conceptual development often examine how a child’s concept gets
enriched over time, well after they first learn a word for it (Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997).
Thus, we can envision the concepts that are associated with words to lie on a continuum
from impoverished placeholders to rich representations.
Putting it together, then, what is the relationship between a concept and words? Fig-
ure 2.4 illustrates a concept as not being cleanly associated with any particular word in
a 1-to-1 relationship. Rather, a concept can be linked with different words to varying
degrees of strength, which reflect their average relative frequency of application for that
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concept across a range of contexts. Therefore, although during speech we make dis-
crete lexical choices (see Section 2.6.5), that does not imply that the connection is static
in general.
c
w1 w2 w3 w4 w5
Figure 2.4: The relationship between a particular concept (c) and words (w1, w2, w3, w4, w5):
Multiple words can be associated with the same concept, with varying degrees of strength (in-
dicated with the relative thickness of the lines). Lines are dotted to indicate that the relationship
is not fixed (in contrast to that between concepts and categories). Of course, a polysemous word
also maps onto multiple concepts, but that is not the focus here.
2.4.4 Conclusion
To summarise, the relationship between words and concepts is far from simple, being
simultaneously quite tight and highly flexible. Words can have multiple meanings, but
the meanings are difficult to individuate and may not be stable across time, people, and
contexts. Different words map onto different sets of meanings, although in some con-
texts, they may theoretically coincide. To the extent that word meaning is determined
by mental representations in the individual’s mind, these representations can, for my
purposes, be subsumed under concepts. However, there is good psychological evid-
ence that words and concepts are partially dissociated. Moreover, the relationship is not
symmetric: words seem to depend on concepts more than vice versa.
At this point, it is useful to relate these conclusions to the previous sections, in which
I discussed the relationships between concepts and categories and between categories
and words, respectively. First, I argued for the necessity of distinguishing concepts and
categories. Categories do not exist independently of concepts: in fact, concepts determ-
ine categories. This also implies that since concepts can vary from person to person,
categories can vary as well. Second, I pointed out that influential semantic theories in
philosophy and linguistics attempt to bypass the human mind altogether, linking words
and categories directly. However, if we are loyal to conceptual variation, this cannot be
maintained, even though language use involves co-occurring manifestations of the two.
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How do these three relationships fit together then? Recall that the relationship between
concepts and categories was captured in Figure 2.2, and that between words and con-
cepts in Figure 2.4. Moreover, as I argued in Section 2.4.2, there is no direct psychological
connection between categories and words, so that their indirect relation needs to be me-
diated by concepts. Figure 2.5 synthesises these three conclusions, effectively merging




Figure 2.5: The relationship between an individual’s concept (c), its category (k) and its associ-
ated words (w1, w2, w3).
Notice that this diagram highlights a difference in the structural relationships that con-
cepts take part in. On one hand, concepts and categories are tightly bound in a de-
terministic causal relationship. On the other hand, comparatively speaking at least,
the relationship between concepts and words is relatively loose and malleable. This
assymetry reasserts the close bond between concepts and categories, which will be a
recurring theme in my thesis, coming up in theoretical discussions (as in Section 2.5),
methodological decisions (see Section 4.2), and experimental design and interpretation
(especially Experiment 4).
2.5 The internal structure of concepts
So far I have treated concepts as black boxes with no internal structure. However, over
the last forty years, psychologists have extensively explored how concepts are repres-
ented in the mind. This issue is not as central to my thesis as the relationship between
words, concepts, and categories, but it will still be important for grounding the interpret-
ation of my experiments, and Experiment 4 in particular. As a result, in this section, I
1The triadic relationship between words, concepts and categories has also been an important focus for
semioticians (most famously perhaps, Peirce 1932). Indeed, if a direct connection weremade betweenwords
and categories, and each concept were associated with only one word, Figure 2.5 would effectively turn into
the semiotic triangle (Ogden and Richards 1923).
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overview psychological theories of concepts, beginning with the main theories, and then
discussing more recent attempts at merging them.
Before discussing the internal structure of concepts, it’s important to touch on an import-
ant ambiguity. Given the emphasis I have placed on a distinction between concepts and
categories (see Section 2.4.1), one might sensibly first ask which of the two is the focus
of psychological theories. At first glance, psychologists cannot look directly at people’s
concepts, but rather conduct experiments in which participants produce or learn categor-
ies. Indeed, in her ground-breaking categorisation studies on prototypes (see below),
Eleanor Rosch was sometimes reluctant to draw conclusions about concepts themselves:
“prototypes themselves do not constitute any particular model of processes, represent-
ations, or learning” (e.g., Rosch 1978, p. 40). However, although it is difficult to draw
strong conclusions about conceptual representations from categorisation studies, that is
what such studies are usually about. Psychologists do not generally care about categor-
ies in themselves, but rather what can be inferred about people’s concepts (Malt 2006).
Indeed, Rosch herself was less careful on other occasions, as in the title of a related paper,
“Cognitive representations of semantic categories” (Rosch 1975). I too will take such a
perspective, so that, Rosch’s caution notwithstanding, I will assume that the structure of
“categories” from psychology categorisation studies are actually the structures of mental
concepts which determine those categories. Nevertheless, I will follow the field in this
section and use the terms relatively interchangeably.
2.5.1 Prototypes, exemplars and theories
Until relatively recently, Aristotle’s classical view (Ackrill 1963) was ubiquitous. Con-
cepts had the form of definitions, with clear necessary and sufficient conditions. Cat-
egorymembership was a clear black-and-white matter, and boundaries between categor-
ies were sharp. This view hadmany advocates for millenia, including Frege (1903/2004).
However, Wittgenstein (1953) argued that our categories in general can’t be given defin-
itions, because we cannot generally come up with necessary and sufficient conditions
for what exemplifies a particular category. He gives the example of a game, pointing out
that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to come up with some specific attribute
that all games have in common: some games are played in groups, others alone; some
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involve physical exercise, others not; some are competitive, while some are cooperative;
and the list goes on.
And indeed, in the 1970’s, Eleanor Rosch “essentially killed the classical view” (Murphy
2002, p. 16) with prototype theory (Rosch 1978). In contrast to the classical view, cat-
egories are characterised by their clear cases rather than their boundaries. Rosch’s view
is that not all members of a category are equal, with some being more central, more pro-
totypical members than others. The degree of membership of other members depends
on their “family resemblance” to the prototype, which is based on their degree of sim-
ilarity in relevant features. For instance, a robin might be a prototypical bird, while an
ostrich, although still a bird, would be more peripheral. Many studies by Rosch and
colleagues involving natural categories found evidence for prototypes (e.g., Rosch and
Mervis 1975; Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson and Boyes-Braem 1976; Rosch 1978; Mervis
and Rosch 1981). Importantly, as Murphy (2002) points out, prototypes are generally
interpreted not as actual best examples stored in memory, but as “summary representa-
tions” (p. 42), which specify, for example, a weighted set of features. Some researchers
adopted this view explicitly, and elaborated such abstract versions of prototypes (e.g.,
Hampton 1979). Despite little theoretical development over the last 30 years, prototype
theory is still very influential and has taken central stage in some linguistic theories of
meaning (Lakoff 1987; Taylor 1995; Croft and Cruse 2004).
An alternative view is offered by exemplar theory (Medin and Schaffer 1978). The main
idea is that concepts are represented in terms of actual remembered instances. As with
prototype theory, similarity still plays a central role, but this time items to be categor-
ised are compared to many previously seen exemplars rather than a single prototype.
Thus, one’s bird category consists of all the birds one has previously encountered. There
is some ambiguity, however, as to what counts as an exemplar. Does my category of
dogs consist of all the dogs I have seen, or is each dog encounter counted separately?
And how about dog encounters that I mentally imagine or simulate (Barsalou 1999)?
These issues notwithstanding, many studies, especially those using artificial and clearly
manipulable stimuli, have supported exemplar theory (e.g., Medin and Schaffer 1978;
Medin and Schwanenflugel 1981; Ross, Perkins and Tenpenny 1990; Allen and Brooks
1991; Nosofsky and Johansen 2000). Moreover, exemplar theory has been implemen-
ted in several incarnations in various rigorous computational models (e.g., Nosofsky,
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Palmeri and McKinley 1994; Nosofsky and Palmeri 1997), although the behaviour of
these models depends strongly on the rule used to calculate similarity (Murphy 2002).
The other major player in psychological theories of concepts is theory theory (Murphy
and Medin 1985). This view emphasises that concepts cannot be looked at in isolation,
but are deeply embedded in our general knowledge and understanding of the world.
Concepts are interrelatedwith each other, so that learning new concepts happens against
a rich existing backdrop of existing ones and can also in turn affect them. Moreover, ac-
cording to theory theory, such factors are more important andmore explanatorily power-
ful than the notion of similarity (which takes central stage for both prototype and exem-
plar theories). Our knowledge of birds, then, is not cleanly separate from many other
things that relate to them, such as their environment, prey and predators, and general
biology; and identifying a bird is not just a matter of comparing its features to previ-
ously seen birds. Advocates of theory theory emphasise that many psychological stud-
ies, in their attempts at isolating concepts, yield misleading results and implications for
real everyday categorisation. And indeed, many empirical investigations which include
more background knowledge and coherent inter-category relationships have found sup-
port for this view (Murphy and Medin 1985; Pazzani 1991; Heit 1998; Murphy and Ka-
plan 2000; Palmeri and Blalock 2000; Harris, Murphy and Rehder 2008).
What is the state of our current understanding then? Barsalou (1990) cautions against
attempting to settle the debate, at least with regards to prototype and exemplar theories.
He points out that empirical evaluations often unfairly characterise one of the theor-
ies, and argues that the sophisticated prototype and exemplar models actually carry the
same information as each other, so that they cannot in principle be distinguished. Nev-
ertheless, Murphy (2002) reviews a huge body of experimental studies and attempts to
evaluate the theories in terms of the findings. His analysis highlights that no one exist-
ing theory can account for all the results. He concludes that, in general, theory theory
and prototype theory stand up best to the evidence across a wide range of areas. This
is particularly true for higher-level aspects, such as the hierarchical structuring of con-
cepts, conceptual combination, induction and word meaning. Exemplar theory, on the
other hand, while not accounting for many of these phenomena as well, does have a
clear edge which must be acknowledged in category learning experiments. As a result,
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Murphy cautiously proposes that a complete theory of concepts would need to incorpor-
ate elements of all three theories. While the relative importance of these elements is still
unclear, it seems that our minds manage and integrate abstracted prototypes, stores of
exemplars, and a web of knowledge, and that all of these play central roles in conceptual
processes. As such, all three are cognitively real and should find a place in a complete
model of conceptual structure.
2.5.2 Hybrid views
Given this state of affairs, the last decade or so has seen increasing attempts at develop-
ing and testing hybrid theories of concepts. This work is based largely on experiments
which have revealed how different theories can complement each other in explaining
different aspects of categorisation results.
One solution to the problem is that the type of representation that is used may depend
on the type of concept. And this seems to make intuitive sense: we might imagine that
our concepts of dogs, height and π could have very different kinds of representations.
Along these lines, Atran (1989) claims that there are different types of concepts, so that
trying to find some universal method of representation is a lost cause. For instance, he
argues that artifact concepts fit the prototypemould better, while natural kinds are better
handled by causal theories. Medin, Lynch and Solomon (2000) lay out some consider-
ations for distinguishing types of concepts, based on structural, processing and content
criteria. While they consider it premature to draw concrete conclusions, they point out
that the evidence does suggest that there are different kinds of concepts, and at the very
least, that our theories of concepts should be open to making such theoretical distinc-
tions. Machery (2005) is less conservative, and argues that concepts themselves do not
constitute a natural kind. In particular, prototype, exemplar, and theory theories have
very little in common, and yet there is solid psychological evidence for each in differ-
ent domains. Therefore, Machery concludes that “Some concepts are prototypes, some
concepts are exemplars, some concepts are theories” (p. 465).
Other researchers have proposed various hybrid models of categorisation theories, of-
ten based on direct experimental evidence. Smith and Minda (1998) compared proto-
type and exemplar models during various stages of category learning. Their starting
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point was the observation that prior comparisons of prototype and exemplar views in
category learning have generally supported exemplar theory, but that this was based
largely on experiments which used small, poorly differentiated categories and focused
only on performance on the final tasks. As a result, Smith and Minda conducted experi-
ments in which they manipulated the structure of the categories and evaluated different
learning models at several stages. As in previous work, the exemplar model domin-
ated for the smaller, less differentiated categories, and at later stages in learning. In
contrast, when larger, more differentiated categories were being learned, participants’
performance was much more in line with a prototype model. However, when a mixture
model was applied (borrowed from Medin, Dewey and Murphy 1983), which incorpor-
ated both exemplar and prototype elements, both learning trajectories were satisfied.
Rigorously comparing models and developing hybrids is more difficult when theory
theory is also involved. This is largely because while prototype and exemplar theories
share substantial common ground in their heavy reliance on similarity, theory theory is
more abstract and based on rules and causality. However, a variety of work has sug-
gested that these views are broadly complementary. Sloman (1996) broadly reviews a
range of work in the hotly debated topic of rule-based versus similarity-based systems
in human reasoning. He argues that both systems are needed if we are to explain all the
empirical evidence on different aspects of human behaviour. With regards to conceptual
structure in particular, he concludes that the two systems play important, complement-
ary roles. Nosofsky et al. (1994) presented a formal computational “rule-plus-exception”
model, in which categorisation is done via a decision tree in which nodes can be either
logical rules or checks for exceptional and previously seen exemplars. The model was
successfully fitted to a wide range of empirical results, and accounted for many differ-
ent attested categorisation phenomena. Whittlesea, Brooks and Westcott (1994) set up a
range of experiments to study how participants might rely on different levels of know-
ledge depending on the task and context. They found that when participants carried
out a classification task, they tended to use general conceptual knowledge, while when
they carried out a recognition task, they relied on item-specific knowledge. Moreover,
relative reliance on the two kinds of knowledge was further modulated by a variety
of other factors, such as the format of stimulus presentation, the demands of other ex-
perimental tasks, social conventions, and the familiarity of cues. Juslin, Jones, Olsson
and Winman (2003) conducted two category learning experiments which compared an
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exemplar model versus a cue abstraction model. The latter model was one in which sev-
eral property relations are mentally integrated; this has similarities but remains distinct
from a prototype model. In the experiments, the quality of feedback was manipulated:
it either just identified which category a stimulus belonged to (poor), or also indicated
howmuch of a critical and invisible property the stimulus had (rich). The results showed
that participants’ performance fit the exemplar model when there was poor feedback,
but the cue abstraction model when there was rich feedback. Moreover, these results
were modulated when there was time pressure in the tasks. Weiskopf (2009) surveys
the body of available psychological evidence and argues that a given category is asso-
ciated with multiple concepts, each with a different kind of representation. According
to this view, for any given category our mind may manage prototypes, sets of exem-
plars, causal dependencies, words, etc, and these should be treated as distinct concepts.
Weiskopf distinguishes such a pluralistic theory of concepts from hybrid theories: in the
former, different concepts of cats become activated in different situations, while in the
latter, a single complex concept of cat is always activated, even if a particular component
is highlighted. However, it seems to me that this issue is an empirical one, and until it
is resolved, it is more natural and conventional to use the term “concept” in the hybrid
sense.
What are we to make of such attempts at unifying theoretical representations of con-
cepts? Murphy (2002) points out that although no single monolithic theory is sufficient
to account for all the known psychological evidence, we must also be suspicious of hy-
brid models because they are less parsimonious andmay be too powerful. However, it is
not my goal here to evaluate specific models. Instead, what will be important is that the
inner structure of concepts seems to include different forms of representation, which are
potentially recruited in different situations and contexts. And these representations can
be thought to occur at different levels, possibly along a spectrum. At the bottom, there
are exemplars, which encode individual members of categories. Next, we have proto-
types, which abstract away from individual members and describe typical features of a
concept. Finally, there are theories, which characterise the concepts in still more abstract
terms, and relate them to other concepts and knowledge.
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2.5.3 Conclusion
In line with the growing consensus that no monolithic theory of concepts will do, I too
am adopting a hybrid approach. However, in this thesis, I will not generally have to
distinguish between prototype theory and theory theory. Instead, I distinguish only two
levels of conceptual representation, drawing a line between a concept’s set of exemplars
and what I will call its sense. The resulting relationship is shown in Figure 2.6. While
exemplars are the representations of individual category members, a concept’s sense
contains the knowledge that is general to it. Thus senses can be seen as encapsulating
prototype and theory theories, while exemplars derive straightforwardly from exemplar
theory. However, I recognise that this terminology can also be misleading, in light of my
earlier discussion of Frege (see Section 2.4.1). For Frege (1892/1948), senses were fixed,
public symbols, and determined reference on their own. In contrast, I am proposing
that it is the combination of a private concept’s sense and exemplars that determines its
category.
s
e1 e2 e3 e4
Figure 2.6: The internal structure of a concept, with a sense (s) and a set of four exemplars (e1, e2,
e3, e4). The concept’s sense derives from a combination of its prototype and relevant background
knowledge.
We can now incorporate internal conceptual structure into the relationship between a
concept, its category and words (see Figure 2.5), as shown in Figure 2.7. Since it is the
concept as a whole that determines its category, I have causally connected both the sense
and the exemplars to the category. On the other hand, since words are general to a
concept, and word meaning is more compatible with prototype and theory theories, I
have linked the words directly to the concept’s sense. Note that although this schematic
treats all exemplars of a concept equally, thismay be cognitively inaccurate (as suggested
by prototype effects, e.g., Rosch 1975) and is done only for visual simplification.
When I develop these relationships and how they are involved in conceptual processing
later in this thesis, I will generally work with the simplified version of the conceptual
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Figure 2.7: The relationship between an individual concept (represented by the larger box), its
category (k) and associated words (w1, w2, w3). The concept is represented by its sense (s) and
its sets of exemplars (e1, e2, e3, e4). The word is connected primarily with the sense, while the
exemplars are linked more intimately with the category (since they encode actually encountered
items from it). However, the concept as a whole determines its category, so all elements of the
concept are causally connected to it.
model (Figure 2.5). This allows us to abstract away from internal conceptual structure
and is visually cleaner. However, at times I will need to deal with the components of
concepts directly and how the inner and outer relationships of concepts interface. In
those cases, I will work with the fuller version (Figure 2.7).
2.6 Categorisation, conceptualisation and words
2.6.1 Introduction
Up to this point, I have focused mainly on the mental structures of concepts and their
offline relationships to categories andwords. But the power of concepts comes from their
actual application in important cognitive processes. Although concepts are recruited
for a range of processes and it may be ultimately misleading to focus on a single one
(Solomon, Medin and Lynch 1999), in my thesis I focus mainly on conceptualisation.
However, just as categories are a convenient way to get at concepts, so categorisation is
easier to work with than conceptualisation.
Although I have insisted on a clear distinction between concepts and categories (see
Section 2.4.1), this does not imply a fundamental split between conceptualisation and
categorisation. Since categories are only extensions of concepts (see Section 2.4.1), any
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act of categorisation has an associated act of conceptualisation, and vice versa. In other
words, they identify the same cognitive process. Therefore, the difference between cat-
egorisation and conceptualisation lies only in emphasis in the process outcome: are we
interested in which concept is activated in the head, or the category of things in the
world that it determines? Nevertheless, it is important to remember that since concepts
overdetermine categories, conceptualisation overdetermines categorisation as well. For
instance, I could group a set of fruit into bananas and kiwi, while you could group the
same set into yellow and brown. But although our categorisations would probably be
the same, our conceptualisations would be different. Therefore, as with concepts and
categories, I will stick to the distinction when relevant; otherwise, I will often use the
two terms interchangeably.
In this section, I first converge on a definition for categorisation, driven by methodo-
logical considerations which arise out of my rejection of conceptual uniformity. I then
discuss the implications for a corresponding definition of conceptualisation, and con-
sider how the internal components of concepts, especially exemplars, are involved in
the process. Then I discuss how categorisation is related to similarity, and introduce an
important cognitive phenomenon called categorical perception. Finally, I consider how
the words individuals know and use affect their conceptualisation processes.
2.6.2 Categorisation
Categorisation is a (or even the, Harnad 2005) fundamental cognitive process. Jackendoff
(1983) claims that, in fact, without it memory is useless, and that it is central to cognit-
ive psychology. Mervis and Rosch (1981) express something similar: “without any cat-
egorisation an organism could not interact profitably with the infinitely distinguishable
objects and events it experiences” (p. 94).
Having allowed for the possibility of conceptual variation, the first step towards finding
a definition of categorisation is to emphasise that the repertoire of categories (and con-
cepts) is specific to an individual. In other words, when different people categorise the
same item, they do so relative to their own set of categories. As a result, strictly speak-
ing, we cannot interpret an experimental participant’s categorisation choice as identify-
ing some kind of universal category. For example, at the risk of being overly pedantic,
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it is not appropriate to claim that an experiment participant puts a stimulus in the dog
category, but rather in her dog category.
Notice that this argument automatically applies to word meaning as well: just because
you and I both call something a “dog” does not mean that we categorise it in exactly
the same way. This means that it’s now theoretically problematic to relate two people’s
categorisation of the same thing, which was the point Fodor (1998) was making when he
attacked conceptual relativity (see Section 1.3). However, we are in too deep now, and
have no choice but to accept the resulting difficulties. In particular, we cannot depend
on language as a reliable indicator of someone’s categories.
How do these considerations relate to available definitions of categorisation? Jackendoff
(1983) gives a straight-forward definition, saying that to categorise is “to judge that a
particular thing is or is not an instance of a particular category” (p. 77). Thus, when we
are exposed to a particular item, we identify, from among our set of categories, the cat-
egory to which it belongs. If we interpret the category as being local to the categoriser’s
repertoire, then theoretically, this definition could survive the potential problems above.
Wewould just need to be careful to interpret someone’s categorisationwithin the context
of their own system of categories.
However, as it stands, this definition is not much use from a methodological point of
view. The problem again lies in the identification of the category. If all we have is a
single item matched with a single “identifier”, we have no way of actually identifying
the category being used, regardless of whether or not the identifier was linguistic.
We therefore need to consider alternative definitions. Note that Jackendoff’s (1983) defin-
ition embodies a top-down perspective: there is a set of preexisting categories, and
when we are exposed to an item, we choose from one of them, possibly using language.
However, recall that categories are “classes of things” (Murphy 2002, p. 5). Mervis and
Rosch (1981) say that “A category exists whenever two or more distinguishable objects
or events are treated equivalently” (p. 89). Similarly, Hahn and Ramscar (2001a) state
that “Categories allow us to treat different - but in important ways similar - objects equi-
valently, and hence to communicate about, draw inferences from, reason with, and inter-
pret these objects” (p. 1). These relationships betweenmembers of a category suggest an
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alternative, bottom-up view of categorisation. As Medin and Aguilar (1999) put it, cat-
egorisation is “the process by which distinct entities are treated as equivalent” (p. 104).
In this view, the categorisation of an item is defined in terms of the other things in its
category.
In other words, we need not necessarily have an external identifier of a category. The
“particular category” bywhich an item is categorised can be identified by the set of items
it is grouped with. Items that are mentally put together are in the same category, and
those that are put separately are in different categories. This view easily accommodates
the possibility for variation among people, and no longer relies on language (or any other
kind of symbol) for category identification. Indeed, this approach would even allow us
to have brand new categories every time items are grouped, consistent with a highly
dynamic view of categorisation (Smith and Samuelson 1997).
Although framing categorisation in a top-downwaymay seemmore intuitive and simple,
in some ways a bottom-up view is actually more fundamental. In a recent paper which
emphasises the central cognitive importance of categorisation (indeed, it is entitled “Cog-
nition is categorization”), Harnad (2005) gives a general bottom-up definition: “most
simply and generally, categorization is any systematic differential interaction between an
autonomous, adaptive sensorimotor system and its world” (p. 21, author’s emphasis). In this
view, reminiscent of Johnson (1987), categories are grounded in experience, and emerge
out of our bodily interaction with the world. Thus, far from being artificial, bottom-up
categorisation may in fact be far more natural and evolutionarily primal.
However, we still have a problem: while there may be nothing intrinsically wrong with
Harnad’s (2005) view, it has taken us a bit too far afield, as it has dissociated categor-
isation from the human mind. His definition could get by without any mental concepts
being associated with the categories at all, like a thermostat responding to temperature
changes. As such, Harnad’s definition is inconsistent with my definition of categories,
which demands that they be associated with underlying human concepts. What I need,
then, is a step back from Harnad’s position.
Therefore, combining the definitions, insights and considerations discussed above, I
define categorisation as the mental act of assigning items to categories. The key is the
plurality here, allowing one act of categorisation to handle multiple items and categories
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together. The definition combines Jackendoff’s (1983) notion of assignment to categories
with Medin and Aguilar’s (1999) emphasis on grouping, while appealing to Harnad’s
(2005) ecological justification. The explicit mention of a mental process also helps link
categories back to concepts, and we just need to be careful to interpret the categories as
being specific to the categoriser (and perhaps even to the moment of categorisation).
This perspective may be a little unusual, in that it frames an act of categorisation as
relating to multiple things together at the same time. In particular, it could lead to the
absurd suggestion that we cannot recognise lions (for example) unless we see them in
batches. However, the definition is motivated largely on methodological grounds. From
a methodological point of view, once we abandon universal and public concepts and the
use of words as reliable category identifiers, we can no longer study categorisation of one
item in isolation. Although this is not the standard notion of categorisation, I appeal to
the intuition that the result of acts of “categorisation” should be “categories”. Moreover,
the definition is quite flexible and actually subsumes the canonical case involving one
item and category (Jackendoff 1983) as a special case.
Before moving on, I should briefly address one potential concern. In reviewing the in-
ternal structure of concepts in Section 2.5, one of the clearest conclusions was that con-
cepts are not black-and-white boxes with necessary and sufficient conditions. And yet,
the way I have been talking about and defining categorisation makes it sound like that
is the view that I am adopting. So what gives? The catch comes from the difference
between the structure of concepts and their use in the process of categorisation: the lat-
ter is black-and-white, while the former is not. As Croft and Cruse (2004) argue, there
is nothing incompatible between taking concepts as having prototypical structure while
still requiring discrete decisions for any individual act of categorisation. This can be
easily seen if we consider how we use language, where we are required to make lexical
choices all the time. An ostrich may be a relatively poor example of a bird, but I still need
to decide, when speaking about it, whether to call it a “bird” or not.
2.6.3 Conceptualisation
Now that I have defined categorisation, my definition of conceptualisation can simply
piggy-back off of it. In particular, since categorisation is the act of assigning items to cat-
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egories, and categories are associated with concepts, conceptualisation is the mental act
of assigning items to concepts. Again, the main difference between conceptualisation
and categorisation is in the process result: when we talk about conceptualisation, we are
primarily concerned with the concept rather than the category that an object is assigned
to.
Note that while the terms “concepts”, “categories”, and “categorisation” are all quite
widespread in the psychological literature, “conceptualisation” is less so. This may be
because modelling conceptualisation requires incorporating concept senses and categor-
isation processes, which typically belong in the purview of different disciplines. In par-
ticular, while philosophers and linguists tend to focus on the senses that correspond to
words, psychologists conduct experiments with categorisation tasks.
However, this separation is rather artificial. As pointed out at the outset of Section 2.5,
categorisation experiments in psychology are not just about groups of things in the
world, but about the corresponding concepts in the minds of the categorising humans
(Malt 2006) . As such, in the terminology that I’ve adopted here, psychology categorisa-
tion studies are actually largely focused on conceptualisation. When a participant puts
an item into a category, psychologists are ultimately interested in the underlying mental
assignment of the item to a concept. And psychologists are by no means the only ones
concerned with conceptualisation. Indeed, cognitive linguistics has placed conceptual-
isation at its core (Langacker 1987).
In considering conceptualisation processes, it’s worth raising two theoretical issues from
earlier in this chapter. First, there may theoretically be variation in conceptualisation
without necessarily implying variation in concepts. Rather, differences might come from
which concept is selected by two different people for the same thing. For instance, as
discussed in Section 2.3.1, I may conceptualise a particular flying thing as a bird, while
bird watchers may do so at the more specific level of a robin (Bailenson et al. 2002).
More generally, there are likely to be many different concepts that could be assigned to
a particular item even from within the same person’s conceptual system, so differences
between people may sometimes stem solely from which choices they make. Second,
shifting the focus from concepts to acts of conceptualisation provides a partial solution
to the concept individuation problem (see Section 2.3.2). Rather than worrying about
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whether conceptual shifts imply a switch to a different concept, change of an existing
concept, or creation of a new one, we can ignore this question and simply look at con-
ceptualisation snapshots: how does a person conceptualise something at a particular
time? This does not deny that acts of conceptualisation intimately involve underlying
concepts. However, it does allow me to take an agnostic stance regarding whether con-
cepts are largely static structures or are generated anew at each moment of use (Smith
and Samuelson 1997).
It is also useful here to return to the internal structure of concepts and consider how they
participate in conceptualisation. In Section 2.5.3, I settled on a conceptual representation
that includes a sense and a set of exemplars. Recall that a sense contains things that are
general to a concept, while exemplars encode individual category members. Notice that
there is an asymmetry between the relations of these two parts of a concept to an act
of conceptualisation. While the impact of conceptualisation on a concept’s sense is not
clear a priori, the effects on its set of exemplars is relatively straightforward: the concep-
tualised items become encoded and added to the concept’s exemplars (by definition).
One noteworthy consequence of this situation is that we now seem to have conceptu-
alised stimuli in two places: both in the world, among a category’s members, and in
the mind, among a concept’s set of exemplars. But this is not redundant. Dogs really
are in the world, and memory representations of dogs I have seen really are in my mind.
And if we want a theory which handles both a concept’s reference and is psychologically
plausible, as is required here, then we need both.
This distinction between theworld and our representation of it lies at the core of Johnson-
Laird’s (1983) influential theory of mental models. Johnson-Laird argues that we con-
struct and develop working models of the world, and that these models are central to
our reasoning, perception and thought. Our mental access to the world is therefore in-
direct: “Human beings, of course, do not apprehend the world directly; they possess
only an internal representation of it, because perception is the construction of a model of
the world” (p. 156). Mental models can also provide the basis for a theory of linguistic
meaning (which was one of Johnson-Laird’s objectives), because the truths of proposi-
tions can be evaluated relative to a mental model of the world, rather than the world
directly. This means that referential aspects of meaning can be taken seriously, without
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complications being automatically caused by typically problematic phenomena such as
hypothetical or counterfactual situations.
Although Johnson-Laird (1983) didn’t apply his theory to relate a concept’s set of ex-
emplars and a concept’s category, it is easy to adopt it for this purpose. Consider, for
example, dogs. My set of dog exemplars consists of all the dogs that I have seen, heard
or perhaps even imagined. In contrast, my dog category consists of all the things in the
world that I would judge to be a dog if they appeared before me. Dropping for the mo-
ment the difference between my encoding of a particular dog and that dog itself, we can
consider all four set intersection possibilities here. There are dogs that I have both seen
and remembered, but there are also dogs that exist although I have never seen them, as
well as dogs that I have imagined but which do not exist. Mental models are therefore
also useful from an analyst’s point of view, as they allow us to both dissociate and relate
the otherwise easily confusable notions of exemplars and category members.
2.6.4 Categorisation and similarity
In discussing the inner structure of concepts in Section 2.5, an important theme was that
of similarity. Indeed, exemplar and prototype theories both rely heavily on similarity,
but the relationship between categorisation and similarity is still highly debatable (Hahn
and Ramscar 2001b). In particular, on what basis is the similarity of items assessed?
This issue turns out to be surprisingly problematic, and has interesting implications for
the potential role of language in categorisation. Therefore, in this section, I explore the
notion of similarity further, and its relation to categorisation.
For prototype and exemplar theorists, similarity is used to compare stimuli being cat-
egorised to prototypes or sets of exemplars, respectively. Similarity is often defined in
terms of perceptual features. Features may be categorical (e.g., colour), discrete (e.g.,
number of legs) or continuous (e.g., height). The similarity of two stimuli can then be
assessed by comparing their feature values. If the features are numerical or binary, this
notion of similarity can be captured in a formal geometric model: the stimuli are con-
ceived as being points in a multi-dimensional similarity space, where each dimension
represents a feature, and the similarity of stimuli is defined as the distance between the
points. Although such geometric models are probably themost common, they have been
CHAPTER 2. CONCEPTUALISATION IN THE INDIVIDUAL 57
heavily criticised on both theoretical and empirical grounds (e.g., Tversky 1977; Gauker
2007), and psychologists have proposed several other types of similarity models as well
(Goldstone 1999).
However, the notion of similarity has a number of problems. In their initial proposal
of theory theory, Murphy and Medin’s (1985) starting point was an attack on the ex-
planatory usefulness of similarity. In particular, there are no clear and unproblematic
constraints on what counts as a feature or why. What list of attributes is used to assess
the similarity of two things? In principle, Murphy and Medin (1985) point out, the list
of potential features is infinite, so that without some a priori understanding of which
features are important, how they should be weighed, and potentially how they co-occur,
“any two entities can be arbitrarily similar or dissimilar” (p. 292).
One way to try to get around this problem is to propose that there’s a fixed universal set
of features and weights. Then there would be a unique, objective degree of similarity for
any two stimuli. However, this work-around has several problems of its own. First, the
set of features (or at least a set of primitive features) could not be conceptual, but rather
would have to be entirely perceptual. Otherwise, we would have a circular argument,
and would have to re-adopt conceptual universals, which I have adamantly rejected. But
none of the typical features typically listed for birds (e.g., has wings, has feathers, flies),
for example, seem to satisfy this criterion. Second, Schyns, Goldstone and Thibaut (1998)
argue theoretically and demonstrate experimentally that a fixed set of features cannot
easily explain concept learning in cases that involve new kinds of features. Instead, the
new features too must be developed, after which then can serve as the basis for the
relevant concepts. Third, there is empirical evidence that, in fact, similarity depends
on various factors, including context, perspective, and expertise (Tversky 1977; Medin
et al. 1993). Together, these considerations strongly suggest that there is no fixed mental
similarity space, supporting Murphy and Medin’s (1985) arguments of its inadequacy.
Indeed, Rips (1989) neatly demonstrated a dissociation between categorisation and sim-
ilarity in an influential study. In one experiment, he first chose pairs of categories which
differ on a salient dimension, and also in their degree of variability (e.g., pizzas and
quarters). Then he asked participants for similarity and categorisation judgements con-
cerning objects whose value on the relevant dimension was between that of the two
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categories (i.e., 3 inches in diameter for the pizza/quarter example). Participants judged
the object to belong to the more variable category (i.e., pizza), but to be more similar to
the less variable one (i.e., quarter). In a second experiment, participants read a story in
which one animal was somehow artificially transformed from one type to another (e.g.,
bird → insect). Participants judged the transformed animal to be more similar to the
new animal type (i.e., insect), and yet to still be of the old type (i.e., bird). Rips’ findings
do not imply that similarity has no role in categorisation, but rather that it cannot be
the whole explanation. However, if we allow for our knowledge of the world to alter
our similarity space (as theory theory could have it), so that, for example, similarity is
graded differently in the cases of pizzas and quarters, then Rips’ dissociation may well
disappear.
But this suggests that we may judge similarity relative to the categories that objects be-
long to. In other words, rather than similarity wholly underlying categorisation, cat-
egorisation may in turn affect similarity. Indeed, this is manifest in a well-established
phenomenon called “categorical perception” (Studdert-Kennedy,M., Harris and Cooper
1970). Categorical perception occurs when one is more sensitive to perceptual differ-
ences if they cross a category boundary. The most prominent example comes from phon-
ology. In a classic study, Liberman, Harris, Hoffman and Griffith (1957) systematically
prepared sequences of speech sounds with equal phonetic distances between adjacent
sounds. For instance, /da/ can transition into /ta/ by gradually increasing the voice-onset
time. Participants first listened to two sounds, and upon hearing a third sound, had to
indicate which of the first two it was identical to. Participants performed more accur-
ately when the two candidate sounds involved different phonemes rather than variants
of the same phoneme. This was the case even when the phonetic distance between them
was constant.
Although speech sounds are perhaps the best documented domain of categorical per-
ception effects, they have been demonstrated in a variety of cognitive domains (Harnad
1987), including object categorisation. Goldstone (1994) studied how categorical percep-
tion effects emerged during category learning. In a series of experimentswith visual geo-
metric stimuli varying gradually in size and darkness, he found evidence for increased
perceptual discrimination across category boundaries. His analysis also revealed that
discrimination improved mostly because of “acquired distinctiveness” across a category
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boundary rather than “acquired equivalence” within a category, although other exper-
iments have shown evidence for both (Rothbart, Davis-Stitt and Hill 1997). In another
category learning experiment involving morphed pictures of human faces, Goldstone,
Lippa and Shiffrin (2001) sought to disambiguate between two possible explanations
of categorical perception: do participants merely use category membership as an extra
criterion when actually judging similarity, or is their initial encoding of objects already
affected by the object’s category? Their results, based on similarity ratings of category
members to a novel neutral stimulus, found support for the latter hypothesis. This sug-
gests that the way in which we represent exemplars in our minds is significantly influ-
enced by what categories they belong to.
Lupyan (2008a) studied the effects of pre-established concepts on visual processing in an-
other way, using a visual search paradigm. His study is particularly important, because
it also touches on the role of language. Participants had to look for a target stimulus
amongst a set of distractors, and the conceptual heterogeneity of the non-targets was
manipulated, while keeping the perceptual differences constant. In particular, the target
was a character which looked like a hybrid between a “b” and a “p”, and the distract-
ors were either “B”’s and “b”’s (conceptually homogeneous) or “B”’s and “p”’s (con-
ceptually heterogeneous). The results indicated a “conceptual grouping” effect: parti-
cipants were faster at locating the target in the conceptually homogeneous case. Lupyan
then conducted two follow-up experiments in order to disambiguate between two pos-
sible explanations for the results. He first had participants carry out a speeded similar-
different judgement task, and examined participants’ reaction times. The results showed
that although participants were definitely slower if one of the stimuli was the novel b-
p hybrid, there was no speed difference between the B-b and the B-p discriminations.
This finding argued against a long-term categorical perception explanation. In the other
follow-up, participants heard either “find the target” or “find the B”, and had to look for
a “B” among either “b” or “p” distractors. Importantly, the participants already knew
that they would be looking for a “B” beforehand, so the difference in instructions did
not actually provide any new information. The results revealed that the label signific-
antly speeded up search, but only when looking amongst “p” distractors. Therefore,
it appears that hearing the category label prior to the search improved discrimination,
provided that it crosses the category boundary. This finding suggested an online effect
of conceptualisation on perception, mediated by concept labels. Lupyan concluded that
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concepts impact on perceptual processing, and do so even more when they are labelled
online.
Together, these studies reveal a potential general mechanism through which concepts
could become coordinated between people. They suggest that to the extent that concepts
align, there may also be a convergent effect on the feature space in terms of which partic-
ular items are encoded. In turn, this supports the possibility of a much more interactive
view of top-down and bottom-up cognitive processes (Lamme, Super and Spekreijse
1998), so that alignment at conceptual and perceptual levels could mutually reinforce
each other. In particular, if alignment in conceptualisation results in convergent sim-
ilarity spaces, then this may in turn cause people to subsequently conceptualise more
similarly. This suggests a way in which language may bring people’s conceptualisations
together, not only explicitly and consciously, but also through lower-level and more im-
plicit cognitive mechanisms. I explore this possibility when I look into the relationship
between words and conceptualisation in the next section.
2.6.5 Conceptualisation and words
In the last section, I discussed how conceptualisation could have top-down effects on
similarity and perception. In this section, I move up one level further, and discuss how
wordsmight affect conceptualisation online. In particular, to the extent that wordsmight
affect conceptualisation, do they always have this effect, or only when they are invoked?
As suggested by Slobin (1996) (see Section 3.3.5), it’s possible that we process things
differently depending on whether or not we are using language. Our conceptualisations
may be modulated as a result of online lexical processes.
However, it is important to first note that it is highly controversial whether words affect
private conceptualisation at all. This is partly because this possibility is incompatible
with the traditionally dominant sides of two broad debates in cognitive science. One of
these concerns the modularity of the mind, and language in particular. In Fodor’s (1983)
influential proposal, the mind is organised into different functional modules. Mod-
ules are domain-specific, only operating on specialised inputs and yielding restricted
outputs, and they are informationally encapsulated, operating independently of each
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other. language is proposed as one such module. In particular, language can take in-
put from perception, but operates independently of it, and does not make its output
available to it. Chomsky’s (1988) influential theory of language explicitly takes this po-
sition. In his view, language is an innate module, or “mental organ”, which operates
mostly independently of other cognitive modules. Similarly, Levelt et al.’s (1999) psy-
cholinguistic model of lexical access in speech production feeds forward from concep-
tualisation through semantic levels to other levels of linguistic representations, but not
backwards. Although the model does include self-monitoring which can lead to recon-
ceptualisation, the latter only occurs when a person notices herself making (or about to
make) an error. Even more interactive models (e.g., Dell 1986) only incorporate bidirec-
tional flow among the linguistic levels of representation (e.g., phonological, syntactic,
semantic).
However, other researchers take issue with such modular views of language, claiming
that language is closely integrated with the rest of cognition. In particular, cognitive
linguists have argued that language is not domain-specific or encapsulated, and that it
is grounded in the rest of cognition (e.g., Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1987). These theories
borrow heavily from insights in related disciplines (such as prototype theory, Taylor
1995) and stress the role of conceptualisation and other cognitive processes in linguistic
theories (Croft and Cruse 2004). These views are more comfortable with language having
a bidirectional relationship with conceptualisation. It is worth noting that criticism of
Fodor’s (1983) modularity hypothesis has not been confined to language, and includes
both strong objections (e.g., Uttal 2003) and reconciling proposals (e.g., Karmiloff-Smith
1992).
The other important issue in cognitive science I want to raise concerns the function of
language. Language obviously serves as a tool for human communication: we exchange
information and opinions about the world via language. Some researchers emphasise
the communicative aspect of language and claim that while words serve to exchange
ideas, the concepts underlying them are relatively fixed (Fodor 1975; Pinker 1994). Un-
der this view, there is nothing for words to do other than passively attach to pre-existing
concepts and express them. Note also that an emphasis on the communicative func-
tion of language seems inevitable if we adopt innate, universal concepts (Fodor 1998),
although it does not require them (Pinker and Jackendoff 2005).
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However, some researchers have also argued that language also has important cognitive
functions. Goldstein (1948) suggests that language is not only used for communication,
but also can “support” and “fixate” thinking (p. 115). Similarly, Chomsky (2000) claims
that although language can of course be recruited for communication, what primarily
distinguishes it is that “it is a system for expressing thought” (p. 75). Carruthers (2002)
argues that language helps us integrate information from different otherwise domain-
specific cognitive modules. Dennett (1995) claims that language is largely responsible
for human consciousness and gives us cognitive abilities which greatly outstrip those of
other animals. And Clark (1998) suggests several specific areas in which words might
enhance human computation, including memory, attention, representation, and simpli-
fication.
I will not engage the modular or functional debates further here. The key point is that
the role of words in conceptualisation is theoretically important, and yet has been under-
studied. Although I have given two important historical reasons for this, another major
cause is the methodological challenges behind it. As Nuyts and Pederson (1997) point
out, in order to study the relationship between language and conceptualisation, we must
first separate them, and that is not an easy task.
Note that investigations of the role of words in conceptualisation generally reflect the
view of language as a tool for communication. In most studies, words are provided
by the experimenter (e.g., concept learning: Lupyan, Rakison and McClelland 2007) or
other participants (e.g., communicative tasks: Markman and Makin 1998), rather than
the participant himself. And the majority of the recent studies that have focused on the
participant’s own pre-existing knowledge have been cross-linguistic. Therefore, while
such work is extremely relevant for my thesis, it will be covered in Chapter 3.
In contrast, there are not many studies which investigate how a person’s own words
affect their conceptualisation online, although a few key recent studies have begun to
address this gap. In one series of experiments, Lupyan (2008b) explored the effect of
linguistic categorisation on item recognition. Participants were first presented with se-
quences of pictures of furniture and asked to either categorise them linguistically (from
among a set of two categories, like “chair” and “lamp”) or to indicate preference (whether
they liked them or not). Afterwards, participants were tested on both previously seen
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and unseen items, and had to indicate for each whether it was old or novel. The results
showed that old items in the categorisation conditionweremore likely to bemistaken for
novel items than those in the preference condition. After rejecting several alternative ex-
planations via follow-up experiments in which important variables such as stimuli and
timing were altered, Lupyan (2008b) argued that the results were best explained with a
“representational shift account”. In this view, when items are linguistically categorised,
the memory representations of items are influenced not only by bottom-up perceptual
features of the items, but also by top-down conceptual representations activated by the
linguistic labels. As such, the representations of items which are linguistically categor-
ised get “shifted” towards the category prototypes, so their memory encoding is less
loyal to the original. Thus, words seem to affect conceptualisation, and conceptualisa-
tion in turn affects memory encoding.
A couple of other intralingual studies have taken a different approach. People may in-
ternally verbalise things during categorisation, even when they don’t explicitly produce
them: when presented with a chair, we may sometimes think “chair” without actually
saying it. This suggests that perhaps the role of words could also be studied by design-
ing experimental conditions in which one manipulated whether or not participants were
verbalising internally. While this may be impossible to achieve with certainty, Roberson
and Davidoff (2000) used verbal interference tasks for this purpose and obtained fruit-
ful results. Building off of previously documented categorical perception effects in the
colour domain (see Section 3.3.2), they conducted several experiments to see whether
such effects were robust to verbal interference. Participants were first shown a colour
stimulus in the green-blue range, then carried out an interference task for a few seconds,
and finally had to identify the original colour from a pair of similar stimuli which in-
cluded the original. The interference task was either visual (tracking a line through a dot
pattern) or verbal (reading words aloud), and there was also a control condition with
no interference task. The results confirmed categorical perception effects in the control
and visual conditions, but also showed that they disappeared in the verbal conditions.
This was the case regardless of whether the words that participants read were colour
words (none of which matched the stimuli) or unrelated words. Thus, it seems that if
we are prevented from internally labelling something due to other linguistic processing,
our words might not affect how we encode things; however, words can affect percep-
tion under other conditions, even if we do not explicitly produce words. Together with
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Lupyan’s (2008a) results, this suggests that our words can affect conceptualisation, as
long as we are not simultaneously processing other words.
Lupyan (2009) used verbal interference tasks to study another aspect of how words
might affect conceptualisation. His starting point was the aphasia studies and reviews of
Cohen and colleagues (Cohen, Kelter and Woll 1980; Cohen, Woll and Ehrenstein 1981),
from which the authors concluded that aphasics have a defect in analytically isolating
single features (such as colour or size) of stimuli, while performing normally on global
comparisons. Lupyan conducted two experiments to see whether these patterns would
also be found in normal participants under verbal and/or visual interference. Parti-
cipants were shown triads of stimuli, and had to choose the odd one out, based on either
colour, size or thematic (e.g., cake and balloon are both related to the theme of parties)
criteria. Stimuli were presented either as pictures or as words. In the verbal interfer-
ence condition, they were shown a 9-digit number before each trial and were asked to
rehearse and remember it, for which theywere tested after the trial. In the visual interfer-
ence condition, a visual grid display was used instead of a number. The results showed
that judgements were impaired for the single dimension judgements (colour or size) for
both picture and word stimuli, but only under verbal interference. However, this effect
did not extend to thematic judgements, nor did it occur under visual interference. These
results suggest that words help people conceptualise in terms of a particular dimension,
but are less critical for more general assessments.
A final relevant line of evidence here consists of developmental studies with infants. The
advantage of using infants is that, in contrast to older children or adults, their vocabu-
lary and object familiarity is relatively limited and can be approximately indicated in
advance by their caregivers in questionnaires. This allows us to study how knowing
a word for something may affect an infant’s processing. Schafer and Plunkett (1999)
carried out such a study with 17-month-olds. Each infant was simultaneously shown
pairs of object images and their viewing times were recorded to each image. The ob-
jects were selected individually for each infant so that they were both approximately
equally familiar but the infant only knew one of the object’s names. Results showed
that infants looked significantly longer at objects for which they knew the name, even
though there was no linguistic input in the experiment. Similarly, Gliga, Volein and
Csibra (2010) conducted a neuroscientific study to see whether infants’ brains processed
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stimuli more extensively (in terms of a measure that was previously shown to be in-
volved in visual object processing, Tallon-Baudry and Bertrand 1999) if they knew their
names. 12-month-olds were shown images of objects which were either unfamiliar, fa-
miliar with known names, or familiar with unknown names, and their brain activity was
recorded. Results showed greater activation only for objects with known names, and no
effect of mere object familiarity. Moreover, the same pattern of results was duplicated
when infants were first trained on novel word-object associations. Finally, Rivera and
Zawaydeh (2007) had infants carry out object individuation tasks with spatiotemporally
ambiguous events. 10- and 11-month-old infants were first shown a pair of different ob-
jects coming in and out from behind a screen, after which, in some trials, one object was
surreptitiously removed. Then the screen was lifted and the infant’s looking time was
recorded. The results indicated that infants noticed inconsistencies best when they were
familiar with names of both of the objects, even when controlling for object familiarity
and general receptive vocabulary. Together, such developmental findings suggest that
knowing a word for an object increases attention and processing in young infants, even
without verbal input.
Overall, then, there is plenty of evidence that the words we already have in our minds
affect howwe conceptualise and process things in the world. These effects do not require
verbal input, or even explicit lexical production, and they are documented from a very
early age. However, they are also not static or permanent, since they can be blocked by
conflicting lexical processing.
2.6.6 Conclusion
In this section, I have focused on processes involving concepts. First, I looked for a
methodologically motivated definition of categorisation which was compatible with my
commitment to conceptual variation. I settled on a hybrid of top-down and bottom-up
definitions by which categorisation is defined as the act of assigning items to categories.
I then discussed conceptualisation, and how it actually identifies the same process as cat-
egorisation, but emphasises the resulting concepts, rather than the resulting categories.
I also explored how conceptualisation relates to theoretical issues concerning concepts,
and how the internal components of concepts are involved in conceptualisation. I then
considered the relationship between categorisation and similarity, showing that it is not
CHAPTER 2. CONCEPTUALISATION IN THE INDIVIDUAL 66
as simple as it first appears. After that I introduced a well-documented phenomenon
known as categorical perception, in which categorisation can affect the perceived simil-
arity of things. Finally, I moved on to discussing the complex relationship between con-
ceptualisation and words. I discussed how, although words are generally understood
as reflecting rather than determining conceptualisations, there is increasing evidence for
them also playing a causal role.
We can now put together a model for an act of conceptualisation by an individual at
a particular time, as shown in Figure 2.8. A concept is applied to three objects in the
world, and is potentially (but perhaps not) lexicalised with a word. Notice the differ-
ences between this diagram and that developed earlier for the structural relationship
between concepts, categories and words (Figure 2.4). This is because it is modelling
something different, and has a different purpose. The previous diagram had focused
on the structural relationships. In contrast, here we are taking a dynamic snapshot of a
person’s concept being applied online. First, since the individual has to make a discrete
lexical decision, there is now just one word (assuming the conceptualisation is lexical-
ised). Also, there is now a bi-directional relationship between words and concepts, since
conceptualisation affects the choice of words but the word also affects the conceptualisa-
tion. Finally, a specific set of objects (which is a small subset of the concept’s category)
in the world triggers the conceptualisation, while before I focused on how a concept the-
oretically determined its whole category (hence the arrow pointing now in the opposite
direction). The two models are compatible, however: strictly speaking, we could still
have an arrow down from the concept to the category (as a whole), but that relationship
is not the focus here and this would only add confusion.
Finally, as shown in Figure 2.9, we can also incorporate what we established about in-
ternal conceptual structure into this model (see Figures 2.6 and 2.7). The diagram also
captures how categorisation is not only driven by exemplars we encounter but also
in turn affects it (i.e., there are both top-down and bottom-up processing influences
between a concept’s sense and its exemplars), as we saw in Section 2.6.4. However,
the actual objects in the world only trigger the conceptualisation: there is no effect in the
opposite direction.




Figure 2.8: An act of conceptualisation, in which an individual’s concept (c) is applied to a set of
objects (o1, o2, o3). A word (w) may also be applied, but it is optional (indicated with brackets).
The arrows between the word and the concept show how the levels influence each other in both
directions: conceptualisations trigger words, but words also influence conceptualisations. The
direction between objects and concepts is unidirectional: objects trigger conceptualisations, but
although conceptualisations can affect the perception and encoding of objects, they do not change
the actual objects themselves.
(w)
s
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7
o2 o4 o6
Figure 2.9: An expanded view of the act of conceptualisation, incorporating the internal struc-
ture of an individual’s concept (represented by the box). The word (w) relates to the sense (s),
and objects (o11, o2, o3) become new exemplars (e2, e4, e6), which are thus added to the previous
exemplars (e1, e3, e5, e7). The existence of mutual (top-down and bottom-up) processing influ-
ences in categorisation is indicated by the arrows running in both directions between the sense
and the exemplars; however, as this will not be the focus, these will generally not be represented
in subsequent diagrams.
2.7 Summary
In summary, this chapter focused on individual conceptualisation and its relation to
words and objects. Although it is theoretically convenient to posit that concepts are uni-
versal, there is good evidence for conceptual variation, so we must abandon a universal
position, especially in a thesis about conceptual coordination. Doing so, however, has
important theoretical implications. Most fundamentally, we must now define categories
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and words in terms of concepts, rather than the other way around. Concepts determine
categories, rather than reflecting them, and they have no fixed 1-to-1 relationship with
words. They also have an internal structure, with both exemplar-specific and concept-
general components. The usefulness of concepts, however, comes from their application.
In particular, in the process of conceptualisation, the mind assigns items to its concepts.
Conceptualisation has tight but non-trivial relationships with both similarity and lan-
guage. It also offers us a way to access concepts, provided that we keep in mind that the
process is dynamic, and may vary from person to person.
The most important result of this chapter is the simple theoretical model that I have de-
veloped. The model has two parts, which I have referred to as offline and online. The
former (see Figures 2.5 and 2.7) concerns the abstract general relationships between con-
cepts, categories and words, while the latter (Figure 2.8 and 2.9) addresses actual applic-
ations of concepts during acts of conceptualisation. In principle, which one we place our
emphasis on depends on our theoretical orientation. However, in practice, even when
we are interested in the abstract relationships, we can only get at the underlying struc-
tures through processing (Barsalou 1990). As such, for most of my thesis, I will primarily
use the processing aspect of the model. However, it’s good to keep in mind how the two
relate, especially when we want to draw conclusions about conceptual structure, or the
relationship between language, mind and world.
CHAPTER 3
Conceptualisation and shared words
3.1 Introduction
In the last chapter, I discussed conceptualisation from the point of view of an individual.
Even when language was discussed, the focus was on the associations between words
and concepts in an individual’s mind. However, a fundamental property of words is
that they are a shared, public resource. Although two different English speakers may
associate slightly different concepts with the word “dog”, they nevertheless both store
the same word form in their individual minds. Since these words are used in linguistic
communication about things in the world, they might serve as a vehicle through which
people, consciously or otherwise, influence each other’s views of those things. As such,
consideration of the shared nature of lexical knowledge and the interactive nature of
language use is a critical step in addressing the hypotheses of my thesis.
In this chapter, I review evidence concerning the public aspect of words and how they
might coordinate concepts and conceptualisation. First, does having the same set of
words as other speakers of the same language result in having similar concepts? And
second, does the use of words in linguistic interaction bring together our conceptualisa-
tions? These two questions are explored in detail in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, respectively.
Having done so, I will also apply the theoretical model I developed in Chapter 2 and
incorporate the new social issues. However, first, in Section 3.2, I discuss an important
issue that in some ways is presupposed by the other two: whether the words of others
affect how we learn and use concepts.
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3.2 Word input
In this section, I consider the effects of external lexical input. How does hearing the
word label of others while processing a stimulus affect a person’s concept and conceptu-
alisation? This is important to my thesis because, if words are to bring about conceptual
coordination between individuals, then a logical pre-condition must be that the words
of others somehow affect a person’s own conceptualisations.
However, I do not attempt to review this issue comprehensively here, as it would take
us much too far afield. In particular, the issue is central to the controversial relationship
between language acquisition and conceptual development (Bowerman and Levinson
2001; Nelson 1996), and indeed the cognitive processes underlying language compre-
hension in general. Therefore, here I will only highlight several key findings from three
broad age groups: (prelinguistic) infants, children and adults.
I should first point out that, in principle, there are three different but related ways in
which hearing another’s words during conceptualisation could affect a person’s concep-
tual system: the building of connections between concepts and words, the development
of concepts, and the recruitment of concepts online during conceptualisation. Also, the
effects might depend on whether the words heard are already familiar, and, if so, how
well they match the referent in a person’s preexisting conceptual system.
Note that the necessity of linguistic input in the first of the above issues is beyond dis-
pute: although there is plenty of debate concerning how exactly words are learned (Hall
and Waxman 2004; Bloom 2000), noone questions that they must be learned. And since
word learning is not the focus of this thesis, I will not address it here, focusing instead
on work that is relevant to the latter two issues: the effects of word input on conceptual
development and conceptualisation. As these two issues are related and I can only ad-
dress them briefly, I will not explicitly separate them in this discussion, but it is worth
keeping them in mind as we go along.
3.2.1 Infants
Although the extent and specificity of an innate human language capacity remains a
topic of intense debate (Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch 2002; Pinker and Jackendoff 2005), it
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is uncontroversial that particular words and their conceptual associations are not innate.
Different languages have different lexicons, and children must learn their native lexicons
from the people around them. However, there is ample evidence that even for young
“prelinguistic” infants, external words do not merely passively map onto preexisting
concepts, but rather play an active role in conceptual development.
Xu (2002) studied the role of words in object individuation in 9-month-old infants. Two
different objects were revealed to infants from behind a screen, one at a time, and then
returned behind the screen. While an object was being visually presented, the infant
also heard either a linguistic label (e.g., “Look, a ball”), an auditory tone, other kinds
of sounds (e.g., a car alarm), or an emotional expression (e.g., “Ah”). After both ob-
jects had been presented in this way, the screen was lifted, revealing either one or both
objects. Based on infants’ looking times, the results showed that hearing two different
linguistic labels for the two objects helped them individuate them. In contrast, a single
label for both objects, or two different non-label sounds did not have this effect. These
findings have been corroborated by several other studies which have shown that infants
individuated objects better if they already knew the words being used (Rivera and Za-
waydeh 2006), that they expected the number of objects to correspond to the number of
labels even when they were never shown any objects in advance (Xu, Cote and Baker
2005), and that they expectedx different labels to be used for two objects that varied in
shape but not in colour (Dewar and Xu 2007). These results suggest that words guide
individuation in infants, and that hearing words may therefore affect early conceptual
development.
A related line of work has looked more directly at how words may influence the form-
ation of concepts in young infants. Waxman and Markow (1995) first showed 12- to
13-month-old infants a series of toys from the same category (e.g., animals), one at a
time. For each toy, the experimenters either labelled the toy (e.g., “Look, an animal”) or
didn’t (e.g., “Look what’s here”). After this familiarisation phase, infants were shown
two objects simultaneously, one from the same category (e.g., another animal) and one
from another category (e.g., a vehicle). The results revealed that infants familiarised to
categories faster and showed a greater preference for the object from the novel category.
In particular, when hearing a label, infants’ attention to new exemplars from the same
category decreased faster, and they subsequently showed a greater preference for items
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from a novel category. Waxman and Markow conclude that even in these earliest stages
of language acquisition, labels act as “invitations to form categories” (p. 298). Waxman
and colleagues have extended these results to show that these effects are already found
in 6- and 9-month-old infants (Balaban andWaxman 1997; Fulkerson andWaxman 2007),
that they rely on the use of a consistent word label (Waxman and Braun 2005), and that
they do not occur for non-word auditory stimuli such as tones (Fulkerson and Wax-
man 2007). Moreover, Plunkett, Hu and Cohen (2008) showed that when infants were
trained to distinguish two novel categories, they were able to do so without any labels
or when the items from the two categories were consistently given two corresponding
labels. However, infants failed to learn the two categories if the labels and categories
were uncorrelated, or if only one label was used.
It should be noted that although efforts have been made to identify word labels as the
specific source of the effects discussed in this section, this does not imply that they are
the only source. Indeed, based on carefully coded video data during story-reading with
2-3 year-olds, Gelman, Coley, Rosengran, Hartman and Pappas (1998) have argued that
influential maternal input on early conceptual development consists of much “beyond
simple labelling routines” (p. v), and includes both non-linguistic cues (e.g., gestures)
and subtle linguistic guides (e.g., generic noun phrases). However, as Keil’s (1998)
commentary points out, it remains unclear how much of this rich information actually
reaches and is exploited by the child. Thus, although word labels do appear to play a
special role in early development, it is not clear how important they are relative to other
factors and kinds of input.
3.2.2 Children
While the previous sectionwas concernedwith the developmental effects of words in the
earliest stages of language acquisition, researchers have also looked at how lexical input
affects children who have already acquired substantial language. This period of devel-
opment is important, because children are already actively using word-concept associ-
ations while still being very much in the process of acquiring language and developing
concepts.
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A key issue here concerns the role of word labels in children’s induction: how much
do children rely on the labels of others to infer the unseen properties of objects? Since
young children have been shown to rely heavily on superficial perceptual properties
in cognitive tasks (Flavell 1963), Gelman and Markman (1986) tested four-year-olds by
pitting perceptual similarity against category labels in a property-induction task. Parti-
cipants were first shown pictures of two different objects. Information was given about
each object using a sentence which provided both a category label for the object and an
unseen property of it (e.g., “This dinosaur has cold blood”, “This rhinoceros has warm
blood”). Children were then asked to infer the appropriate property of a third object,
which was more perceptually similar to one of the preceding objects but shared a la-
bel with the other one. Children tended to make their choice based on a shared label,
rather than shared properties. Davidson and Gelman (1990) conducted further experi-
ments which qualified these results. They showed that if the category labels were novel,
and they showed no correspondence with appearances, children resorted to perceptual
properties. On the other hand, if labels were familiar or there was some correspond-
ence between labels and features, four-year-olds still resorted to labels. However, in a
study involving three age groups (i.e., 4-5, 7-8, and 11-12) Sloutsky, Lo and Fisher (2001)
demonstrated that the effects of labels in category induction increases with age. The
youngest children’s reliance on labels depended on the degree of perceptual similarity
among the items, the oldest children relied entirely on labels, and the 7- to 8-year-olds
showed an intermediate transitional pattern. Based on these results, Sloutsky et al. pro-
posed a developmental model in which children shift from treating words as category
attributes to category identifiers. Together, these results suggest that the effects of other
people’s words on a child’s conceptualisations can override perceptual similarity, and
that children’s trust of words as conceptual indicators is not blind and yet increases with
age.
While such studies concerning category induction in object domains constitute the bulk
of developmental studies of relevance here, it is worth noting that word input has also
been shown to enhance children’s abilities to perform other cognitive tasks, and not al-
ways with object concepts. To illustrate, Loewenstein and Gentner (2005) studied how
hearing words for spatial relations might help children perform a relatively difficult
mapping task. In a first experiment, children watched as the experimenter put an ob-
ject either on, in, or under a box. While placing the object, the experimenter either also
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indicated it overtly with a relation term (e.g., “I’m putting this on the box”) or not (e.g.,
“I’m putting this here”). The child then closed their eyes while the experimenter placed
an object in the corresponding position of another box, and then the child guessed its
location. Although the relation term did not provide any new information, children per-
formed better on this task if they had heard the relational term. Follow-up experiments
showed that older children also benefited from hearing relational terms if the task was
harder, that the effects disappeared if inappropriate spatial terms were used, and that
the effects persisted when the children were re-tested two days later.
3.2.3 Adults
As shown in the last two sections, developmental evidence suggests that words play a
causal role in conceptual development and conceptualisation. Moreover, the increasing
reliance with age on word labels in category induction (Sloutsky et al. 2001) suggests
how adult conceptualisation is likely to be particularly prone to linguistic effects. Indeed,
Gelman and Markman (1986) preceded their developmental induction experiment by
confirming that adults relied on category labels to infer hidden object properties. This
is not surprising, since compared to children, adults have well-developed lexicons and
are accustomed to using language for learning about the world through indirect means
(e.g., in university lectures). Indeed, it is important to point out that although adults
may arguably not rely on others as much as children do to learn about the world around
them, adult conceptualisation is also very much affected by the words of others. In this
section, I point out a few studies that have demonstrated that further.
In a classic study, Carmichael, Hogan and Walters (1932) first showed participants a
series of ambiguous figures. Presentation of each figure was accompanied by one of two
verbal labels (except in a control condition). For instance, a circular figure with loops
around its diameter was labelled as either “ship’s wheel” or “sun”. Participants were
then asked to redraw the items they had seen, and their drawings were coded blindly
for various criteria. The results showed that relative to the original figures, participants’
drawings tended to be transformed to more closely match the labels they had heard.
Similar effects have been found more recently in other domains. Billman and Krych
(1998) studied the effects of labelling on participants’ recognition of motion events. Par-
ticipants were shown short videos depicting events and simultaneously heard auditory
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labels that described either the manner or path of motion (e.g., a child “skipping” across
a room to “exit” it). The next day, participants were tested on their memory of these
events, by showing them variations where either the path or manner was different. Re-
cognition was affected by the type of verb that had been used: when an event had been
labelled with a path verb, errors weremore likely for eventswith changes inmanner, and
vice versa. Similarly, Feist and Gentner (2007) tested spatial terms’ effects on people’s
memory. Participants were first shown a set of pictures depicting borderline examples
of spatial relations (e.g., for “on”, a balloon was touching the surface of the table, but
was actually hanging from a support above), possibly accompanied with a sentence that
depicted it. After a ten-minute filler task, they were then tested on their recognition of
the original stimuli, using pictures that either exemplified the spatial relation’s prototype
or deviated still further from it. The results showed that when the original relations had
been labelled linguistically, participants mademore recognition errorswith the prototyp-
ical examples of the spatial relations; this was not the case when participants did not get
this linguistic input. Together, such experimental results are consistent with Lupyan’s
(2008b) findings that category labels can actually skew and thus worsen item memory
(see Section 2.6.5).
While the experiments above deal with words and concepts that participants are already
familiar with, adults too learn new words and concepts throughout their lives. In a re-
cent experiment, Lupyan, Rakison and McClelland (2007) investigated whether redund-
ant category labels enhance category learning in adults. Participants were first trained
on two types of alien-like figures. After presentation of each alien, there was feedback
as to whether it was friendly or dangerous; moreover, in the label condition, this feed-
back also included a category label (i.e., “leebish” or “grecious”). Even though the labels
were completely redundant, participants performed better in subsequent testing (as to
whether aliens were friendly or dangerous) if they had been in the label condition. In
a follow-up experiment, Lupyan et al. showed that these effects occurred regardless
of whether the labels were presented visually or auditorily, but did not happen when
participants were provided instead with a non-linguistic association (i.e., whether the
alien lived above or below). These results with normal adults are reminiscent of the
infant studies which suggested that words act as “invitations to form categories” (Wax-
man and Markow 1995). Indeed, even when adults know that they are trying to learn
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perceptual categories and they get formally equivalent alternative feedback, words still
enhance their abilities to learn them.
3.2.4 Conclusion
In this section, I have discussed some studies which have shown that lexical input from
other people does not just communicate ideas or drive our word learning, but also affects
the development and use of our conceptual system. Moreover, these effects take place
throughout our lives, from before we produce our first words ourselves right through
our adulthood. Hearing words affects how young infants attend to things and what
concepts they form. It drives children’s inferences about the properties of things and
enhances their cognitive abilities. And it influences how adults encode things and events
that they experience and improves adult category learning.
In themselves, these findings show only that hearing words affects our conceptual sys-
tem, but says nothing directly about conceptual coordination. Just as eating the same
food affects people but does so in different ways (due to differences in taste, allergies,
medical conditions, etc), it is theoretically possible that words may affect our conceptu-
alisations without necessarily bringing them closer together. For example, there may in
principle be more variation in people’s linguistic concepts than there is between the way
that they conceptualise non-linguistically “by default”. Therefore, conceptual coordina-
tion does not logically follow and still needs to be tested. Nevertheless, these findings
do provide good motivation for thinking that words might bring about conceptual co-
ordination.
In particular, there are two ways in which the words of others may coordinate concepts,
corresponding to two different timescales. First, over the course of our lifetimes, and
perhaps especially in childhood, repeated exposure to hearing words from the same lan-
guage may result in us developing concepts that are similar to the people around us.
As a result, people with the same native language may end up with similar concepts.
Second, when people interact linguistically, they may coordinate their conceptualisa-
tions of things in the world. Such online coordination may or may not persist beyond
the interaction or affect their long-term conceptual development. Indeed, these two pos-
sibilities constitute the focus of this thesis, and provide the empirical hypotheses for my
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experiments. I therefore review relevant work for these two possibilities in the next two
sections, respectively.
3.3 Linguistic relativity
In this section, I first introduce the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. The bulk of this section then
consists of a review of empirical work in the area. Next I briefly discuss recent and more
subtle reformulations of the hypothesis and how theymatch up to the empirical data. Fi-
nally, I draw conclusions concerning the effects of language on conceptual coordination
and further work that is needed.
3.3.1 Whorf
The question of how our native language may affect the way we think has been of in-
terest for millenia, but nowadays is most commonly associated with the American an-
thropologist Benjamin LeeWhorf. In the 1940’s, Whorf put forth strong views regarding
the relationship between language and thought (Whorf 1956). Using cross-linguistic re-
search for support, he expressed ideas that have become known as the “Sapir-Whorf
hypothesis”, or the “linguistic relativity hypothesis”. In its strong form, this is basically
the following argument: (1) there are substantial cross-linguistic differences in semantic
structure, and (2) linguistic categories determine aspects of non-linguistic thought; there-
fore (3) speakers of different languages think differently.
Whorf’s views were popular for a time, but came under increasing attack during the rise
of the cognitive sciences in the 60’s and 70’s. The general dominant position became that
“(1) human conceptual structure is relatively constant in its core features across cultures,
and (2) conceptual structure and semantic structure are closely coupled” (Gentner and
Goldin-Meadow 2003a, p. 5). Added to methodological criticism of Whorf’s empirical
work and findings of seemingly language-independent cognition in the domain of col-
our (Berlin and Kay 1969; Heider 1972a), the strong Whorf hypothesis was convincingly
rejected and work in the area was widely abandoned.
It should be pointed out that the idea of linguistic relativity is not monolithic and does
not actually constitute a single well-defined hypothesis. Moreover, as we will see, the
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body of empirical results makes taking an extreme position (i.e., that language fully de-
termines thought or that it has no effect on it) untenable, as is evident from the positions
of most researchers (Gleitman and Papafragou 2005; Carruthers 2002). But in moving
away from a black-and-white view, the number of questions quickly expands as we con-
sider the issues in more detail: how much which aspects of one’s native language affect
which aspects of thought in what ways.
Note that Whorf was primarily interested in grammatical effects on thought. For in-
stance, he noted that Hopi does not encode verb tense, and argued that its speakers
must therefore have a different understanding of time than (for example) English speak-
ers (Whorf 1956). Much of linguistic relativity research has looked into cases where one
language makes certain formal grammatical distinctions that another does not, includ-
ing gender (Sera, Elieff, Burch, Forbes and Rodrı́guez 2002), event structure (Papafragou,
Massey and Gleitman 2002), spatial frames of reference (Levinson 2003) and count/mass
nouns (Imai and Mazuka 2007).
However, the idea of linguistic relativity could also be interpreted in a lexical sense.
Perhaps the words of a language and how they divide up the world into categories has
an impact on non-linguistic cognition. Indeed, this possibility seems to be embodied in
probably the most frequently cited formulation of Whorf’s ideas:
We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The cat-
egories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not
find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the
world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be or-
ganised by our minds - and this means largely by the linguistic systems of
our minds. (Whorf 1956, p. 213)
In this view, the natural world is chaotic and has no predetermined structure, remin-
iscent of William James’ characterisation of the infant’s world as “buzzing, blooming
confusion” (James 1890/1981, p. 462). According to Whorf (1956), it is our native lan-
guage that gives it structure and determines concepts and categories. As such, people
will conceptualise things differently to the extent that their native languages provide
them with different concepts.
Whorf’s (1956) claim has a direct connection to my thesis of language-induced concep-
tual alignment. If a language provides a person with a distinct repertoire of concepts,
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then speakers of the same language should have more similar concepts and therefore
conceptualise things more similarly to each other than speakers of different languages.
Importantly, the claim is that language is responsible for such alignment, rather than
other cultural or environmental factors. Moreover, it’s important to emphasise that in
this view, language’s role is not just invoked during linguistic categorisation, but applies
to conceptualisation in general. Merely noting that speakers of different languages have
different lexical concepts is thus not enough to provide support for linguistic relativity.
In the next few sections, I will review empirical investigations of the lexical version of the
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. I focus primarily on two domains: colour and objects. Colour
is important because it has been the longest and most intensively studied domain, and
demonstrates both how complex the questions and findings are, as well as howmuch we
still do not know. I then focus on objects because I used object stimuli in all of my experi-
ments (see Chapters 5-8). Afterwards, I will also briefly mention some key findings from
other domains to round off the picture. Finally, I will consider recent and subtle theor-
etical formulations of linguistic relativity which have arisen out of these investigations,
and how they relate to my hypotheses.
3.3.2 Colour
The first and most vigorously explored domain has been that of colour, and there are
good reasons why. Languages vary significantly in how they lexically partition the col-
our space (Kay, Berlin, Maffi and Merrifield 1997). It is comparatively easy to object-
ively control and manipulate colour stimuli in psychology experiments, and even to
compare colour term systems with the distribution of colours in the perceived world
(Yendrikhovskij 2001). Moreover, children get proficient with colour terms relatively
slowly (Bornstein 1985), allowing for tracking of the phenomenon at various ages.
An influential early study by Brown and Lenneberg (1954) suggested a relationship
between colour naming and recognition. They asked native English speakers to name
colour stimuli, and coded their output in various ways, including length of names, reac-
tion times, and agreement between speakers. Another set of participants was first shown
colour stimuli and then asked to identify the ones they had been shown among a larger
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set. Brown and Lenneberg found that certain lexical variables were related to recogni-
tion: in particular, colour stimuli which were given shorter names, were named more
quickly, and exhibited less variation among the speakers, were also remembered more
accurately.
Subsequent studies yielded mixed results (e.g., Burnham and Clark 1955; Lenneberg
1961; Lantz and Stefflre 1964; Stefflre, Castillo and Moreley 1966), but then two papers
were published which had a devastating impact on the Whorfian hypothesis in gen-
eral. First, Berlin and Kay (1969) carried out a large cross-linguistic survey, analysing
how different languages divided up the colour space. Their analysis was conducted in
terms of “basic” colour terms, which they characterised as words which consisted of a
single morpheme, were of general use, and were known and used by all native speak-
ers of a language; this influential notion has formed the foundation for most subsequent
work in this area. Berlin and Kay found systematic patterns across languages, on whose
basis they proposed a universal evolutionary trajectory for basic colour inventories. The
number of colour terms increased along the stages of the trajectory, but at any particu-
lar stage the space was more or less fixed, with the colour terms centering on universal
“focal points” in the colour space (i.e., points which people largely agreed were the best
exemplars of a colour). Thus, the way different languages partitioned the colour space
was a product of fixed properties of human perception and biology, rather than arbitrary
language-specific conventions.
This universalist view was corroborated by two important empirical papers by Eleanor
Rosch (Heider) a few years later. Heider (1972b) developed Berlin and Kay’s (1969)
work on focal points and conducted several cross-linguistic experiments investigating
colour naming and memory. In one experiment involving speakers of 23 different lan-
guages, she found that focal colours were given shorter names and named faster than
non-focal colours. And in two follow-up experiments focusing on speakers of English
and Dani (a language with only two basic colour terms), they found that speakers of
both languages remembered focal colours better than non-focal colours, and that Dani
were better at learning to associate words with focal than non-focal colours. Heider
and Olivier (1972) ran another study with English and Dani speakers, which invest-
igated whether there were correspondences between naming and memory within lan-
guages. Participants carried out a naming task in which they named colour stimuli, and
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a memory task in which they looked for a previously seen stimulus among an array. Us-
ing multi-dimensional scaling techniques, Heider and Olivier reconstructed a naming
space and a memory space for speakers of both languages. They found that there was
more divergence between the resultant naming spaces than between thememory spaces,
and that therewas no correspondence between the naming andmemory spaces for either
language. Together with the Berlin and Kay survey, these studies strengthened the uni-
versalist position, and research in this area was quite limited over the next couple of dec-
ades, though not entirely abandoned (e.g., Kay and Kempton 1984; Lucy and Shweder
1979; Bornstein 1985).
However, at the turn of the century, the universalist position was seriously challenged.
Focusing on Berinmo, a language with five basic colour terms, Roberson, Davies and
Davidoff (2000) (see also Davidoff, Davies and Roberson 1999) conducted a series of
experimentswhich set out to replicate some of the keyDani results (Heider 1972b; Heider
and Olivier 1972), and explore the issues further. Their results were generally in conflict
with Rosch’s: they found that Berinmo memory corresponded more closely to Berinmo
naming than to English memory, that Berinmo did not remember focal colours better
than non-focals (once they accounted for response bias), and that the Berinmo were no
better at learning new associations for focal rather than non-focal colours (except for
red, but this is also the centre of a Berinmo category). Then, in several experiments with
different kinds of tasks, they tested for categorical perception with Berinmo and English
speakers, and found that regardless of the paradigm, categorical perception effects did
occur and that they were consistent with the speakers’ native language. In discussing
the results, Roberson et al. also criticised some aspects of Rosch’s methodology and
interpretation, including the use of a biased stimulus set and unjustified emphasis on
only those of her analyses which supported her conclusions. This paper thus gave strong
new support for linguistic relativity.
Roberson et al.’s (2000) experiments revitalised linguistic relativity research in the col-
our domain. Roberson, Davidoff, Davies and Shapiro (2005) extended their findings
to Himba, another language with five basic colour terms. They found the same gen-
eral pattern of results as for Berinmo: Himba memory matched Himba naming bet-
ter than it did English memory, there was no evidence for a focal colour advantage in
memory tasks, and language-specific categorical perception effects were found using
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various methodologies. Winawer et al. (2007) conducted a categorical perception exper-
iment with Russian and English. Russian makes a category distinction which is absent
in English, having separate basic colour terms for (approximately) light and dark blue.
Winawer et al. elicited the Russian boundary and then used it as the basis for a simple
perceptual matching task, in which they found a clear categorical perception effect for
the Russian (but not the English) speakers. Moreover, this effect disappeared when par-
ticipants were given a verbal interference task, but not when given a spatial interference
task. Athanasopoulos (2009) took up a similar case with Greek (another language with
a basic distinction between light and dark blue), but focused on bilingual Greek-English
speakers. He found that the focal colours shifted for participants with different levels
of English. Moreover, although there was no clear difference between bilinguals and
monolingual English speakers which would reveal a categorical perception effect, res-
ults correlated with two of the other independent variables that Athanasopoulos meas-
ured: salience of colour terms and length of time spent in an English-speaking country.
While the results of this study are not unequivocal, they domark the first bilingual study
concerning colour and linguistic relativity.
Although the above studies, focusing on particular languages, have generally found
evidence for linguistic relativity, a few other studies analysed data from the World Col-
our Survey (WCS) in various ways which tended to support a universalist view. The
WCS was compiled in an attempt to improve on Berlin and Kay’s (1969) survey, after
criticisms that it had consisted mainly of languages spoken in industrialised societies
and that much of the data was collected from bilingual speakers who also spoke English
(e.g., Hickerson 1971). The WCS has colour term data from 110 languages spoken in
non-industrialised societies, gathered mostly from monolingual speakers. Kay and Re-
gier (2003) used mathematical clustering techniques and a psychologically meaningful
colour space to plot the WCS colour term systems together, and found that this resulted
in much less variation between languages than there was in hypothetical randomly gen-
erated datasets. In addition, when they made an overall comparison between the WCS
colour terms and those from Berlin and Kay (1969), they again found a correspondence
much greater than expected by chance. Regier, Kay and Cook (2005) followed this up by
looking at focal colours across the WCS dataset, and found that they generally lined up
well with English focal colours. Moreover, comparing again data from the two surveys,
there was a better correspondence in focal colours than there was in category extensions.
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Regier et al. argued for a universal tendency towards certain points in the colour space.
Similar results were obtained by Lindsey and Brown (2006) by applying additional stat-
istical techniques, such as cluster and concordance analyses, to the WCS data. Their
analyses suggested that although there may be differences between languages, there are
still universal language-independent tendencies in colour term systems, and these seem
to derive from biologically biased points in the colour space. A corroborating conclu-
sion was reached from a cross-linguistic study in which participants both named colour
stimuli and freely sorted them into groups (Roberson, Davies, Corbett and Vandervyver
2005). The results showed that although there were substantial differences between the
languages in naming, colour sorting exhibited less cross-linguistic variation. Roberson,
Davies, Corbett and Vandervyver explained the patterns with a hybrid model, combin-
ing both universalist and relativist components.
Some researchers have also investigated developmental issues. Roberson, Davidoff,
Davies and Shapiro (2004) carried out a longitudinal study, assessing 3-year-old (at the
beginning) English-speaking and Himba-speaking children six times over a period of
three years. The children carried out 12 naming, comprehension and memory tasks,
which yielded several findings. First of all, prior to learning any colour terms, children
tended to perform similarly on the memory tasks, but the patterns appeared to be based
on perceptual distance rather than the 11 basic categories of English. Secondly, there
was a lot of variation in the order in which children learned colour terms in both popu-
lations. Third, a memory advantage for focal colours was absent at first, but increased
longitudinally; and this advantage was specific to the focal colours of children’s native
languages. Fourth, learning colour terms was not an instantaneous process: even after
initially learning colour terms, children would only gradually learn their extensions over
a couple of years. Roberson et al. argue that these findings are in conflict with a univer-
salist position, according to which children would just need to learn the names for their
pre-existing colour categories.
However, the developmental evidence is varied. Franklin and Davies (2004) conducted
three experiments with 4-month-old infants, using a looking time technique, and found
that they showed categorical perception effects for adult colour categories. Franklin,
Clifford, Williamson and Davies (2005) then followed this up with experiments with
naming, comprehension and matching tasks, involving young English-speaking and
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Himba-speaking children. The results were consistent with Franklin and Davies (2004)
but quite different from those of Roberson et al. (2004). Both Himba and English chil-
dren showed categorical perception effects, even for category boundaries that existed in
English but not in Himba. Moreover, the effect was no larger for children with more
developed colour vocabularies. Goldstein, Davidoff and Roberson (2009) sought to re-
concile the findings of Roberson et al. and Franklin et al. with two more developmental
experiments. With English children, they replicated Franklin et al.’s (2005) results when
using their methods of analysis, but found that using a stricter criterion for colour term
knowledge, the categorical perception effect disappeared for the children with less col-
our term understanding. With Himba children, they found a categorical perception ef-
fect for only one of the two category boundaries they investigated, and argued that even
this could be explained in terms of other linguistic and cultural factors. The debate was
continued by Franklin, Wright and Davies (2009), who found their original results un-
changed when they reanalysed their data using Goldstein et al.’s adapted criterion, and
discussed other work which had presented findings in conflict with those of Goldstein
et al. They also pointed out theoretical shortcomings in this line of work, and called for
new methods to investigate the issues.
A recent study has also shed light on the debate in an intriguing new way. Gilbert,
Regier, Kay and Ivry (2006) pioneered an investigation based on a consideration of
brain lateralisation. They hypothesised that, due to dominance of the left hemisphere
of the brain in most language tasks (Hellige 1993), and the contralateralisation of the
primate visual system (Tootell, Silverman, Hamilton, Switkes and De Valois 1988), lan-
guage may be more implicated in perception in the right visual field (RVF) than the
left visual field (LVF). They tested this possibility with two experiments in which par-
ticipants looked for a target stimulus among a ring of otherwise identical stimuli. The
results confirmed the hypothesis. In the RVF, 13 participants were significantly faster at
finding between-category rather than within-category targets; no difference was found
in the LVF. Moreover, these results were reversed when participants were also given a
verbal interference task: in this case, they were actually faster on within-category than
between-category trials. A third experiment sought evidence that the source of the ef-
fects was indeed brain lateralisation. The same experimental procedure was carried out
by a split-brain patient with lesions in the left hemisphere. The results confirmed that
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the patient was much slower in general when the target was in the RVF, and that only in
the RVF was there a between-category advantage.
There have been a couple of follow-ups to Gilbert et al.’s (2006) study. Drivonikou et al.
(2007) first examined data from two previous experiments in which a target colour was
searched among distractors (Daoutis, Pilling andDavies 2006), and reanalysed it in terms
of the LVF and RVF. They also conducted their own two experiments, in which parti-
cipants saw a single stimulus on the background of a similar colour. Participants in-
dicated on which side of the display the stimulus appeared, and their reaction times
were measured. The results from both approaches were similar though not identical to
those of Gilbert et al.: in general, the category effect was stronger in the RVF than in
the LVF, but there was still an effect in the LVF as well. Drivonikou et al. speculated
that the LVF effects could be due to either language affecting both visual fields (albeit,
not equally), or that they indicate universal category distinctions. Roberson, Pak and
Hanley (2008) decided to test these possibilities. Noting that Korean made a colour dis-
tinction which English did not, they conducted an experiment testing for corresponding
categorical perception effects with Korean and English participants. They used the same
visual search paradigm with a target among a ring of distractors as Gilbert et al. and
Drivonikou et al. The results revealed a between-category advantage for the Korean
speakers in both visual fields, and in neither for the English speakers. Roberson et al.
argued on the basis of these results that the LVF effect is also due to language, and not
to universal categories. However, Franklin et al. (2008) extended this line of research to
infants, from which they drew different conclusions. They compared performance in the
visual fields for both adults and infants, and found that while adults again did better
in the RVF, prelinguistic infants actually performed better in the LVF. They argued from
this that only the RVF effect was language-driven.
A few other colour experiments have added evidence from neuropsychological patients.
Roberson, Davidoff and Braisby (1999) conducted a case study with a patient who had
suffered a left hemisphere stroke which left him with intact visual processing but im-
paired naming. They compared his performance with controls on several kinds of tasks,
and found that he had normal performance on some tasks (e.g., recognising a previously
seen colour or choosing the “odd” one out of three colours), but heavily impaired in oth-
ers (e.g., naming colours and freely classifying them into groups). They argued from
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the pattern of results that he had intact and normal implicit knowledge of colour cat-
egories, but was unable to explicitly use it. However, Haslam et al. (2007) carried out a
follow-up longitudinal study which looked further into free classification performance
in another patient with declining language abilities. They first emphasised the need for
an objective measure to compare two people’s sets of categories (which they stressed
was lacking in Roberson et al.’s study), and found substantial variation among control
participants upon applying one. They then tested the patient in both naming and free
classification tasks across three different sessions. The results showed that although his
performance in naming underwent profound degradation, his categorisation was sim-
ilar to that of controls, and did not diverge across the sessions. Haslam et al. concluded,
contra Roberson et al., that colour categorisation does not depend on language.
In summary, the multi-pronged investigations of linguistic relativity in the colour do-
main have yielded a wealth of data with varying results. While questions remain, it is
becoming increasingly clear that it is oversimplistic to expect a simple black-and-white
answer concerning language’s role in colour cognition. As Regier and Kay (2009) argue,
it is long time to end the battle between relativists and universalists. Language does play
a role in colour conceptualisation, but its impact is limited and balanced by other factors,
particularly human biology and perception.
3.3.3 Objects
Object stimuli have also been extensively used in linguistic relativity research. However,
for themost part the purpose has been to study the potential impacts that different gram-
matical distinctions might have. For instance, languages vary in whether they require
count/mass or gender distinctions, and researchers have examined whether these dis-
tinctions have cognitive consequences for how objects are conceptualised (e.g., Sera et al.
2002; Imai and Mazuka 2007; Lucy and Gaskins 2001; Boroditsky, Schmidt and Phillips
2003).
However, as indicated in Section 3.3.1, I focus here on lexical effects, and these have been
much less studied. An important exception consists of a series of experiments conduc-
ted by Barbara Malt and her colleagues. These experiments have investigated whether
differences in how object domains get lexically partitioned correspond with how the
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objects are perceived and categorised non-linguistically. In a first experiment (Malt, Slo-
man, Gennari, Shi and Wang 1999), native speakers of English, Spanish and Mandarin
carried out two kinds of tasks with sixty pictures of every-day containers (i.e., bottles,
jars, etc.). First, they sorted the items into groups based on similarity. The numbers,
sizes, and nature of the categories was up to the participants. After that, they were
asked to label each item with the way they would normally refer to it. Linguistic cat-
egories were then induced by considering what head nouns (e.g., the head noun of “big,
red bottle” is “bottle”) were used for each item. Upon comparing category patterns, the
results showed that the different language groups partitioned the set of items differently
in naming, but achieved quite similar groupings in sorting. Moreover, there was no cor-
respondence between the naming and sorting patterns within a language. These results
suggested that languages have different lexical concepts, but that these do not affect how
we group or perceive things in general. Note that my first experiment in this thesis was
largely a replication of Malt et al.’s study, so I will discuss it in more detail in Section 5.2.
Since their original study, Malt and colleagues have pursued several further issues re-
garding the relationship between linguistic and similarity-based categories. One study
(Malt and Sloman 2003) looked at the naming patterns of non-native speakers of English
in the United States, and discovered that there were differences between their (English)
linguistic categories and those of native English speakers. Moreover, they found that
these differences were smaller for speakers with more English experience, and that, in
this regard, the length of immersion in an English-speaking environment was more rel-
evant than the amount of formal instruction or age of introduction to English. This study
did not, however, involve similarity-based sorting tasks.
In another study, Ameel, Storms, Malt and Sloman (2005) looked at the correspondences
between naming and sorting patterns in bilingual speakers of Dutch and French, com-
pared to monolinguals. The procedure was very similar to Malt et al.’s (1999) original
experiment, with the main difference being that bilinguals did the naming task in both
languages. The analysis first replicated the previous findings: Dutch and French mono-
linguals exhibited different naming patterns from each other, even though they sorted
the items in much the same way. In addition, a closer look at the data, and elaborated
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further by Ameel, Malt, Storms and Van Assche (2009), showed that the bilinguals’ nam-
ing categories in the two different languages were very close to each other, and lay in
between the monolingual French and Dutch ones.
Another set of experiments (Ameel, Malt and Storms 2008) investigated developmental
aspects of these issues. Participants were native Dutch speakers, and included children
of several ages between 5 and 14, and monolingual adults. The naming patterns for the
different age groups showed a gradual convergence of the children’s linguistic categor-
ies onto those of adults. Ameel et al. also explored the features which participants were
using to label the items, and found that although children initially seemed to categorise
in a more holistic way than adults, they gradually learned to attend to the adult fea-
ture set. Finally, sorting patterns also suggested that younger children judged similarity
between items differently from adults, but again converged on the adult patterns with
time. However, Ameel et al. point out that the fact that convergence occurs in both nam-
ing and sorting does not imply that naming has a causal role. Indeed, the direction may
be reversed, so that sensitivity to more complex features emerging during development
may be required to fully learn adult lexical categories. Alternatively, given the dissoci-
ation between linguistic and non-linguistic categorisation found byMalt et al. (1999), the
two may develop relatively independently.
3.3.4 Other domains
3.3.4.1 Space
After colour, the most studied domain in linguistic relativity, especially in recent years,
is probably that of space. This is because spatial relations also exhibit substantial cross-
linguistic variation (Talmy 1983), but are less likely to be constrained by biological as-
pects of human perception, and have the potential for more far-reaching cognitive con-
sequences (Gentner and Goldin-Meadow 2003b).
Choi and Bowerman (1991) explored a few basic spatial relations in Korean and English
experimentally, and showed that the spatial categories of the two languages cross-cut
and overlapped each other in clear and significant ways. This means that the languages
required their speakers tomake different distinctions in their language use. McDonough,
Choi and Mandler (2003) followed this up and showed that adult native speakers of a
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language were insensitive to some distinctions important in the other language, even
though this was not yet the case for prelinguistic infants from the same cultural back-
ground. In contrast, Munnich, Landau and Dosher (2001) compared adult speakers of
three languages in spatial language andmemory tasks, but found that despite certain key
lexical differences between the languages, there were no corresponding cross-linguistic
differences in memory performance.
In a related line of research, Levinson (2003) has explored the cross-linguistic variation
in spatial frames of reference, which concern (at the risk of oversimplifying) how the
relative locations and orientations of things are expressed (e.g., “in front of me”, “to the
north of me”). He conducted experiments involving rotating tables and memory tasks
to show that the type of frame of reference typically employed by one’s native language
has consequences for how one encodes spatial configurations and events. Other exper-
iments have found that the non-linguistic “defaults” of infants and apes coincide on
the same general frame of reference, suggesting that 16 languages which use different
systems must “override” those defaults (Haun, Call, Janzen and Levinson 2006; Haun,
Rapold, Call, Janzen and Levinson 2006). However, there are also findings which argue
against Whorfian effects, or at least in favour of weaker ones: for instance, Li and Gleit-
man (2002) have shown that the kinds of effects found by Levinson are limited, in that
they can be overridden by contextual factors, such as the presence of conspicuous land-
marks. Thus, overall, findings in the spatial domain have generally supported claims
of linguistic relativity, although the interpretation and scope of the results needs to be
treated with caution.
There have also been studies concerned specifically with motion events. Gennari, Slo-
man, Malt and Fitch (2002) investigated whether the conflation pattern differences in
linguistic event encoding between English and Spanish (Talmy 1985) had consequences
in recognition and similarity tasks. Using triads of short video clips in which the target
clip had one alternative which varied in path, and another which varied in manner, they
confirmed the linguistic differences via naming tasks, but generally found little correla-
tion between them and performance in non-linguistic tasks. However, they did find that
if Spanish speakers desribed the clips linguistically while first viewing them, it affected
their performance on subsequent similarity tasks in a way which reflected the Spanish
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language’s emphasis on path overmanner. Thus, while these results were generally anti-
Whorfian, they do suggest that language may have an effect in the encoding of events
online. A similar study was conducted by Papafragou et al. (2002) with Greek and Eng-
lish. In this case, the results were more unequivocal: the languages differed in how they
encoded motion, but participants performed identically on non-linguistic tasks.
3.3.4.2 Number
In the domain of number, there are languages which do not have full counting systems,
but only have a few words for the smallest integers, and then global terms like “few”
or “many”. For instance, Mundurukú uses count words for 1, 2 and 3, and arguably
4 and 5 (Pica, Lerner, Izard and Dehaene 2004), while Pirahã does not even use 1 and
2 consistently (Gordon 2004). Does this mean that native speakers of these languages
have a difficult time dealing with non-trivial numerosities? It has often been argued that
language is necessary for the development of number concepts (Hurford 1987; Carey
2004). Empirical results on this question are mixed: some experiments seem to show that
numerical cognition is limited in speakers of such languages (Gordon 2004), while others
find that there is little or no impact (Gelman and Gallistel 2004). Nevertheless, if there
are language-induced limitations, they do not seem to be insurmountable, since there is
evidence (for example) that speakers of these languages can easily learn counting words
from other languages if there are pressures for doing so (e.g., as in modern commerce,
Dixon 1980).
3.3.4.3 Time
Some researchers have also looked at the domain of time. Although time is a more ab-
stract domain and difficult to pin down non-linguistically, it has been argued that in
many (if not all) cultures, people think of time in terms of space through broad con-
ceptual metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). In a series of experiments, Boroditsky
(2001) tested this proposal with native speakers of Mandarin and English. According
to Boroditsky, while English predominantly frames temporal relations horizontally (e.g.,
“push deadlines back”), Mandarin also systematically frames them vertically (although
English does so sporadically, e.g., “the meeting was coming up”). In line with this dif-
ference, Mandarin speakers processed temporal relations faster after being exposed to a
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vertical spatial prime (e.g., one ball above another ball) than a horizontal one, while the
opposite was true for English speakers. However, if English speakers were trained on
a set of vertical spatial terms, their behaviour on the vertical temporal relations began
to mirror that of the Mandarin speakers. Boroditsky concludes that our native language
powerfully shapes our thinking about time (and other abstract domains), but does not
strictly determine it.
However, the reliability of Boroditsky’s (2001) results has come under considerable at-
tack. Both January and Kako (2007) and Chen (2007) failed to replicate her findings.
In addition to criticising Boroditsky’s (2001) interpretation of her results, January and
Kako made six separate replication attempts with English speakers, and despite discus-
sions with Boroditsky to resolve any methodological differences from the original stud-
ies, none of the experiments revealed a significant advantage of horizontal primes over
vertical primes. Chen first searched the Internet and found that in fact, contra Borod-
itsky’s assumption, Mandarin, like English, uses horizontal expressions for time more
frequently than vertical expressions. Moreover, he also failed to replicate Boroditsky’s
findings despite four attempts with Chinese-English bilinguals.
3.3.5 Theoretical positions
In summary, then, the range of empirical studies on linguistic relativity has yielded
mixed results. There appear to be universal and non-arbitrary aspects to colour cog-
nition, but language-specific partitionings of the colour space do play a role as well.
People are sometimes more sensitive to the spatial distinctions which are encoded by
their language, and their memory can be affected by the spatial frame of reference nor-
mally employed by their language, but the extent and conditions of these phenomena
are still unclear. Numerical cognition does seem to sometimes correlate with the range
of number terms in a language, although these can be overcome through cross-cultural
interaction. The spatial metaphors that languages use to talk about time might have an
impact on thinking about time, but results are inconsistent. Object cognition seems to be
uncorrelated with cross-linguistic differences, although there are exceptions, especially
those involving obligatory grammatical distinctions.
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In light of this growing body of subtle results, advocates of linguistic relativity have
generally shifted from the strong claim that language determines thought to the weaker
claim that language influences thought. However, as Carruthers (2002) points out, an
ultra-weak Whorfian view (i.e., that language affects thought in some way) is as trivially
true as an ultra-strong Whorfian view is trivially false. Consequently, the current chal-
lenge is to formulate precise weak versions of the Whorf hypothesis, and evaluate them
based on empirical research (Hunt and Agnoli 1991). Essentially, the questions now
comes down to: to what extent, how, when and why does language affect non-linguistic
cognition?
A variety of “neo-Whorfian” views have been put forth. Hunt and Agnoli (1991) ar-
gue that in shifting to a weaker and more plausible version of linguistic relativity, the
question should shift to how natural and computationally costly expressing the same
thought is in different languages. Languages differ in what kinds of structural features
they require and encode, so that “at any point in time a language user thinks most ef-
ficiently about those topics for which his or her lexicon has provided an efficient code”
(p. 378). Levinson (2003) uses evidence mainly from cross-linguistic spatial cognition
experiments to argue that, in order for it to be possible to later discuss experiences, it
is necessary for people to encode the aspects of those experiences that their native lan-
guages emphasise: “Language is an output system. The output must meet the local
semantic requirements. Consequently, the input to language production must code for
the right distinctions” (p. 301). Slobin (1996) proposes a more conservative but more
tacklable version of the Whorfian hypothesis, by shifting from the static notions of ‘lan-
guage’ and ‘thought’ to the more dynamic notions of ‘speaking’ and ‘thinking’. The
basic idea is similar to Levinson’s in its emphasis on the different distinctions that differ-
ent languages require of their speakers, except that Slobin restricts his claims partly to
the time of speaking: “the expression of experience in linguistic terms constitutes think-
ing for speaking - a special form of thought mobilised for communication” (p. 76). For
example, people who speak a language which emphasises path over manner in motion
may attend to path aspects of motion events more, but perhaps only if they are witness-
ing themwhile using language. Another view is that, when faced with a difficult cognit-
ive task, people can rely on the distinctions of their native language (Kay and Kempton
1984). In this view, lexical classification can be exploited by people if needed as a sort of
“naming strategy” when appropriate.
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At the moment, it remains difficult to disambiguate between these different views. Al-
though some researchers have made efforts to assess these views based on particular
experiments (e.g., Gennari et al. 2002) or larger sets of studies (e.g., Levinson 2003), it is
too early tomake a single coherent story for all the data available. However, at the risk of
speculation, perhaps the various neo-Whorfian proposals can be seen broadly as varying
in strength, and which one best applies may depend on the domain and context under
consideration. In some cases, the cognitive system seems to be significantly transformed
by language in order to provide necessary input for it (e.g., orientation for languages
with absolute frames of reference). In other cases, it may be merely more sensitive to
distinctions made by the language, but can still handle other distinctions (e.g., categor-
ical perception in colour). Still further, these differences may only occur when language
is being used (e.g., processing of motion events). And then there may also be situations
where it only comes up when people consciously use language as an explicit strategy
(e.g., difficult colour discriminations). Finally, there may of course be cases where lan-
guage has no impact on non-linguistic cognition at all. Therefore, it may turn out to be
fruitless to seek one overarching explanation for all linguistic relativity phenomena.
3.3.6 Conclusion
Linguistic relativity research relates closely to one of the main questions in my thesis. In
particular, does having the same native language coordinate the way people conceptu-
alise things? While the evidence suggests that it does, the depth of this coordination is
unclear, and seems to depend on the domain and context.
Interestingly, although the object domain plays a primary role in many disciplines con-
cerned with concepts, ranging from experimental cognitive psychology to theoretical
philosophy, it has seen little direct attention in investigations of linguistic relativity. The
limited studies that have been done suggest that non-linguistic object categorisation is
not influenced by one’s native language. However, they (and other studies of this sort)
have not addressed conceptual coordination.
Nevertheless, provided that we solve certain methodological challenges (see Chapter 4),
the kinds of experiments used to study linguistic relativity could be readily accommod-
ated for this purpose, and fit in well with the theoretical model I developed in Chapter 2.
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Consider, for example, Malt et al.’s (1999) study. Again, native speakers of three dif-
ferent languages carried out two different categorisation tasks, one linguistic and one
non-linguistic. Using data gathered in this way, it would be possible to pair up people
(whether with speakers of different languages or the same language) and compare their
categorisations (whether linguistic or non-linguistic). Such comparisons are shown in
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 for linguistic and non-linguistic comparisons, respectively. There-









Figure 3.1: Comparison of two people’s linguistic categorisations. The difference between their
conceptualisations (assuming it can be quantified) is indicated with δ. Note that if the people are
native speakers of the same language, then we may have w1 = w2. Also, there may be overlap







Figure 3.2: Same comparison as in Figure 3.1, except this time the categorisation is non-
linguistic, so that concepts are not lexicalised.
3.4 Linguistic interaction
In this section, I move on to the other timescale that I have identified at which language
could coordinate people’s concepts. I begin by discussing how dialogue, which consti-
tutes the most natural form of language use, is both a paradigmatic example and special
component of social interaction. I then discuss how dialogue relies on shared informa-
tion between interlocutors, and builds off of it. Next, I discuss a recent theory claiming
that during dialogue, people align different levels of mental representation with each
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other. After that, two key sections review empirical evidence on conceptual alignment,
first during and then after interaction. Finally, I summarise the discussion and point out
important unanswered questions concerning conceptual alignment in dialogue.
3.4.1 Joint action and dialogue
Up to this point, we have looked at language and words from the point of view of the
individual, and how long-term immersion in the same languagemight result in some de-
gree of conceptual coordination between people. Even though I have begun to consider
the implications of the shared nature of words on an individual’s concepts and concep-
tualisations, I have still, in a sense, been modelling the individual as a mostly isolated
input-output organism.
However, since hearing other people’s words can affect how a person conceptualises
something, and linguistic interaction typically involves a rapid exchange ofmanywords,
we need to look beyond this oversimplification. Indeed, Clark (1996) emphasises this
issue in developing a theory of language use. He points out that language use has typ-
ically been studied from two broadly different perspectives. Cognitive scientists have
generally adopted a “product approach”, in which the focus is on the individual, treat-
ing hearers or speakers in decontextualised isolation. In contrast, social scientists have
more often followed an “action approach”, which centres on intentions and social ac-
tions but neglects the thoughts and actions of individuals. Clark opts strongly for the
action approach, arguing that the product approach is fundamentally inadequate and
incompatible with the social, interactive and contextual nature of language use. This is
especially clear since face-to-face conversation seems to be the most fundamental use of
language, as it is universal across human societies, does not require special skills, and is
the basic setting of children’s language acquisition. However, Clark (1996) also emphas-
ises that a theory of language use must incorporate aspects of both individual and social
cognition, since it must take into account both the intentions and actions of individuals
and how they are embedded in joint processes.
Clark’s (1996) view centres on the idea that language use is a form of “joint action”. He
identifies joint actions as those in which two or more people coordinate their individual
actions. Participants may play different individual roles and carry out correspondingly
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different actions, but they achieve something together as a unit (e.g., two people play-
ing a duet). Clark argues that linguistic dialogue is a particularly good example of joint
action. This is because conversation does not involve an isolated speaker and an isol-
ated listener, but rather the intimate coordination of speaking and listening processes
between interlocutors attempting to achieve mutual understanding. Therefore, a theory
of language use can benefit significantly from the study of joint action in general.
This is significant, because joint action is pervasive in human social life, and is exempli-
fied in such diverse joint activities as buying food at the supermarket, playing a game
of chess, or moving heavy furniture. Moreover, in addition to being itself a form of joint
action, language use is also intimately involved as a means of achieving other forms of it.
In fact, Clark (1996) argues that “language use and joint activity are inseparable” (p. 29).
However, he also emphasises that some activities rely more on language than others, so
that the extent to which joint activities rely on language varies along a “discourse con-
tinuum” (p. 50), ranging from mostly linguistic activities (e.g., talking on the phone) to
mostly non-linguistic ones (e.g., playing a string quartet) .
Systematic study of joint action has been significantly developed in recent years, and
it has not been confined to language-based studies. To illustrate, Richardson, Marsh,
Isenhower, Goodman and Schmidt (2007) examined the physical coordination between
people sitting side-by-side in rocking chairs. They found that participants tended to
synchronise their rocking, even when they were asked to rock at their own pace and
were given chairs with different natural rocking frequencies. Sebanz, Bekkering and
Knoblich (2006) review a range of recent studies in developmental psychology, cognitive
psychology and cognitive neuroscience, with the aim of identifying mechanisms which
underly successful joint action. They conclude that joint action relies largely on the abil-
ities to share representations and predict and integrate actions, and that these abilities
in turn build off of a capacity for joint attention and a close link between perception
and action. Moreover, Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne and Moll (2005) argue that the
abilities to share behaviours, goals and intentions emerge in stages very early in human
development. According to them, human infants are able to interact with others towards
a shared goal and with coordinated action plans from around the age of 12-15 months.
This ability seems to underly language acquisition and precedes a full-fledged theory of
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mind by several years. In comparing human infants to non-human primates, Tomasello
et al. also argue that these abilities are uniquely human.
To sum up, then, joint action is pervasive in human social life, and involves the co-
ordination of individual actions by two or more people for a common purpose. This
coordination seems to concern both mental representations and processes. While joint
action is evident in non-linguistic human interaction, language use is intimately asso-
ciated with joint action in two ways. First, even in activities that are not intrinsically
linguistic and could in principle be carried out without language (e.g., playing football),
participants often use language in the course of the activity. Second, language use itself,
and especially dialogue, its canonical form, is a good example of joint action.
3.4.2 Common ground
3.4.2.1 Theoretical background
Participants in a conversation rely on lots of shared information about things, people
and events in the world. Clark and Brennan (1991) emphasise its importance in conver-
sational coordination: “they [interlocutors] cannot even begin to coordinate on content
without assuming a vast amount of shared information or common ground” (p. 127).
Common ground is a technical notion developed by Stalnaker (1978) (although it has
earlier origins), who defined it as the knowledge that speakers believe they share in
communication. Clark (1996) broadened the concept to include other types of represent-
ations shared by people, and not necessarily restricted to conversation: “Two people’s
common ground is, in effect, the sum of their mutual, common, or joint knowledge, be-
liefs and suppositions” (p. 93). Clark uses the example of a chess game to show how
common ground generally consists of different kinds of information, obtained at differ-
ent temporal stages. At any point during a game of chess, the players share knowledge
of how the game works in general, of how to interpret the board and pieces, and of
popular strategies. But they also share knowledge of the current state of that particular
game, and the steps that took place to get it there. Of course, as Clark points out, there
may also be discrepancies between people’s representations of their common ground.
When these are discovered, they can either be ignored (especially if they are small), or
corrected (as is usually done, according to Clark).
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But what is the basis for common ground? Clark and Marshall (1981) argue that it is not
enough for people to independently have the same knowledge. For example, if I refer to
“Sue’s cat” while talking to you, this requires not just me to know Sue and that she has
a cat, but also you to know that too, and for me to know that you know. In fact, Clark
and Marshall show with an extended example that in general, the common ground that
underlies conversation involves an infinite number of recursively defined conditions.
In particular, two interlocutors A and B have mutual knowledge of a proposition p if A
knows that p, B knows that p, A knows that B knows that p, B knows that A knows that p,
A knows that B knows that A knows that p, etc, etc. Of course, people cannot in practice
check such a list of conditions when constructing or interpreting an utterance, and Clark
and Marshall emphasise that this would be psychologically implausible. Instead, they
propose that common ground is checked via “copresence heuristics”, by which people
check their memory for evidence that they were “openly present together” with the ref-
erent in question, either directly or indirectly. Such evidence can be of three general
types: community membership (interlocutors belong to the same community and hence
can be expected to know certain things), physical co-presence (the referent is or was be-
ing attended to by both interlocutors) or linguistic co-presence (the referent has already
been established earlier). For this to work, Clark and Marshall argue, our memory must
contain information not just about the things we interact with, but also with whom we
do so.
Clark and Brennan (1991) point out that, during conversation, interlocutors are not just
passively relying on their common ground, but are constantly updating it. This process,
which Clark and Brennan refer to as “grounding”, occurs not just by a speaker men-
tioning new things in a conversation, but also by the interlocutors both making sure
that the hearer understood them as intended. Clark and Brennan discuss how people
resort to different kinds of strategies for achieving this depending on their purpose of
communication. For instance, when identifying objects, they tend to provide alternative
descriptions or use gestures like pointing, while for communicating something verbatim
(e.g., a telephone number), they might resort to spelling. Clark and Brennan also explore
how the medium of communication can shape grounding, identifying eight relevant di-
mensions along which different media differ, such as copresence and simultaneity. De-
pending on the features of a given medium, grounding may be easier or more difficult,
and may require different methods, which can in turn result in additional processing
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costs. For example, communication via email does not normally involve sharing the
same physical environment, and it is asynchronous. As such, it may often require more
explicitness than face-to-face conversation.
3.4.2.2 Interactive dialogue experiments
Common ground has been experimentally shown to play an important role in commu-
nication. However, in order to contextualise some key examples, it’s important to men-
tion a paradigm which was originally used for somewhat different questions but which
has since been recruited for many studies of common ground. In particular, Krauss and
colleagues used a referential communication task with participant pairs in several stud-
ies. For instance, in one experiment (Krauss and Weinheimer 1966), the speaker had a
card with six unusual figures on it, and the listener had several such cards with the same
figures but in different orders. Their task was to get the listener to identify which of his
cards had the figures in the same order as the speaker’s cards. The results showed that
over a series of such tasks, the speaker’s referring expressions became shorter. Moreover,
the decrease was greater when the speaker got either of two forms of feedback: concur-
rent feedback from the listener and confirmation of whether or not the listener identified
the right card.
Clark andWilkes-Gibbs (1986) explored howdialogue participants established reference.
They point out that traditional theories of reference separate the speaker and hearer, with
the speaker being fully in charge of selecting an appropriate noun phrase, and the hearer
merely receiving and interpreting it. However, in real dialogue, hearers contribute to the
conversation and speakers monitor hearers for understanding. Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs
adapted Krauss and Weinheimer’s (1966) method to investigate this issue. They found
that speakers and hearers collaborated closely and gradually in the construction and
interpretation of referential expressions. And indeed, their roles were not discrete: for
instance, speakers used hedges or asked for confirmation of understanding, while listen-
ers expressed confusion, made guesses, and proposed their own contributions. Negoti-
ation continued until they reached “mutual acceptance” (p. 9) that understanding had
been achieved. Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs thus proposed that speakers and hearers take
“mutual responsibility” (p. 33) for the hearer’s understanding of the speaker’s intended
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meaning. Moreover, like Krauss andWeinheimer, they also found that referential expres-
sions got shorter during interaction. They proposed that this was because interlocutors
sought to “minimize collaborative effort” (p. 26), so that as they converged on a common
understanding they could get away with more compact expressions.
Another important issue relating to common ground concerns one’s degree of involve-
ment in a conversation. Schober and Clark (1989) conducted an experiment with a ref-
erential matching task and a triad of participants: speaker, addressee and overhearer.
The participants could hear but not see each other, and had the same set of figures be-
fore them. The speaker instructed the addressee on how to rearrange the figures in a
certain order and the addressee could respond and ask for clarifications, while the over-
hearer only listened. Even though overhearers heard everything that speakers said, they
rearranged the figures less efficiently than addressees. Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark (1992)
looked into this issue further by considering different non-addressee (or “bystander”)
conditions and having the speaker switch to addressing them part-way through the ex-
periment. They found that the efficiency withwhich the new pairs carried out thematch-
ing tasks depended on the condition that the addressee had been in as bystander. Effi-
ciency was highestwhen the bystander had sat next to the speaker, intermediate when he
had watched and heard everything through a video screen (and the speaker was aware
of this), and lowest when the bystander had either sat out of view of the cards or had
been absent completely. Moreover, speakers’ referential expressions also reflected this
pattern, so that the greater the participation of the bystander, the shorter and more con-
cise were the speaker’s referential expressions upon switching. Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark
concluded that there were various levels of common ground, and that these affected the
form and efficiency of subsequent communication.
It’s worth emphasising that there was no difference in efficiency in Wilkes-Gibbs and
Clark (1992) experiment when the bystander only heard the speaker and addressee com-
municate and when he was not present at all. This indicates that hearing the referential
expressions on their own was useless without seeing how they were coupled with par-
ticular figures. Several other experiments have examined how important visual inform-
ation may be in successful communication in these kinds of tasks. Kraut et al. (2003)
conducted two experiments in which participants carried out a physical bicycle repair
task either alone or with the help of a bicycle expert. In the latter case, they manipulated
CHAPTER 3. CONCEPTUALISATIONAND SHAREDWORDS 101
the location of the expert and the communication medium. They found that the repairs
were more efficient when the workers received help, andmost efficient when the experts
were in fact in the room with them. However, if the expert was remote, it made no dif-
ference if they were only able to communicate through audio, or if the expert also had
access to a video display (from a camera mounted on the worker’s forehead). Gergle
et al. (2004) used a computerised matching task, in which they manipulated whether the
director had a view of the matcher’s workspace while instructing him how to arrange a
set of colour patches in a particular configuration. They found that pairs solved the task
faster and communicated more efficiently (i.e., used fewer words) when they shared the
visual space. Moreover, the advantage was larger if the patches fluctuated in colour
(making them hard to describe verbally), and a three-second delay in updating the dir-
ector’s view removed the speed advantage (but not the efficiency advantage). Clark and
Krych (2004) conducted a similar experiment in which directors instructed builders to
build lego models. The experimenters manipulated whether the directors could see the
matchers’ workspace and whether the participants could see each other’s faces. They
found that visibility of the workspace greatly increased the matchers’ building speed
and decreased errors. In contrast, although facial visibility was exploited through the
use of eye gaze and head gestures, it did not lead to faster model-building.
In considering the usefulness of visual information, it’s important to acknowledge that
various body signals and gestures can also be very useful in communication and indic-
ative of coordination. In a referential task, Hanna and Brennan (2007) showed that eye
gaze can be used faster to disambiguate between items than linguistic expressions, even
whenmatchers and directors had reversed displays. Of course, when people are actively
interacting, they can and do also use their hands. Goldin-Meadow and Wagner (2005)
review gesture studies and argue that gestures are used both by speakers to help with
their thinking and by listeners to infer speakers’ intended meanings. Pointing in partic-
ular plays an important role in establishing joint attention and building common ground
from a very early age (Tomasello, Carpenter and Liszkowski 2007).
3.4.2.3 Comprehension and production experiments
Many researchers have focused on either comprehension or production when invest-
igating the role of common ground in referential communication. Although my own
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experiments will not exhibit such an asymmetry, it’s worth having a quick overview of
the range of effects that have been documented.
By conducting experiments in which the speaker and listener had visibility of slightly
different subsets of the same grid of objects, it has been shown that listeners seem to
consider what speakers can see and thus what is common ground, even if they are
also influenced by things that they can only see themselves (Hanna, Tanenhaus and
Trueswell 2003). However, Keysar, Barr, Balin and Brauner (2000) showed that listen-
ers’ initial interpretations of speakers’ expressions were egocentric, not paying attention
to common ground. Moreover, Barr and Keysar (2002) showed evidence that listeners
expect speakers to adhere to linguistic precedents (rather than common ground), even
if they are unnecessarily specific (e.g., “the big apple” when there is only one apple), or
when a new speaker takes over. In contrast, Metzing and Brennan (2003) demonstrated
a partner-specific effect: listeners comprehended new expressions to old objects more
slowly when theywere used by the same speaker rather than a new speaker. Kronmüller
and Barr (2007) qualified these results by showing that listeners tend to rely on partner-
specific associations only later in processing, so that there were two distinct processes at
work. Moreover, Shintel and Keysar (2007) demonstrated that listeners expected speak-
ers to use referring expressions they had used previously, even if they were not aware
that the listeners had heard them. However, Brown-Schmidt et al. (2008) showed that
common ground effects were sensitive to the types of utterances involved. And Brown-
Schmidt (2009) showed that if the tasks were more interactive, as in normal dialogue,
then partner-specific effects were evident from early processing stages. This family of
studies has been complemented by recent eye-tracking experiments: Richardson and
Dale (2005) demonstrated that interlocutors’ coordination of eye movement (even when
they did not see each other) with respect to an array of figures corresponded to better
comprehension on the part of the listener, and Richardson, Dale and Kirkham (2007)
found that coordination increased if their common ground was first supplemented by
giving them the same background information. Nevertheless, the debate about the role
of common ground in comprehension continues (Brennan and Hanna 2009; Shintel and
Keysar 2009).
The oppose side of the coin, of how speakers tailor their referential expressions to ad-
dressees in production (known as “audience design”) has also been investigated extens-
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ively, especially by William Horton and colleagues. Brown and Dell (1987) showed that
speakers, when retelling a story, did not generally take confederate listeners’ knowledge
into account, and suggested that speakers only did so in monitoring and repair. How-
ever, using naive participants as listeners, which may have been important if speakers
pick up on subtle cues from listeners, Lockridge and Brennan (2002) found the oppos-
ite result. Horton and Keysar (1996) further showed that speakers did not tailor their
referring expressions to the common ground if they were under time pressure. Simil-
arly, Bard et al. (2000) found that speakers simplified their expressions over time regard-
less of whether they changed who they were addressing. They argued that speakers’
production was best explained by a combination of fast ego-centric priming based on
the speaker’s knowledge and slow, optional inferences about the listener’s knowledge.
However, Galati and Brenna (2010) qualified these findings by showing that speak-
ers’ simplifications were more dramatic when they interacted with the same listeners
rather than switching listeners. On the other hand, Horton and Gerrig (2002) found that
when speakers were aware of the need for audience design, they resisted the tendency
to use consistent or increasingly short expressions when switching addressees, while
also learning to improve their expressions better with time and experience. Further-
more, Horton and Gerrig (2005a,b) and Horton (2007) used experiments with changing
addressees and a telephone conversation corpus to argue that speaker partner-specific
effects are not a product of special processes involving explicit consideration of common
ground, but rather are rooted in basic memory traces. As such, people are more likely to
use certain terms when speaking with certain interlocutors because they are associated
relatively strongly in their memory. Finally, Keysar and Henly (2002) showed that when
speakers were asked to say ambiguous sentences to addressees with a certain intended
meaning, they overestimated their own effectiveness, even though overhearers hearing
the same utterances did not.
3.4.2.4 Summary
In summary, in this section I first introduced the notion of common ground. I then re-
viewed empirical work which explored the role and development of common ground in
conversation, covering bothmore interactive experiments as well as thosewhich focused
more on either comprehension or production. Considering the body of studies together,
it has been clearly established that common ground plays a role in comprehension and
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production during linguistic interaction. What is debatable, however, is how much in-
terlocutors take it into consideration, when they use it, and to what extent it leads to
partner-specific effects.
3.4.3 Alignment
3.4.3.1 Theory and scope
Building common ground in the course of dialogue involves coordination between speak-
ers and listeners. But what is coordinated at the level of mental representations, and
how? This is a crucial question to consider, since I am interested in conceptual coordina-
tion. Pickering and Garrod (2004) pick up these issues and propose a mechanistic theory
of dialogue which they call the “interactive alignment” account. They point out, fol-
lowing (Clark 1996), that dialogue is the most natural form of language use, and yet
has long been neglected by linguistic and psycholinguistic theories. Moreover, contrary
to common belief (and as we have seen in the previous section), it is possible to con-
duct controlled experiments to investigate dialogue phenomena together with cognitive
processes and representations. Pickering and Garrod’s theory states that dialogue does
not just involve general coordination, but specifically brings about alignment, in which
interlocutors adopt similar cognitive representations at a particular level. Alignment oc-
curs at various levels of representation, and comes about through priming. The process
is automatic and does not require understanding or modelling the cognitive states of
others. Hence, their position is most compatible with the previously mentioned ego-
centric views of processing during dialogue, such as those of Horton and Gerrig (2005a)
and Barr and Keysar (2002). For instance, syntactic alignment would normally occur
when dialogue participants unknowingly adopt each other’s syntactic structures during
conversation. Different levels of representation are linked, so that alignment at one level
can bring about alignment at other levels. This kind of coordination greatly simplifies
language comprehension and production processes in dialogue processing. Moreover,
Pickering and Garrod argue that there is no dichotomous distinction between dialogue
and monologue; rather, various forms and uses of language involve interaction to vary-
ing degrees, resulting in various degrees of inter-personal alignment.
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It’s worth pausing for a moment here to address a bit of terminology. Pickering and Gar-
rod (2004) distinguish alignment from the looser notion of coordination, whereby people
are engaged in a joint activity (Clark 1996) but need not share representations (e.g., when
performing a duet). In contrast, alignment is specifically about shared representations.
The distinction is a valuable one in general, but is not critical for my purposes, because as
we will see, coordination in my experiments will be explicitly concerned with alignment
specifically. Therefore, I will use the two terms fairly interchangeably, just with a slightly
different emphasis, with alignment being more emphatic about shared representations.
In addition, since most of my experiments will look at the timecourse of alignment, I will
also use the term convergence when I want to emphasise an increase in alignment over
time.
Alignment has been demonstrated at various levels of linguistic representation. Bren-
nan and Clark (1996) showed that interlocutors align at a lexical level in a referential
coordination task, converging on the same words or phrases. Expressions were impli-
citly agreed upon together, and became shorter and more stable during interaction as the
same figures were referred to repeatedly (I return to this study when I focus specifically
on lexical alignment in the next section). Branigan, Pickering and Cleland (2000) studied
syntactic alignment instead. The experiment exploited the dative alternation in English,
whereby we can say “John gave the book to Mary” or “John gave Mary the book”. Par-
ticipants were shown to align on the same syntactic variant when describing a series
of pictures to each other, even though the particular words varied (since the different
cards depicted a variety of characters and actions). Finally, Pardo (2006) investigated
phonetic alignment in dialogue. Conversation participants’ speech was recorded before,
during and after a joint task. Other participants then listened to some of the recorded
expressions and judged the similarity between pronunciations. The results revealed that
interlocutors’ pronunciations were more aligned during their interaction than before,
and that the alignment persisted beyond the interaction.
But dialogue does not only involve linguistic alignment. Garrod and Pickering (2009)
argue that in conversation, interlocutors must coordinate their mental representations
and behaviour at various levels, both linguistic and non-linguistic, and these levels can
mutually reinforce each other. Indeed, the scope of the coordinating effects of dia-
logue reaches surprisingly far, including speech rate (Giles, Coupland and Coupland
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1992), posture (Shockley, Santana and Fowler 2003), laughter and yawning (Hatfield
et al. 1994), gaze (Richardson and Dale 2005) and gait (Murray-Smith, Ramsay, Garrod,
Jackson and Musizza 2007). Given the close relationship between words and concepts,
this suggests that words, especially when used freely in dialogue, may also coordinate
people’s conceptualisations.
So what about alignment of conceptualisations? Although Pickering and Garrod (2004)
do not address conceptual alignment directly, they start their discussion of alignment
at the level of situation models. Situation models are non-linguistic multi-dimensional
mental representations of the current situation of interest, and encode such aspects as
space, time and causality (Zwaan and Radvansky 1998). As such, they encode the men-
tal picture of the thoughts underlying the discourse at hand. Therefore, they are related
to concepts, although the exact relationship or correspondence is unclear. Pickering and
Garrod argue that although alignment of situation models might not be required for
communication, the alternative would be to maintain two different representations (for
oneself and for one’s interlocutor), and that this would be “wildly inefficient” (p.172).
Moreover, misalignment would raise the question of whether participants really under-
stand each other, even if they communicate successfully. However, they do concede
that interlocutors’ situation models will generally vary a little, and thus will not be fully
aligned. Indeed, several commentators (e.g., Branigan 2004; Schober 2004) argued that
interlocutors are less likely to align with as much precision at the level of situation mod-
els compared to linguistic levels of representation.
I will not delve any further into situation models and how they may or may not cor-
respond to concepts. Instead, I now move on to studies that shed light on conceptual
alignment specifically.
3.4.3.2 Lexical (and conceptual) alignment
In this section, I discuss evidence from dialogue experiments which sheds light on how
interlocutors might align their conceptualisations. However, given how hard it is to get
at people’s concepts, how can we assess conceptual alignment? Just as psychologists
cannot access individuals’ concepts directly and often rely on naming tasks, much of
what we know about conceptual alignment comes from people’s lexical choices in dia-
logue. It would therefore be difficult and even counterproductive here to completely
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filter out studies dealing with the latter, as long as we guard against prematurely equat-
ing the two.
Brennan and Clark (1996) focused on how lexical choices are made in conversation de-
pending on the context and history of interaction. They first claimed that “labels reflect
conceptualizations” (p. 1482), and noted that the same thing can be conceptualised in
many different ways. Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of this lies in different
levels of specificity of a category (e.g., animal, dog, terrier, small black terrier). They
conducted referential communication experiments in which a target object (e.g., a shoe)
had to be distinguished from other objects in a sequence of tasks. The experimenters
manipulated whether the context of surrounding objects included other objects from the
same category (e.g., other kinds of shoes). The results showed that participants tended to
start with whatever level of specificity was required to distinguish the items. But when
the context was widened during the course of interaction, participants often continued
using the (unnecessarily) specific terms they had adopted (e.g., “loafer”). This effect
was reduced, however, if participants changed partners during the experiment. These
results suggest that naming choices do not just depend on an object’s properties and on
informativeness (being as precise but no more precise than needed, Grice 1975), but also
on factors that are specific to the local interaction, such as recency and partnership. They
also showed that convergence can be quite gradual and involve provisional stages.
Brennan and Clark (1996) concluded that the process of settling on a term for an object
was best understood as the development of a “conceptual pact”: interlocutors gradually
converge on a joint conceptualisation for the purposes of a particular interaction. No-
tice that, under this view, people who agree on a term for something implicitly achieve
conceptual alignment. However, this interpretation relies on assuming an equivalence
or direct correspondence between lexical and conceptual alignment, which in turn pre-
supposes that words are reliable conceptual identifiers. But as I argued in Chapter 2, this
assumption cannot be made in this thesis. From my perspective, it’s necessary to adopt
a more conservative interpretation: although converging on the same words suggests
some degree of conceptual coordination, it is not clear a priori to what extent. You and
I may agree on the term “loafer”, but have somewhat different concepts associated with
this word (indeed, I had never heard this word until I read this paper).
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Garrod and Anderson (1987) used a different methodology to study lexical and con-
ceptual coordination. They developed a computerised game in which participants had
to individually navigate from one position to another in a two-dimensional maze com-
posed of nodes and connections. However, the maze had obstacles, and these could
only be overcome if one’s partner moved to certain special locations in the maze. Much
as in the previously discussed experiments, participants could not see each other or each
other’smazes, but theywere allowed to talk freely during the task. Participants therefore
discussed their locations in the maze, providing data on how they referred to locations
and thereby how they mentally modelled the maze. The results showed that pairs did
align in their descriptions, but did so in different ways. Garrod and Anderson identified
four different kinds of schemes from the dialogues, which they called “path” (e.g., “See
the bottom right, go two along and two up”), “co-ordinate” (e.g., “I’m on the third row
and fourth column”), “line” (e.g., “Third bottom line, third box from the right”), and
“figural” (e.g., “See the rectangle at the bottom right, I’m in the top left-hand corner”).
The coordination task is challenging, because participants must align both conceptual-
isations and linguistic ways of describing them, and the correspondence is not trivial
(e.g., from where do you count rows to determine which one is “the third row”?). So
how do interlocutors achieve this? Garrod and Anderson first point out that it was very
rare for participants to explicitly agree on a scheme in advance, and even when they did
so, they tended to abandon it once it proved inadequate. Instead, they argue that parti-
cipants followed a simple “output/input co-ordination” principle, whereby you would
formulate your output based on the same interpretative principles as applied to themost
recent relevant input. This simple mechanism, they argue, is sufficient to explain how
such linguistic and conceptual conventions arise. In any case, this experiment demon-
strates how lexical and conceptual alignment are not trivially equivalent and yet how
both occur during interaction.
In a follow-up study using the same methodology, Garrod and Doherty (1994) explored
how a convention could arise in a small linguistic community. Twenty participants were
assigned to one of two conditions: either they worked with the same partner through-
out nine different mazes, or they worked with a different partner from the same “com-
munity” of ten for each of the nine mazes. This allows one to investigate coordination
and stability for isolated pairs versus small communities. Garrod and Doherty found
that the isolated pairs used substantial and stable proportions of both matrix and line
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schemes throughout their games. In contrast, the community group converged rapidly
on one particular type of matrix scheme, which was the most common scheme used in
the first game across the group. Closer analysis showed that although pairs in the isol-
ated pairs group attained a fairly high degree of lexical alignment quickly, they did not
get any higher, while pairs in the community group started low but eventually reached
nearly perfect lexical alignment. In a second experiment, participants interacted with
new partners for every maze, but these partners never interacted amongst themselves
(i.e., it was not a community). In this case, no convention emerged, and participants
did not increase their alignment over the course of the study. Garrod and Doherty ex-
plained the results by arguing that isolated pairs resorted to precedence and salience
constraints, which are sensitive to changes in the immediate context (in this case, in the
mazes), while the community group quickly developed a more stable convention, which
“overrides precedence and salience” (p. 208).
So far, I havemainly discussed lexical alignment, and implicitly appealed to Brennan and
Clark’s (1996) claim that these alignments reflect conceptual pacts. However, although
they are no doubt related, it is important not to assume equivalence between lexical and
conceptual alignment. Schober, Conrad and Fricker (2004) demonstrated this from a dif-
ferent and more applied perspective. They conducted telephone surveys about employ-
ment, housing and purchases, in which respondents were given fictional scenarios and
asked questions about them. The scenarios were set up so that as long as the participants
understood the terms used in the questions in line with the interviewers’ standardised
definitions (e.g., of terms like “household furniture”), there were objectively correct an-
swers. In this way, respondents’ comprehension could be tested. The experimenters
manipulated when participants received clarification: only when they asked for it, also
when the interviewer thought they needed it, or neither. The results showed that when
the scenarios were straight-forward (i.e., any ambiguity was unlikely to affect relevant
comprehension), comprehensionwas very high across all conditions. But when the scen-
arios were more complicated, respondents’ comprehension was a function of howmany
kinds of clarification they received: those who received no clarification diverged the
most, while thosewho received both kinds of clarification understood best. These results
demonstrate how even speakers of the same language presented with the same context
and language can differ significantly in their underlying conceptualisations. However,
they also suggest that the more collaborative the dialogue is, the closer the alignment. In
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sum, these results both caution us against equating lexical with conceptual alignment (in
Schober’s 2005 terms, “linguistic alignment does not guarantee conceptual alignment”,
p. 249), and support the idea that full dialogue may be able to bridge the gap between
them.
In summary, in this section we have seen how interlocutors tend to gradually develop
conceptual pacts, reducing the length of expressions and converging on particular terms
through two-way interaction and negotiation. However, there is no consensus on the
extent to which lexical alignment reflects underlying conceptual alignment. Part of the
problem with settling this issue using the methods above is that the data collected dur-
ing online tasks is primarily lexical, which makes it difficult to separate words from con-
cepts. As a result, in the next section I discuss a few key studies which have decoupled
these levels of representation using separate tasks.
3.4.3.3 Preserved conceptual alignment
In this section, I discuss research that has tested for conceptual alignment between dia-
logue participants after their linguistic interaction. These studies are important to my
purposes for two reasons. The first is methodological, and concerns the challenge of
separating the questions of lexical and conceptual alignment. It is difficult to give exper-
iment participants tasks that simultaneously have them communicating linguistically
and performing some kind of non-linguistic tasks that probe their concepts. This is evid-
ent in all the studies discussed in the previous section: they draw conclusions about
conceptual alignment but rely enormously on linguistic evidence. In contrast, it is re-
latively easy to have participants first perform a joint task together while conversing,
and then carry out individual non-linguistic tasks. One can then examine whether part-
ners have convergent responses in the latter tasks. While separating the linguistic and
non-linguistic tasks in this way offers clear advantages, it is important to acknowledge
that it has limitations too, and asks somewhat different research questions. In particular,
conceptual alignment could well occur during an interaction without persisting beyond
it. Therefore, evidence for the lack of post-interaction convergence does not necessarily
indicate that interlocutors were not aligned conceptually while engaged in dialogue.
The other reason why these kinds of studies are important is that they provide a poten-
tial link between the two timescales of potential coordination that I have identified. In
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particular, to the extent that linguistic relativity effects do occur (see Section 3.3), they
must somehow originate in linguistic interaction or acquisition. However, it is not ob-
vious how exactly this occurs, and evidence for preserved post-interaction alignment
would provide support for a plausible explanation. If people align conceptually during
dialogue and stay aligned beyond it, then perhaps repeated linguistic interaction with
speakers of the same language throughout one’s lifetime could lead to a more perman-
ent kind of conceptual alignment. Of course, such conclusions would still need to be
highly provisional, since whatever effects are found immediately after interaction may
well dissipate later on.
Despite the important implications of this kind of research, there have been very few
studies which have adopted the use of a joint communication task followed by indi-
vidual non-linguistic categorisation tasks. As a result, I describe the ones that have been
carried out in a relatively high amount of detail.
Markman and Makin (1998) investigated the role of communication in category acquisi-
tion, structure, and consistency. Their studies used LEGO pieces and involved building
models. Dyads were first given a set of pieces and allowed to come up with labels for
them together. They then were assigned to two roles, with one participant directing
the other how to build a model of either a car or a spaceship. Afterwards, participants
were individually given the pieces and asked to sort them into groups. There were also
two kinds of control participants: those who built models without communication, and
those who did not build models. Although Markman and Makin were interested in
three different central questions, I focus on the main one of relevance here: whether
linguistic communication draws individuals’ categorisation closer together. Their ana-
lysis revealed that participants who communicated during model building categorised
more closely than those who did not communicate or those who did not build a model.
This was the case even when comparing two communicating participants who had been
re-paired in analysis with other communicating participants, as long as they had both
worked on the same kind of model (car or spaceship). In a second experiment, dyads
built three models, and were assigned to build either two vehicles and then a car, or two
spaceships followed by the (same) car. The sorting task for all participants was based on
the pieces used to build the car. The results showed that participants categorised more
similarly to other participants who had worked on the same two initial models than
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those who had worked on different models, even though they all built the car model in
the end and sorted only its pieces. These findings suggest that communication aligns not
just people’s words, but also their underlying conceptual structures, and that this align-
ment persists beyond the immediate interaction. However, their results also suggest that
it is not so important who you communicate with, but only that you communicate. Com-
munication, and word usage in particular, seem to place certain constraints on category
acquisition that are not specific to a given dyad. In connection with this, it’s worth not-
ing that in their second experiment, a delay of 2-5 days was imposed after building the
first model, but that dyads maintained use of their established names when building the
second and third models. Thus, it seems that conceptual pacts (in Brennan and Clark’s
1996 sense) can persist over time and can in turn affect concepts and conceptualisation.
Voiklis (2008) combined a category learning paradigm with referential communication
tasks. Stimuli consisted of unfamiliar creatures that varied along several perceptual fea-
tures, which corresponded to two key functional features (i.e., nutritive/non-nutritive
and destructive/non-destructive) in a complex way. Participants underwent a large
training sequence, in which they judged individual creatures on the two functional fea-
tures and then received corrective feedback. However, in a dyad condition, one parti-
cipant saw a creature and described it to her partner while the other judged it based on
this description. Before and after these category learning tasks, all participants carried
out sorting tasks, in which they put creatures into groups. The results showed that par-
ticipants in the dyad condition learned the categories better and faster, especially when
the category structures were relatively simple. Moreover, in line with Markman and
Makin’s (1998) findings, there was more convergence in the post-training sorting tasks
between dyad participants than between non-dyad participants, regardless of whether
the comparisons were made between partners or non-partners. Voiklis noted that these
dyad effects could be due both to linguistic factors (e.g., linguistic terms highlighting the
relationships between features or serving as a compressed form of concepts and features)
or non-linguistic factors (e.g., knowledge diversity, division of labour, increased motiv-
ation). In any case, they concluded that “communication may push ’public’ conceptu-
alizations and publicly-formed ’private’ conceptualizations towards a limited range of
widely shareable conceptual structures” (p. 86).
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Another relevant study was conducted by Malt and Sloman (2004). In a pair of experi-
ments, they used a coordinated matching task, and used stimuli which could (based on
pre-tests) be readily labelled with one of two labels (e.g., bucket/pail, bottle/jar). In a
first set of matching tasks, for each picture, confederate directors consistently referred
to it with one of the two alternative words. Then the matchers became directors for a
second batch of matching tasks. Afterwards, participants individually rated a sequence
of pictures in two of three ways. In a naming preference task, participants indicated the
appropriateness of the two alternative labels for each item. In a typicality task, they rated
how typical items were relative to the named categories. In a similarity task, they judged
the similarity of the items to their imagined prototypical category members. Malt and
Sloman’s analysis revealed that, first of all, participants stuck to the terms that were first
used by the directors. This was the case even though the two name alternatives were
generally at the same level of abstractness (unlike Brennan and Clark’s 1996 study). In
addition, the main analyses showed that which of the two alternatives was used had
an impact on all three individual post-interaction tasks. However, Malt and Sloman em-
phasised that the effects were stronger for the naming preference task than the other two.
They concluded that naming choices affect further naming access and usage, but had less
of an impact on non-linguistic tasks. While the methods used in this experiment had the
advantage of getting at lexical and conceptual alignment on relatively equal grounds
(since, in a way, both were tested after rather than during the interaction), it should be
noted that the naming preference tasks were carried out before the typicality or simil-
arity ratings, which means that the smaller effects in the latter may be due to general
dissipation of any influence of interaction.
In summary, the studies discussed in this section suggest that engaging in dialogue does
not only align people’s lexical representations, but also related cognitive representations
as well. Moreover, these effects persist beyond the immediate interaction. However,
the degree of alignment that is evident in a given process seems to be a function of
how linguistic that process is, although it is not clear how exactly these processes relate
to conceptual representations (and thus conceptual alignment) per se. In addition, the
studies suggest that alignment with another person only requires linguistic interaction
with someone, not necessarily with that person specifically.
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3.4.4 Conclusion
People clearly adapt to each other when they interact and engage in joint action. While
it is debatable how much and when they shift to other people’s perspectives, there is
ample evidence that they coordinate their actions with others. During dialogue in par-
ticular, evidence suggests that interlocutors align mental representationswith each other
at various levels, both linguistic and non-linguistic.
Conceptual alignment in particular, however, has not been studied much directly. This
is not surprising, given the methodological challenge of not only accessing people’s con-
cepts, but also doing so online during dialogue. Indeed, investigations of conceptual
alignment have generally been of two types. On one hand, many studies have doc-
umented lexical alignment, showing that interlocutors converge and entrench on par-
ticular lexicalisations to refer to particular referents. To the extent that words reflect
conceptualisations (Brennan and Clark 1996), dialogue can be claimed to also result in
conceptual alignment. This is particularly evident in cases where different lexicalisations
clearly reflect different schemes and solutions to some kind of joint problem (Garrod and
Anderson 1987).
On the other hand, a few studies have lookedmore directly at conceptual alignment non-
linguistically, but only after, rather than during, interaction (Markman and Makin 1998;
Voiklis 2008). These studies have shown that people who communicate during joint
tasks involving objects then seem to conceptualise those objects more similarly to each
other. Interestingly, these effects were not specific to conversational partners: people
seemed to align to communicating participants in general, even those that they did not
interact with. Moreover, they also aligned more if they had been using the same set
of referential terms (Malt and Sloman 2004). To the extent that speakers of the same
language do share the same concepts, these results are consistent with studies showing
how the use of language can affect conceptualisation online (e.g., Lupyan 2008b; see
Section 2.6.5).
Despite the progress that has been made on these issues, many important questions
remain regarding conceptual alignment and its relationship with language. The first
question is primarily methodological: how can we separate investigations of conceptual
alignment during interaction from reliance on language? I identified this issue back in
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Section 1.2, but it still remains to be solved. Second, does online conceptual alignment
occur only during linguistic interaction, or during interaction in general? In order to have
an empirical basis to claim that it is specific to linguistic interaction, we need to compare
interactive conditions which vary in how much language is available. Third, even if lex-
ical and conceptual alignment do turn out to be closely intertwined, this says nothing in
itself about the direction of causation. Does dialogue cause both lexical and conceptual
alignment, does one of them bring about the other, or is there still another explanation?
Although we cannot manipulate these directly, we can control interactional conditions,
and in particular, the exchange of lexical and/or conceptual information between parti-
cipants.
Chapters 6-8 present experiments intended to address these issues. Figure 3.3 adapts
my conceptualisation model for the interactive case to give a hint of how this will work.
Pairs of participants will carry out joint tasks, and I will measure the conceptual align-
ment between them while (or after) they do so. Within this set up, I will manipulate the
information exchange that takes place between participants, including the availability of
dialogue and the exchange of words and subsets of categories. However, before I can










Figure 3.3: Interaction between two people, and potential sources of conceptual coordination.
People may be able to speak freely with each other (blah blah blah). They might also have access to
each other’s concepts through their categories and words (indicated by the bi-directional arrows
connecting them).
3.5 Summary
Although conceptualisation is a psychological process that takes place in theminds of in-
dividuals, the publicity of words and their close associations to concepts implies that our
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conceptual systems and processes are unlikely to be independent of each other. Indeed,
in this chapter, I have reviewed work concerning three broad issues, which revealed
evidence that language may draw people’s conceptualisations together in various ways.
First, I discussed how the input of words from others affects conceptual development
and conceptualisation, starting from early infancy and continuing throughout our lives.
Hearing words has diverse effects, such as guiding infants’ early conceptual develop-
ment, influencing children’s category induction, and shifting adults’ memories. Al-
though the influence of others’ words is not the focus of my thesis, it does underly my
main hypotheses, because it confirms that people’s conceptual systems do influence each
other, and suggests how others’ use of language could play a causal role in conceptual
processing.
Second, I introduced the linguistic relativity hypothesis, according to which our native
language determines how we partition the world into categories. I discussed empirical
evidence in several domains, especially colour and objects, and considered several theor-
etical reformulations of the original idea which better fit the body of findings. However,
there is no clear winner, since the results are quite complex and subtle, and much further
study is needed before we can arrive at a satisfying full story. While this line of work
relates to my hypothesis of language coordinating conceptualisation, this question has
not been the direct focus of investigation. As a result, the effect of our native language
on our “pre-alignment” will be addressed in Experiment 1.
Third, I considered how language use could lead to the coordination of people’s con-
ceptualisations. I outlined the view that dialogue in particular is a form of joint action,
and involves coordination of behaviours and alignment of cognitive representations. I
discussed how dialogue depends on common ground, while also building it up further,
but that visual information also plays an important role. I then discussed two lines of
evidence which consider conceptual alignment in the context of dialogue. One line takes
up conceptual alignment during dialogue, but tends to rely strongly on lexical alignment
data and assumptions of how they correspond. The other avoids these assumptions, but
is focused on conceptual alignment which persists beyond dialogue, and still doesn’t
separate dialogue from interaction in general. Consequently, the role of language in con-
ceptual alignment will be taken up in Experiments 2, 3 and 4.
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However, before we can dive into empirical investigations, there are methodological
challenges to confront. In particular, we need to decide on kinds of experimental tasks
and how to quantitatively compare two outputs from them. I turn to this next.
CHAPTER 4
Developing a framework
In Section 1.3, I pointed out howmy research question automatically comes in a package
with two uncomfortable principles: that concepts can vary and that we cannot count
on language to identify them. As I explained, taking these principles seriously imposed
significant theoretical and methodological challenges. Now that I have developed my
theoretical position while considering the implications of those principles, it is time to
face the methodological challenges.
Therefore, in this chapter, I first lay out the criteria for an experimental framework, given
my research questions. I then justify the use of behavioural categorisation experiments
for investigating them. Next I list some important considerations regarding the selection
of stimulus domains. After that, I discuss existing categorisation paradigms, and argue
for the adoption of a particular type of task for my experiments. I then discuss possible
measures for comparing two outputs from this task, and settle on the ones I will adapt.
Finally, I describe how the framework can be readily imposedwith appropriate linguistic
manipulations.
4.1 Criteria
Before developing my experimental framework, it’s important to be clear what we want
it to do and what the constraints are. The general purpose reflects my theoretical goals:
to support a set of experiments which investigates how language might have an effect on
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conceptual coordination. In this section, I list specific methodological criteria concerning
the experimental tasks, measure, stimuli and manipulations.
First, the experimental tasks should involve conceptualisation, and yield output that
captures it. However, the task output cannot be identified by reference to words or
externally-specified categories. Since conceptualisation is flexible (see Chapter 2), the
tasks should also yield snapshots of participants’ concepts, allowing for potential change
over time.
Second, there must be a well-defined, objective, and meaningful measure for comparing
participants’ task outputs. In other words, the measure should quantitatively capture,
as well as possible, the difference between two acts of conceptualisation. This measure
is very important because it will produce the values for the primary dependent variable
in all of my experiments.
Third, it should be straightforward to superimpose the framework with various manip-
ulations, primarily, but not only, linguistic in nature. In particular, it needs to be possible
and meaningful to control whether participants can speak to each other, whether they
can exchange word and/or category information, and how and whether they interact.
Moreover, the framework should be appropriate for use with different languages.
Fourth, the stimuli should be selectedwith care. They should be presentednon-linguistically,
so that we can manipulate language independently of them. They should come from a
familiar domain, so that words already have pre-establishedmappings with them.1 And
the domain should be continuous and finely sampled, to maximise the potential for vari-
ation in conceptualisation.
Note that, to some extent, these criteria are interrelated. For instance, the kind of task we
use obviously impacts what kind of outputs it produces, and thuswhat kind ofmeasures
for comparing them are possible. Thus, although I will deal with the criteria one at a
time, it’s important not to lose track of the bigger picture.
1Novel domains would also be interesting to explore, but that would involve somewhat different re-
search questions, which my thesis does not address directly.
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4.2 Categorisation tasks
4.2.1 Justification
What kinds of experimental tasks should we use to query people’s concepts? In prin-
ciple, there are different approaches we could take, ranging from high-level methods
such as asking participants a set of survey-style questions (Vosniadou and Brewer 1992),
to low-level methods like analysing brain activation patterns (Koenig et al. 2005). Like
most cognitive psychologists (Murphy 2002), however, I will take the middle ground,
and use categorisation tasks. As such, people’s categorisation decisions will be the
source of my comparison of their conceptualisations.
However, this brings the distinction that I made between concepts and categories (see
Section 2.4.1) uncomfortably back to the surface, and harks back to the introduction of
Section 2.5. Since I have insisted for a clear separation between concepts and categories,
is it not hypocritical to then turn back and use categories as a measure of concepts? The
way I have incorporated my theoretical model from Chapter 2 into the questions raised
in Chapter 3 (see Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3) specifically targets the level of concepts as
the one we ought to be comparing, in contrast to the levels of words or categories. As
such, the proposal to use categorisation tasks can be seen as rather blatantly at odds
with that program. In particular, I am proposing to shift from the comparison depicted
in Figure 4.1 to the one shown in Figure 4.2. Since I will be looking at how people align
their concepts andmanipulating word and category feedback (see especially Experiment








Figure 4.1: Comparison of two people’s conceptualisations.
My answer is that yes, it is a significant compromise, but it’s the best that we can do.
We do not have direct access to people’s concepts, so we have to access them indirectly.








Figure 4.2: Comparison of two people’s categorisations. This may the best we can do if we are
actually trying to compare conceptualisations.
And although concepts and categories aren’t the same thing, concepts determine cat-
egories, so their relationship is nevertheless very tight. There doesn’t seem to be a better
way, as is evident from the fact that Murphy’s (2002) “Big book of concepts” is almost
entirely devoted to discussing categorisation experiments. More importantly, my other
conclusion from Section 2.4.1 was that categories are not autonomous: they exist only as
conceptual extensions. They tell us about, and only about, the concepts inside someone’s
mind. They appear to be unique in this, and should therefore be exploited.
As a result, despite the imperfection of this solution, the practical constraints give us
no clearly superior alternative. Therefore, I adopt the use of categorisation experiments,
while acknowledging that this may bias results a little. However, this doesn’t solve our
problems yet, because there are many categorisation paradigms, and as we will see next,
most of them are unsuitable for my purposes.
4.2.2 Categorisation paradigms
Categorisation tasks will occupy a very central position in my experiments. But what
sort of tasks shouldwe use? Aswewill see, although different options are available from
the literature, most of them are incompatible withmy criteria from Section 4.1. Moreover,
the choice that I will actually converge on has some other issues that we will have to
be prepared to swallow. Therefore, it is important to survey the different possibilities
relatively carefully.
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4.2.2.1 Picture naming task
Perhaps the most obvious categorisation task is the picture naming task. Participants
are shown picture stimuli one at a time and asked to say what they are, perhaps with a
single word or a longer phrase. The answer they give is taken as identifying their current
conceptualisation. This paradigm can be used for various purposes, such as the invest-
igation of semantic priming and domain differences (e.g., Lloyd-Jones and Humphreys
1997).
However, in terms of the framework criteria listed above, the picture naming task has
an obvious shortcoming. It violates the criterion that concept identification must be
separate from language. This is problematic on three fronts. First, since we are trying to
assess the role of language in categorisation, we cannot identify participants’ categories
linguistically. Second, if words are the participants’ only output, then there is no non-
linguistic interaction between participants. This means that in manipulating language,
the control condition would have no information exchanged. Third, we cannot assume
identical word-concept associations, so the same word may relate to somewhat different
concepts in different instances.
Does this mean that the picture naming paradigm is of no use to us? One potential
workaround would be to borrow the same structure as is used in the picture naming
task, but to replace linguistic naming with some other non-linguistic concept identify-
ing elicitation. Perhaps participants could produce some other kinds of symbols (e.g.,
colours, numbers, geometric shapes) instead of words, while everything else is kept the
same. However, although such an approach would make the identification of concepts
language-independent, it would still suffer from the most important problemwith using
words: how could we compare the meanings associated with these symbols for different
people? Indeed, symbol-concept associations of this sort are likely to be less convention-
alised and shared than word-concept associations, so in fact the comparison would only
become harder.
Moreover, the serial nature of the task also means that we are inducing participants’ con-
ceptual snapshots from temporally scattered responses. We learn what a participant’s
‘dog’ concept looks like by considering which items they called “dog” and which they
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didn’t across the series of tasks in the experiment. However, this neglects the possibility
that conceptualisation may change over the course of the experiments.
The unsuitability of the picture naming task is unfortunate, because it would be readily
extendable to cases involving pairs of participants. Indeed, as we have seen, dialogue
studies have examined how speakers refer to items and how hearers interpret their ex-
pressions (e.g., Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs 1986), and such natural interactions provide a
good natural context in which online conceptual coordination might occur. Moreover,
it would not be too difficult to measure conceptual coordination. A crude binary meas-
ure could be given by simply seeing whether participants applied the same label to a
particular referent. A more sophisticated method could be applied for cases with differ-
ing labels which takes into account the difference in meaning between words, by using
statistical techniques such as latent semantic analysis (Deerwester, Dumais, Landauer,
Furnas and Harshman 1990).
4.2.2.2 Category training
Another common categorisation paradigm is the use of category training. In such ex-
periments, the researcher usually has a predefined set of categories that the participant
is supposed to try to learn. Normally the stimuli are shown one at a time, and the par-
ticipant responds with one of the categories. The category may be identified by a name,
a button, or a location on the screen. Participants are often given feedback after their
response, helping them to learn the categories over time. Such paradigms have been
used to explore category learning, looking at how easily people learn different kinds of
categories, under what situations they do best, etc (e.g., Smith and Minda 1998; Lupyan,
Rakison and McClelland 2007).
At first glance, this paradigm seems promising, since it doesn’t necessarily depend on
linguistic responses. Participants can select from a set of categories by non-linguistic
means, such as the left vs right sides of the screen. Moreover, it would be easy, though
crude, to measure agreement between participants’ categorisations, by simply seeing,
on any particular task, whether they make the same judgement. Finally, it would be
possible to manipulate linguistic conditions, by controlling whether participants could
talk or exchange their own linguistic labels for the stimuli.
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However, upon closer inspection, the paradigm actually suffers from the same funda-
mental problems as picture naming, and more. From a functional point of view, any
means of identifying the concepts in such a task is symbolic, and therefore again faces
the problem that the link between identifiers and concepts is not fixed. Indeed, these
paradigms implicitly acknowledge this, since they are concerned with how the concept
associated with an identifier changes, and perhaps does so differently for participants in
different conditions.
In addition, category learning experiments involve an externally defined category, which
participants are trying to acquire. As such, rather than emphasising what participants’
own concepts are, they are focused on how a participant mentally represents categories
set up by the experimenter. Therefore, while these tasks may tell us which of the experi-
menters’ defined categories are associatedwith particular stimuli for a given participant,
this restricts the participants to using these categories rather than ones that they would
naturally choose themselves.
Moreover, as participants are only learning these categories in the course of the exper-
iments, the conceptual snapshots are again scattered across time. As in the case of the
picture naming tasks, this is problematic, since the concept may change over time; in-
deed, since these are online learning tasks, they depend on this kind of learning to take
place.
Also, it is unclear how a category learning paradigm could be extended to study concep-
tual coordination. Confusion is likely to arise from participants simultaneously trying
to learn the experimenter-defined categories and adapt to their partner’s categories. Al-
ternatively, learning can and perhaps should be envisioned as involving a teacher and
a learner, and the participants could be assigned to these roles. However, it is not clear
how compatible this asymmetric relationship is with an investigation of conceptual co-
ordination. Of course, there are potential solutions: for example, perhaps coordination
could be framed in terms of a series of bouts of learning, with the teacher and learner
roles alternating within a participant pair. Nevertheless, the interactive solution doesn’t
flow cleanly from category learning as a starting point.
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4.2.2.3 Familiarisation and novelty
Another place to look for help with categorisation tasks is in developmental and com-
parative psychology, since these disciplines are interested in categorisation, and must
often research it with prelinguistic subjects. As such, they have the experience of ne-
cessarily gathering non-linguistic responses from participants. Various paradigms have
been used, but they have in common a reliance on the coding of behavioural responses
to stimuli. Here I discuss one such technique, which is based on the idea of familiarising
participants to a series of items from one category and then showing them an item from
a different category. While different behavioural measures can be used in conjunction
with this technique, I discuss the looking time measure here because it makes it easier to
understand how this technique works and is dominant in infant categorisation studies.
In this method, infants are typically exposed to a sequence of stimuli on a screen, and the
experimenters measure how long the infants look at each stimulus. As infants become
familiarised to a category by seeing repeated exemplars of it, their interest, as manifes-
ted in their looking times, tends to decrease. In contrast, if they exhibit relatively long
looking times upon presentation of an item, then this is assumed to mean that the infants
find the stimulus novel, and thus of a novel category. In this way, infants’ discrimina-
tion of categories is studied by analysing their looking time patterns (e.g., Fulkerson and
Waxman 2007). This method has also been recruited in experiments with non-human
primates (e.g., Hauser and Carey 2003). Similar methods have been used based on other
behavioural measures, such as the order in which infants touch objects (Mandler, Bauer
and McDonough 1991).
In a way, these techniques are similar to the categorisation training tasks described previ-
ously. Usually, the experimenter has some pre-determined category distinction in mind,
and wants to see if the subjects can make it. However, there is a little bit more freedom
here, as there may bemultiple different category boundaries that the subjectsmay distin-
guish, and the experimenter may be interested in which one the subjects tend to react to
most (Mandler 2000). In this sense, to some extent, the experimenters are interested not
in training the participants on certain categories, but in determining which categories
the subjects use “spontaneously”.
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However, these paradigms have a number of important limitations with respect to my
goals and criteria. First, they are very noisy and insensitive. This is important, because it
is one thing to studywhether a participant can distinguish airplanes frombirds, but quite
another to look at more subtle conceptualisations with fine differences between people,
and how these may dynamically change through interaction. Second, these methods
have not been used much with adults, and indeed, it is highly questionable whether
they are appropriate for adults. There are likely to be far more complicated factors in
explaining an adult’s looking patterns than an infant’s. Third, it would be difficult to
come up with a reasonable measure which compared participants’ conceptualisations in
these tasks. The simple thing to do would be to quantitatively compare their looking
times, but this could be interpreted in many different ways.
4.2.2.4 Tasks involving two or three stimuli at a time
Two other common kinds of categorisation tasks consist of judgements involving a min-
imal number of stimuli. In one type of task, a participant is simultaneously shown two
items and asked to indicate whether they are the same kinds of things or different (e.g.,
Neiworth and Wright 1994). In another type, the participant is shown three items and
asked which one doesn’t belong with the other two (e.g., Lupyan 2009), or which of two
items better matches a third (Rips 1989). The basis for the judgements could be unspe-
cified in the task instructions, or specific criteria could be provided, such as the feature
of interest.
For my purposes, these paradigms are improvements over the previously discussed
methods for a couple of reasons. First, they do not involve any sort of identification
using words, symbols, or other top-down associations. As such, there is no concern over
how the token used to identify a concept may have different associations for different
people or in different contexts. Second, they do not necessarily constrain participants
with a predetermined set of experimenter-specified concepts to choose from. If the task
instructions do not explicitly ask for them to use certain categories or criteria, then their
output can be treated as reflecting their spontaneous personal choices. Third, these tasks
involve judgements which explicitly put items together or split them apart. As such,
these tasks do give partial conceptual snapshots. Fourth, it would be relatively simple to
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extrapolate these tasks for interactive purposes and with linguistic manipulations. Parti-
cipants could carry out these tasks while communicating, name the items and exchange
their labels, and see each others’ judgements. Fifth, measuring conceptual coordination
could be pretty easy, judged simply by whether or not the participants made the same
judgement on a given task or not.
The main limitation with these tasks for my purposes, however, is that they only give
snapshots of a tiny part of participants’ categories, leaving the rest to the interpretation
of the experimenter. In the dyad task, all we know directly is that the participant either
places or doesn’t place a category boundary between the items. Similarly, in the triad
task, we only get a grouping of two items separated from a third. However, building up
of the categories to span across multiple tasks is only possible with extra assumptions
from the experimenter. For instance, if a participant judges an orange and a grapefruit to
be the same kind of item, but a lemon and an apple to be different, then we might con-
clude that the grouping is based on citrus versus non-citrus fruit. However, having in-
formation of only two items at a time is rather crude, and combining results across tasks
relies on speculative higher-level interpretations. This will not do for a study examin-
ing fine differences between people’s conceptualisations. While we cannot completely
remove this kind of uncertainty, we could do better if we had a larger number of items
but fewer tasks to have to bridge across.
4.2.2.5 Free classification
A further categorisation paradigm involves sorting, or “free classification” (Imai and
Garner 1965). Participants are given a relatively large set of stimuli at once, and asked to
sort them into groups. Within practical constraints, the number, nature and sizes of the
categories is up to the participant, and the end result of such a task is a partitioning of
the stimulus set (e.g., Malt, Sloman, Gennari, Shi and Wang 1999; Clopper 2008).
This method has definite advantages for my purposes. First of all, it does not presup-
pose what concepts might be used. Participants can freely choose, consciously or not, on
what basis they conceptualise items, and where they draw the boundaries between con-
cepts. The relative lack of restrictions on the outputs means that participants can output
categories which more faithfully reflect the concepts they correspond to. Moreover, the
task does not depend on language. The groups of stimuli that participants come up with
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are sufficient as outputs, and are independently meaningful. Indeed, this method has
been used in categorisation experiments with non-human primates with fruitful results
(Spinozzi and Langer 1999). Also, if the sets of stimuli being grouped are not too small,
there is no intrinsic need to try to relate the outputs across tasks, in contrast to the dyad
and triad tasks. Indeed, the categories that are produced in a single task can be inter-
preted as referential snapshots of the concepts that the participant used to conceptualise
the items. In other words, these experimental outputs are finite but meaningful subsets
of categories.
Moreover, it is not difficult to extend these tasks to involve pairs of participants and to
superimpose linguistic manipulations. Tasks involving participant pairs could be con-
structed in a couple of ways. First, participant pairs could perform a free classification
task together, perhaps by taking turns or by deciding each step in unison. Alternatively,
participants could carry out the tasks individually, but they might be allowed to com-
municate during the tasks. Notice that in contrast to the previous paradigms, where
communicating one’s categorisation decision on a given task would make coordination
trivial, that would not be the case here, since there are many stimuli to deal with at once
and the task output does not consist of a single decision. Finally, participants could carry
out a sequence of tasks individually, but get feedback on each other’s output between
tasks. This feedback could consist of the category groupings, and, if participants were
also asked to label their categories, of the category names. Although we might give a
participant his partner’s category name, this is not a problem (as it would be, for in-
stance, in the picture naming tasks), since we can still define the main category output
and analysis in terms of the groupings. Thus, this type of task can be readily used in
interactive experiments, while simultaneously handling the linguistic manipulations we
want.
However, this method involves a few complications, which may help explain why it is
not particularly popular in categorisation experiments. First of all, there’s the question
of how we measure the degree of coordination between two task outputs. As we have
seen, in some of the other paradigms, this is quite easy, often coming down to a binary
value: agreement or disagreement. But in this case the situation is much more complex:
how do we compare one set of sets of stimuli to another? Fortunately, as we will see
in Section 4.3, there are well-defined and meaningful methods for this. These methods
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don’t give binary outputs, but rather a value in some range indicating the degree of
agreement between participants. For our purposes, this is actually an advantage rather
than a weakness, since it may give us a more sensitive measure that can be used in
analysis. Nevertheless, analysis and interpretation is more difficult in this case.
Furthermore, although, as I have outlined, free classification tasks can be adapted for
an interactive coordination experiment, these tasks may not be as natural as some of
their counterparts in previously discussed methods. It is normal for us to communicate
linguistically about individual objects in the world, as would happen in an interactive
extension of the picture naming task, for example. In contrast, in an interactive version
of free classification, participants exchange information about several items at a time,
and may do so through the category outputs alone, in experimental conditions where
language is not available. As such, the ecological validity and relevance of such tasks
could be questioned. However, there are real-world counterparts to these experimental
situations as well. To give an intuitive example: when sharing a kitchen in a flat, flat-
mates coordinate how they sort dishes in the cupboards, possibly but not necessarily
with the help of language. This can be seen when flat visitors come and wash the dishes,
and may be unsure at first about where to put some of them afterwards. Therefore, these
tasks might not map onto the most common situations involving conceptual coordina-
tion, but they are nevertheless grounded in normal behaviour and interaction.
4.2.2.6 Coordination games
So far, I have evaluated different kinds of tasks used to study the categorisation of indi-
viduals, and discussed how they might be adapted in coordination experiments. How-
ever, some researchers have also designed tasks specifically for studying coordination
between individuals. Therefore, here I consider these kinds of tasks and whether they
can be recruited for my purposes.
In typical coordination tasks, participants have to coordinate their behaviour or lan-
guage to achieve particular joint goals. Among these, quite a few have looked at how
people conceptualise things and how language is used in this process. Typically, these
tasks are framed as some kind of game, to make them more meaningful for the parti-
cipants, and to give them a clear goal. Often the tasks involve the description of items
by one participant and their identification from among a set by the other (e.g., Clark and
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Wilkes-Gibbs 1986). However, such studies also often emphasise that communication is
not a one-way process with a distinct hearer and speaker, but that linguistic expressions
and their referents are established through joint interaction. This is often reflected in
the methods and data, by allowing participants to talk freely and converge on referring
expressions (Garrod and Anderson 1987).
Can such paradigms help us here? On one hand, such interactive tasks have certain
definite advantages. First of all, participants are explicitly motivated to coordinate how
they conceptualise things, and are entertained in the process. Second, these tasks can
help us see how dyads converge on particular expressions and contrast their solutions
with those of other dyads. Divergences between different dyads can then be interpreted
as demonstrating relative convergence within dyads. Third, since these experiments
involve identification of a referent from among a set, we can study whether participants
have the same referent in mind for a given expression, and under what conditions they
match better or worse.
On the other hand, these tasks suffer from some of the same problems as previous
paradigms. In particular, categorisation is again indicated through linguistic expres-
sions, much as in the picture naming tasks. As a result, we are once again relying on
words as top-down concept identifiers, we do not have referential snapshots of parti-
cipants’ categories, and we have no reasonable way of setting non-linguistic control con-
ditions. Although some interactive coordination experiments have explicitly avoided
reliance on language, they have still been dependent on some kind of response which
relates to referents in a symbolic or iconic manner (e.g., Galantucci 2005).
Moreover, since the task output is now largely achieved together, it becomes difficult
to identify individuals’ categorisation. Rather than having separate results from indi-
vidual participants, we must rely on more qualitative or indirect measures of how well
they seem to understand each other. This therefore complicates the problem of defin-
ing a measure which compares two people’s separate outputs. However, it is possible
to partially get around this by following coordination tasks with individual ones, to see
whether interaction has an effect on subsequent individual categorisation (Markman and
Makin 1998).
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Therefore, although I cannot adopt typical coordination game tasks directly here, it is
still helpful to gather their insights more generally. In particular, it will be important to
motivate participants with clear goals, to compare results not only within pairs but also
across pairs, and to acknowledge that the richness of interaction permitted in the tasks
may have a profound impact on the degree of conceptual convergence.
4.2.3 Conclusion
I have discussed a variety of different categorisation task paradigms with respect to my
theoretical aims and methodological criteria. Most approaches suffer from a reliance
on language or other symbols to identify categories, and constrain how participants can
conceptualise items. Another common problem is how tomake taskswhich can be easily
adapted to interactive sessions with pairs of participants, and how linguistic variables
can be manipulated along with sensible control conditions. The best option overall ap-
pears to be the use and elaboration of free classification tasks, in which participants sort
stimuli into groups. This method allows participants to conceptualise things relatively
freely according to their own concepts, in a way which provides referential snapshots
of their concepts in use. Moreover, it does so independently of language, although lan-
guage can be easily superimposed on the task in different ways. However, this technique
also involves certain challenges, especially with regards to comparing two people’s con-
ceptualisations. This is a crucial consideration that I turn to next.
Notice that in such a paradigm, each task outputs a subset of the category determined
by a concept. This recalls the definition of categorisation that I arrived at from a theoret-
ical point of view in Section 2.6.2, in which categorisation involves assigning (multiple)
items to (multiple) categories. In effect, I have now independently argued for the appro-
priateness of that decision on methodological grounds.
4.3 Comparing two task outputs
4.3.1 The requirements
As I have mentioned, it is relatively difficult to define a suitable measure of agreement
for the free classification paradigm. Multiple stimuli, multiple categories and a lack of
predefined (by the experimenter) concepts result in complications. Figure 4.3 shows a
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schematic example involving six stimuli, where both participants produced two (almost
identical) categories. And yet even here, it’s not clear a priori how we would want the
measure to work or what it should output. And things only get worse if there are more














Figure 4.3: The comparison of two full categorisation outputs (top and bottom). The outputs
are shown by the sets of sets of objects, and the measure is again represented by the δ between
them. Note that the two outputs contain the same sets of objects.
Before looking into the problem more closely, let’s be clear about what the measure is
supposed to do, and in particular, what it should take as input and yield as output. First,
the inputs. Free classification tasks are done individually by pairs of participants. Both
participants are given the same set of n items and put them into between kmin and kmax
categories of their own individual choosing (participants are also asked to name their
categories, but that is irrelevant for the agreement measure). Mathematically speaking,
each participant produces a “partitioning” (following Hubert and Arabie 1985), which
is a set of subsets, where each of the subsets represents a category and each element of a
subset represents a stimulus. The inputs to the agreement measure will be the partition-
ings of the two participants.
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The output of the agreementmeasure needs to be an evaluation of the agreement between
the two partitionings. For the sake of concreteness, we could require that the output be
a number between 0 and 1 (inclusive), with 1 meaning exact match (i.e., the partition-
ings are identical). The ideal meaning of 0 would be complete disagreement, although
as we will see, that is not so simple but not so important either. We also generally want
lower values to indicate lower degrees of agreement. Indeed, as wewill see, ourmeasure
would ideally have certain other properties as well.
It’s worth noting that the simplest possible measure might be one which yields 1 if the
two partitionings are identical, and 0 if they are not. However, such a measure would
collapse a lot of information and would thus be much less sensitive, which makes it
unattractive for my purposes.
But if we do try to define a more granular measure, then the fact that different parti-
tionings can contain various numbers of categories of potentially different sizes adds
complexity to the problem, and makes it difficult to define a measure that matches intu-
itions. For instance, if two partitionings are identical except for one item, we may want
to treat the measure differently depending on whether that item was put (by one or both
of the participants) in a large category, a small category, or a category of its own, or if the
total number of categories (for one or both participants) is large or small. We shall see an
example of this complication later in this section.
4.3.2 An example
I start with a schematic example. Suppose that two participants are both given a set of 10
items, identified schematically here with letters A through J. They individually partition
the set into groups. Then our agreement measure must assign a number comparing the
two partitionings. Suppose that the first participant puts A, B, and F in one category,
C, D, E in a second, and G, H, I, and J in a third. We can write this in set notation as
{{A,B,F}, {C,D,E}, {G,H, I, J}}. Or, diagrammatically,
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A B C D E
F G H I J
Now suppose the second participant partitions the set in one of four ways, shown below.
A B C D E
F G H I J
A B C D E
F G H I J
A B C D E
F G H I J
A B C D E
F G H I J
(a) (b) (c) (d)
What would we want the agreement measure to give us for these four cases? The parti-
tioning for (a) is identical to that for the first participant, so the measure should yield a
perfect score of 1. As for (b) and (c), it’s not clear what we’d want the absolute scores to
be, but intuitively the score should be higher in (b) than in (c). This is because in (b), the
partitioning is nearly the same as for the first participant except for the categorisation
of stimulus B, while (c) is quite different altogether. Finally, (d) should get the worst
score, since the match between the partitionings is about as bad as possible: notice, for
instance, that there is no pair of items that is put into the same category for both par-
titionings. Depending on how we define the measure, the score in this case may even
be 0. In summary, for these four cases, we’d want the agreement measure M to satisfy
0 <= M(d) < M(c) < M(b) < M(a) = 1.
4.3.3 Possible measures
Fortunately, the formal problem of comparing partitionings has been addressed in nu-
merous ways in the literature. There are at least four families of approaches: based on
stimulus pairs, category association, set matching, and variation of information.
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Rand (1971) defined an early measure based on counting pairs. The idea is to look at
each stimulus pair individually, and see if the partitionings are in “agreement”. The
partitionings agree if they either both put the pair in the same category, or both put the
pair in different categories. The “Rand Index” is then the ratio of the agreements to the
total number of pairs.
More formally, given two partitionings p1 and p2, we first define four values:
• a = number of pairs put in the same category in p1 and in the same category in p2
• b = number of pairs put in the same category in p1 and in different categories in p2
• c = number of pairs put in different categories in p1 and in the same category in p2
• d = number of pairs put in different categories in p1 and in different categories in
p2
Then the Rand Index, RI , is given by:
RI = (a+ d)/(a+ b+ c+ d) (4.1)
It can be easily verified that for our four examples above, RI yields (a) 1.00, (b) 0.89, (c)
0.53, and (d) 0.60. Notice that this doesn’t quite satisfy the conditions specified earlier:
the score in case (d) is too high relative to (c) and far above 0.
In fact, the Rand Index, although simple and reasonably intuitive, has other problems.
For example, this measure (and other similar measures) is not corrected for what values
are expected by chance. In particular, it does not take into account the varying numbers
and sizes of categories that may be used by participants. Indeed, this is largely respons-
ible for the counterintuitively high value on this measure for Example (d).
To address these problems, variousmodifications of the Rand Index have been proposed.
For instance, Hubert and Arabie (1985) modify the Rand Index by correcting for its ex-
pected value. Under their modification, the measure yields a value of zero for the level
of agreement which is expected by chance, taking into account the number of categor-
ies and their sizes. However, under such a definition, the measure can now sometimes
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take negative values (so it’s no longer bounded by [0, 1]), along with other undesirable
properties (Meila 2007).
Another kind of agreement measure, developed by Wills and McLaren (1998), is based
on Cramer’s phi statistic (Cramer 1946). The original statistic is designed to measure the
association between two categorical variables, and is in turn based on Pearson’s standard






where χ2 is the χ2 statistic based on the contingency table between the two sets of cat-
egories, N is the number of items being categorised, and k is the number of categories
used in the smaller of the two sets.
However, as Wills and McLaren (1998) pointed out, this measure does not take into ac-
count the fact that participants can use different numbers of categories. To address this,
they defined an adjusted measure, which corrected the value for what would be expec-
ted by chance. The value expected by chance, φchance (see their paper for mathematical
justifications), is given by
φchance =
√
2(r − 1)(c− 1)− 1
2(N − 1)(k − 1)
(4.3)
where r and c are the number of categories in the two sets. The adjusted Cramer’s phi,





With this adjustment, claimWills andMcLaren (1998), the measure yields a value of 0 for
the degree of agreement expected by chance, independent of the number of categories
in the two sets.
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For the four examples above, φadj gives (a) 1.00, (b) 0.76, (c) 0.24, (d) -0.39. Thus, al-
though the measure decreases monotonically for these examples, it does not satisfy the
conditions laid out earlier, since it is not bounded on [0, 1] (like Hubert and Arabie’s 1985
measure).
A third basis for obtaining an agreement measure is set matching. In this approach,
the sets in one partitioning are matched with the sets in the other partitioning in every
possible way, and the total number of matching elements is counted for each alignment.
The score is then based on the alignment for which this count is maximised. For instance,










where k indexes a category, K is the number of categories in the partitioning with less
categories, and π is an injective mapping from {1, ...,K} to {1, ...,K
′
}.
Under this definition, for our examples, M gives: (a) 1.00, (b) 0.90, (c) 0.50, and (d) 0.30.
These values do satisfy the criteria above.
Other measures based on set matching have also been proposed, with different ways
of determining how to match the sets. None of these methods, however, considers the
“unmatched” parts of the sets, and thereby fails to capture certain intuitions (Meila 2007).
For example, if two partitionings differ with respect to a few stimuli, then we would
expect the measure to yield higher numbers if all of these stimuli were together in a
separate category than if they were scattered across the other categories.
A fourth agreement measure is derived from information theory, based on the notions
of entropy and information. The basic idea is to define a measure in terms of how much
information is lost or gained in shifting from one partitioning to another. The more
difference in information there is between the two partitionings, the higher is the value
along this measure.
The full mathematical derivation of the measure and its properties (see Meila 2007) is
relatively complex. Here I present only the equations needed for calculations of the
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measure, and a brief summary of its most relevant properties.
First, given a particular partitioning C , the probability P (k) that a randomly selected





By extension, the joint probability P (k, k′) can be defined as











P (k) log P (k). (4.8)












Finally, the variation of information between two partitionings is then a function of the
entropies and the mutual information:
V I(C,C ′) = 1−
H(C) +H(C ′)− I(C,C ′)
log n
. (4.10)
Note that the log n term normalises the measure so that it is bounded on [0, 1], and the
subtraction from 1 reverses the direction of the scores so that a value of 1 indicates that
the two partitionings are identical, as before.
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For the example above, this measure yields: (a) 1.00, (b) 0.82, (c) 0.41, and (d) 0.15. Like
the set-matching measure, this one satisfies the conditions laid out earlier. In addition, it
also gives more divergent values between the cases.
Although this kind of measure is more complicated than the two discussed previously,
it has several favourable properties. Most importantly, for any fixed number of stimuli
n, it is, mathematically speaking, a metric. In particular, it is symmetric and satisfies the
triangle inequality. This means that we can visualise different partitionings as occupying
distinct points in a geometric Euclidean space. Moreover, this measure handles the prob-
lem mentioned earlier of the unmatched parts of the sets in an intuitive way, handling
cases where categories are split or merged. For details, see Meila (2007).
For my purposes, I will generally use Meila’s (2007) measure based on information the-
ory, due to its useful properties. However, when participants are constrained to parti-
tion the items into exactly two categories, it seems better to use a set-matching approach:
with only two categories, the drawbacks of this approach do not apply, making its sim-
plicity preferable. In practice, this means that I will use the information theory method
in Experiments 1, 2 and 3, and the set-matching method in Experiment 4.
4.4 Experimental manipulations
In Section 4.1, I described how the framework should support various kinds of manipu-
lations. Therefore, beforewe commit to free classification tasks, it’s important to consider
whether they can support them effectively. Fortunately, they are quite amenable to the
kinds of manipulations that I need.
The framework can be easily adapted to study coordination due to one’s native lan-
guage (see Section 3.3), or brought about by interaction (see Section 3.4). In the first case,
participants with different native languages are tested individually, on either linguistic
or non-linguistic categorisation tasks (which can be achieved by manipulating whether
they are asked for category labels or not). Their free classification outputs are then com-
pared both to those of other native speakers of the same language and to native speakers
of other languages. The interactive case can also be addressed. Two participants can
carry out a categorisation task at the same time, with the same stimuli and the same
constraints. Alternatively, they could be asked to sort stimuli together, generating just
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one output between them. Depending on the experimental condition, they may be al-
lowed to speak to each other during the tasks, and they could be given feedback on their
partner’s categories and/or labels. Participants could also be asked to carry out mul-
tiple tasks in succession, to give them time to learn and coordinate better. Many other
manipulations are also possible, but these are the main types that I will use.
However, the success of the framework in handling these manipulations will no doubt
be judged by whether or not they yield significant and interesting results. This is an
empirical matter that cannot be decided a priori. Therefore, I do not discuss it further
here: we will see from the experiments themselves the real answers about how well the
framework supports these manipulations.
4.5 Stimulus considerations
In setting out my general framework criteria, I identified three subcriteria relating dir-
ectly to stimuli. First, stimuli should be non-linguistic, so that we can separate language
from conceptualisation. Second, they should come from a familiar domain, so that preex-
isting word-concept associations can be studied. Third, they should be prone to variab-
ility in categorisation, to maximise potential for variation and coordination. How can
these criteria be satisfied?
The first two criteria are straight-forward, and have a lot of precedents. Although many
categorisation experiments use verbal stimuli, whether auditory or written, visual pic-
tures are probably even more common, and often involve familiar stimuli. Indeed, the
categorisation literature has long been dominated by object concepts, which are com-
monly presented in pictorial form. Particularly frequently used stimulus domains which
are easily presented visually include animals (e.g., Rousselet, Fabre-Thorpe and Thorpe
2002), foods (e.g., Ross and Murphy 1999), faces (e.g., Goldstone, Lippa and Shiffrin
2001), artifacts (e.g., Malt et al. 1999), shapes (e.g., Rothbart and Lewis 1988) and dot pat-
terns (e.g., Zaki 2004). Most such domains are highly familiar to participants of various
backgrounds.
It is less clear how to best satisfy the third criterion: what kinds of stimuli should be
selected to maximise the potential variation in conceptualisation? First of all, we can use
fluid stimulus domains, in which the boundaries between concepts are not obvious or
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even stable. Fluidity can be achieved through fine sampling of a domainwhich is already
naturally fluid, or through the use of computer programs. An example of the former
is Malt et al. (1999), in which the experimenters used photographs of real containers.
While prototypical bottles, jars and tubes may be distinct, there are many intermediate
items which might be ambiguous with respect to these categories. The use of computer
software to achieve fluidity is exemplified in Goldstone et al. (2001), in which pairs of
distinct human faces were fed into a morphing program, yielding a sequence of faces
with interpolated features with images that still looked human. Computer programs
can be used even more easily with artificial stimuli, by manipulating the parameters
used to generate them along a continuum (Goldstone 1994).
Another simple way to produce variability in categorisation could be to use stimuli with
multiple prominent dimensions. For instance, fruit vary visually in terms of at least
colour, size, shape and texture. However, what is harder is getting the changes along
different dimensions to be of roughly equal salience. How much of a shift in colour cor-
responds to a particular shift in size? This cannot be answered in purely objective, phys-
ical terms, but must be treated psychophysically (Shepard 1987), since we know that
human perceptual sensitivity is not uniform even along a single dimension like colour
hue (Wright and Pitt 1934). As a result, even for artificial geometric stimuli, for which we
can often finely and precisely define values along particular dimensions, it is not clear
a priori how these shifts correspond to shifts in psychological representations. There-
fore, in selecting stimuli which vary along multiple dimensions, we cannot guarantee to
sample the domain in a perfectly uniform manner.
Finally, a third way of maximising conceptual variation is by using domains for which
cross-linguistic variability has already been demonstrated. If a stimulus domain exhibits
cross-linguistic differences in its conceptual partitioning, this is evidence that its stimuli
do not fall into uncontroversial natural kinds. As a result, such a domain is relatively
likely to exhibit differences in how individuals conceptualise items, even for speakers
of the same language. Researchers have argued that there are differences in how much
different domains vary cross-linguistically. For instance, it has been claimed that there
is more cross-linguistic variation in verbs than in nouns (Gentner 2006). On the other
hand, there is also evidence for at least some cross-linguistic differences in concrete object
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domains like containers (Malt et al. 1999) and dishes (Ameel, Storms, Malt and Sloman
2005).
Putting these considerations together, I have settled on two kinds of domains for use in
my experiments: dishes and triangles. Both of these domains are familiar and consist
of non-linguistic stimuli. They can be sampled in such a way as to create a highly fluid
set, augmented further with the help of morphing software or other computer programs.
They vary along multiple dimensions such as shape and size, and the dishes domain has
already been shown to exhibit cross-linguistic variation (Ameel et al. 2005). Moreover,
using one natural and one artificial domain increases the generalisability of potential
findings. Further details on how the particular stimulus sets were chosen and generated
are provided in the individual experimental chapters.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, I have laid out a general experimental framework aimed at addressing
specific research questions. I started by laying out a few critical criteria for my frame-
work, and then developing a framework which matched them. I began by arguing that
categorisation tasks are the best way for us to assess conceptualisation, even though this
is theoretically dissatisfying. I then reviewed different kinds of categorisation tasks, and
argued that free classification, in which people sort things relatively freely into groups,
was the most appropriate for my purposes. I then listed and assessed different measures
for comparing two outputs of free classification tasks, and suggestedhow the framework
could be manipulated suitably in my experiments. Finally, I considered some specific
subcriteria for stimulus domain selection and sampling, and how they will be satisfied.
CHAPTER 5
Experiment 1: native language and prior conceptual align-
ment
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, I distinguished two processes, operating at different timescales, in which
language could plausibly play a causal convergent role: the developmental shaping of
concepts, and the online application of concepts. In this chapter, I consider the first of
these options empirically, albeit by examining the adult end state. As such, we are in the
realm of the controversial linguistic relativity hypothesis, whereby our native language
shapes our conceptual repertoire (see Section 3.3). To the extent that this view may be
correct, it should follow that people’s concepts would generally be more in line with
those of other speakers of the same language. This is the main question behind Experi-
ment 1: do speakers of the same native language conceptualise things more similarly to
each other than speakers of different languages?
Recall that, according to Whorf’s (1956) strong original formulations of linguistic relativ-
ity, our native language would determine our conceptual system. If that were the case,
two native speakers of the same language would conceptualise things in the same way
as each other, but in general differently than two native speakers of different languages.
In other words, Whorf’s position immediately predicts a positive answer to the question
above.
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However, as we have seen, the empirical evidence for linguistic relativity is mixed,
which has resulted in weaker modern forms of the hypothesis. While current theor-
ies vary in their details, they share the basic principle that our native language influ-
ences how we see things in the world, without fully determining it. It has now been
established that our language can have an effect on our conceptualisation, but this effect
is limited and not pervasive. Therefore, further study in this area should stop asking
whether language affects conceptualisation and focus instead on the scope and depth of
this influence (Kay and Regier 2006).
This means, among other things, that linguistic relativity research should no longer con-
fine itself to particular favourite domains, like colour. Indeed, one striking aspect of
the literature is that the domain of object concepts, otherwise so pervasive in cognitive
psychology experiments and cognitive science research in general, is relatively unrep-
resented in studies of linguistic relativity. As we have seen, although a fair number of
studies have looked at how cross-linguistic grammatical differences may result in dif-
ferences in object conceptualisation, very few have considered the potential effects of
different languages lexically partitioning an object domain in different ways.
An important exception to this is Malt, Sloman, Gennari, Shi and Wang’s (1999) cross-
linguistic experiment, which suggested that native language has little or no effect on
the non-linguistic categorisation of artifacts. In line with my methodological choices in
Chapter 4, they used a free classification paradigm to probe individuals’ conceptualisa-
tions. However, their analysis was not focused on the question of conceptual coordina-
tion between individuals, and those of their results that relate to it are equivocal.
As a result, in this chapter, I present an experiment which is based heavily on Malt
et al.’s (1999) study but addresses slightly different target questions. I aim both to test the
robustness of their findings by using different languages and a different set of stimuli,
and to supplement their analysis by using different analytical measures and statistical
tests.
In the rest of the chapter, I first discuss Malt et al.’s (1999) experiment in more detail,
and how and why I propose to modify their design. Then I present my study, and finally
draw conclusions concerningwhether native languages induce conceptual coordination.
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5.2 Malt et al. (1999)
5.2.1 Purpose
The main purpose of Malt et al.’s study was to explore the relationship between how
people recognise objects and how they name them. They called these two types “re-
cognition categories” and “linguistic categories”, respectively. It is often assumed, they
point out, that these two types of categorisation are virtually isomorphic, so that the
name used for an object directly reflects the kind of thing that the object is recognised to
be. And intuitively, this makes sense: after all, words refer to categories of things in the
world (even though, as I argued in Section 2.4, categories are determined by concepts,
and so can vary from person to person).
However, as Malt et al. point out, the correspondence may not be as tight as we might
at first expect, because the two processes serve different functions. Object naming is
a communicative act, while recognition is not. Consequently, there may be different
pressures on how the two types of categories are formed, resulting in a potential disso-
ciation between recognition categories and linguistic categories. This issue is of course
related to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis: discovering that recognition categories are not
the same as linguistic categories would be evidence against the idea of language de-
termining thought. It also relates to my model of conceptualisation, and Malt et al.’s
(1999) linguistic and recognition categories can be loosely identified with lexicalised and






Figure 5.1: Malt et al.’s (1999) two types of categories in terms of my conceptualisation model:
linguistic (left) and recognition (right).
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Malt et al.’s experiment was designed to test whether there was a dissociation between
the two kinds of categories. More specifically, they aimed to answer three questions
(p. 237):
1. “Does the division of objects into linguistic categories differ across the three lan-
guages for this set of objects?”
2. “Does the perception of similarity among the objects differ across speakers of the
three languages?”
3. “If at least some differences in linguistic categorization and perceived similarity
are found, do these differences parallel one another?”
5.2.2 Design
The participants inMalt et al.’s studywere native speakers of Chinese, English and Span-
ish, who were undergraduate students in China, the United States, and Argentina, re-
spectively. They were mostly monolinguals, although some of the Chinese and Spanish
speakers did know limited amounts of English. They were individually tested in their
native language in their respective countries.
The stimuli consisted of photographs taken by the experimenters of sixty common con-
tainers. They were selected to represent as wide a range as possible of containers that
were likely to be called “bottle” or “jar” in English, or to share features in common with
these categories.
All participants carried out two kinds of tasks: sorting tasks and naming tasks. These
were meant to capture participants’ recognition and linguistic categories, respectively.
In the sorting tasks, they were asked to sort the full set of sixty stimuli into categories
based on similarity. The number, size, and nature of their categories were up to them.
Therewere three kinds of sorting tasks, depending onwhat kinds of features participants
were asked to base their sorts on: physical, functional or overall. All participants carried
out two of these three sorts in succession. These were thus free classification tasks (see
Section 4.2.2.5), with the constraint that the general basis for categorisationwas provided
by the experimenter. In the naming tasks, participants were asked to independently
name each stimulus (in their native language). They were to name things the way they
normally would to refer to the objects, and their names could consist of one or more
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words. All participants named each of the 60 stimuli. The resulting bodies of linguistic
and non-linguistic categorisation data for each of the three languages groups provided
the basis for testing Malt et al.’s research questions.
5.2.3 Analysis and results
The first step in Malt et al. (1999)’s analysis was to make the naming data comparable
in form to the sorting data. Although participants named each object independently,
linguistic categories could be induced by bringing together all items that were given the
same label. However, since participants were given complete freedom in the basis and
length of their expressions, they could, in principle, name each item (slightly) differently
by using long and detailed descriptions. Malt et al. dealt with this by collapsing par-
ticipants’ free labels to the head nouns they used in their descriptions. For instance, “a
small white bottle” would be treated as “bottle”. By doing this for all the labels of a par-
ticipant, they obtained a partitioning of the stimuli into a manageable number of basic
noun categories for that participant, parallelling the sorting data.
Having done this, Malt et al. (1999) conducted different kinds of analysis. Since it is very
relevant for the experiment I present in this chapter, I discuss a quick summary here
(but see their paper for details). First, for each language, they looked at the the distri-
bution of dominant names, which they defined as the most commonly used head nouns
for particular objects. They showed that these distributions for the different languages
diverged from each other. In a subsequent analysis of the same data, Malt et al. (2003)
elaborated this analysis further and showed that the differences in the naming patterns
could not be attributed to any single explanation, such as one language simply using
more superordinate terms than another.
Also, for each language, they derived a measure of inter-object similarity of every pair
of objects for both sorting and naming, based on the extent to which they were treated
the same (i.e., were sorted into the same groups, or had similar naming distributions,
respectively). This resulted in several sets of inter-object distance data, one for each
combination of language and task, which were then used as input to further analyses.
First, they computed correlations of the resulting values between different pairs of data-
sets to address their three research questions. The relative values of these correlations
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showed that the languages differed more in naming than in sorting, and that the naming
of a given language did not correspond to its sorting any more than it did to other lan-
guages’ sorting. Since these results capture their main findings succinctly, I reproduce
the correlation values in Table 5.1. Second, they presentedmultidimensional scaling dia-
grams which plotted the objects in the similarity space derived from sorting, with each
object labelled with its dominant name. This showed visually how the dominant names
of a language did not correspond closely with the way objects mapped onto a similar-
ity space based on their sorting data. Third, they used the inter-object similarities in
both naming and sorting to test whether the discrepancies between naming and sorting
tended to occur for the same pairs of objects in the different languages. Correlations










Sorting American Argentinean Chinese
American .70 .71 .43
Argentinean .65 .78 .48
Chinese .65 .68 .47
Table 5.1: Correlations comparing the naming patterns between languages (top left), the
sorting patterns between languages (top right), and the sorting-naming correspondence
both between andwithin languages (bottom). The sorting values come from the physical
sorting tasks.
Finally, they derived a furthermeasure, quite similar to the Rand Index (see Section 4.3.3),
which wasmeant to capture the difference between the naming or sorting outputs of two
individuals, irrespective of their language group. Principal components analyses were
then conducted on the resulting sets of values to see if factors emerged that distinguished
the groups. The analyses generally did find such factors, but more distinguishing factors
emerged for naming than for sorting, and the differences in the factor loadings were also
greater in the case of naming. This too suggests that the different languages named
things differently from each other but sorted things relatively similarly.
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5.2.4 Interpretation
Based on their results using these complementary forms of analysis, Malt et al. con-
clude that the different language groups name the objects differently from each other
despite sorting them quite similarly, and that there is no clean direct correspondence
between sorting and naming. In terms of linguistic relativity, this means that one’s nat-
ive language appears not to determine one’s non-linguistic categorisation of the world.
Similarly, in terms of my hypothesis of conceptual coordination, it suggests that different
speakers of the same language do not generally conceptualise objects in line with their
language and hence in line with each other.
These conclusions make a good case against a deterministic role of language on non-
linguistic categorisation. However, it’s important to recognise that they only reject a
strongWhorfian position, which, as mentioned earlier, has been already abandoned and
replaced by weaker versions in recent years. Malt et al. emphasise the fact that there is
greater divergence in linguistic than in non-linguistic categorisation between language
groups. But that merely shows that language affects the former more than the latter, not
that it fails to affect the latter at all. In otherwords, just because non-linguistic categorisa-
tion fails to directly reflect linguistic categorisation does not imply that it is unaffected by
language. Indeed, particularly weak formulations of linguistic relativity, such as Slobin’s
(2003) “thinking-for-speaking” (see Section 3.3.5), might even predict that linguistic ef-
fects on conceptualisation would only occur during explicit language use (and so not
during non-linguistic sorting, for example). So what do Malt et al.’s findings tell us in
terms of weaker forms of linguistic relativity?
To answer that, we need to focus on the sorting results, and whether they showed an
effect of native language. In the correlational analysis based on object pairs, Malt et al.
found high degrees of agreement for all three types of non-linguistic sorting (physical,
functional and overall), consistently higher than the results for naming. But what is
“high”? As Malt et al. acknowledge, their analysis is difficult to assess with significance
tests, because looking at all object pairs means that the data entries are not independent
of each other. This makes it difficult to put these numbers in perspective: is there no dif-
ference between the language groups, or are the differences merely small? Similarly, in
the other relevant analysis, based on comparisons of results from participant pairs using
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principal components analysis, Malt et al. found that for two of the three sorting types,
factors emerged which distinguished between the linguistic groups. In other words,
there was evidence that speakers of different languages did sort things differently. Thus,
although Malt et al. emphasised that their results were less divergent for sorting than
for naming, they may still be consistent with a weak linguistic relativity position.
On the other hand, even if cross-linguistic differences in non-linguistic categorisation
are found, it does not necessarily imply that language is responsible. This is why col-
lecting data on linguistic categorisation is also important. However, the naming data
fromMalt et al.’s study needs to be treated with caution. Recall that the first step in their
analysis was to collapse all the linguistic expressions down to their head nouns. This
is an intuitively sensible and necessary simplification to make the rest of the analysis
possible. However, it does also risk throwing away important information and making
the naming differences between languages seem larger (or smaller) than they actually
are. Indeed, in their discussion of naming patterns in the data, Malt, Sloman and Gen-
nari (2003) noted that some of the cross-linguistic variation may be due to systematic
morphosyntactic differences between the languages (e.g., diminutives in Spanish, clas-
sifiers in Chinese), which may result in an unequal burden on head nouns. This may be
important, because all of the naming results were based on these head nouns. Therefore,
it is possible that the analysis exaggerates the lack of correspondence between linguistic
and non-linguistic categorisation.
It’s also worth noting that Malt et al.’s (1999) analysis did not generally focus on the dif-
ferences between individuals and thus directly test the possibility that sharing the same
native language results in conceptual coordination. The one type of analysis that did
focus on inter-individual comparisons yielded relatively clear inter-group differences
for naming and weaker results for sorting. Moreover, the measure used for quantitat-
ive comparisons of two people’s categorisations was closely related to the Rand Index.
However, as I showed in Section 4.3.3, this measure has shortcomings and there are bet-
ter alternatives available. Since comparing categorisations of individuals yielded mixed
results in Malt et al.’s study and is central to my thesis, the choice of measure may be
important. In addition, as I will show later in this chapter, it is possible to test the con-
ceptual coordination hypothesis more directly and with a different type of analysis.
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Finally, the robustness and scope of Malt et al.’s findings are unclear. As I surveyed
in Section 3.3.3, linguistic relativity research has barely investigated how different lan-
guagesmight partition object domains differently, andwhether or not theway they do so
impacts how their native speakers perceive or categorise the domain non-linguistically.
An important exception is Ameel, Storms, Malt and Sloman (2005), who replicated Malt
et al.’s experiment as part of their bilingual study. Their replication tested French and
Dutch monolinguals in Belgium, and tested two object domains: containers (as in Malt
et al.’s study) and dishes. Both domains were sampled in a similar way to the original
study, using as wide a range as possible of relevant stimuli. Their analysis yielded sim-
ilar results to the original study: there were greater divergences between the languages
in naming than in sorting (although the difference was smaller for the dishes domain),
and sorting was less affected by one’s native language (if at all) than naming.
In summary, Malt et al.’s results document divergence in the linguistic categorisation of
different languages, but this does not appear to be reflected in non-linguistic categor-
isation. However, while the results refute a strong Whorfian position, this has already
been generally dismissed in linguistic relativity research. It is not surprising that our
native languages affect linguistic categorisation more than non-linguistic categorisation.
In contrast, with respect to current weaker Whorfian positions, the results sit on the
fence. In particular, Malt et al.’s results are equivocal with respect to the question of
whether our native language affects the non-linguistic categorisation of objects at all.
Malt et al.’s did not place emphasis on this, but their forms of analysis can be modified
slightly and supplemented to address the hypothesis of conceptual convergence more
directly. Subsequent work has yet to achieve this. I therefore address these issues in a
modified replication of Malt et al.’s experiment, which I present next.
5.3 Experiment 1
5.3.1 Overview
Malt et al.’s (1999) study used novel methodological methods to provide evidence for a
dissociation between linguistic and non-linguistic categorisation in the object domain.
However, the object domain remains largely understudied in linguistic relativity re-
search, so that the scope and depth of their findings are unclear.
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More importantly for my purposes, their experiment yielded equivocal results concern-
ing one of the central hypotheses of this thesis. In particular, it remains unclear whether
native speakers of the same language exhibit a significant degree of conceptual align-
ment with each other when categorising non-linguistically. The basic comparison un-
der consideration is shown generically in terms of my model of conceptualisation in
Figure 5.2. Thus, my main focus in analysis will be on inter-lingual and intra-lingual
comparisons in sorting tasks. However, I will also look at the naming data and the cor-







Figure 5.2: A comparison between the outputs on a non-linguistic categorisation task for two
participants. The experimental hypothesis is that δ will be smaller when the two categorisers are
native speakers of the same language, even in non-linguistic categorisation tasks.
Therefore, Experiment 1 has two main purposes:
1. Do linguistic and non-linguistic categorisation dissociate in the way suggested
by Malt et al.’s (1999)?
2. Are native speakers of the same languagemore conceptually aligned, by default,
than speakers of different languages?
Given the shortcomings I have identified of the original study with respect to my hy-
pothesis, these two goals are partly at odds and wedding them requires a bit of com-
promise. Nevertheless, provided both purposes can be met, this yields obvious benefits,
since it would allow me to directly address my thesis goals while also clearly relating
my results to the limited amount of previous work that has been done in this area.
In terms of replication, I use largely the same experimental procedures as in the original
study. Thus, as in the original experiments, each participant carries out both naming and
sorting tasks. Despite the potential problems I identified with the naming tasks, I use
the same procedure, and also analyse the naming data exclusively in terms of the head
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nouns used. I stick to the original procedure for three reasons. First, it allows for direct
comparison of the results with the original study. Second, despite its shortcomings, it is
still an intuitive basis for analysis and it is not clear what would be a superior alternative.
Third, the primary emphasis of my study is on whether one’s native language has an
effect on sorting, not naming.
However, my study will differ from the original (as well as Ameel et al.’s 2005 replic-
ation) in the native languages selected, the language profiles and location of the parti-
cipants, and the choice and sampling of the object domain. In particular, I will com-
pare native speakers of English, Polish and Japanese. In contrast to the original study,
the speakers are not necessarily monolingual (in fact, all the Polish and Japanese parti-
cipants had at least a fairly good grasp of English), and rather than being tested in their
home countries, they were all residing in Edinburgh, UK. This means that they could
be expected to be less divergent both linguistically and culturally (even compared to the
participants in Ameel et al.’s replication), and thus, if anything, are less likely to exhibit
group differences in both linguistic and non-linguistic categorisation. The stimulus do-
main is dishes, which was not the case in Malt et al.’s (1999) original experiment, but
was one of the two domains used in Ameel et al.’s replication (which found a smaller
dissociation between naming and sorting in the dish domain than the container domain).
This domain is appropriate because it exhibits all of the important properties identified
in developing my framework in section 4.5: it is familiar, non-linguistic, fluid, multi-
dimensional, and cross-linguistically variable. However, I sampled this domain differ-
ently than in the previous studies: rather than attempting to sample as large a variety
of relevant stimuli as possible, a fairly narrow set was chosen, often with subtle differ-
ences between stimuli. This was done in hopes of increasing the amount of variation in
categorisation among participants, by having more ambiguous items whose status with
respect to certain category boundaries was debatable. Together, these modifications al-
low us to test the scope and robustness of the original results.
Moreover, I will introduce a couple of changes in analysis, which aim to improve and
supplement the original methods used. First, I will use a slightly different method for
calculating the distance between object pairs in naming, which is more directly analog-
ous and comparable to the method used for sorting. Second, in order to compare the
categorisations of two individuals, I will use Meila’s (2007) information-theory method,
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which has advantages over methods based on the Rand Index (such as Malt et al.’s 1999,
as argued in Section 4.3.3). Third, and most crucially, I will add a form of analysis which
will allow for the comparison of conceptual agreement between individuals in differ-
ent conditions. In particular, I will (among other tests) directly test whether pairs of
participants who are native speakers of the same language categorised the stimuli more
similarly than native speakers of different languages.
This last method of analysis will also have the advantage of providing concrete signi-
ficance tests. Such tests are lacking in Malt et al.’s (1999) methods, due largely to the
complexity of the data and the non-independence of their units of observation. This res-
ulted in many of their analyses and conclusions (and inevitably also those in my replica-
tion analyses) being based on rather subjective comparisons of different values. Supple-
menting their methods with objective tests is beneficial, as it will serve to either increase
confidence in their results or provide good reasons for putting them in doubt.
Finally, I will also counterbalance the order in which participants carry out the naming
and sorting tasks. In the original experiment, participants always did sorting first. How-
ever, given the kinds of dynamic effects of words on conceptualisation that have been
documented (see Section 2.6.5), it is possible that the order would matter. As a result,
in my experiment, half of the participants (in each language) sorted the stimuli first,
and the other half named them first. I then checked whether there is greater alignment
between individuals in one condition or the other.
5.3.2 Method
5.3.2.1 Participants
Participants were mainly undergraduate students recruited through the University of
Edinburgh student employment website. However, some postgraduate students and
non-students also participated, especially in the Japanese group. There were 24 native
speakers for each of three different languages: English (age: M=20.8, SD=2.8; gender:
female=20, male=4), Polish (age: M=20.4, SD=2.5; gender: female=17, male=7) and Ja-
panese (age: M=26.8, SD=6.1; gender: female=17, male=7). However, all of the Polish-
and Japanese-speaking participants also had an intermediate or high level of English,
and some participants also spoke other languages.
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5.3.2.2 Stimuli
The stimuli consisted of sixty simple photographs of dish-like objects taken from online
catalogues of IKEA and other stores, printed and laminated on 6cm× 6cm size white pa-
per (Figure 5.3). The items were primarily chosen to be variants of what might be called
“plates” and “bowls” in English, together with other items that shared many features in
common with such items. The amount of variability among these stimuli was substan-
tially smaller than in the original studies, so that effectively the domain was smaller but
was sampled more finely.
Figure 5.3: The stimuli used in Experiment 1.
CHAPTER 5. EXPERIMENT 1 156
5.3.2.3 Conditions
The main experimental condition was the participant’s native language. To the extent
possible, the experiment sessions took place entirely in the native language of the parti-
cipants. The experimenter (who is native in English, fluent in Polish, and intermediate
in Japanese) greeted and conversed with the participants in their native language. The
written instructions (which were the main form provided) for the tasks were also in their
native language, having been translated from English into Polish and Japanese together
with the experimenter by native speakers of the respective languages who were also flu-
ent in English. Naming data was collected in the native language of the participants (and
the Japanese participants were asked to write the names in hiragana or katakana).
In addition, the order of the naming and sorting task was counterbalanced, so that half
of the participants in each linguistic condition carried out the sorting task first (as in the
original experiment), while the other half did the naming task first.
5.3.2.4 Procedure
Participants carried out one sorting task and one naming task, with the order of the
tasks depending on the experimental condition they were randomly assigned to. After
the tasks, they filled out a short questionnaire.
The tasks were nearly identical to the original experiment. In the naming task, par-
ticipants were given the pile of stimulus cards (in random order) and asked to write
down, for each stimulus, the number on the back of the card togetherwith the name that
they would naturally apply to the item in normal conversation. In the sorting task, the
experimenter laid out all sixty cards (in random order) on a table, and the participants
were asked to arrange them into groups based on similarity. Participants were asked
to sort the stimuli based on physical features (recall that participants sorted based on
either physical, functional or overall features in Malt et al. 1999, and based on overall
features in Ameel et al. 2005). This was done because the categorisation criteria made
little difference in the original experiment, and instructions for physical sorts seem the
most concrete and therefore least susceptible to translation-induced differences. Also,
the range of the allowed number of categories in the sorting task was more restricted,
with a minimum of three categories and a maximum of eight (in contrast with Malt
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et al.’s original range of 2-15), because the stimulus domain was more restricted in this
experiment.
5.3.3 Results
As this is largely a replication study, my analysis will, for the most part, follow the meth-
ods of Malt et al. (1999). In presenting my results, I will relate them to theirs (and, where
more relevant, to those of Ameel et al. 2005). I first present results for the naming data,
then move on to the sorting data, and finish by looking at the relations between them.
However, in order to address some of the issues identified in the introduction and test
my own hypotheses more directly, my analysis will diverge from theirs in three main
ways. First, I adapt a measure they used to analyse the naming patterns of the differ-
ent languages to be analogous (and hence more comparable) to the analysis of sorting
patterns. Second, I use a different measure for comparing the categorisation outputs of
individuals, in line with my discussion of such measures in Section 4.3.3. Third, I add a
new set of testswhich compare the degrees of alignment between individuals in different
conditions. These tests are based on randomly pairing up the outputs of different people
under the constraints of particular conditions of interest. My analytic modifications will
be explained in greater detail as they come up.
5.3.3.1 Example output
Before analysing the data, I first show an example of the experiment output from a ran-
domly selected native English speaking participant. Figure 5.4 shows the sorting output,
and Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show the naming output.
5.3.3.2 Comparisons of naming patterns
For each of the three languages, participants’ full labels for each object were first col-
lapsed to their head nouns. Lexical categories were then induced from the resulting la-
bels. For instance, “large round bowl”, “small bowl”, “bowl” and “bowl for cereal” are
all collapsed to the category “bowl”. In addition, Polish diminutives were collapsed to
the canonical form. For example, “miska” (bowl) and “miseczka” (little bowl) were both
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Figure 5.4: An example of the sorting task of an English speaker from Experiment 1. Each row
represents one category.
treated as “miska”. Similarly, Japanese words which incorporated adjectival and hon-
orific prefixes were collapsed analogously, so that “sara” (plate), “osara” (o = honorific
prefix), and “fukazara” (fukai = ’deep’) were all treated as “sara”. This process dismisses
a lot of information, but allows us to examine the lexical categories corresponding to ob-
ject noun concepts, and to make the naming and sorting data fairly analogous. All of the
remaining analysis involving object names operates on the resultant head noun data.
Nowwe can identify the “dominant names” for each languagewith respect to the stimuli
of the experiment. A dominant name is defined as the most frequently used name for a
given object. Of course, since the objects come from quite a restricted domain, many of
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salad bowl dish tray dish
deep serving bowl serving bowl casserole pot plate
plate plate serving bowl serving bowl
serving plate plate dinner plate dish
large square serving bowl square serving bowl pudding bowl large bowl
plate square baking tray pie dish pie dish
dinner plate plate plate tray
tray dish serving dish plate
Figure 5.5: An example of the naming task of an English speaker from Experiment 1 (first half).
The head nouns used in analysis are shown in bold.
the 60 objects will have the same dominant names. Table 5.2 shows the dominant names
for English, Polish and Japanese, and their composition in terms of the dominant names
for the other two languages.
CHAPTER 5. EXPERIMENT 1 160
plate plate plate dish
square plate soup bowl dish pasta dish
large bowl round serving bowl plate pie dish
square plate dinner plate cake tin salad bowl
serving dish plate plate plate
tray bowl soup bowl dinner plate
plate avocado bowl washing-up bowl quiche dish
Figure 5.6: An example of the naming task of an English speaker from Experiment 1 (second
half). The head nouns used in analysis are shown in bold.
English, Japanese and Polish each had four dominant names, although, as we will see,
they varied substantially in their scope. The English and Polish dominant names exhib-
ited some correspondences. English speakers called over 80% of the items either “plate”
or “bowl”, which corresponded roughly to Polish “talerz” and “miska”, respectively.
However, “talerz” had a wider scope than “plate”, encompassing a few items that were
called “bowl”, while the reverse was not the case (i.e., the dominant names of the same
item being “plate” and “miska”). Both English and Polish also had two other dominant
CHAPTER 5. EXPERIMENT 1 161
English name N Polish composition Japanese composition
plate 26 talerz(24), taca(2) sara (26)
bowl 24 miska(21), talerz(3) sara (10), hachi (8), wan (5), booru (1)
dish 8 miska(4), talerz(3), forma(1) sara (8)
tray 2 talerz(1), taca(1) sara (2)
Polish name N English composition Japanese composition
talerz 31 plate(24), bowl(3), dish(3), tray(1) sara (31)
miska 25 bowl(21), dish(4) sara (11), hachi (8), wan (5), booru (1)
taca 3 plate(2), tray(1) sara (3)
forma 1 dish(1) sara (1)
Japanese name N English composition Polish composition
sara 46 plate(26), bowl(10), dish(8), tray(2) talerz (31), miska (11), taca (3), forma (1)
hachi 8 bowl(8) miska (8)
wan 5 bowl(5) miska (5)
booru 1 bowl(1) miska (1)
Table 5.2: The dominant names for each language, and their composition in terms of the domin-
ant names of the other two languages. The numbers (under the N column for the first language,
and in brackets for each of the names for the other two) indicate the quantity of stimuli for which
the names were dominant.
names each that covered a small range of items, but they did not correspond to each
other in an obvious way.
The Japanese dominant names, on the other hand, partitioned the space of objects quite
differently. The relatively generic term “sara” was used for over 75% of the items. Strik-
ingly, these included items which corresponded to each of the dominant names for Eng-
lish and Polish. On the other hand, “sara” does not appear to be a generic superordinate
term that covers the whole space. Indeed, each of the items with one of three remaining
Japanese dominant names were called “bowl” in English and “miska” in Polish. In other
words, Japanese seems to have one term which covers all of the non-bowls and some (in
fact, almost half) of the bowls, but makes several fine distinctions among the remaining
bowls.
Malt et al. (1999) do not show the compositions for all of the languages in terms of the
dominant names for the others, so it is difficult to compare the results closely. How-
ever, from what they do show, it seems that the naming patterns in their experiment
are harder to pinpoint. For instance, although Chinese also had one highly dominant
term for containers, much like Japanese has for dishes in my experiment (i.e., “sara”),
it is not the case that the remaining Chinese terms all map onto the same English cat-
egory, or that they map cleanly onto separate ones. Similarly, in their results, there is no
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close correspondence between terms in two languages, like English “plate” and Polish
“talerz”. Much the same is true of Ameel et al.’s (2005) replication with dishes in French
and Dutch: there too, there are no close correspondences between the scope of terms in
the languages (with the exception of “pot”).
As Malt et al. (1999) point out, the above form of analysis only considers the most fre-
quently used names for each item, which ignores the fact that there was substantial
intra-lingual variability in naming. Indeed, only 3 (two “bowl” and one “plate”), 3 (all
“talerz”) and 11 (all “sara”) items were given the same name by all native English, Polish
and Japanese speakers, respectively. The subsequent forms of analysis thus take the full
head noun distributions into account.
The next analysis is based on pairs of objects. First, for each language, I made a list
of all the head nouns that were used. Then, for each object, I counted the number of
times that it was named with each of the head nouns, generating a name distribution
for each object. Next, a correlation was calculated between the naming distributions of
every pair of stimuli, giving a measure of naming similarity for each of the 1770 (60×592 )
pairs. These values provide measures of how similar the two objects were in terms of
naming for the language group as a whole. Finally, the resulting correlation vectors for
one language were (second-order) correlated with each of the other languages to derive
a measure of naming similarity between the languages. The resulting correlations are





Table 5.3: Naming pattern correlations between languages, based on their naming distributions
over object pairs.
AsMalt et al. (1999) point out, the first-order correlations for each language are not inde-
pendent of each other, since the same stimulus enters into 59 correlations. Consequently,
it is not possible to do a simple significance test on the correlations. The focus is thus on
how these correlation values compare to each other and to those for the sorting data to
follow. Here, the correlations seem substantial, and similar to those in Malt et al.’s exper-
iment. However, the relatively high correlation of English-Polish was not matched for
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any of the language pairs in the original experiment. On the other hand, naming agree-
ment in Ameel et al.’s (2005) study suggested greater cross-linguistic variability in the
container domain than in the dishes domain, and in fact the correlation between French
and Dutch for dishes in their study was higher than any of the values found here (0.80).
The lack of significance tests and reliance on relative values makes it particularly import-
ant that the naming and sorting comparisons be as similar and fair as possible (if we are
to compare them to each other). However, it is not possible to derive a directly analogous
measure to the one above for sorting. Instead, since sorting does not offer category labels
that can be used to bridge different participants’ outputs together, a label-independent
measure is needed which can be used for both naming and sorting. Fortunately, the de-
rivation of Malt et al.’s (1999) object pair correlations for sorting (to be replicated in the
next section) can be applied directly to the naming data as well. I conduct this analysis
next.
In particular, for each pair of objects, we count the number of participants within each
language who gave the two objects the same name. Note that this has a counterintuitive
consequence, since the count can include different name-pair associations. For instance,
a given pair of objects might both be called “dish” by some participants, “bowl” by oth-
ers, and “plate” by still others: all of these count as the two items being put into the same
category. Thus, unlike the previous analysis, here we are focusing on participants’ cat-
egory boundaries in their partitionings of the object space, without considering whether
participants agree with each other on the names used. Again, this is necessary if we
want to compare the naming and sorting correlations fairly. And, as before, the object
pair values give ameasure of how similarly the two objects were treated in naming space
for each language group. Once these counts are obtained for each pair of objects, we can
then carry out correlations between the languages, as in the previous analysis. The res-





Table 5.4: Naming pattern correlations between languages based on how often object pairs were
given the same name.
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Notice that each of the naming correlations is higher in this analysis than it was when
we looked at naming distributions. In other words, the cross-linguistic differences in
naming are smaller according to this measure than according to the one originally used
by Malt et al. (1999) and Ameel et al. (2005). This may be important when we compare
the naming and sorting results.
The next analysis compares the naming output of pairs of individuals, regardless of
native language, and tests whether there are group differences underlying the results
that correspond to native languages. To do this, first the degree of naming agreement
between each pair of participants was calculated, yielding a symmetric distance matrix.
However, in order to calculate the degree of inter-participant categorisation agreement,
unlike Malt et al. (1999), I use Meila’s (2007) measure based on information theory (as
proposed in Section 4.3.3). The calculations resulted in a symmetric distance matrix
which was then subjected to principal components analysis using the ‘principal’ func-
tion in R’s psych library. Following Malt et al., if there are underlying group differences
corresponding to the three languages, we expect at least three different principal com-
ponents to emerge, and for them to distinguish between the languages. If not, we expect
just one factor to emerge and for all languages to load equally on it. The analysis re-
vealed five factors with eigenvalues above 1 (Malt et al.’s criteria for howmany factors to
keep). Nevertheless, while the first eigenvalue (48.24) was much higher than the second
(2.38), there was a much smaller drop down to the third eigenvalue (1.39) and beyond.
This suggests that actually only one factor should be extracted. Therefore, an analysis
was first conducted to extract one factor. This factor accounted for 69% of the variance,
which was much higher than in Malt et al.’s results. However, this factor did distinguish
between the languages, with mean factor loadings significantly higher for Japanese than
the other two languages (English: M = 0.81, SD = 0.05; Japanese: M = 0.84, SD = 0.03;
Polish: M = 0.80, SD = 0.07; F (2, 69) = 4.30, p < .05). As a result, a second principal
components analysis was run, this time extracting three factors, to see if the different
factors would correspond to the different languages. The analysis suggests that they do,
with the first factor loading most on Japanese (English: M = 0.40, SD = 0.07; Japanese:
M = 0.70, SD = 0.08; Polish: M = 0.46, SD = 0.12; F (2, 69) = 67.63, p < .001), the
second most on English (English: M = 0.63, SD = 0.10; Japanese: M = 0.38, SD = 0.05;
Polish: M = 0.42, SD = 0.09; F (2, 69) = 64.40, p < .001), and the third most on Polish
(English: M = 0.37, SD = 0.09; Japanese: M = 0.35, SD = 0.06; Polish: M = 0.52,
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SD = 0.09; F (2, 69) = 30.00, p < .001). However, the three factors accounted for only
slightly more variance (i.e., 72%) than the analysis with a single factor. These analyses,
while being more equivocal than Malt et al.’s, are largely in agreement with them.
So far, the analyses presented have mainly considered group-level differences. However,
my thesis is focused on conceptual coordination between individuals. Therefore, I also
analyse the data by looking at the degrees of agreement between pairs of participants,
in order to see whether conceptual coordination is relatively high in certain conditions.
Since such analyses were not conducted by Malt et al. (1999), and I will present sev-
eral of them both here and in subsequent subsections, I first explain the general method
abstractly here, which will then be demonstrated through application.
In order to compare the degree of coordination between pairs of individuals in differ-
ent conditions, I adopt the following technique. The main idea is to randomly assign
participants to pairs under two conditions, subject to corresponding constraints. For
instance, in order to see whether there is more coordination in naming between pairs
of native speakers of the same language compared to native speakers of different lan-
guages, we can first randomly assign half of the participants to within-language pairs
and the other half to across-language pairs. Then we again use Meila’s (2007) measure
to compare the categorisation outputs for each pair, and conduct a t-test to see whether
there is a difference between the two conditions. However, since there is an enormous
number of possible pairing permutations for most of the conditions I will test, we can
sample many different pairing configurations and run such a test for each case. Then we
can look at how often we get significant results in these tests.
However, there is a difficulty in interpreting this number, since it’s not obvious what
number of tests should yield significant results by chance. As several preliminary suites
of tests revealed, the ratio of significant results was often well below 5%, which at first
glance is surprising if we use a 5% threshold for significance. The reason for this seems
to be that the inter-participant scores are largely dependent on which participants are in-
volved (as shown by preliminary examinations of the scores), so that some participants’
average coordination with others tended to be relatively high or relatively low. In other
words, participants varied in terms of how idiosyncratic their categorisation tended to
be. However, since the pairing configurations always include exactly one score involving
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each participant, then whatever samplings of scores are taken (under these constraints)
can still show substantial variation, which means high standard deviations and thereby
lower chances of significant differences.
As a result, the following strategy was used. For each test of this type, 10,000 random
permutations were generated, and for each one, two one-tailed t-tests were conducted,
one for each tail. If there is no difference between conditions, we would expect about the
same number of significant results in both directions. Otherwise, we expect the number
of significant one-tailed tests in one direction to be significantly higher than the number
in the other direction. Chi-squared tests can be used on these totals (comparing the
number of significant and non-significant results for both tails) to assess whether there
is a difference between the conditions.
Here, I present the first two tests using this technique. First, I compared the degree
of coordination in linguistic categorisation between languages versus within languages.
In each of the 10,000 tests, the 72 experiment participants were randomly assigned to
pairs in such a way that 18 pairs consisted of two native speakers of the same language
(with 6 pairs for each language), and the remaining 18 pairs were two native speakers
of different languages (with 6 pairs for each language combination). After calculating
the degree of agreement for each pair, each test was then subjected to the two one-tailed
t-tests. Out of 10,000 different pairing configurations, 5280 suggested that there was
more naming agreement within languages, and only 1 supported the opposite claim.
The chi-squared test confirmed that the difference between the two conditions is highly
significant (χ2(1) = 7167.61, p < .001). Thus, speakers of the same languages named
things more similarly than speakers of different languages.
A second test examined whether the degree of naming agreement within languages de-
pended on the order in which the tasks were carried out. In particular, was naming
agreement higher (or lower, or equal) if naming was done after sorting? Participants
were randomly paired with other speakers of the same language who did the tasks in
the same order. In this case, 153 tests suggested that naming agreement was higher if
naming followed sorting, while none suggested the opposite, which was highly signific-
ant (χ2(1) = 152.17, p < .001). Thus naming agreement was increased by doing sorting
first.
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5.3.3.3 Comparisons of sorting patterns
The sorting data does not offer the possibility of any analysis that relies on category
identifiers (such as labels). In particular, we cannot ask whether two participants put
a particular stimulus into the “same” category as each other. However, many of the
analyses conducted with the naming data in the previous section can be directly applied
to the sorting data as well.
First, we can still consider how object pairs are treated by the different language groups
and then compare the groups to each other. While there is no direct analogue for looking
at naming distributions, we can look at how often items are grouped together. In partic-
ular, for every pair of objects, we can count the number of speakers of a given language
that put the pair into the same category. This method is directly analogous to the mod-
ified method I proposed for dealing with object pairs in the naming analysis, and gives
a measure of how similar the objects were for a language group as a whole. Again, this
procedure results in a vector of 1770 values for each language, which can then be correl-
ated with the corresponding vector for another language. The resulting correlations are





Table 5.5: Sorting pattern correlations between languages based on how often object
pairs were put into the same category.
Although again we cannot conduct significance tests since the vector values are not inde-
pendent, the correlations are noticeably higher than the ones for naming. This is the case
regardless of whether we are comparing to Malt et al.’s (1999) method based on naming
distributions or the alternative I proposed based on how often pairs of objects are given
the same names. Either way, the language groups seem to differ more in naming than in
sorting. These results are consistent with Malt et al.’s and Ameel et al.’s (2005) results,
although the correlations in my study are slightly higher: in both of those studies, the
sorting correlations were consistently around .9.
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Next, as for naming, principal components analysis was used to test whether there were
group differences underlying patterns in inter-participant sorting agreement. If so, we
again expect at least three different principal components to emerge, and for the lan-
guages to distinguish between them. Otherwise, we expect just one emergent factor
which loads equally on the different languages. The analysis revealed that there were
four components with eigenvalues greater than 1, but only the drop between the first
(49.41) and second (2.13) was large, levelling off after the second (e.g., the third eigen-
value was 1.44). However, unlike for naming, this factor, which accounted for 69% of
the variance, did not distinguish between the languages (English: M = 0.83, SD = 0.04;
Japanese: M = 0.82, SD = 0.06; Polish: M = 0.83, SD = 0.04; F (2, 69) = 0.17,
p > .05). Nevertheless, for comparison with the naming results, another analysis was
run, extracting three principal components. In contrast to naming, and in agreement
with Malt et al.’s (1999) results, none of the three principal components (which together
accounted for 74% of the variance) distinguished between the languages (component 1:
English: M = 0.53, SD = 0.13; Japanese: M = 0.53, SD = 0.13; Polish: M = 0.53,
SD = 0.16; F (2, 69) = 0.01, p > .05; component 2: English: M = 0.51, SD = 0.13;
Japanese: M = 0.44, SD = 0.13; Polish: M = 0.48, SD = 0.14; F (2, 69) = 1.52, p > .05;
component 3: English: M = 0.38, SD = 0.09; Japanese: M = 0.46, SD = 0.15; Polish:
M = 0.42, SD = 0.11; F (2, 69) = 2.25, p > .05). This suggests that speakers of the
different languages sorted things in the same way, in line with Malt et al.’s results.
Finally, using the randomised pairing method introduced in the naming section, I con-
ducted two analogous sets of tests involving randomised pairings of participants. First,
I tested whether sorting agreement within languages was higher than sorting agreement
across languages. 844 out of 10,000 tests suggested that it was, while 275 suggested the
opposite. While the difference is not nearly as striking as for naming (consistent with
the previous analyses and Malt et al. 1999), the chi-squared test confirmed that speakers
of the same language did sort more similarly to each other than speakers of different
languages (χ2(1) = 305.40, p < .001).
Second, I tested whether sorting agreement was higher within languages if the sorting
task was done before the naming task rather than vice versa. 13 tests suggested that it
was, while 28 suggested that sorting agreement was higher if naming was done first.
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This result is also significant (χ2(1) = 4.79, p < .05). However, given the very low num-
bers for significant tests in both directions (much less than 1%), this result is suspicious
and may be an artifact of the particular statistical technique I am using.
5.3.3.4 Correspondences between naming and sorting patterns
So far we have looked at sorting patterns and naming patterns independently. However,
if words play a causal role in non-linguistic categorisation, then not only should sorting
differ for the different languages, but also sorting should reflect naming.
First, multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) was used in order to give a basic visualisation of
the degree of correspondence between naming and sorting for each language. MDS is
a technique which takes a set of distances between every pair of points and lays them
out in a lower-dimensional space in such a way as to preserve the distances as much as
possible. In our case, the points are objects, and the distances come from the inter-object
similarity measure defined in the preceding section (for sorting). By labelling the objects
in the diagram with their dominant names, we can get a general impression of how well
clusters in a language group’s “similarity space” correspond to its words. Figures 5.7,
5.8 and 5.9 show the resultant two-dimensional scaling solutions for the three languages.
The solution for English suggests that there is quite some correspondence between nam-
ing and sorting, although it is far from perfect. For example, most of the “plates” are
found tightly in a cluster of their own (top right), with no other items nearby. However,
there are several “plates” further off that are together with a couple of “dishes” and near
a “tray” (bottom). The “bowls” and most of the “dishes” (top left) are found together
and form a more diffuse group, but still fairly distinct from the “plates”.
The Polish solution is broadly similar to the English. There is again a tight cluster of
“talerz” (top right), and a few “talerz” among “taca” (bottom). Here too the “miska” are
together, and form a somewhat more diffuse group (top left); however, there are also a
few “talerz” and one “forma” nearby.
As was the case for the dominant name data, the Japanese solution is clearly different
than the other two. “Sara”, by far the most prevalent Japanese dominant name, forms
several separate clusters (top right, bottom right, bottom left). Among these, there are
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Figure 5.7: MDS solution for English: English sorting patterns are superimposed with English
dominant names (b = bowl, d = dish, p = plate, t = tray).
no items whose dominant names are not “sara”, with the possible exception of the one
“booru” which is on the edge of one of the clusters. However, the most diffuse group of
objects has several “sara” and all the “hachi” and “wan” together. While the “wan” ar-
guably form a subcluster, the rest are scattered around the cluster in no obvious pattern.
Comparing the multidimensional scaling diagrams of my study with those of Malt et al.
(1999) is necessarily impressionistic, and I thus do not pursue this much here. I only
make two observations. First, the results are in general agreement: in both cases, there
was clearly some correspondence between lexical categories and object clusters in sim-
ilarity space, but these correspondences were not clean and consistent. Second, the cor-
respondences appear a little more chaotic in their data, with more distribution of certain
lexical categories around the space and more cases of relatively adjacent items with dif-
ferent dominant names.
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Figure 5.8: MDS solution for Polish: Polish sorting patterns are superimposed with Polish dom-
inant names (m = miska, t = talerz, c = taca, f = forma).
Next, I return to the correlational methods involving object pairs. Previously I looked
at how well the different languages agreed in their sorting or in their naming independ-
ently. In doing so, I obtained two vectors of inter-object distance data for each language,
one for sorting and one for naming. Now we can see how well naming and sorting fit
each other, and in particular whether the naming patterns of a given language fit that
language’s sorting patterns better than the sorting patterns of other languages. To that
end, we can take correlations of each of the three naming vectors with each of the three
sorting vectors. If naming and sorting correspond to each other within a language, we
should expect higher correlations within a language (e.g., Polish naming and Polish sort-
ing) than across languages (e.g., Polish naming and Japanese sorting). Moreover, since I
carried out two kinds of analyses of this sort for naming (one according to Malt et al.’s
1999 naming distribution method and one that is more analogous to sorting), we can
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Figure 5.9: MDS solution for Japanese: Japanese sorting patterns are superimposed with Japan-
ese dominant names (s = sara, b = booru, h = hachi, w = wan).
conduct these nine correlations twice, once for each method. The results are shown in
Tables 5.6 and 5.7, respectively.
Naming
Sorting English Japanese Polish
English .69 .36 .57
Japanese .67 .48 .65
Polish .71 .37 .62
Table 5.6: Correlations of correspondences between naming (using the naming distribution
measure) and sorting.
Since the two tables have virtually identical patterns of results, with the second table
having consistently higher values across the board, I focus on the second table, as it is
derived from the vectors obtained with analogous techniques for naming and sorting.
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Naming
Sorting English Japanese Polish
English .80 .45 .71
Japanese .76 .59 .78
Polish .82 .47 .75
Table 5.7: Correlations of correspondences between naming (using the measure analogous to
that for sorting) and sorting.
Although the non-independence of the data does not allow for simple significance test-
ing, the relative values of the correlations do not fit cleanly with the prediction of a
naming-sorting correspondence. The values along the diagonal are generally not higher
than off the diagonal, showing that the naming of a language predicts that group’s sort-
ing no better than it predicts the sorting of other groups. Although English sorting is
best predicted by English naming, Polish sorting also fits English naming better. Japan-
ese sorting is most consistent with Polish naming, although English naming is almost as
good, and in fact, according to the first table, fits Japanese sorting better. As such, for the
manner of analysis borrowed from Malt et al. (1999), English naming actually predicts
sorting best for all three languages.
Indeed, the predictability of naming appears to be independent of which language’s sort-
ing patterns are being compared to. As mentioned, English naming seems to generally
fit the sorting data best. Polish naming is not far behind, while Japanese naming is by
far the least predictive. Indeed, it is particularly striking that Japanese sorting is much
more consistent with English or Polish naming than with Japanese naming.
These results are again consistent with the findings of Malt et al. (1999). They too found
not only a lack of intralingual correspondence between naming and sorting, but also
that the naming patterns of certain languages generally predicted sorting patterns better
(or worse) irrespective of which language group did the sorting. In particular, they had
found that Spanish naming tended to correlate with sorting the best, English was inter-
mediate, and Chinese was the worst. Indeed, analogously to the finding in my data for
Japanese, Chinese naming was the worst of the three at predicting Chinese sorting. This
was the case for all three of their sorting data sets (recall that they had participants sort
stimuli in three different ways).
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Next, I look at whether the discrepancies between two languages in naming correspond
to the discrepancies between them in sorting. The starting point is again the inter-object
relation data derived in the previous sections for both naming and sorting. In this case,
we can subtract two languages’ resultant vectors for naming, getting a measure of how
much the languages agreed in naming with regards to each pair of objects. The ana-
logous calculation can be carried out for sorting. Then we can correlate the resulting
two vectors. The resulting correlations reflect the extent to which sorting and naming
discrepancies between pairs of languages match each other. The results (again for both





Table 5.8: Correlations among groups in naming-sorting differences (using the naming distribu-





Table 5.9: Correlations among groups in naming-sorting differences (using the analogous
method to sorting for naming).
These results are again generally consistent with Malt et al. (1999). The relatively low
correlations here suggest that although speakers of different languages sort similarly,
and to a lesser extent name similarly, the discrepancies between naming and sorting
vary across the languages.
However, note that in Table 5.9, which reflect my alternative inter-object measure for
naming, the results are a little different. Although the correlations are still relatively
low, notice that they vary depending on whether Japanese is one of the languages in-
volved. The correlation for English and Polish was quite low, but their comparisons
with Japanese resulted in much higher values (note that the English-Polish correlation
is also the lowest in Table 5.9, although the differences are less striking). This suggests
that although Japanese sorting and naming do not fit each other well (as shown in the
previous analysis), Japanese speakers may have a somewhat different (perhaps cultural)
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understanding of certain objects than their English and Polish counterparts, resulting in
divergent patterns for both naming and sorting.
To finish analysing the correspondences between naming and sorting, I conducted more
tests using the random partner permutations method introduced in the naming section.
In this case, several more kinds of tests are possible than when we only looked at nam-
ing or sorting independently. First, I checked whether the degree of agreement between
one participant’s naming and another’s sorting differed for native speakers of the same
language rather than native speakers of different languages. Of the 10,000 tests, 407 sug-
gested greater within-language agreement, and 424 suggested greater across-language
agreement, which was not significantly different (χ2(1) = 0.32, p > .05). Next, I tested
whether the amount of correspondence between naming and sorting within languages
was greater if sorting was done before naming: 159 supported this claim while only 56
favoured the opposite. This difference was highly significant (χ2(1) = 48.92, p < .001).
Third, I tested whether native speakers of the same language agreed with each other
more in naming than in sorting. Thus, here the randomised pairing configurations con-
sisted of 36 pairs of speakers of the same language, and each pair’s degree of agree-
ment was measured for both naming and sorting. 165 paired t-tests suggested greater
agreement in naming than in sorting, while none suggested the opposite, and the differ-
ence was significant (χ2(1) = 164.36, p < .001). In contrast, conducting the same kind
of test but with participants matched with native speakers of a different (rather than
same) language revealed the opposite pattern, and even more strongly, with 5958 tests
showing more agreement in sorting than in naming and none showing the opposite pat-
tern (χ2(1) = 8483.12, p < .001). Next, I tested whether there was greater agreement
between naming and sorting of the same individuals than there was between pairs of
native speakers of the same language. In this case, each random configuration consisted
of 24 individual participants (8 from each language) and 24 participant pairs (also 8
for each language). Of the 10,000 tests, 2116 favoured the claim that there was more
intra-individual agreement, while only 62 supported the opposite position, which again
constitutes a significant difference (χ2(1) = 2171.67, p < .001). Finally, I tested whether
the agreement between sorting and naming within individuals depended on the order
of the tasks. In this case, there is only one “pairing” configuration, with no randomisa-
tion possible: 36 participants did naming first and 36 did sorting first. A simple t-test
revealed no significant difference (t(70) = 0.03, p > .05).
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5.3.3.5 Questionnaire data
The responses to the questionnaire (see Appendix A.2) confirmed that, as expected, par-
ticipants had a variety of linguistic and cultural backgrounds. Many participants spoke
a few languages at different levels of proficiency, and/or had lived in a variety of coun-
tries. The Polish and Japanese native speakers in particular nearly all had an advanced
level of English. This was thus not a controlled variable in this experiment.
5.3.4 Discussion
I first summarise my results while discussing how they replicate and extendMalt et al.’s
(1999) findings. Then I discuss the implications for conceptual and lexical alignment,
and linguistic relativity. Finally, I discuss some outstanding methodological issues.
5.3.4.1 Replication and extension of Malt et al. (1999)
Experiment 1 used the same general procedure as Malt et al.’s (1999) study, but modi-
fied a few other aspects of the design, and made a few changes in analysis. Participants
carried out sorting tasks, in which they freely grouped a set of object stimuli into categor-
ies. They also did naming tasks, in which they freely named individual items. However,
unlike the original experiment, my study tested a different set of languages, recruited
participants who all lived in the same city and who were often bilingual or even multi-
lingual, sampled the stimulus domain in a more restricted way, and modified a few of
the original analytic methods. Despite these changes, my results were broadly similar to
the original ones.
Most of my analyses followed the same general statistical techniques as Malt et al. (1999),
including the use of correlations between languages based on the categorisation of ob-
ject pairs, principal components analyses searching for factors which distinguished the
different languages, and multi-dimensional scaling to visualise the extent of naming-
sorting correspondenceswithin languages. The results were quite similar to Malt et al.’s.
The most commonly used names for the different languages varied in their scope, and
Japanese naming was particularly distinct from Polish and English. More generally, al-
though there was plenty of overlap, the languages differed substantially from each other
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in how they partitioned up the objects into linguistic categories. In contrast, sorting pat-
terns were largely similar across languages. People tended to partition the objects non-
linguistically in quite similar ways, regardless of their native language. However, like
the original study, there was no evidence for a simple correspondence between naming
and sorting, even though they are clearly related to some extent. The naming patterns
of a particular language did not reflect the same language’s sorting patterns any better
than they did the sorting patterns of other languages. In brief, speakers of different lan-
guages seem to differ in how they name objects, but perceive things in largely the same
way, and differences in perception do not generally correspond to naming differences.
Unlike Malt et al.’s (1999) original study, my experiment also looked more directly at the
factors involved in determining the degree of categorisation agreement between pairs
of individuals. This was done by assigning all of the participants in the experiment to
random partners, subject to the conditions in question. These analyses fit with the previ-
ous ones and Malt et al.’s results, while also extending them. First, they confirmed that
there were substantial cross-linguistic differences in naming objects. Also, in contrast
to previous analyses, such cross-linguistic differences (albeit much smaller) were also
found in sorting. This is a particularly relevant finding for my thesis, and I return to it
later. Next, the order of the tasks was found to make a difference in the degree of cat-
egorisation agreement between people, especially in naming, and least clearly in sorting;
however, the degree of naming-sorting correspondence for individuals did not depend
on the order of the tasks. Moreover, people agreed more in naming than in sorting when
compared with native speakers of the same language. In contrast, when compared with
native speakers of other languages, agreement was higher in sorting than in naming.
Finally, people’s naming was found to be more consistent with their own sorting than
with that of other speakers of the same language.
5.3.4.2 Prior conceptual (and lexical) alignment
In terms of my thesis, the main issue addressed by Experiment 1 is whether having the
same native language makes people conceptualise things more similarly to each other.
This issue can be broken down into two parts: (1) do people conceptualise things more
similarly to other speakers of the same language, and (2), if so, is this due to language? I
address the first part here, and the second in the next section.
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One of the clearest findings of the experiment is that people’s linguistic categories are in
greater agreement with speakers of the same language than with speakers of other lan-
guages. This is not surprising, and is consistent with the results showing cross-linguistic
differences in naming found in both this experiment and in Malt et al. (1999). Differ-
ent languages divide up the object space in different ways, which is simply reflected in
people’s linguistic categorisation.
However, as I have argued in Chapter 2, the relationship between concepts and words
is not trivial, so that there may be cross-linguistic differences in linguistic conceptualisa-
tion without corresponding differences in non-linguistic conceptualisation. If we take
the categories people produce in the sorting tasks as snapshots of their concepts (see
Chapter 4), then the main question concerns whether people sorted things more simil-
arly to speakers of the same language than speakers of different languages. While the
results of Malt et al. (1999) and my replicated analyses suggested that they probably do
not, an analysis of the sorting data designed to test this question directly found that they
did. Speakers of the same language agreed more in their non-linguistic categorisation
than speakers of different languages.
It is worth emphasising that the degree of conceptual agreementwas sandwiched between
intralingual and interlingual lexical agreement. Although speakers of the same language
agreed more in how they named things than in how they sorted, the opposite was true
when comparing speakers of different languages. Indeed, chaining a few of the results
together suggests a hierarchy of levels of agreement: intralingual naming, intralingual
sorting, interlingual sorting, interlingual naming.
This hierarchy and the relative strengths of the effects suggest that languages polarise
categorisation. Speakers of the same language may apply words to things in very similar
ways, while exhibiting less underlying conceptual uniformity. At the same time, speak-
ers of different languages may conceptualise things more similarly than their conflicting
naming patterns may at first suggest. This is consistent with the idea that conceptual
structure is largely universal, while linguistic structures differ in how exactly they map
onto it (Chomsky 1986).
These results have implications for theories of online alignment during dialogue (Pick-
ering and Garrod 2004; see Section 3.4.3). Pickering and Garrod argue that interlocutors
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align different levels of mental representations when engaged in dialogue. While my
experiment does not investigate alignment processes in interaction between individuals,
it does say something about how far they need to go to become fully aligned. In par-
ticular, my results can be interpreted as indicating relative levels of “prior alignment”.
Speakers of the same language seem to agree to a large extent on what words should be
used for what objects, but exhibit a little more variation in how they conceptualise those
objects. If they are to align during dialogue, then they have a larger road to travel at the
conceptual level than at the lexical level. However, the conceptual distance will gener-
ally be smaller if both interlocutors are native speakers of the same language. If they are
speakers of different languages, then their prior alignment in conceptualisation could be
higher than their prior alignment in their lexical patterns. This reflects some of Pickering
and Garrod’s commentators’ arguments that interlocutors may align relatively little at
the situational level (Schober 2004; Branigan 2004). It also relates to the extent to which
interlocutors already share common ground upon engaging in joint action (Clark 1996).
Importantly, the different degrees of agreement between people in linguistic and non-
linguistic categorisation support the view that lexical and conceptual alignment cannot
be equated a priori (Schober 2005). Although words certainly provide some indication
of how people conceptualise things (Brennan and Clark 1996), they do not determine
concepts (which is consistent with the view that I developed in Chapter 2). Studying co-
ordination in conceptualisation must be done at least partly independently of language.
5.3.4.3 Is language responsible?
The experimental results showed that even non-linguistically, people conceptualised
things more similarly with speakers of the same language than with speakers of dif-
ferent languages. But is this coordination due to language? Since participants cannot be
“assigned” to native languages during the experiment, the study is only correlational.
Therefore, differences found between the language groups could be due to language,
but could equally well be due to other things that they have in common, including other
cultural factors.
Indeed, the results do not give much reason to believe that the coordination effects are
due to language. Although several different analyses showed that naming and sorting
patterns were certainly related, they failed to show that the correspondences were very
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close or language-specific. Perhaps most strikingly, and as in Malt et al. (1999), the nam-
ing patterns of a given language were not correlated any more closely with the sorting
patterns of that language than with the sorting patterns of other languages. Indeed,
English seemed to be generally better at predicting the sorting of the other languages,
while Japanese was the worst. This runs counter to the possibility that language could
be causally related to sorting. Even the randomised pairing tests, which seemed to be
relatively sensitive and gave significant results in many cases, did not show a significant
difference here: while people named things much more similarly and sorted things a
little more similarly with speakers of the same language, this was not at all the case for
naming-sorting correspondences.
What about the result that there was more agreement between the naming and sorting
within individuals than there was between native speakers of the same language? At
first glance, this might suggest that naming is in fact responsible, but also that we have to
look more closely, considering idiosyncratic differences between individuals. However,
this result can also be explained differently, and consistently with the rest of the above
findings: perhaps there are other characteristics that speakers of the same language have
in common beyond the language itself whichmay be responsible for similarity in sorting.
While it is beyond the scope of my work to determine what such factors may be, it seems
likely that other cultural factors may be responsible.
Indeed, if we just revisit the main differences between the dominant names of the lan-
guages, we can see that these could be associated with cultural differences. The main
difference between Polish and English was that although they both had two dominant
names that covered roughly the same set of items (“plate”/“talerz”, “bowl”/“miska”),
their boundaries were a little different, with “talerz” subsuming some “bowls”. This
could be related with the fact that it is common in Poland to serve soup in relatively flat
dishes, and to refer to them as “talerz”. Similarly, the greater degree of divergence of
Japanese naming from English and Polish is consistent with the (subjective) observation
that Japanese cuisine and tableware vary more radically from their western counterparts
than the latter do among themselves. This explanation is admittedly speculative and
vague, but it does fit the data better than a view involving a strong naming-sorting cor-
respondence. Moreover, it is in line with experimentally motivated proposals of cross-
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cultural differences in categorisation reflecting cultural variation in domain expertise
(e.g., Tanaka and Taylor 1991).
But if such non-linguistic cultural factors are to explain the differences between the lan-
guages, then why are differences in sorting smaller than those in naming? This may
be because linguistic categories, via words, are more public and thus more susceptible
to cultural influence, while non-linguistic categories are more necessarily private and
sheltered from culture (Hurford 2007; Voiklis 2008). Indeed, the setup of the experi-
mental tasks may have made this contrast particularly stark. In the naming task, par-
ticipants were asked what they would normally call the items, which may conjure up
situations in which they are interacting with other people with the same cultural back-
ground. In the sorting task, they were asked to sort things by physical similarity, which
means a relatively low-level perceptual basis that has little or nothing to do with cultural
practice. While cultural factors might still influence the latter, they are likely to be more
directly implicated and hence stronger in the former.
This conclusion bears directly on the issue of linguistic relativity. Malt et al. (1999) found
no cross-linguistic differences in non-linguistic categorisation, from which they argued
against a (strong) Whorfian position. I argued, however, that the verdict was still open
with respect to weaker Whorfian positions, whereby language merely influences rather
than determines thought. And indeed, the new forms of analysis that I used in analysing
the data ofmy experiment did discover some cross-linguistic differences in sorting, albeit
small. Nevertheless, it appears that these differences might not be due to language after
all, but to other cultural factors. As such, they do not provide support to even a weaker
Whorfian position, since the causal role of language is crucial therein.
5.3.4.4 Methodological considerations
There is of course, as always, an important alternative explanation for the lack of corres-
pondence between naming and sorting in the experiment: it may be due to methodolo-
gical limitations. While this is always a possibility, there is a specific aspect of the results
that lends itself to suspicion.
In particular, why would the naming-sorting correspondences in some cases be better
across languages than within languages? The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis would predict
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that the naming patterns of a language should fit the sorting patterns of that language
better than the sorting patterns of other languages. In contrast, an anti-Whorfian posi-
tion would say that this should not be the case, with naming in one language being no
more predictive of that language group’s sorting than any other. However, noone has
proposed that a “reverse” Whorfian pattern should occur, with some group’s linguistic
categorisation actually fitting worst with its own non-linguistic categorisation. And yet
this is precisely what the correlations in Table 5.7 suggest. The most striking example of
this is that of Japanese sorting being much better predicted by both English and Polish
naming than by Japanese naming. Actually, as mentioned earlier, each of the language’s
sorting patterns fit best with English naming, and worst with Japanese naming. Why
would this be?
One possible explanation is that languages differ in how “naturally” they carve up the
conceptual space. For whatever reasons, perhaps even historical accident, certain lan-
guages, like English, may have formed lexical categories which are based more heavily
on perceptual similarity and deviate less from universal conceptualisation tendencies. In
contrast, other languages, such as Japanese, may have divergedmore from non-linguistic
categorisation, perhaps by more often undergoing the kinds of processes suggested by
Malt et al. (2003) that could lead to a dissociation in the two kinds of categories.
However, a simpler and more likely explanation for the findings here would relate to
natural tendencies in sorting. When you are asked to classify a set of items into groups,
there is probably a natural bias towards putting roughly an equal number of items into
different groups. However, when it comes to naming, the data showedmuch more dom-
ination of the object space by a single term in Japanese than for English or Polish. As a
result, it is likely that there would be greater discrepancies between Japanese naming
and sorting of any of the languages. Indeed, if a different sampling of the object space
was taken, which focused on items that were not called “sara” in Japanese, perhaps the
opposite pattern would be found, with Japanese names being more predictive than Eng-
lish or Polish (which might be tempted to call most of the items “bowl” or “miska”, re-
spectively). This explanation is reflected by the fact that Japanese participants assigned
many more items to their largest linguistic category than English or Polish (Japanese:
M = 40.75, SD = 6.19; English: M = 24.42, SD = 3.78; Polish: M = 28.5, SD = 6.06;
F (69, 2) = 58.19, p < .001), but did not differ in this respect for non-linguistic categories
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(Japanese: M = 20.54, SD = 6.16; English: M = 18.12, SD = 3.67; Polish: M = 18.50,
SD = 4.40; F (69, 2) = 1.72, p > .05).
There are other reasons to be cautious about both the sorting and the naming tasks. I
have already discussed the potential concern of truncating the naming data to the head
nouns used (see Section 5.2.4). The naming task alsomay be problematic in that it is done
serially, and thus does not give a snapshot of a concept in the same way as the sorting
task does. Since precedence and priming have been shown to play an important role in
the choice of referring expressions used for objects (Brennan and Clark 1996; Garrod and
Anderson 1987), it is likely that participants prime themselves with names, meaning
that the order in which they name things may have an effect. Moreover, assigning a
name to an object in a decontextualised non-communicative setting may be artificial,
and subtle unintended cross-linguistic differences in the task instructions may have had
an impact. The sorting task is less problematic, but also raises concerns. Malt et al. (1999)
designed the sorting task to probe similarity-based categorisation specifically, and thus
this aspect was explicitly incorporated into their (and my) instructions. However, this
places constraints on the kinds of categories that people produce, which are possibly at
odds with the way they would naturally conceptualise, especially given the dissociation
that has been demonstrated between categorisation and similarity (Rips 1989).
It’s worth emphasising that these issues with naming and sorting are not necessarily so
troublesome in themselves: any experimental task has limits that should be acknow-
ledged. The problem is in expecting the data from the tasks to be analogous, and thus
shedding light on the correspondence between linguistic and non-linguistic categorisa-
tion. It is possible that thought does reflect language, but that the different demands
of the two types of experimental tasks introduce a methodological dissociation. Thus,
while the present results seem to be best framed as showing cross-linguistic categor-
isation differences that are not due to language but to other cultural factors, there is
certainly ample room and need for further exploration of this issue.
At this point, I should also mention the effects that were found concerning the order of
the tasks. Recall that the results suggested that the degree of categorisation agreement
between individuals was a little higher if participants first carried out the sorting task
CHAPTER 5. EXPERIMENT 1 184
and then the naming task. This was the case for naming itself, for naming-sorting cor-
respondences, and even, more debatably, for sorting. Although these effects were weak,
they do draw attention to the fact that conceptualisation is a dynamic process, that may
not always lead to the same results. The task context, goal and other factors may all
play a role in how people conceptualise objects. And when it comes to coordination
between individuals, this may especially be the case when people are engaged in inter-
action. These considerations will take a more central role when I shift my theoretical and
experimental focus from the next chapter onwards.
5.3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I asked whether language brings about conceptual coordination on a
relatively large timescale. In particular, the question was whether having the same nat-
ive language results in people conceptualising things more similarly to each other. In
this light, I first discussed a particular experiment that had previously been conduc-
ted which found a dissociation between linguistic and non-linguistic categorisation in
the object domain. I pointed out that the study had different theoretical priorities from
mine, and that a replication supplemented with new analytic methods could both test
the robustness of their findings and zero in on my research questions. Experiment 1 was
designed with this dual purpose in mind. The results confirmed the dissociation doc-
umented previously, while also qualifying it. Although the effects were much stronger
in the linguistic than in the non-linguistic case, speakers of different languages did cat-
egorise things more similarly to each other than to speakers of other languages, for both
kinds of categorisation. A close look at the data, however, suggests that these effects are
more likely due to other cultural factors rather than language. In sum, native speakers
do seem to be a little conceptually pre-aligned, but it does not appear that language is
responsible.
CHAPTER 6
Experiment 2: conceptual convergence due to dialogue
6.1 Introduction
Experiment 1 found some evidence that even when categorising non-linguistically, nat-
ive speakers of the same language do categorise objects a little more similarly than speak-
ers of different languages. However, as I argued, this phenomenon does not seem to be
attributable to language rather than other cultural factors. I therefore tentatively con-
cluded that sharing the same native language does not seem to bring together people’s
conceptualisations in the object domain.
Nevertheless, this is only one side of the story. Malt, Sloman, Gennari, Shi and Wang’s
(1999) study and my replication implicitly assume, in a sense, a static conceptual system
and a static lexicon. The two different tasks that participants carried out were meant to
capture how they categorised objects, both linguistically and non-linguistically. For each
experimental participant, a single answerwas obtained for each of these tasks. However,
in Chapters 2 and 3, I reviewed different kinds of evidence showing how both lexical-
isation and conceptualisation are flexible, dynamic processes whose outcomes vary both
between and within individuals. While it may be reasonable to assume that in the ab-
sence of an explicit context people have some kind of “default” conceptualisations, we
need to treat this as a starting point and look beyond it to get a more complete under-
standing of the role of language in conceptual coordination. In particular, as discussed in
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Section 3.4, another important possibility for how language may coordinate conceptual-
isation is online through interaction. However, unlike the question of linguistic relativity,
this issue still largely remains to be investigated.
Therefore, I now take up the issue of the role of language in conceptual coordination
between individuals on a much shorter timescale. Does interactive language use bring
together people’s conceptualisations? The next three chapters present three experiments
which explore different aspects of this issue, and constitute the bulk of the empirical
work ofmy thesis. All three experiments fully employ the general framework developed
in Chapter 4.
Similarly, all three experiments will also take the model in Figure 6.1 as their theoretical
starting point. The diagram is the same as in Figure 3.3, except that I have incorporated









Figure 6.1: The general interactive model that will serve as the theoretical starting point for Ex-
periments 2-4. Recall that δ is the numerical difference between the two people’s categorisations,
as discussed and defined in Section 4.3.
Recall that previous studies have already suggested that dialogue can bring together
people’s categorisation (see Section 3.4.3.3). In particular, Markman and Makin (1998)
and Voiklis (2008) showed how communicating together during a shared task can result
in relatively similar subsequent categorisation with other people who had communic-
ated. However, these studies have lacked a crucial manipulation which prevents us
from concluding that it is dialogue itself that is responsible for the coordination. In both
studies, the main contrast in conditions involved one in which participants performed a
task on their own, and another in which theyworked together on the task while commu-
nicating linguistically. As such, the difference between the conditions cannot necessarily
be attributed to language specifically, rather than interaction in general (or some other
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specific aspect of interaction). In order to determinewhether dialogue is causing the sub-
sequent convergence in categorisation, we need to have an experiment that manipulates
whether or not partners can talk to each other on top of a condition which already has
some form of interaction. In other words, we need a joint task that can be meaningfully
performed with or without language, while still exhibiting other features that we want.
This is addressed in Experiment 2.
6.2 Overview
The main purpose of Experiment 2 is to determine whether linguistic dialogue in a joint
task temporarily brings together people’s conceptualisations. As mentioned above, the
main challenge is what to use as the joint task which dialogue gets added to. In particu-
lar, we need a joint task which can in principle be carried out without dialogue, prior to
having participants carry out individual categorisation tasks.
Rather than constructing a special kind of interactive task, the solution I adopt is simply
to adapt the free classification task so that participant pairs categorise a set of items
together. That is, they are given a set of stimuli, and must decide together on how to put
them into categories. Nevertheless, they still have their individual concepts, through
which all decisions must be mediated. Figure 6.2 shows how this fits into the model
I have developed. As the diagram highlights, the task can be thought of as a kind of





Figure 6.2: An interactive joint task between two people, in which they jointly make categorisa-
tion and lexicalisation decisions, although their concepts are still distinct. This was the form of
the joint task in Experiment 2.
Indeed, as I argued in Section 4.4, while free classification tasks can probe people’s in-
dividual conceptualisations, their properties are also suitable for a joint task. First, they
CHAPTER 6. EXPERIMENT 2 188
can be done without resorting to dialogue, provided that partners can share the same
perceptual input. Recall that reliance and manipulation of a shared visual space has
already been fruitfully applied in dialogue studies (Clark and Krych 2004; Gergle, Kraut
and Fussell 2004; Kraut, Fussell and Siegel 2003; see Section 3.4.2). Second, the task can
be set up so that it is one large task in which participants can work together to arrive at a
solution, rather than a sequence of individual tasks where the participants take turns but
cannot affect each other’s decisions. This makes the task more interactive and cooper-
ative, which, as we saw in Section 3.4.2, seems to be important for supporting linguistic
effects. Third, by virtue of being directly analogous to the individual categorisation tasks
of the experiment, we may be able to optimise the sensitivity of the experiment and thus
the chance of finding differences between conditions.
The experiment has three conditions. In each condition, participants start and end the
experiment by carrying out free classification tasks individually. However, the condi-
tions differ in terms of what happens in between. In two of the conditions, they perform
a joint task, as described above. In one of them, they carry out a joint free classification
task, during which they are allowed to talk freely with each other. A second condition
is identical except that no talking is allowed. Finally, in a third condition, no interaction
or joint task takes place, and the participants simply carry out another free classification
task on their own. Thus the structure of the experiment will follow a standard pre-task,
treatment task, and post-task type of design, in which all participants carry out the same
pre-tasks and post-tasks, but vary in the treatment.
A secondary but also important design decision is whether participant pairs also label
their categories in the joint task. On one hand, if participants label their categories and
these labels are visible to their partners, this allows for a limited mode of linguistic com-
munication, which seems to run counter to the goal of isolating language in one con-
dition. However, on the other hand, participants may implicitly label their categories
anyway. By requiring them to do so explicitly in the task, we would control across all
participants, so that they all label the categories, regardless of condition. Therefore, since
in this experiment I want to see whether dialogue specifically brings about conceptual
coordination, I have opted for the second possibility. But Experiment 4 in Chapter 8 ad-
dresses the problem that this leaves behind: whether merely exchanging category labels
brings about conceptual coordination.
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Using this design, the experiment is mainly meant to address two questions:
1. Does engaging in a joint categorisation task bring about conceptual convergence
after interaction?
2. If so, is this effect stronger if people can also communicate through dialogue?
Thus the aim is to tease apart the role of dialogue from other aspects of interaction in
conceptual coordination. While the studies of Markman and Makin (1998) and Voiklis
(2008) suggest that there should be a difference between the two extreme conditions, it
is unclear how each of them will fare relative to the middle one (i.e., interaction without
dialogue).
A secondary but also important purpose of Experiment 2 concerns lexical alignment. As
discussed in the previous section, we can separately compare the labels and categories
between interacting pairs. Doing so will allow us to see whether the conceptual and lex-
ical convergence results parallel each other, and thus how the two levels and processes
might be related. However, it’s worth noting the difference between how lexical and
conceptual alignment were investigated in Experiment 1 and how they will be now. In
Experiment 1, there were two kinds of conceptualisation tasks: sorting without labels,
and labelling. Here there is one conceptualisation task, which merges those two tasks to-
gether: sorting with labels. While these are complementary investigations, the difference
in approach can be theoretically confusing, and I return to it in Section 9.3.1.
Finally, Experiment 2 also serves as a general methodological test. Since this experiment
constitutes the first attempt to apply the full interactive experimental framework de-
veloped in Chapter 4, there are various general problems that could potentially surface
with the experimental stimuli, tasks, and program interface. Therefore, an informal but
important overarching objective of this experiment was to evaluate the general frame-
work. This was donemainly by obtaining feedback from participants via a questionnaire
following the categorisation tasks.
Unfortunately, as we will see, this experiment fell short of addressing its primary pur-
pose. After running 24 participant pairs, preliminary analysis did not show any signs of
the predicted differences between conditions. Combinedwith unanticipatedmethodolo-
gical shortcomings of the experimental design that revealed themselves in themeantime,
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this ledme not to run anymore sessions. Nevertheless, the experiment did provide other
interesting data concerning lexical choices and alignment (via the category labels), the
use of dialogue in coordination, and evaluation of the framework (via feedback from the
questionnaire). Therefore, Experiment 2 is still an important stepping stone to Experi-
ments 3 and 4.
6.3 Methods
6.3.1 Participants
Participants were 48 adult native English speakers (age: M = 21.49, SD = 2.34), mostly
undergraduate students recruited through the University of Edinburgh student employ-
ment website. There were 31 female participants and 17 male participants. Participants
were assigned randomly to pairings, and pairings were assigned randomly to condi-
tions. Partners did not know each other before the experiment.
6.3.2 Conditions
Experimental sessions were conducted with pairs of participants, and there were three
between-pair conditions: control, silent, and talking. In the control condition, participants
independently carried out all three categorisation tasks individually in succession, without
ever working or speakingwith their partner. In the silent condition, participants conduc-
ted the pre-task and post-tasks independently, but in between silently carried out a joint
categorisation task together. The talking condition was the same as the silent condition,
except that participants were allowed to talk to each other during the joint categorisation
task.
6.3.3 Stimuli
The dish domain exhibited inter-participant variation in categorisation in Experiment
1, and was therefore used again in Experiment 2. However, this time, we do not just
need variation, but also room for potentially different degrees of alignment. Therefore,
in order to maximise the stimulus set’s fluidity and thereby potential variability in parti-
cipants’ categorisation, morphing software was used to generate many stimuli interpol-
ated between prototypical dishes. This generated a large domain of stimuli from which
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different subsets were then sampled to be used in different categorisation tasks. Below
I first explain how exactly the stimulus domain was generated, and then describe how
the subsets were sampled and ordered.
6.3.3.1 Generation
The first step in generating the stimulus domain was selecting the starting points (which
I call base stimuli) for the morphing sequences. For that purpose, ten pictures of dishes
were selected from online catalogues like IKEA’s. I selected the base stimuli to be likely
members ofwhat in Englishmight be called “bowls”, “plates”, “trays”, “cups” or “dishes”.
All of the items were square black-and-white photographs with a white background.
The objects were simple in form (e.g., no handles), had no ornamentation, and were of
a white or light grey colour. This was done mainly to facilitate the morphing process,
since oddly shaped or coloured items tended to produce strange interpolations. It was
also done in order to limit overly obvious features that distinguished the items, in the
hope that this would increase variation in categorisation. The ten base stimuli are shown
in Figure 6.3.
Figure 6.3: The base stimuli used in Experiment 2.
Morphing was done with the Morpheus Photo Morpher program (Version 3.10 Stand-
ard). Pairs of images were loaded into the program and many calibration points were
aligned manually between corresponding positions of the images. Then the program
was run and created a sequence of interpolated images. After that, the new images were
visually inspected, and those that looked particularly unnatural were removed from the
set. This yields many intermediate and therefore potentially ambiguous items.
In particular for each of the 45 possible pairs of stimuli, a sequence of thirteen interme-
diate stimuli was generated. An example sequence is shown in Figure 6.4. All of the
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resulting pictures were then visually examined to assess whether they looked natural,
and on this basis, 25 stimuli were eliminated. Thus, at the end of this process there was
a collection of 570 stimuli (10 + 45× 13− 25).
Figure 6.4: An example morphing sequence between two base stimuli used in Experi-
ment 2.
The resulting stimulus domain, while highly continuous within the scope that it did
cover, was relatively restricted in terms of how much of overall ‘dish space’ it covered.
This is in contrast to the stimulus selection methods of Malt et al. (1999) (and even my
replication), which specifically tried to collect as varied and diverse a set as possible.
However, while Malt et al. were partly interested in how different languages actually
divided up the dish domain, here the interest lay exclusively in how well people co-
ordinated their concepts, and so emphasis was placed on fluidity rather than represent-
ativeness.
6.3.3.2 Allotment
From the superset of 570 stimuli, subsets were selected for the categorisation tasks. Ten
sets of 120 stimuli were randomly and independently assembled. Selection was random
rather than strategically selecting morphing sequences because all the stimuli for each
task are visible at once, so such systematic sets would perhaps have been transparent to
the participants. Each set was divided randomly into three subsets of 40 stimuli each,
one for each of the three categorisation tasks. An example subset for one categorisation
task from the experiment is shown in Figure 6.5.
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Figure 6.5: One of the stimulus subsets used in categorisation tasks in Experiment 2.
Each of the ten stimulus sets above identified a level in a secondary experimental con-
dition. One participant pair from each main condition was assigned to each such level.
Thus, different pairs in the same condition were in different stimulus groups, but they
had a corresponding pair in each of the other two conditions which were in the same
stimulus group. This was done in order to both prevent idiosyncratic properties of a
particular set to affect the experiment too much, while still controlling for all conditions
being as similar as possible.
As a result of this random procedure, the extent of usage of stimuli from the global set
was not uniform across them: some stimuli were used multiple times, others just once,
while others not at all. In addition, the tasks in which a stimulus was used were also
random, so that, for example, the same stimulus could appear in the third task for one
stimulus group but the first task in another group.
The visual order in which stimuli appeared on the screen for a given task was chosen
randomly for every participant for all the pre-tasks and post-tasks (see Section 6.3.4 for
descriptions of the task sequences). However, for the treatment task, the order of the
stimuli was the same for both participants of a pair (but different from other pairs),
regardless of whether or not they were carrying out the task together (in the silent and
talking conditions) or separately (in the control condition). This was done to give the
two participants in a pair the same experience (to the extent possible) in the treatment
task. This could be a problem if we wanted to compare participants’ outputs to other
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participants who weren’t their partner. However, that is fortunately not the focus of this
experiment.
6.3.4 Procedure
The experiment was conducted through a computer interface and consisted of a small
practice categorisation task, three large categorisation tasks, and a short questionnaire.
Pairs of participants were brought into the experimental lab and assigned randomly to
two separate computer cubicles. After filling out a consent form, they began the experi-
ment.
The practice task was a free classification task, but involved only 10 stimuli, consisting
of pictures of pieces of furniture. Participants sorted the items into the groups on their
own (much as in the sorting task in Experiment 1). In addition to sorting the items, the
practice task also required participants to perform all the possible interface functions:
naming a category, adding an item into a category, magnifying a category, changing
the item in focus, renaming a category, and changing the category of an item. During
this task, the doors to the experimental cubicles were left open, and participants were
encouraged to ask the experimenter questions about the interface.
The subsequent three tasks were all relatively large free classification tasks, in which a
set of 40 stimuli was to be sorted into 3 to 9 categories. Some of the tasks were carried
out individually, while others, depending on the condition, were done together with
another participant. In particular, the experiment design included a pre-task, treatment
task, and post-task, with the conditions varying only in the treatment task. Both the
pre-task and post-tasks consisted of individual categorisation tasks. In these tasks, there
was no interaction between partners, no feedback concerning each other’s categories or
degree of categorisation agreement, and no reference to working with one’s partner in
the task instructions. Participants simply sorted the stimuli into categories and named
the categories.
In the treatment, the task depended on the condition. In the control condition, parti-
cipants carried out an individual categorisation task, just as in the pre- and post-tasks.
In the silent and talking conditions, pairs worked together on a joint categorisation task (see
the next section for mechanical details). Moreover, in the talking condition, pairs were
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allowed to talk freely during this task, while in the silent condition (and in the control
condition), they were not. The task sequence is schematised in Figure 6.6.














































Figure 6.6: Task sequence (for the silent and talking conditions): Participants first engage in
individual categorisation tasks, then carry out a joint task together (during which the talking
condition participants can talk), and finish with another individual task. In the control condition,
the treatment task consists of another individual categorisation task (so that control participants
simply carry out three individual tasks in a row).
6.3.5 Program
The experiment was run through a computer program, which was specially written in
Java, with the data stored in a MySQL database. Sessions were conducted in an exper-
imental lab with dual computer cubicles, such that two participants sat side-by-side in
front of individual computers, but were separated visually by a screen (so they could not
see each other or the other screen). The computer monitors were all of the same model,
and the different monitors used had the same display settings (e.g., size, contrast, bright-
ness).
I first describe the program interface and operation for the individual free classification
task. Snapshots of the interface are provided in Appendix B.3. The program window
initially contains several colour-coded boxes: the nine blue category boxes on the left,
the green focus box in the top right, and the black pool in the bottom right. The stimuli
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initially all show up in the pool, and the participants need to move the stimuli into the
categories. Each of the category boxes also has an associated text field in which category
labels are typed, and an “Add” button for putting a stimulus into it. Participants must
name a category box before they can put any stimuli in it.
When participants click on an item, it is moved to the focus box, which allows them to
inspect a larger version of it. Thus participants always see such a large version before
they categorise any item. This was done because under the size constraints of the mon-
itor, items must otherwise be shown quite small so that they all appear on the screen at
once. Moreover, each category box (and the pool as well) also has a “Big” button, which
allows participants to see all the stimuli in that category in the larger version together
(alongside whatever object is currently in the focus box). Thus the focus box and “Big”
buttons effectively serve as a virtual magnifying glass.
After all the stimuli have been moved into categories, a ’Done’ button appears under-
neath the pool. Once this button is clicked on, the task is over. However, before pressing
the button (and in fact at any stage prior to that as well), the participants can make as
many changes as they want to the categories. This includes recategorising stimuli (i.e.,
putting them into different category boxes) and relabelling the categories. Only the par-
ticipants’ final partitioning of items into categories is submitted to analysis.
The interface and operation of the joint categorisation task is nearly the same as for the
individual task, with a few minor changes. First and most obviously, the task is carried
out by pairs of participants. In particular, participants see the same program window
on their two computer monitors, and take turns in performing operations, while their
partner’s window is updated. During their turn, participants can also make changes
to either their own or their partner’s previous contributions, including recategorisation
of stimuli and relabelling of categories. A participant’s turn includes any magnifying
and naming (or renaming) actions they perform, and ends when they perform a cat-
egorisation (or recategorisation) action. The changes that a participant makes during
his turn are marked with a temporary red border around category labels (for category
name changes) or stimuli (for categorisation changes). Whose turn is also indicated by
the background colour of the focus box: during one’s turn it is green (like it is during
an entire individual categorisation task), and when the turn ends, it becomes red (until
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it is one’s turn again). The interface for a participant is passive when it is not his turn,
so that any typing or mouse-clicking in the interface window at this time has no effect.
Once all the stimuli are categorised and both partners do not want to make any further
changes, the task is finished (as indicated by both partners clicking on the “Done” button
in succession). Thus, participants negotiate the categories during the task through their
categorisation decisions and changes (and possibly through dialogue as well, depending
on the experimental condition). The final result is interpreted as the joint categorisation
of the two participants. Note, however, that since the output is joint, there is no clear
way to obtain an agreement score between the participants for the task itself.
6.4 Results
I first present the results addressing conceptual alignment, as this is the main purpose
of the experiment. I then show analogous analyses for lexical alignment, followed by
tabulation of the most common category labels used by participants. Next I provide
some examples of how dialogue was actually used by pairs in the talking condition. Fi-
nally, I present questionnaire data relevant to evaluating the experimental design and
the general framework.
But first, in order to give a concrete example of the data, Figure 6.7 shows the output
from a joint categorisation task. This is the output from a random pair in the talking
condition, which means that the pair worked together and were able to talk during the
task. In this case, the pair chose to use eight (of nine possible) categories.
6.4.1 Conceptual convergence
The main empirical issues concerned whether participant pairs categorised things more
similarly as a result of having done a joint categorisation task, and whether dialogue
made this effect even stronger. First, I calculated the degree of agreement in every part-
nership’s scores for both the pre-tasks and post-tasks (using Meila’s 2007 information
theory measure). The resulting means and standard deviations for each condition are
shown in Table 6.1, and boxplots are shown in Figure 6.8.
I conducted three kinds of statistical tests to evaluate whether pairs were more aligned
in the post-task than in the pre-task, and whether the degree to which this was the case
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Standard Bowls
Deep Round Bowls





Figure 6.7: An example of a joint task from Experiment 2.
control silent talking
Pre 0.68 (0.09) 0.65 (0.08) 0.70 (0.09)
Post 0.70 (0.14) 0.74 (0.16) 0.66 (0.09)
Table 6.1: The means and standard deviations for conceptual alignment scores for participant
pairs in each condition and for both pre-tasks and post-tasks.






































Figure 6.8: Distributions of conceptual alignment scores in both pre-tasks and post-tasks for
each condition.
depended on the condition. The first test consisted of a mixed-effects ANOVA, with
condition as the between-pairs variable and task (pre-task, post-task) as the within-pairs
variable. There was no significant main effect of condition (F (2, 21) = 0.05, p > .05),
task (F (1, 21) = 1.58, p > .05) or the interaction (F (2, 21) = 2.97, p > .05).
A second test, following the recommendation of Twisk and Proper (2004), consisted of
an ANCOVA, with pairs’ post-task scores as the dependent variable, pre-task scores as
the covariate, and condition as the independent variable. Although pre-task scores were
found to make a significant contribution (F (1, 20) = 12.18, p < .01), the analysis also
showed no significant effect of condition (F (2, 20) = 2.71, p > .05).
Finally, a third test was run using Jacobson and Truax (1991)’s reliable change index. This
method considers the amount of variation in all the participant pairs’ pre-task scores,
and then uses it independently for each pair to evaluate whether the pair’s change from
pre-task to post-task scores is a reliable change (i.e., less than 5% chance of it occurring
by chance); see their paper for calculation details. Support for my hypotheses would be
found if the number of pairs for which a reliable change was found was low in the control
condition, higher in the silent condition, and highest in the talking condition. However,
the results revealed that only 1 of the 24 pairs exhibited such a reliable change. This
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pair was in the silent condition and was the only pair with a post-task score of 1.00 (their
pre-task score was 0.688).
Thus, all three tests failed to find support for my hypotheses. Conceptual alignment did
not increase between pre-task and post-task, and no difference was found between the
conditions.
6.4.2 Lexical convergence
Although I am mainly concerned with convergence in categorisation, it is also insightful
to consider category label convergence, especially given the lack of the former. To that
end, I define here a simple measure of lexical agreement, and make analogous tests to
the three used above for categorisation. In addition, I will be able to conduct a few extra
tests whose analogues were not possible for categorisation.
Defining a measure for comparing two sets of labels is tricky because participants can
vary in their number of categories (and thus labels), and because they were free to use
whatever labels they liked, including labels composed of multiple words. To deal with
this, I define a relatively simple measure. In particular, given two sets of labels, I count
the number of labels that occur in both, and divide it by the average number of labels in
the two sets. I count only labels that match exactly, except for discrepancies in irrelevant
aspects such as spelling, capitalisation, and pluralisation. For example, given one label
set of “plates”, “big bowls”, “small bowls”, and “trays”, and a second set of “Plaet”, “Big
round bowl”, “Big square bowl”, “Smal bowl” and “Large tray”, there are two matches
(i.e., “plate” and “small bowl”) and an average of 4.5 labels between the two sets, which
yields an agreement of 0.444 (2/4.5). Although this measure is quite strict, it makes
objective coding easier (which was done blind to the condition and task). The measure
was used to calculate a degree of label agreement for every participant pair in both the
pre-task and the post-task, which was then fed into the following analyses.
Using this measure, I can now compute the degree of agreement between partners in
both pre-tasks and post-tasks for every pair, just as I did for the categorisation data. The
resulting means and standard deviations for each condition are shown in Table 6.2, and
boxplots are shown in Figure 6.9.
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control silent talking
Pre 0.31 (0.38) 0.18 (0.20) 0.18 (0.15)
Post 0.40 (0.38) 0.35 (0.29) 0.49 (0.33)
Table 6.2: The means and standard deviation for lexical alignment scores for participant pairs in






































Figure 6.9: Distributions of lexical alignment scores in both pre-tasks and post-tasks for each
condition.
I begin again with a mixed ANOVA (between: condition; within: task). Unlike the find-
ing for categorisation, the main effect of task was highly significant (F (1, 21) = 13.68,
p < .01). However, there was no significant effect of condition (F (2, 21) = 0.23, p > .05),
nor of the interaction (F (2, 21) = 1.52, p > .05).
Next, I ran an ANCOVA again (dependent variable: post-task scores; covariate: pre-task
scores; independent variable: condition). As for conceptual convergence, the covariate’s
contribution was again highly significant (F (1, 20) = 14.35, p < .01), while there was no
significant effect of condition (F (2, 20) = 1.23, p > .05).
The third analysis was based, as before, on the reliable change index, measuring how
many participants in each condition exhibited reliable changes between the pre-task and
post-task, based on the amount of variability exhibited overall in the pre-task. Remark-
ably, despite the effects of task found in the first analysis, reliable changeswere not found
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for any pair in any of the conditions: no pair showed higher levels of label agreement in
the post-task than would be expected if they had not undergone interaction.
Together, these three tests do provide some evidence that lexical alignment occurred
between the pre-task and post-task, although it is not unanimous. However, no differ-
ence was found between conditions.
The labelling data also allows for an extra kind of analysis that was not possible for
categorisation. In particular, we can also look at the labels that partnerships used in the
joint categorisation task and see if participants preferred to stick with those labels or to
revert to their pre-task labels in the post-task. I use the same measure of label agreement
as before, but this time compare the label set of each participant in the silent or talking
condition (the control condition is excluded because it did not include a joint task) with
both their own label set in the pre-task and the label set they used with their partner
in the joint categorisation task. The resulting means and standard deviations for both
interactive conditions are shown in Table 6.3, and boxplots are shown in Figure 6.10.
silent talking
Pre 0.37 (0.23) 0.51 (0.22)
Joint 0.58 (0.32) 0.63 (0.34)
Table 6.3: The means and standard deviation for label agreement scores in both interactive con-
ditions between participants’ own post-task labels and both their pre-task labels and their part-
nership joint-task labels.
AmixedANOVA (between: condition; within: task) showed amain effect of task (F (1, 30) =
10.59, p < .01), but no main effect of condition (F (1, 30) = 1.19, p > .05) and no signific-
ant task-condition interaction (F (1, 30) = 0.66, p > .05). As for the previous analyses, it
appears that participant pairs do converge in their lexical choices, but that this does not
depend on the experimental condition.
For the sake of comparison, and to help verify that the naming agreement measure is
sensible, I also performed a loosely analogous test with the control condition. Recall that
in this condition, participants carried out another (their second) individual categorisa-
tion task instead of a joint task with their partner. As such, they never actually interacted
with their partner, and were fully naive to both their categories and labels. In this case, I
compared each control participant’s post-task labels with both their pre-task labels (as for
the other conditions above) and their partner’s mid-task labels. Since again they would






































Figure 6.10: Distributions of lexical alignment scores in each condition between partners’ own
post-task labels with both their own pre-task labels and their partnership joint task labels.
have had no exposure to the latter, we should expect higher agreement with their pre-
task labels. A paired t-test revealed that this was indeed the case: control participants’
post-task labels agreed more with their own pre-task labels (M = 0.61, SD = 0.40) than
with their partner’s mid-task labels (M = 0.37, SD = 0.34), and the difference was sig-
nificant (t(15) = 2.91, p < .05). Thus, control participants remained relatively consistent
with themselves across tasks.
6.4.3 Lexical choices
Before finishing with the label data, it is informative to see what kinds of labels parti-
cipants actually came up with. Recall that participants were free to use whatever labels
they liked, and that their labels could consist of multiple words. And indeed, as we will
see, they often made use of these possibilities.
In order to give an impression of the range of labels that participants used, I conducted
two kinds of tallies, one based on the full labels and one on individual words used. The
first tally counts the number of tasks in which each label was used (after having pruned
the label data of differences in spelling, capitalisation, pluralisation, and punctuation).
To put the resulting numbers in perspective, note that the total number of tasks in the
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experiment was 128 (3 pairs of individual tasks in each of eight sessions in the control
condition, plus 2 pairs of individual tasks and 1 joint task in each of the other sixteen
sessions: 6 × 8 + 5 × 16 = 128). The most frequent label, “plate”, was one of the cat-
egory labels in 60 of those 128 tasks. The second word-based tally counts the number of
categories across all tasks whose names included each word that occurred in labels. The
total number of categories was 707 (although the sum across all word frequencies will be
substantially higher, since many labels included multiple words). The most frequently
occurring word in category labels was “bowl”, which was included in the label of 232 of
the 707 categories. Table 6.4 shows the fifteen most frequent labels and words, according
to these two respective tallies.
Full label Frequency Word Frequency
plate 60 bowl 232
cup 51 plate 178
bowl 45 round 98
square plate 32 square 88
round plate 31 dish 78
dish 30 cup 64
square bowl 24 deep 59
tray 23 shallow 57
deep bowl 22 rim 38
round bowl 21 tray 24
shallow bowl 19 saucer 16
serving dish 12 mug 16
saucer 12 circular 15
mug 11 lip 14
pot 10 serving 14
Table 6.4: The 15 most common labels (left) and words occurring in labels (right), with their
respective frequencies. The label tallies are based on all the tasks from all the sessions, while the
word tallies are based on all the categories from those tasks.
Other less common types of labels framed the objects in alternative ways. For instance,
one participant divided up the items in terms of different kinds of “crockery”, includ-
ing “breakfast service crockery” and “lunch service crockery”. Another participant used
geometric terms, such as “tall cylinders” and “sliced spheres”. Some participants used
prepositional phrases or adjectives in brackets to describe the objects in more detail (e.g.,
“bowls with a rim”, “cup (shallow)”). Other categories were explicitly given hybrid
names, such as “cups and mugs” or “saucers/side plates”. And a few labels presum-
ably identified the kinds of things they may be used for (e.g., “noodles”, “ice cream and
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strawberries”) or things they resembled (e.g., “flying saucer”). Finally, a few labels from
one participant seemed completely senseless (e.g., “X marks the spot”, “Patagonia”).
6.4.4 Use of dialogue
In this section, I focus on the recorded audio data from the joint categorisation tasks in
the talking condition. Although dialogue strategies are not the focus of my experiment,
it is useful to take a brief look at how participants actually used dialogue in the tasks. As
a result, here I present several excerpts from the talking condition pairs which exemplify
a few different ways in which dialogue was used.
The first general observation is that all of the participant pairs in the talking condition
did in fact exploit the opportunity to talk. However, they varied in the extent to which
they did so. Some pairs discussed their general categorisation schemes in some detail,
and asked each other about uncertainties concerning which category to place an item
(that was currently in the focus box) into or what to call a category. Other pairs were
less communicative, with one pair in particular, after an initial exchange, only seeking
confirmation a few times during an otherwise silent interaction.
Pairs generally began their linguistic interaction by asking each other and explaining
what kind of categorisation schemes they had used in the previous task. In some cases,
they began by settling on one category label (e.g., “Alright, what’s the first category?”)
and populating it extensively before moving on to others. More often, they asked each
other about the categorisation schemes they had used in the previous, individual task
(e.g., “What kind of categories - what did you name your categories before?”), and/or
discussed what scheme to use together (e.g., “How do we wanna categorise these?”). In
some cases, one participant’s scheme would be immediately accepted, without discuss-
ing the other’s, as in this example:
A: How did you categorise them before?
B: Ummm, I categorised them, in, uh, plates, dishes and bowls. And categor-
ised each by round or square, but I don’t know whether that’s very accurate,
because I can’t tell the difference between some of them, between -
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A: Yeah.
B: - the plates and the dishes.
A: Yeah. We’ll go for that.
B: Yeah, sure.
A: That’ll be fine.
Participants often asked their partners for their opinion about categorisation decisions,
such as the features of an object (e.g., “Would you say that’s quite deep?”) or what
category to put it into (e.g., “Would you say that’s a plate?”, “What about this one?”).
Occasionally, participants also asked each other for explicit explanations of how they
understood different categories (e.g., “Wait. What’s the difference, well, what would you
say is the difference between a saucer and a plate?”) Such questions were particularly
prevalent when dealing with boundary cases, often indicated by two specific options
(e.g, “Do you reckon that one’s more a dish or a bowl?”).
Here’s an example of an uncertain boundary case and how it was readily resolved:
A: What’d you think, that’s a bowl?
B: Yeah.
A: Or a plate.
B: It could be um, I reckon it could be either a plate or a bowl.
A: I don’t know. I’ll go for bowl.
B: Cool.
Occasionally, discussion of boundary cases triggered a partial restructuring of the cat-
egory system, as in this example:
A: Is that a dish or a plate?
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B: I’d say that’s probably a plate.
A: Okay.
B: We could scrap our dishes section, and -
A: What, just have bowls and uh,
B: - have bowls or plates and settle on.
A: Yeah, I like that idea.
B: Cause that one is probably a round plate, isn’t it?
A: Yeah.
Sometimes pairs would explicitly disagree, but normally, one participant would readily
conform with the other, as shown below. This example also illustrates how decisions
were often made by reference to similarity with other items already placed into categor-
ies:
A: Shallow bowl?
B: Uh, it’s looking quite deep compared to the other shallow bowls.
A: Yeah.
B: It’s another serving dish I think.
In a few cases, one participant suggested a category which changed how their partner
categorised things. One way in which this happened was when a category label was
introduced which was relatively unfamiliar to one participant. For example, one parti-
cipant wanted to call an item a “trough”, which was initially rejected by their partner for
the more familiar “bowl”. However, the first participant later explained what troughs
were and created a trough category, and his partner later used the trough category as
well. Another type of case was when one participant’s categorisation made their partner
see things in a way they had not considered before. This is demonstrated in the example
below, which also shows how participants often appealed to what they had done in the
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previous task, and were even sometimes under the impression that the stimuli were the
same across tasks.
A: What would you say these things are?
B: I, well ...
A: Oh, that’s. I can’t even remember what I put. I think I put mug.
B: Oh, right. I put, for one of the tall ones I put kitchen utensils -
A: Yeah.
B: - utensil holder, but that one, I think you could be right, yeah, I didn’t think
of it as a mug.
A: Cool, I’ll put mug.
Finally, it’s worth noting that pairings usually explicitly checked with each other be-
fore finalising their categorisations by clicking on the “Done” button. Here’s the final
exchange of a particularly enthusiastic pair:
A: Right, so are we done?
B: Yeah.
A: Are you happy with everything?
B: Couldn’t be more happy.
A: Perfect. Done.
6.4.5 Framework and experiment feedback
Given that Experiment 2 is the first of my experiments to use the full-fledged general
experimental framework developed in Chapter 4, as well as its lack of evidence for con-
ceptual convergence, it is especially important to evaluate different aspects of both the
specific experiment and the general framework. To that end, here I present the relevant
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questionnaire data, which concerns the stimuli, categorisation strategies and tendencies,
and the experiment and program interface more generally. The feedback question num-
bers are marked with ‘#’ in brackets and refer to Appendix B.2.
I begin with general feedback concerning the stimuli. Participants were asked to rate
the set of experimental stimuli on a scale of 1 (very low) to 5 (very high) in terms of two
criteria: how familiar the items were (#6), and how natural they looked (#7). The stimuli
were judged to be both familiar (M = 4.27, SD = 0.79) and natural (M = 3.81, SD =
0.89). When asked to indicate whether they noticed differences between the stimulus sets
from the three categorisation tasks (#8), participants varied in their responses, with 13
participants responding that they did not notice differences, while the rest claimed that
they did to varying extents (e.g., “Yes”, “There were sometimes more of one type of item
than another”, “Slight variances, but not particularly”). Finally, the questionnaire asked
participants whether they mentally labelled stimuli linguistically (#5). A vast majority
of participants (40) claimed that they did mentally label items with English words, with
only four saying that they did not. The remaining four participants gave more subtle
responses (e.g., “Not every item”, “Generally, unless it was too ambiguous”).
Participants were also asked about their basis for categorisation, whether this changed
over the course of the experiment, and how they coordinated categorisation with their
partner. For the basis (#2), most participants mentioned one or more criteria which they
followed (so that many participants in the tallies below belong to two or more tallies).
37 participants mentioned some kind of physical basis (especially shape (26) and size
(10)); 22 participants listed object function, use or purpose, sometimes indicating more
specific criteria (e.g., “what kind of food/drink I think I would put in them”); 7 parti-
cipants simply referred to the kind of object (e.g., “type”) as a criterion; 4 participants
mentioned that they categorised by evaluating similarity between objects (either differ-
ent objects from the experiment, or other objects they were familiar with); and 1 parti-
cipant referred to organisation (“how I would organise them in a cupboard”). In terms
of changing their basis for categorisation across tasks (#3), 11 participants said they did
not, 25 indicated that they did, while 11 claimed that they did but only slightly. Of those
who said they did change their basis, a few offered details, such as “used size also later
on” and “developed more complex categories as the tasks progressed”. One participant
mentioned methodological constraints, saying how they needed to be more flexible due
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to limited space allowed per category. And three participants mentioned that working
with a partner affected the joint categorisation or their own subsequent individual cat-
egorisations. When the participants in the silent and talking conditions were asked about
how they agreed with their partner on categories (#4) , there was a variety of responses,
partly because they seemed to interpret the question differently. Participants had differ-
ent opinions on how well they agreed (e.g., “agreed very well”, “a little”, “I disagreed
with her categories”), the procedure which they followed (e.g., silent condition: “I went
with her categories”, “one person would enter a category name, generally the other per-
son agreed with them”; talking: “by discussing what I had done in the first round and
then discussing each picture on screen”, “we picked an item and decided together on a
label”), and the basis that they used together (e.g., “function, shape and depth”, “both
went for shape of opening”). Thus, the questionnaires offered independent evidence
that participants conceptualised the items differently, that they sometimes underwent
changes, and that they varied in their strategies.
A further question asked participants what they thought was the purpose of the exper-
iment (#1). Only 9 participants gave no answer, claimed they had no idea, or made
guesses that were well off (e.g., “to code different objects”). 26 participants gave re-
sponses that were correct but quite general or that were slightly off (e.g., “to see how
people categorise every day things”, “examine how we categorise visual objects and
how we refine our thinking”, “to see how your mind can be changed by another per-
son”). The remaining 13 participants, all of whom had engaged in a joint categorisation
task (6 in the silent condition, 7 in the talking condition) guessed the purpose remarkably
well (e.g., “To see if you categorised things differently after workingwith a partner”, “To
find out the effects that the other persons categorizations had on our own”). From these
responses, it seems that the experiment’s purpose was pretty transparent to most of the
participants, especially those who had worked together on a joint categorisation task.
The final two questions on the questionnaire were quite general: the first asked parti-
cipants if they had any comments about the experimental program interface (#9), and the
second asked for any more general comments about the experiment (#10). In both cases,
the vast majority of participants either gave no comment or gave positive feedback (e.g.,
“Very straight forward to use”). However, 6 participants did provide some constructive
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criticism about the interface (e.g., “Sometimes there was a delay when choosing a pic-
ture”, “A bit sticky sometimes”, “the way items swap when you have one and then click
another can be quite confusing”). Most of these comments concerned technical issues
with mouse clicking in Java that were difficult to avoid, but fortunately, as suggested
by the relative lack of negative comments, these things were only minor annoyances.
Overall, then, the participants felt that both the program interface and the experiment in
general were well-designed and easy to use and follow.
6.5 Discussion
6.5.1 Summary of results
The main hypothesis of this experiment was that engaging in a joint task would bring
together people’s categorisation, and would do so more if they were able to talk to each
other. The results do not provide support for this position. Pairs did not categorise any
more similarly before interaction than they did after it.
However, the experiment also gathered other data of theoretical and methodological
value. First, unlike categorisation, label agreement between participants did increase
from pre-tasks to post-tasks. However, the extent to which this occurred did not depend
on the experimental condition. Moreover, inspection of category labels suggested that a
range of different kinds of words and phrases were used, with nouns referring to types
of dishes (e.g., “plate”, “bowl”, “cup”) and adjectives identifying dimensions of vari-
ation (e.g., “square”, “round”, “deep”) being particularly common. Despite the lack of
effect on conceptual or lexical convergence, dialogue was exploited by all the participant
pairs in the talking condition, in order to agree on general categorisation schemes, cat-
egory labels and the categorisation of particular (especially ambiguous) items. Finally,
questionnaire feedback on different aspects of the experiment showed that participants
found the stimuli suitable, varied in their bases and strategies for categorisation, guessed
the purpose of the experiment with surprising accuracy, and were comfortable in using
the program interface.
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6.5.2 Conceptual alignment, lexical alignment and dialogue
The results of this experiment do not provide support for my hypotheses. In contrast
with the past findings of Markman and Makin (1998), conceptual convergence was not
increased by engaging in a joint task.
How can this be explained? Previous work has shown that engaging in a joint task with
linguistic interaction does bring together people’s subsequent categorisation (Markman
and Makin 1998; Voiklis 2008; see Section 3.4.3.3). While these experiments did not tease
apart the effects of interaction from those of dialogue specifically, the results here show
no effect of either. This suggests that methodological factors may be responsible for the
results, which I discuss in the next section.
Given the lack of expected conceptual convergence results, the lexical results take on
more weight and offer indirect insight. The weak lexical convergence results are also
surprising, although they did yield some significant effects. Pairs did showmore lexical
agreement in the post-task than in the pre-task, but the differences did not depend on the
condition. This seems to conflict with previousworkwhich has shown how interlocutors
converge on shared referential expressions for objects (e.g., Clark andWilkes-Gibbs 1986;
Brennan and Clark 1996; see Section 3.4.3.2). In contrast to those studies, there is no evid-
ence in Experiment 2 that either a joint task in general or dialogue specifically resulted in
greater amounts of lexical convergence after interaction. The lack of difference between
conditions suggests that even pairs in the control condition were converging more across
the tasks, so that there may be an effect of familiarity with the stimuli and tasks on la-
bel convergence. Perhaps as people continue to work with the same objects they begin
to give them less idiosyncratic names, leading to more agreement with each other. If
so, the lexical agreement may be due to this kind of standardisation rather than partner
coordination (Voiklis 2008).
However, this cannot be the full story, because there was also some evidence for conver-
gence. Participants who engaged in a joint task tended to stickwith their joint labels after
interaction, rather than reverting to their own individual labels from before. This result
cannot just be explained as all participants becoming less idiosyncratic across the tasks,
because an analogous comparison with the control participants showed that people who
did not interact were significantly more consistent with their own pre-task labels than
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their partner’s mid-task labels. This shows that interaction does in fact have an impact
on lexical convergence. To reconcile this with the previous finding, it seems that the gen-
eral lexical convergence evident from pre-tasks to post-tasks may still be primarily due
to the silent and talking conditions, but that the difference was statistically too small to
manifest itself as a significant effect between the conditions in the other analyses. This
would also be a little more consistent with previous lexical alignment work.
To the extent that the results do show lexical alignment, they suggest that interaction
between individuals may result in lexical convergence without necessarily implying
conceptual convergence. Interlocutors’ agreements on “conceptual pacts” (Brennan and
Clark 1996) may not reflect a corresponding underlying agreement in conceptualisation.
Although it may seem surprising that this would not be the case at all, we should at
least be cautious about assuming the latter from the former. Indeed, such a conclusion
would be broadly compatible with the findings of Malt et al. (1999) (and my replication
in Experiment 1) of a dissociation between naming and sorting. Echoing Schober (2005),
labels do not necessarily reflect conceptualisation to the extent that we might imagine.
Nevertheless, overall, therewas no support found for dialogue-induced conceptual align-
ment, and the lexical alignment results were relatively weak. The relative lack of dia-
logue effects for both conceptual and lexical convergence are also surprising given how
pairs in the talking condition exploited the opportunity to use the speech channel. As
shown in Section 6.4.4, participants used dialogue extensively and for a variety of pur-
poses. They negotiated general categorisation systems, the nature and names of partic-
ular categories, and the categorisation of particular items. Why wouldn’t such extensive
and categorisation-relevant interaction result in some degree of conceptual convergence?
While this may be a real effect, I suggested above that the results may perhaps be primar-
ily due to methodological factors. Therefore, I discuss methodological issues concerning
both the current experiment and general framework in the next section.
6.5.3 Methodological issues
I have already raised some methodological concerns with this experiment, and hinted
at several others. Indeed, the experiment was stopped early due to these concerns. In
this section, I discuss the methodological issues in more detail, suggest that they may be
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largely responsible for the experimental results (and lack thereof), and point to potential
solutions.
One source of concern lies in the lack of a clear goal and potentially motivation for par-
ticipants. Although the task procedure, mechanics and endpoint were well-defined, and
participants seemed to have no trouble understanding and following them, there was
no clear objective for them to reach. No particular categorisation was treated as “better”
than any other, in that neither the individual nor joint tasks rewarded participants for
how they categorised the items. As a result, in principle, nothing prevented them from
creating arbitrary categories and assigning things to them randomly. A particularly strik-
ing example of this was the participant who seemed to just give random names to his
categories, such as “X marks the spot” and “Patagonia”, although fortunately, that was
by far the exception rather than the rule. Nevertheless, lack of incentive for producing
coherent categories and meaningful labels are a potential factor. This contrasts my study
with those of Markman and Makin (1998) and Voiklis (2008), in which participant pairs
were given a common goal that was intended to be interesting and challenging. Recall
that both of those studies demonstrated how working on a communicative joint task
could result in converging categorisation. It is possible that the lack of such convergence
in my experiment is due to a lack of goal and motivation rather than more theoretical
reasons. Given the fact that many participants guessed the purpose of the experiment
fairly accurately, it would potentially cost little and gain much to modify the design so
that participants are given the explicit goal of trying to converge their categories.
Another unfortunate aspect of the current experiment is a lack of convergence data avail-
able for analysis from the joint task itself. For any pair, we can compare the two parti-
cipants’ categorisations in both the pre-tasks and post-tasks, because they produce inde-
pendent outputs. However, there is no clear way to do this for the current joint task (as is
highlighted by Figure 6.2). On one hand, in that task, participants make decisions jointly,
suggesting that we could treat them as converged by definition. On the other hand, they
are still obviously conceptualising the items with their own minds, and there is no good
evidence to indicate that they were in perfect agreement on all of their decisions. The
lack of comparison available for participant pairs in the joint task means that we are
not able to say, on the basis of the data, how much participants conceptually converge
while interacting. Yet this is an important open question in the literature: while on-line
CHAPTER 6. EXPERIMENT 2 215
alignment between interlocutors has been demonstrated at different linguistic levels, it
is much more controversial at the non-linguistic conceptual level (see Section 3.4.3).
A shortage of analysable data is actually a more general problem with the design of
Experiment 2. Although we do get convergence data for the pre-tasks and post-tasks,
there are just these two values for each participant pair. In other words, from the 48
participants in the experiment, only 48 datapoints were obtained, 24 for pre-task com-
parisons and 24 for post-task comparisons. And since the main analysis is based on the
difference between the two (or just the post-task), and there are three different condi-
tions, that effectively means just 8 datapoints per condition. Finally, assigning random
subsets of the stimulus space to participant pairs makes it difficult to run an alternative,
item-based analysis. Of course, part of the reason for the shortage of data is that the
experiment was stopped early, but still, the design is inefficient.
The previous point also raises the question of whether a pre-task is really needed. If we
had no between-subject conditions, and were comparing only the effect of interaction on
one group of participants, then it would be essential. But since the main comparison of
interest is between conditions, and the control condition is meant to provide a baseline,
it could be argued that the pre-task is redundant, with the main analyses being possible
with just the post-task data. Indeed, there are two further reasons why the pre-task
should perhaps be eliminated. First, the time that it takes up in a standard experimental
session could be exploited instead to gather other kinds of more useful data, so that we
get more datapoints per condition. Second, it may be that engaging in the pre-task “self-
primes” participants to stick more to their own categorisations, making it more difficult
for them to be influenced by their partner.
Also, it appears that trying to maximise the amount of variation in categorisation in the
experiment may have backfired statistically. Recall that for both kinds of alignment, the
residual change index analysis suggested that in fact no convergence was occurring of
either sort. These results may be due to the particular emphasis that this method puts
on the amount of variation in pre-task scores. However, pre-task scores varied widely
for both lexical and conceptual alignment, since participants’ output varied, and only
chance determined whether they had been paired with someonewhose output was very
similar or different to their own. As a result, score changes from pre-task to post-task
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needed to be very high to achieve significance thresholds, so that only one pair in one
type of alignment actually met these criteria.
Finally, it may also be the case that learning about another person’s concepts is more
easily done through a series of short tasks rather than a single large one. Indeed, most
category learning experiments in psychology present only one stimulus at a time. Al-
though free classification tasks inherently requiremultiple stimuli and categories at once,
the number could be reduced, which would also allow for a greater number of tasks, and
thus a greater number of datapoints.
Nevertheless, despite the methodological shortcomings of Experiment 2, the question-
naire feedback gives plenty of room for optimism regarding the general experimental
framework developed in Chapter 4. Participants varied in how they categorised and
labelled the items, and generally found the stimuli familiar and natural, despite the fact
that most of them were morphed. Moreover, aside from a couple of minor annoyances,
the questionnaire feedback indicated that participants found the program interface easy
to use and the task instructions clear. This is particularly encouragingwith regards to the
paired aspect of the experiment, especially in the silent condition, since it demonstrates
that it is possible to conduct meaningful interactive experiments using free classification
tasks either with or without dialogue.
In summary, Experiment 2 had a few serious methodological shortcomings, including
the lack of a clear goal, no simple way of assessing conceptual alignment during in-
teraction, and limited data obtained per experimental session. However, the general
experimental framework seems to have resolved certain methodological challenges, and
holds promise for future experiments.
6.6 Conclusion
Experiment 2 was intended to test the hypothesis that dialogue could result in concep-
tual convergence between individuals, over and above that which occurs as a result
of working together on a joint task (without dialogue). However, the results not only
showed no support for this hypothesis, but even failed to show conceptual convergence
due to interaction in general. This runs counter to previous findings, suggesting that
the experiment may have methodological issues. Indeed, the design did feature several
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flaws that were not identified earlier, which I address in subsequent experiments. Nev-
ertheless, the experiment did provide some other useful and interesting data. First, it
showed how participants used a variety of different category labels, and how there was
some evidence for lexical alignment, despite the lack of conceptual alignment. Second,
it showed that even though dialogue wasn’t necessary to complete the joint tasks, it was
actively used when available to make various kinds of joint decisions. Finally, feedback
from the participants suggested that it was the particular design of Experiment 2 that
was methodologically at fault, and not the general framework. Therefore, more experi-
ments can and should be conductedwithin this framework to explore unresolved issues.
CHAPTER 7
Experiment 3: conceptual alignment during and after
dialogue
7.1 Introduction
Experiment 2 fell short of its ambitions. It was intended to investigate whether dia-
logue played an important role in conceptual coordination. To that end, it examined
whether the use of dialogue in a joint categorisation task brought together participants’
individual categorisations, but found that a joint task does not bring about conceptual
convergence. Moreover, there were also surprisingly few differences found between the
conditions in terms of lexical convergence. However, I then pointed out various meth-
odological shortcomings of the experiment and argued that the results may have been
methodological artifacts rather than real theoretical findings. As a result, I concluded
that further experiments are needed to evaluate these issues.
An obvious strategy in designing follow-up experiments to address these concerns is
to make methodological modifications which lead to a more sensitive design and are
more likely to reveal differences between conditions. If doing so yields the same pattern
of results, then this would add credibility to the findings of Experiment 2. Otherwise,
if expected differences do come up, then we could reevaluate that conclusion and my
experimental hypotheses.
However, the lack of expected results in Experiment 2 also suggests that we shift the
theoretical focus a little. In particular, we should not restrict ourselves to studying con-
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ceptual coordination following interaction. If conceptual convergence between pairs of
participants is not evident after their interaction, then what about even during the inter-
action itself? In effect, Experiment 2 presupposed that participants conceptualise things
the same way while they interact, even though their actual concepts are still their own
(as could be seen in Figure 6.2). This was similar to Brennan and Clark’s (1996) con-
ceptual pacts, whereby interlocutors are assumed to agree on a joint conceptualisation
when they converge on a particular referential expression to refer to an object. However,
as has been emphasised throughout this thesis, lexical alignment does not necessarily
imply conceptual alignment. Moreover, while Pickering and Garrod (2004) have argued
that interlocutors align cognitive representations during dialogue, little is known about
whether such alignment occurs in joint tasks not involving dialogue, and how much, if
at all, dialogue augments it.
Experiment 3 is alsomeant to address themethodological concerns raised by Experiment
2 (see Section 6.5.3). First of all, the participants should be given a clear and challenging
goal, in hopes of increasing both their motivation and the sensitivity of the experiment.
Secondly, and more generally, the task structure should be designed to produce more
readily analysable and relevant data. At the same time, there would ideally be less vari-
ation in the pre-task, or the pre-task would be dropped altogether. Finally, the joint part
of the experiment should be modified to accommodate the change in theoretical scope.
Therefore, in this chapter, I present an experiment which attempts to address the meth-
odological shortcomings of Experiment 2, while also expanding its theoretical scope of
inquiry to include conceptual coordination both during and after interaction. However,
since the issues with Experiment 2 did not appear to be due to problems with my general
experimental framework, Experiment 3 continues to adopt this framework.
7.2 Overview
The main theoretical purpose of Experiment 3 is similar to that of Experiment 2: to in-
vestigate whether dialogue brings about conceptual alignment between interacting in-
dividuals. However, an important difference is that rather than exclusively inquiring
whether joint action and dialogue bring about conceptual coordination after interaction,
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this time I also investigate conceptual coordination during interaction. Also since Exper-
iment 2 showed evidence of lexical but not of conceptual convergence, this raises the
possibility of a dissociation between the two. I therefore investigate lexical alignment as
well, asking the same questions as for conceptual alignment.
The main concrete modification relative to Experiment 2 concerns changes to the inter-
active part of the experiment. Firstly, the two participants no longer categorised a joint
set of stimuli together through a synchronised interface. Instead, they categorised the
items independently (except that they could talk in the talking condition), but were ex-
plicitly asked to categorise the objects as similarly as possible as each other. Therefore,
the focus now was shifted to comparing their conceptual alignment during interaction
under the control, silent and talking conditions. The three cases are visualised in Fig-
















Figure 7.2: Interaction and feedback in the silent condition in Experiment 3.
Moreover, the single large joint task was replaced with a series of ten smaller tasks.
After each task, they were also given feedback by their partner’s categories and labels
appearing on their screen next to their own (potentially helping them to learn across
tasks), alongwith a score indicating howwell they had coordinated. Thesemodifications









Figure 7.3: Interaction and feedback in the talking condition in Experiment 3.
addressed several methodological concerns: they gave the participants a particular goal,
and they produced data (ten datapoints per pair) for analysing the degree of conceptual
alignment during interaction. However, the modified task instructions also change the
theoretical question asked by the joint phase of the experiment. Rather than looking
at whether dialogue spontaneously improves conceptual coordination during interaction,
the experiment now asks whether it potentially can be used to improve it. Thus, this
experiment does not focus on automatic alignment (Pickering and Garrod 2004), but
also encourages the conscious use of language as a coordination tool.
Next, the post-interaction part of the experiment was also expanded. However, rather
than increasing the number of categorisation tasks, a large set of similarity judgements
was added. Recall that acquiring concepts can lead to categorical perception, a phe-
nomenon by which the mind exaggerates the similarity of things that fall within the
same category and the dissimilarity of things that are in different categories (Goldstone
1994; see Section 2.6.4). But if categorisation can affect similarity systematically in this
way, then conceptual alignment could also result in alignment of similarity spaces. As
a result, the potential convergent effects of engaging in a joint task could also manifest
themselves in similarity judgement tasks. Indeed, previous work has documented such
results (Malt and Sloman 2004).
Finally, the pre-task of the experiment was entirely eliminated. This not only addressed
the fact that this part was unnecessary, if not problematic, but also made more room for
the expanded joint phase and individual phase of the experiment. Also, it addresses the
potential concern of self-priming in Experiment 2 (see Section 6.5.3).
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In summary, Experiment 3 makes severalmethodological changes relative to Experiment
2, which not only seek to make the experiment more sensitive and interesting, but also
result in slightly shifted theoretical questions. In particular, Experiment 3 asks:
1. Can engaging in joint categorisation tasks bring people’s categorisation, lexical-
isation, and similarity spaces closer together, both during and after interaction?
2. If so, are these effects stronger if people can also communicate through dia-
logue?
7.3 Methods
The experiment had two phases: a joint phase and an individual phase. The joint phase
consisted of a sequence of ten joint categorisation tasks. The availability of feedback and
dialogue was manipulated, as in Experiment 2. In contrast, the individual phase, like the
pre-tasks and post-tasks in Experiment 2, was individual and the same for all conditions.
It consisted of a sequence of 60 similarity judgements and one categorisation task.
7.3.1 Participants
Participants were 60 adult native English speakers (age: M = 22.0, SD = 3.8), mostly
undergraduate students recruited through the University of Edinburgh student employ-
ment website. There were 36 female and 24 male participants.
Participants were assigned to pairings randomly, and pairings were assigned to condi-
tions randomly, except that the relative numbers of different gender pairings was con-
trolled and kept the same in each condition. In particular, there were four female-female
pairs, four female-male pairs, and two male-male pairs assigned to each of the three
conditions (described in Section 7.3.2). These numbers were chosen to balance the com-
position of gender pairings across conditions, even though gender was not expected to
make a difference in the experiment. Again, partners did not know each other before the
experiment.
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7.3.2 Conditions
Experiment 3 had the same three conditions as Experiment 2: control, silent and talking.
In the control condition, participants were not allowed to talk during the experiment, and
they also did not receive feedback on their partner’s category groupings or labels. In the
silent condition, they also could not talk, but they did receive feedback on their partner’s
category groupings and labels. In the talking condition, participants received feedback
on their partner’s category groupings and labels, and they were allowed to talk freely
during the joint categorisation tasks.
7.3.3 Stimuli
7.3.3.1 Generation
As in the previous experiment, the stimuli used in Experiment 3 consisted of pictures of
dish-like objects. Again, morphing software was used to generate a more fluid space,
but in this case attempts were made to make the space even more fluid and to increase
the level of ambiguity of the items.
In particular, the first step was the selection of four pictures out of the ten base stim-
uli from Experiment 2. I chose items which I considered to be prototypical members
of what in English would be called ’bowl’, ’plate’, ’tray’ and ’cup’, respectively. This
contrasted with Experiment 2, where, according to the distribution of participants’ la-
bels (see Section 6.4.3), there were unequal ratios of different kinds of dishes. For each
of the six possible pairs of these four images, I then took the morphing sequences from
Experiment 2, consisting of 13 intermediate stimuli for each pair.
Then, for each of these six morphing sequences, I used the central interpolant image
(which I call a derived base stimulus) for a further set of “second-generation” morphing
sequences. All fifteen possible pairs of the six derived base stimuli were then used to
morph a further thirteen interpolants. All together, this resulted in a domain of 277
pictures of dish-like objects (277 = 4+6×13+15×13). Figure 7.4 shows the four original
base stimuli, Figure 7.5 shows the six combinations of these and the resulting derived
base stimuli, and Figure 7.6 shows an example morphing sequence taken between two
derived base stimuli.
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Figure 7.4: The original base stimuli used in Experiment 3.
Figure 7.5: The derived base stimuli of Experiment 3 (in the middle column), derived from the
midpoint interpolations of each pair of original base stimuli (left and right columns).
7.3.3.2 Allotment
From the superset of 277 generated stimuli, 100 were randomly selected to be used in
the joint categorisation tasks. These were then randomly divided into ten sets of ten
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Figure 7.6: An example morphing sequence from two derived base stimuli used in Experiment
3.
stimuli, with each set being assigned to one task. Ten different random orderings of these
tasks were then defined. Each of these task orderings was assigned to one participant
pair of the same gender combination (female-female, female-male, or male-male) in each
condition.
The similarity judgement tasks used 60 novel and 60 familiar stimuli. The novel stimuli
were randomly chosen from the remaining 177 in the global set. The familiar stimuli
were chosen from the 100 stimuli previously chosen, with three random pairs chosen
from each joint categorisation task. The order of these tasks was randomised, but kept
the same for all participants.
The individual categorisation task used 35 familiar stimuli (and no novel stimuli), ran-
domly selected from the remaining 40 stimuli which were used in the joint categorisation
tasks (100) but not reused in the similarity judgement tasks (60). Familiar stimuli were
used in order to increase the chances of the joint phase tasks affecting these individual
tasks.
The visual order in which stimuli were displayedwithin tasks varied (within pairs) in the
joint phase, so that participants could not rely on stimulus order to achieve coordination.
In contrast, it was kept constant in both parts of the individual phase for all participants
in all pairs and conditions. This was done so that the individual phase could be treated
like a post-treatment test, with all participants undertaking exactly the same test.
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7.3.4 Procedure
The experiment consisted of two experimental phases, the joint and the individual phase,
and a short questionnaire. As in Experiment 2, pairs of participants were brought into
the experimental lab and assigned randomly to two separate computer cubicles. After
filling out a consent form, they began the experiment.
7.3.4.1 Joint phase
7.3.4.1.1 Joint categorisation tasks After a brief practice individual categorisation task
(as in Experiment 2), participant pairs carried out a sequence of ten joint categorisation
tasks, in each of which they sorted 10 items into 2-4 categories (with a maximum of 5
items per category). However, these tasks were fundamentally different from Experi-
ment 2. This time, both participants first categorised the items individually (just as in
the individual categorisation tasks), although the talking condition pairs were allowed
to talk during these tasks. At the end of each task, in the silent and talking conditions,
they saw their partner’s categories and labels, and had a chance to compare them to
their own. They also saw their task score (in all conditions), which was computed using
Meila’s (2007) measure, but rounded to two decimal places and converted to percents
before being shown to participants. Their task was to try to group things as similarly as
possible to their partner (and thus to maximise their score), and they were told that the
pair with the highest overall scores would receive an extra financial reward (£5 each).
The instructions also emphasised that the labels did not matter to the score: only the
category groupings affected it. As before, participants could change their decisions as
many times as they liked before committing their choices, including both the category
labels and their members.
7.3.4.2 Individual phase
Once participants had completed the ten joint categorisation tasks of the joint phase, the
individual phase began. For the rest of the experiment, participants worked on their
own, and they were told that at this point. This phase of the experiment consisted of
two parts: a sequence of similarity judgement tasks, followed by a single individual
categorisation task.
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7.3.4.2.1 Similarity judgement tasks In the similarity judgement tasks, participants saw
two items at a time, side-by-side, and were asked to assess their degree of similarity.
Participants rated items on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 meaning that the items were very
dissimilar and 7 meaning that they were very similar. The first two similarity tasks were
for practice, and involved pictures of furniture. After that, participants carried out a
sequence of sixty similarity judgement tasks with the dish stimuli. Half of the tasks
involved previously seen stimuli, while the other half involved novel ones (but from the
same dish domain).
7.3.4.2.2 Individual categorisation task After the similarity tasks, participants carried
out a single individual categorisation task. This task was the same as the individual
categorisation tasks in Experiment 2, except that participants sorted 35 items into 2 to
4 categories (with a maximum of 20 items per category). The stimuli were a subset of
those used from the joint tasks.
7.3.4.3 Questionnaire
Once participants had finished with both the joint phase and the individual phase of the
experiment, they filled out a questionnaire. The questionnaire was very similar to that
used in Experiment 2. It asked them for demographic information such as age, gender,
and language background, as well as feedback questions concerning the experiment,
such as what they thought the experiment was about or what strategies they used to
align their categories.
7.3.5 Program
The experiment was run through a revised version of the computer program developed
for Experiment 2. The revisions reflected the methodological changes, as described here.
Snapshots of the program interface for the different tasks can be found in Appendix C.3.
The interface for the joint categorisation tasks worked much the same way as for indi-
vidual tasks in Experiment 2, with participants individually sorting the items into cat-
egories. However, the program window was arranged a little differently, mainly reflect-
ing the reduction in the number of categories available and the fact that the window
now had to visually accommodate both people’s categories (during feedback). The part
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of the window with category boxes was split vertically in half, with the participant’s
four category boxes appearing in the left half. The right half was reserved for the parti-
cipant’s partner’s categories, and was left empty (and black) during the task. After both
partners had finished each task, the program calculated the agreement score between
the two sets of categories, and the score was shown underneath the focus box, high-
lighted by a surrounding red border. In addition, in the silent and talking conditions, the
participants were also then shown their partner’s category groupings and labels to the
right of their own (they were warned this would happen in the task instructions). The
partner’s categories were visually ordered to be in the sequence which gave the best cat-
egorisation match (and hence also which reflects the score). The participants then had 45
seconds to see the score and study the category feedback (if any), and then the next task
automatically began.
The interface for the similarity tasks was very simple. Pairs of stimuli were shown side-
by-side, one pair at time. Underneath the pair there were seven radio buttons, identi-
fying degrees of similarity, from lowest to highest. Participants clicked on the button of
their choice, which immediately triggered the next similarity judgement task.
The individual categorisation task interface was the same as in Experiment 2, except that
there were now only four category boxes (in a 2x2 arrangement), rather than nine, and
the category boxes occupied the right half of the window.
7.4 Results
I present the data in three general parts, corresponding to three types of alignment
between participants: conceptual, lexical, and similarity. However, unlike Experiment
2, I do not go on to present the dialogue data, and I only skim over the questionnaire
data. This is because the audio files, unfortunately, were lost, while the main purpose of
the questionnaire (i.e., assessing the general framework), was already addressed in the
previous experiment.
But first, in order to give a concrete example of the data, I first show the output from
a joint categorisation task. Figure 7.7 is output from a randomly selected task. It is the
fifth joint task of one participant pair in the silent condition. This means that they have
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already had feedback on each other’s groupings and labels four times each. In this case,
both participants used all four categories.
Conceptual score: 0.65; Lexical score = 0.50
PARTICIPANT 1 PARTICIPANT 2
small round small round
small square small square
large round medium round
medium medium square
Figure 7.7: An example of a joint task from Experiment 3.
7.4.1 Conceptual alignment
7.4.1.1 Joint categorisation tasks
Recall that themain hypothesis regarding the joint taskswas that interacting pairs would
align their categorisation over time, and that this would occur more if they were allowed
to talk. Before the main analyses, however, I show, in Figure 7.8, the sequence of scores
for every pair, as well as the mean scores, organised by condition. From these plots,
which provide a quick overview of the raw data, I note three informal observations.
First, there was a lot of variability in scores, even within pairs. Second, there were quite
a few perfect scores of 1, especially in the talking condition. Third, the scores look highest
in general in the talking condition, but, surprisingly, the difference between control and
silent conditions is less clear.
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Figure 7.8: Conceptual alignment for each task in all sessions, by condition.
These preliminary impressions point to caution in conducting analysis. In particular, a
high number of ceiling scores in the talking condition suggests that a standard paramet-
ric test is both inappropriate and relatively unnecessary. Indeed, the score distributions
by condition, shown in Figure 7.9, highlight the obvious ceiling effect in the talking con-
dition. As a result, I conduct standard parametric tests with only the control and silent
conditions, but include all conditions for the tests which should be less statistically sens-
itive.
First, I look at whether pairs in the control and silent conditions increased conceptual
coordination over time across the tasks, and whether the extent to which they did so
depended on the condition. Table 7.1 shows the mean scores for each joint task in each
condition, although I exclude the talking condition pairs from the analysis because of the
high number of ceiling scores. As before, the means are clearly highest in the talking
condition, but here we can also see that the mean scores tend to be higher in the silent
condition than in the control condition. However, there is no obvious learning effect,
with mean scores staying about the same across tasks.
A linear mixed effects analysis (using R’s ’lmer’ and ’anova’ functions) supports this im-
pression. In order to assess whether there was general improvement in scores over time,








































Figure 7.9: Conceptual alignment score distributions, by condition.
Task control silent talking
1 0.70 (0.16) 0.75 (0.19) 0.77 (0.20)
2 0.69 (0.19) 0.78 (0.21) 0.92 (0.18)
3 0.66 (0.16) 0.83 (0.18) 0.89 (0.20)
4 0.67 (0.20) 0.79 (0.18) 0.91 (0.15)
5 0.56 (0.23) 0.80 (0.16) 0.94 (0.12)
6 0.64 (0.19) 0.75 (0.21) 0.91 (0.18)
7 0.82 (0.12) 0.72 (0.19) 0.93 (0.14)
8 0.77 (0.13) 0.79 (0.17) 0.96 (0.13)
9 0.72 (0.21) 0.76 (0.18) 0.85 (0.21)
10 0.67 (0.10) 0.67 (0.14) 0.86 (0.27)
Table 7.1: The means and standard deviations for conceptual alignment scores for each joint task
in each condition.
I applied a simple model1 with task as a fixed effect and pair-specific score intercepts
as the only random effects. Although such linear mixed models do not provide clear p-
values, I used the heuristic, as recommended by Baayen (2008), of looking at the t-value
for the fixed effect of task: an absolute value of this greater than about 2 indicates a sig-
nificant effect. However, in this case, the t-value fell far short of this (-0.29), confirming
that pairs did not manage to improve over time. As a result, for the rest of the analysis,
I ignore the longitudinal variable of task order.
1The R lmer call: lmer(score ˜task + (1 |session)).
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Next, since there were so many ceiling scores in the talking condition, I compare that
condition with the other two just by looking at the number of ceiling scores. There were
68 ceiling scores in the talking condition, and a total of 28 (control: 7; silent: 21) for the
other two. A χ2 test confirmed that the difference was highly significant (χ2(1) = 86.87,
p < .001). Thus, the conditions did differ in how often pairs obtained ceiling scores.
I also compare the different conditions based on the mean scores across all tasks for
each participant pair. This analysis has the statistical advantage of reducing the number
of ceiling effects (there were only two pairs for which the mean scores were 1, both in
the talking condition). The relative values of the mean scores, as shown in Table 7.2,
were consistent with my hypotheses. A one-way ANOVA showed a highly significant
main effect of condition (F (2, 27) = 10.23, p < .001). Pre-planned comparisons revealed
that the talking condition did significantly better than the silent condition (t(27) = 2.89,
p < .01), while there was no difference between the control and silent conditions (t(27) =
−1.57, p > .05). This shows that, surprisingly, feedback on partner groupings and labels
did not increase conceptual coordination, although being able to talk was beneficial.
control silent talking
0.69 (0.18) 0.76 (0.18) 0.89 (0.18)
Table 7.2: The means and standard deviations for conceptual alignment scores across the joint
tasks in each condition.
7.4.1.2 Individual categorisation tasks
So far the analysis has focused on conceptual alignment during interaction. Now I ana-
lyse the results from the individual part of the experiment to see whether interaction and
dialogue resulted in conceptual alignment that persisted beyond the interaction. I turn
first to whether there was conceptual agreement between partners in the subsequent
individual categorisation task. In between, of course, partners also underwent the se-
quence of similarity judgment tasks, but I analyse that separately in Section 7.4.3.
First, I computed the degree of agreement between partners on the individual categor-
isation task, using Meila’s (2007) measure. The resulting means for each condition are
shown in Table 7.3, and their spread is plotted in Figure 7.10.
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control silent talking
0.72 (0.09) 0.72 (0.08) 0.74 (0.11)
Table 7.3: The means and standard deviations for categorisation agreement scores in the indi-

























Figure 7.10: Conceptual alignment in the individual categorisation tasks.
A one-way ANOVAwas conducted to test for the effects of condition on subsequent cat-
egorisation agreement. The analysis revealed no significant effect of condition (F (2, 27) =
0.22, p > .05). Thus, interaction and dialogue did not cause conceptual alignment during
the individual categorisation task.
I also checked for a relationship between agreement in the joint and individual categor-
isation tasks, regardless of condition. A linear regression analysis between pairs’ mean
scores on the joint tasks and their scores on the individual categorisation task revealed
no significant relationship (β = 0.16, p > .05, R2 = 0.05).
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7.4.2 Lexical alignment
7.4.2.1 Joint categorisation tasks
Although my hypotheses are focused on conceptual convergence, analogous analyses to
those above can be performed on the category label data as well. In order to calculate
the degree of label agreement on a given task for a participant pair, I use the same strict
measure as was defined in Experiment 2, based on the proportion of full labels shared
among the pair (see Section 6.4.2 for details).
Figure 7.11 shows the resulting lexical agreement scores for every pair, organised by
condition. There appears to be even more variation and fluctuation in agreement scores
than there was for conceptual agreement (see Figure 7.8), with a fair number of both
ceiling and floor scores. However, it also appears clear that scores are highest in the
talking condition and lowest in the control condition, as expected.




















































































Figure 7.11: Lexical agreement on all runs for each condition.
I consider first whether pairs’ lexical agreement scores increased over time, and how that
might depend on the condition. Table 7.4 shows the means for each task and each condi-
tion. The values in the table give the impression that scores in the silent condition go up
over time, but that this is less clear for the control condition (which has consistently low
scores) or the talking condition (which has consistently high scores). This is intimately
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related with the distribution across conditions of floor and ceiling scores, and makes a
linear mixed model analysis (as was used for conceptual convergence) problematic. In
particular, such an analysis would inappropriately penalise pairs in the talking condition
in terms of improvement over time, since they do sowell from early on that they have far
less potential room for improvement. Moreover, treating the scores in the early task(s) as
covariates (analogously to Experiment 2) would also be inappropriate, because the pairs
in the talking condition had an explicit advantage from the very first task.
Task control silent talking
1 0.23 (0.34) 0.03 (0.10) 0.58 (0.47)
2 0.03 (0.09) 0.30 (0.38) 0.80 (0.36)
3 0.08 (0.17) 0.22 (0.26) 0.82 (0.34)
4 0.10 (0.16) 0.24 (0.32) 0.90 (0.32)
5 0.22 (0.34) 0.47 (0.39) 0.93 (0.22)
6 0.08 (0.25) 0.32 (0.41) 0.82 (0.30)
7 0.13 (0.23) 0.44 (0.35) 0.87 (0.32)
8 0.15 (0.22) 0.52 (0.41) 0.88 (0.23)
9 0.10 (0.18) 0.59 (0.35) 0.92 (0.16)
10 0.09 (0.14) 0.52 (0.42) 0.88 (0.26)
Table 7.4: The means and standard deviations for lexical alignment scores in the joint tasks in
each condition.
Given these difficulties and the fact that this issue is not central to my main hypotheses,
I resorted to a simplified analysis. In particular, I considered each condition independ-
ently, looking at the mean scores for each task. These means were shown graphically
with the bold lines in Figure 7.11. Using the means also has the advantage of smooth-
ing out the data and eliminating many floor and ceiling values. I performed a simple
linear regression for each condition separately, testing specifically for the effect of task.
The results showed that the effect of task was not significant for the control condition
(β = 0.00, p > .05, R2 = 0.02), highly significant for the silent condition (β = 0.05,
p < .001, R2 = 0.79), but also significant for the talking condition (β = 0.02, p < .05,
R2 = 0.44). Thus, pairs converged in their choices of category labels if they interacted,
even if they were not engaged in full-fledged dialogue.
Next, I compare the three conditions, collapsing across task order. First, I consider the
ceiling and floor scores more closely. There were a large number of ceiling scores (i.e.,
pairs used identical sets of labels), especially in the talking condition, but also many
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floor scores (i.e., pairs shared no full labels in common), especially in the control condi-
tion. Table 7.5 shows the totals of both for each condition. The relative values of these
counts are in line with the experimental hypotheses, and the differences between condi-
tions were significant for both ceiling scores (χ2(2) = 145.45, p < .001) and floor scores
(χ2(2) = 88.28, p < .001). This confirms that the conditions did differ in how often
partners used identical label sets and how often they used completely different labels.
control silent talking
Ceiling 0 17 75
Floor 72 40 7
Table 7.5: The total number of ceiling and floor scores in each condition.
I turn next to mean scores, again collapsing across tasks. The means, shown in Table 7.6,
were lowest in the control condition and highest in the talking condition, as expected.
Due to the high number of ceiling and floor scores, and generally non-normal score
distributions, I applied a non-parametric test to compare scores across conditions. In
particular, a Kruskal-Wallis test was applied and confirmed that the differences between
the conditions were highly significant (χ2(2) = 142.84, p < .001). Moreover, preplanned
comparisons were significant for both the control (U = 14, n1 = 10, n2 = 10, p < .01)
and talking (U = 91, n1 = 10, n2 = 10, p < .01) conditions relative to the silent condition.
Thus, control pairs were less lexically aligned than silent pairs, who in turn were less
aligned than talking pairs.
control silent talking
0.12 (0.23) 0.37 (0.37) 0.84 (0.31)
Table 7.6: The means and standard deviations for lexical alignment scores across the joint tasks
in each condition.
7.4.2.2 Individual categorisation tasks
We can next examine whether lexical alignment was preserved in the individual categor-
isation task. I used the same measure of labeling agreement as above, and computed it
for each pair. The means for each condition are shown in Table 7.7, and their spread is
plotted in Figure 7.12.
Due to large fluctuation and non-normal distribution of the data, I again used a Kruskal-
Wallis test to compare the conditions. The result was significant (χ2(2) = 6.42, p < .05).
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control silent talking
0.09 (0.22) 0.33 (0.31) 0.47 (0.40)
Table 7.7: The means and standard deviations for label agreement scores in the individual cat-

























Figure 7.12: Lexical alignment in the individual categorisation tasks.
However, preplanned comparisons showed that while the difference between control and
silent conditions was also significant (U = 24.5, n1 = 10, n2 = 10, p < .05), that between
the talking and silent conditions was not (U = 60, n1 = 10, n2 = 10, p > .05). In other
words, pairs that interacted ended up with more similar sets of labels in the individual
categorisation task, regardless of whether they could talk.
Finally, I checked for a relationship between label agreement in the joint and individual
categorisation tasks, regardless of condition. In contrast to the case for conceptual con-
vergence, a linear regression showed a significant relationship (β = 0.52, p < .01,
R2 = 0.29). In other words, the degree to which partners aligned lexically in the joint
tasks was reflected in the degree to which they remained lexically aligned afterwards.
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7.4.3 Similarity convergence
Recall that all participants carried out the same 60 similarity judgments, for each of
which they gave a number between 1 and 7 indicating how similar they found the
two objects. I now compare the judgments of participants and their partners, and test
whether how close they are depends on the condition.
Quantifying the degree of agreement between two people’s similarity judgments is not
trivial, however. The meaning of a similarity assignment of 2 or 5 (for example) is
not well-defined and thus may depend on the participant. Therefore, I first normal-
ised each participant’s judgments, by subtracting each judgment from that participant’s
mean judgments, and dividing it by the standard deviation of that participant’s judg-
ments. Then, for each participant pair and each similarity task, I defined the similarity
agreement between the pair as the absolute value of the difference between their stand-
ardised judgments. The means of the resulting judgments for each condition are shown
in Table 7.8, and their spread is plotted in Figure 7.13.
control silent talking
0.79 (0.71) 0.76 (0.70) 0.70 (0.64)
Table 7.8: The means and standard deviations for agreement scores in the similarity tasks in
each condition.
A one-way ANOVAwas conducted to test for the effects of condition on similarity agree-
ment. The analysis revealed no significant effect of condition (F (2, 27) = 0.16, p > .05).
Thus, interaction and dialogue in the joint tasks had no effect on alignment in the simil-
arity tasks.
I also checked for relationships between similarity agreements with both conceptual and
lexical agreement in the joint categorisation tasks. Linear regressions for the mean de-
grees of agreement did not show significant effects in either case (conceptual: β = 0.30,
p > .05, R2 = 0.01; lexical: β = 0.12, p > .05, R2 = 0.02). Thus, convergence in similarity
judgments did not appear to be related to either conceptual or lexical convergence.



























Figure 7.13: Similarity judgment agreement in the individual similarity tasks.
7.4.4 Questionnaire data
The questionnaire asked mostly the same questions as were asked in Experiment 2,
aimed largely at assessing the framework. However, I do not go into detail here as I did
there, for three reasons. First, although Experiment 2 had several methodological short-
comings, its questionnaire data already suggested that the general framework was not
to blame (see Section 6.5.3). Second, the questionnaire responses were generally quite
similar to those in Experiment 2. Third, and most important, the experiment yielded
several significant effects, all of which were in line with my hypotheses. This provides
perhaps the best and most direct evidence that the framework is fruitful, and makes
close scrutiny of the questionnaire data largely redundant. However, given the change
to the experiment and joint task structure, it is worth taking a brief look at the questions
concerning the basis of categorisation. The feedback question numbers are marked with
‘#’ in brackets and refer to Appendix C.2.
Themost dominant bases for categorisation (#2) were different physical properties, which
were mentioned by 56 different participants. In contrast, only 12 participants appealed
to the kind of object, 7 resorted to object type or function and 2 mentioned the judgment
of similarity relative to other objects. Finally, two participants mentioned the use of task
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coordination strategy as a basis for categorisation (e.g., “tried to standardize my own
for her while also adopting to her style”). When asked about whether they changed
their basis of categorisation (#3), 13 indicated clearly that they did, and 18 that they
did not; 3 more mentioned their partner and how they tried to coordinate together; 2
said that they made changes when the constraints of the experiment (e.g., the maximum
number or sizes of categories) required this of them, and the remaining 24 gave other
kinds of responses that did not fall clearly into one of the previous criteria. Participant
responses considering coordination strategies (#4) depended a lot on the experimental
condition. In the control condition, participants generally either listed their basis for cat-
egorisation, indicated that they did nothing specific to coordinate, that they tried to use
simple or small category systems, or that they studied the score feedback and tried to
deduce from it how their partner categorised. In the silent condition, participants also
indicated a reliance on simple, small or consistent systems, but also mentioned trying to
identify their common basis, or switching to their partners’ basis, or, conversely, sticking
to their own system in hopes that their partner would switch. In the talking condition,
some participants mentioned similar strategies to those in the other conditions, but oth-
ers mentioned how they communicated together to arrive at decisions, sometimes in
quite specific ways (e.g., “Talked about properties of objects, worked out obviously dis-
tinct objects first”).
7.5 Discussion
7.5.1 Summary of results
The main hypothesis of Experiment 3 was that interaction on a joint task would increase
conceptual alignment, and that dialogue would make the effect even stronger. Align-
ment was tested for both during and beyond interaction. Moreover, although conceptual
alignment was the main focus, I also looked at lexical and similarity alignment.
The results depended substantially on whether we were looking at alignment during or
beyond interaction, and on the type of alignment being investigated. Conceptual align-
ment was very significant in the talking condition during interaction, but did not occur
in the other conditions, and was not evident in any condition after interaction (including
the similarity tasks). In other words, feedback on category labels and groupings did not
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enhance conceptual convergence, but being able to resort to dialogue did. Lexical align-
ment, on the other hand, did occur during interaction with or without dialogue, but was
stronger in the talking condition. Moreover, in this case, there was more convergence
evident beyond the interaction in the silent condition than in the control condition, but
no difference between the talking and silent conditions. For lexical convergence, then,
just getting feedback on category groupings and labels was enough to get people to
converge on their labels, although dialogue did enhance this further during interaction.
Finally, there was no effect of condition on the alignment of similarity judgements, nor
any evidence that similarity alignment correlated with lexical or conceptual alignment.
7.5.2 Conceptual and lexical alignment during interaction
Recall that Experiment 2 had failed to find lasting effects of a joint task in general, and
dialogue specifically, on conceptual convergence between individuals following inter-
action. This surprising result begged the question of whether conceptual convergence
would even occur during interaction. The mechanics and structure of the joint categor-
isation tasksweremodified for Experiment 3 so that theywould provide data that would
bear directly on this question.
The results showed clear effects of dialogue on both conceptual and lexical alignment
during interaction. Participants who could talk to each other during the joint categor-
isation tasks categorised things much more similarly to each other, and also used more
similar category labels. Indeed, unlike in the other two conditions, talking pairs often
managed to adopt identical sets of categories and labels. Although the loss of audio data
prevents us from being able to analyse how participants used dialogue to achieve these
results, dialogue was clearly very helpful to this end.
However, without recourse to dialogue, the results were strikingly different. Participants
who received full feedback on their partners’ category groupings and labels did notman-
age to conceptually converge across the ten joint tasks, and did not align any more with
each other than pairs who did not interact at all. On the other hand, this did not apply to
lexical convergence: feedback was sufficient for pairs to lexically align with each other,
although not to the same extent as pairs who could talk together.
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These results thus show a dissociation between lexical and conceptual convergence, but
only in the absence of full-fledged language use between interacting participants. When
participant pairs could talk, they aligned very well both lexically and conceptually, and
these presumably corresponded to each other. But when their linguistic interaction was
impoverished, so that they got feedback without being able to talk, they still aligned
lexically, but failed to do so conceptually. This is particularly striking since, unlike in
Experiment 2, participant pairs were specifically instructed to try to coordinate their
categories rather than their labels.
The results could serve to reconcile perspectives in the literature (discussed mainly in
Section 3.4) that may at first seem to be in conflict with each other. On one hand, some
authors have argued that there is a close correspondence between conceptual and lex-
ical alignment. Brennan and Clark (1996) equate the two a priori, beginning their study
with the claim that “labels reflect conceptualisations” (p. 1482). Similarly, Pickering and
Garrod (2004) argue that interlocutors align their mental representations at different
levels, including linguistic and non-linguistic ones. On the other hand, other authors
have shown a dissociation between lexical and conceptual processes, including align-
ment. Both Malt et al. (1999) and my replication in Experiment 1 have shown that the
way speakers of a language divide up certain conceptual domains linguistically does not
neatly correspond to how they do so non-linguistically. And Schober et al. (2004) have
shown that respondents in telephone surveys, although faced with questions wrapped
in the same linguistic forms, diverged from the intended meanings of them, especially if
the interviewers did not interactively clarify key terms.
The current results suggest that both perspectives are right. When full dialogue is avail-
able, interlocutors can align both lexically and conceptually, and then these two levels
presumably correspond to each other. But when it is not, people can still align lexically or
accept each other’s lexicalisations, while failing to conceptualise things in the same way.
Indeed, this opposition has already been captured in the theoretical debate between the
commentary and responses in Pickering and Garrod (2004)’s BBS article. Schober (2004)
argued that the authors’ interactive alignment account went too far in claiming that inter-
locutors also aligned conceptually. Pickering and Garrod’s response was that Schober’s
arguments were based on data that did not involve full-fledged dialogue, and that this
form of language was central to their claims. The results here provide an empirical basis
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for this debate, showing that lexical and conceptual alignment do correspond, but only
when full dialogue is available.
It remains to be explained why feedback should be ineffective, while dialogue improves
performance somuch. After all, participants in the silent conditionwere given a full view
after each task of their partner’s categories along with their labels. In terms of concep-
tual structure, this information provided them with an indication of both the senses and
exemplars of their partner’s concepts (see Section 2.5). Why shouldn’t they be able to use
it effectively to align with those concepts? The most obvious explanation is that the task
was still too hard, and that participants did not have enough opportunity to learn and
coordinate. This may be because the subtle perceptual differences among the stimuli that
were intended tomaximise ambiguity and potential variation in categorisationmay have
also had the effect of making learning from feedback a very subtle and challenging task,
which required not only conceptual flexibility but also fine perceptual attention. And as
we already know, perceptual learning is slow (Goldstone 1998). Moreover, the fact that
participants could not interact during the tasksmeant that the joint phase was effectively
a type of coordination game, in which two people have a shared goal and their actions
depend on each other, but they cannot check with each other (Schelling 1960). Theymust
independently decide, after each task, whether to stick to their own concepts, switch to
their partner’s, aim for a middle ground, or try something completely different. This
adds an extra dimension to the already difficult challenge of conceptual coordination.
Dialogue, on the other hand, had a very significant effect on conceptual convergence.
I suggest that this is primarily due to the process of grounding which participants can
achieve through dialogue. Clark and Brennan (1991) argued that the development of
common ground between people depends significantly on the medium of communic-
ation. The more that a medium lacks the properties of natural, face-to-face conversa-
tion, the harder it gets to establish common ground. By being able to talk freely with
each other, people can interactively build up a shared way of both seeing and describ-
ing objects (Brennan and Clark 1996). Recall that there were also signs of this in the
dialogue data from Experiment 2, suggesting that this process also applies to my cat-
egorisation tasks. In addition, this grounding process also addresses the coordination
problem that participants face. Participants can decide together, explicitly or implicitly,
whose or what categorisation approach to adopt in each successive task, and they can
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even revisit their strategy during the tasks. As such, language helps solve the coordina-
tion problem (Lewis 1969).
7.5.3 Conceptual, lexical and similarity alignment beyond interaction
The data and analysis of Experiment 2 had been designed to target conceptual and lexical
convergence after engaging in a joint task. However, the results had been counterintu-
itive. The results were thus questioned on methodological grounds, and Experiment 3
was meant to address the shortcomings.
The first issue was whether conceptual alignment was even to be found during inter-
action, a possibility that had been assumed rather than tested in Experiment 2. As we
have seen in the previous section, Experiment 3 found strong evidence for conceptual
alignment in the talking condition, but none in the silent condition. This suggests that if
conceptual convergence was to be found beyond the interaction, this should occur in the
talking condition, but not in the other two.
However, this was not the case. In fact, no differences were found among the conditions
in post-interaction conceptual alignment. The differences among pairs’ categorisations
were no smaller in the talking condition than the other two. In other words, although
dialogue brought togetherpeople’s categorisations, it only seemed to do so for the period
of interaction, not beyond. The same was true for the similarity judgement results, with
no differences turning up between conditions.
These results are inconsistent with previous studies demonstrating how a linguistically
mediated joint task can result in categorisation alignment lasting beyond the interac-
tion (see Section 3.4.3.3). The experiments of Markman and Makin (1998) and Voik-
lis (2008) had involved individual categorisation tasks, but found that pairs that had
worked together with the help of language categorised more similarly to each other
afterwards. Moreover, Malt and Sloman (2004) had found that using the same terms
for things (from two reasonable alternatives) also brought together people’s similarity
judgements, which again clashes with my results.
How can we explain these discrepancies between my results and past work? I appeal
again to the stimulus domain, and the perceptual challenges it produces. My stimuli
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varied subtly along perceptual dimensions such as depth and roundedness, so that for
participants to converge in a persistent way on similar categorisations would partly im-
plicate a significant degree of perceptual learning. In contrast, the stimuli in previous
work were not specifically designed to be maximally ambiguous and featured more dis-
crete differences between them. For instance, Voiklis’s (2008) alien stimuli varied along
six observable dimensions with binary values. Therefore, participants might align by
settling on the same relative saliences of the dimensions, rather than subtly shifting
category boundaries along perceptually continuous dimensions. Thus, the contrast in
results may be due to conceptual alignment in my experiment relying more on percep-
tual change than previous work. This is consistent with Goldstone’s (1998) argument
that “perceptual processing is slower to change than higher-level conceptual processing”
(p. 242).
Unlike the conceptual and similarity alignment results, the analysis based on the lex-
ical data revealed that lexical alignment was evident in the two interactive conditions.
In other words, participants tended to use similar category labels to their partners in
the individual categorisation task if they at least had feedback about each other’s cat-
egory groupings and labels during the joint tasks. This result is consistent with the
large body of literature showing how referential expressions that are used in dialogue
can get entrenched for people even after they stop interacting with a particular partner
(e.g., Brennan and Clark 1996; Malt and Sloman 2004; Metzing and Brennan 2003; see
Section 3.4.2).
However, the lack of conceptual alignment here despite lexical alignment again warns
us against the presumption that they are equivalent or always go hand in hand. Indeed,
these results again serve to highlight the special role that dialogue can play online in
conceptual coordination. It appears that dialogue can bring together people’s concep-
tualisations, but only for the duration of the interaction (at least of the kind of stimuli
used in my experiment). Together with my previous findings, Experiment 3 suggests
that lexical alignment can induce and correspond to conceptual alignment, but only if
supported by full and current dialogue.
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7.5.4 Methodological evaluation
One of the main goals of Experiment 3 was to address the methodological shortcomings
of Experiment 2. This included establishing a clear goal and motivation for participants,
redesigning the joint task so it provides alignment data, and setting up smaller but more
numerous tasks. Most importantly, the experiment was meant to be more sensitive and
to yield more interesting results with respect to my hypotheses. So how did it do?
The modifications to the joint task were generally successful. There were more joint
tasks, and each of these tasks now readily yielded both conceptual and lexical alignment
scores for each participant pair. Analysis of this data provided some significant results,
each of which supported prior intuitions (unlike Experiment 2).
On the other hand, it remained surprising that no significant differences were found in
conceptual convergence between the control and silent conditions, which suggests that
feedback from another’s category groupings and labels is useless for coordinating one’s
categories with them. Such a conclusion seems counterintuitive, and raises the ques-
tion whether further methodological adjustments are not needed, such as a still greater
number of joint tasks. This is taken up in Experiment 4.
Given the large differences in convergence between the talking condition and the other
two, it is important to point to a substantial mechanical difference between them. In
particular, in the talking condition, participant pairs were not just restricted to feedback
between tasks, but could actively interact during the tasks as well. Therefore, they could
discuss, negotiate and confirm individual categorisation decisionswith each other before
committing to them. Moreover, participants could “meta-negotiate” how to go about
the task in general, such as what basis of categorisation to use. This could help them
avoid the convention problem facing the silent (and control) condition participants of
whether to continue categorising their own way (in hopes that their partner will adapt
to them) or adapting to their partner (in hopes that their partner will not change their
basis). It is possible that if simple labels could be exchanged during the tasks, or if,
conversely, dialogue was only allowed between tasks, the large differences between the
silent and talking conditions would diminish. However, dynamic interaction could also
be considered a crucial feature of dialogue (Clark 1996), so that it is not clear whether
this is a theoretical or methodological point.
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Overall, the design of the joint phase of the experiment was undoubtedly a substantial
improvement over Experiment 2. On the other hand, the individual phase of Experiment
3 yielded mostly null results. There were no differences between conditions in either
the individual similarity or categorisation tasks. In particular, even pairs in the talking
condition, who had aligned sowell in the joint tasks, failed to reveal any alignment in the
individual phase tasks. While this could simply be a theoretically real result, its scope
must be limited, given that it is inconsistent with several other findings in the literature
(as discussed in the previous section).
It is possible that the divergence between the results in the joint and individual phases
of the experiment could be due to the differences in instructions and goals given to the
participants. In the joint tasks, participants were told to try to coordinate as well as they
could with their partner, were given an extra financial incentive, and were given score
feedback at the end of each task. In the individual tasks, participants lacked these goals,
motivation, and information. This difference could be responsible for the relatively rich
results in the former tasks and the mostly null effects in the latter. However, even if this
were the case, it could not explain the interesting differences between the conceptual
and lexical alignment results, which cut across the two phases of the experiment. In both
phases, there were greater differences and more significant effects in lexical alignment
than in conceptual alignment, suggesting a dissociation between the two. Moreover,
in the relevant past experiments also, participants had explicitly worked together on
joint tasks and had not received any coordination instructions on the individual tasks
(Markman and Makin 1998; Voiklis 2008).
Nevertheless, the experimental framework appears to be better suited to studying con-
ceptual alignment during rather than beyond interaction. Fortunately, this is also where
there is a greater gap in the literature. Several studies have addressed how conceptual
convergence could result from linguistic interaction, by having participant pairs work to-
gether on a joint task and then carry out individual non-linguistic tasks such as sorting or
similarity judgements (Markman and Makin 1998; Malt and Sloman 2004; Voiklis 2008).
Thus, although my framework was designed to help separate the effects of dialogue
from other interactional factors, the study of conceptual convergence at least potentially
arising from linguistic interaction is not new. On the other hand, my framework offers
a way to study online conceptual alignment during interaction, while simultaneously
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allowing for an independent examination of lexical alignment as well. While this does
constrain the amount and type of interaction (compared to the range of joint tasks de-
veloped in other experiments), it does thus provide a solution to the difficult problem
of getting at people’s conceptualisations while they interact, independently of language.
As such, these joint tasks are the strength of the experimental framework, and I will fo-
cus exclusively on them in Experiment 4, where I explore the potential role of category
labels in particular in conceptual convergence.
7.6 Conclusion
Experiment 3 was designed to address the methodological shortcomings of Experiment
2, while also extending the scope of inquiry. As such, it asked not only whether inter-
action and dialogue result in conceptual convergence after interacting, but also whether
there was any alignment during the interaction itself to begin with. The results were
more extensive and satisfying than in Experiment 2. Conceptual alignment did occur,
but was heavily restricted in scope: it only occurred when pairs could engage in free
dialogue, and it did not persist beyond the interaction. Post-interaction similarity judge-
ments also did not exhibit any convergence. On the other hand, lexical alignment oc-
curred to varying extents depending on whether participants only received feedback on
their partner’s category groupings and labels after each task, and outlasted the inter-
action. The results suggest a potential reconciliation between two theoretical positions:
lexical and conceptual alignment may be generally dissociated, but do come together
during full, normal dialogue.
CHAPTER 8
Experiment 4: Category versus word feedback in con-
ceptual and lexical alignment
8.1 Introduction
Experiment 3 demonstrated that dialogue is a very useful tool for conceptual coordin-
ation. However, it is important to realise that in Experiment 3, the linguistic resources
available to participant pairs in the talking condition were enormous. Since there was
no restriction on when and how much they could talk, people were free to negotiate
not just the basis of categorisation, the category boundaries, and the category labels, but
even “meta-negotiate” such aspects as the number of items per category and strategies
they used after obtaining low scores.
On the other hand, Experiment 3 found no effect of feedback on conceptual convergence.
Partners who had access to each other’s words and categories did not manage to con-
ceptually align significantly more than those who did not. However, the finding that
dialogue substantially helps in this regard shows that it is certainly possible for people
to converge under the right conditions, and that language can play an important role
in this process. Therefore, the potential usefulness of words as concept labels warrants
further investigation.
The importance of words can also be framed from a different perspective. Recall that,
as I discussed in Chapter 2, words are associated with concepts, but not as tightly as
is often assumed. Concepts, on the other hand, determine categories and are thus in
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a much tighter relationship. Is this reflected in how easy or difficult it is for people to
get at each other’s concepts, depending on the kind of information they have access to?
Notice that this question can be readily studied using my experimental framework. In
fact, Experiments 2 and 3 manipulated both label and grouping feedback, but they were
confounded (compare the control and silent conditions).
Notice that this question is related to the internal structure of concepts. According to
the model I developed in Chapter 2, words seem to be more associated with senses,
while categories are more closely linked to exemplars (see Figure 2.9 in particular). We
can now incorporate that structure into the model I have been working with for the
interactive experiments, as shown in Figure 8.1.
w1
s1
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Figure 8.1: Interactive model which incorporates the internal conceptual structure, and how it
is related to words and objects in the world.
Therefore, the question posed here can also shed new light on conceptual structure. In
particular, if people rely more on words as concept identifiers, that would provide a new
kind of support for prototype and theory theories, while if they do better with sets of
categorised items, this would be evidence in favour of exemplar theory.
Furthermore, manipulating word and category feedback independently may be partic-
ularly fruitful for continuing the investigation of the relationship between conceptual
and lexical alignment. If people rely primarily on one kind of information for the corres-
ponding kind of alignment (and vice versa), that would provide further evidence for a
dissociation between them when they are not talking. Otherwise, we would have novel
support for an intimate connection between them.
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Therefore, in this chapter, I present an experiment which independently manipulates
label and grouping feedback. The experiment should yield data which sheds light on
the role of language in conceptual coordination, the relationship between lexical and
conceptual alignment, and the internal structure of concepts.
8.2 Overview
Experiment 4 does not continue the investigation of dialogue, but instead looks more
closely at the usefulness of feedback in alignment during interaction. As such, it effect-
ively drops the talking condition from Experiment 3, while teasing apart confounded
aspects of the control and silent conditions. To that end, the two types of feedback were
separated, and the design was adjusted in a few ways to make it more sensitive.
The two kinds of feedback consisted of label and grouping feedback, which identify
the kind of information that participants get about their partner’s concepts at the end of
each joint categorisation task. If there is label feedback, participants see their partners’
category labels at the end of each task. If there is grouping feedback, then they see the
groups of stimuli that their partner produced. I use these terms rather than “word” and
“category” feedback to avoid confusion: the words are acting specifically as conceptual
labels, and the groupings are only small subsets of the theoretically infinite categories.
The experiment has a 2X2 between-subjects design, so that all four combinations of the
two variables are investigated. Figure 8.2 shows the kind of feedback given in each
condition and how they give participants different information regarding their partner’s
conceptualisations. As we can see, this design allows us to minimally pit the usefulness
of lexical and conceptual information against each other, and to study how they interact.
Moreover, it will also help shed light on the issues of internal conceptual structure, as
raised in the previous section.
The data analysis will also place a greater emphasis on lexical alignment than was done
in the previous experiments. In particular, since the two kinds of feedback correspond to
the two kinds of alignment under investigation, the experiment offers an opportunity to
look at the relationship between lexical and conceptual alignment more closely. There-
fore, a good portion of the analysis will also consider how the lexical and conceptual
alignment data match up to each other.
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Figure 8.2: Feedback provided to participants on their partner’s concept (represented by the
box) in Experiment 4.
Recall that Experiment 3 did not find any evidence for conceptual convergence in the in-
dividual tasks following interaction, even in the talking condition. Moreover, Experiment
3 showed no impact of label feedback on conceptual alignment, evenwhen accompanied
with grouping feedback as well (i.e., there was no significant difference between the con-
trol and silent conditions). A larger set of joint tasks may be needed to give participants
greater opportunity to learn from each other and conceptually converge. Therefore, Ex-
periment 4 eliminated the post-interaction tasks, and increased the number of joint tasks.
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Unlike the previous experiments, Experiment 4 adopted an artificial domain, consisting
of pictures of triangle-like shapes. Such shapes offer several advantages. First, it is
straightforward to get a fluid set of stimuli with many dimensions of variation. Rather
than using a morphing program, I wrote a simple script which creates random triangles
with a fluid range of different sizes, shapes, colours, angles, corner types, etc. Second,
as these are artificial stimuli without obvious functional properties, there are probably
less culturally entrenched conceptualisations of them than for plates, bowls, etc. This
potentially allows more room for variation and negotiation. Third, they are perceptually
simple, so that it is sufficient to see a relatively small version of the images on the screen.
Fourth, using quite a different domain sheds light on the general scope of the empirical
findings of this thesis.
A couple of further methodological changes were also introduced. First, the number
of categories used by participants was fixed at two. Although this reduces some of the
freedom in the classification tasks, it may be easier for participants to compare their
categorisations with those of their partners. As we will see in Section 8.3.5, this also
renders possible amore efficient program user interface. Moreover, it justifies the use of a
simplified measure for comparing people’s categorisations (Meila and Heckerman 2001;
see Section 4.3.3). Second, two constraints were placed on possible category labels: they
had to consist of a single word, and they had to be real Englishwords (checked against an
electronic dictionary). The restriction to a single word was incorporated since the focus
of the experiment was on the effects of single words (rather than entire phrases). Words
were restricted to existing English ones mainly to prevent participants from “cheating”
(e.g., “bigtriangle”, “followme”) and from creating neologisms (e.g., “trianglish”). This
also made it easier to focus on existing concepts and to compare different participants’
labels.
Within this design, the main empirical hypotheses are:
1. Do grouping and/or label feedback affect conceptual alignment?
2. Do grouping and/or label feedback affect lexical alignment?
3. Is there a correspondence between lexical and conceptual alignment?
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8.3 Methods
8.3.1 Participants
Participants were 80 adult native English speakers (age: M = 21.9, SD = 2.9), mostly
undergraduate students recruited through the University of Edinburgh student employ-
ment website. There were 48 female participants, and 32 male participants.
Participants were assigned to pairings randomly, and pairings were assigned to condi-
tions randomly, except that the numbers of different gender combinations was kept the
same in each condition. In particular, there were four female-female pairs, four female-
male pairs, and two male-male pairs assigned to each of the four conditions (described
in Section 8.3.3). As in Experiment 3, these asymmetric numbers were chosen in ac-
cordance with the relative frequency of male and female participants available, because
gender was not expected to make a difference in the experiment. Again, partners did not
know each other before the experiment.
8.3.2 Stimuli
The stimuli were triangle-like shapeswhich varied along eight dimensions: colour (RGB),
size, shape, orientation, corner size, and corner pointedness (to be defined below). As
I will describe, the set of stimuli was chosen by first generating and piloting several
different sets, and then divided up into particular tasks.
8.3.2.1 Generation
A perl script was written (included in Appendix E) which produced individual Post-
script graphics files, one for each stimulus. Each stimulus was a dark geometric shape
on a white background, and was obtained by randomly selecting values within certain
criteria for the different parameters.
Size and shape were randomly generated according to the following algorithm. First,
six random values were generated between 0 and 160 (since the images were 160 pixels
in width). These defined the initial x and y coordinates of the triangle. If the area of
the resulting triangle was less than 5/9 the area of the image (25,600 square pixels),
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then the triangle was discarded, and the algorithm started anew. Such a criterion was
set so that excessively small stimuli would not be produced, although the particular
threshold was arbitrary. If the triangle was big enough, then it was shifted so that its
centroid (its middle) was at the centre of the image. In case this pushed one or more
corners off the image, the triangle was again discarded. Notice that this can result in the
rejection of triangles which are overly thin and long. If the triangle passed both of these
criteria, it was kept, and then the other parameters were manipulated. Notice that this
procedure automatically generates randomness in size, orientation and shape (within
the constraints mentioned).
The other parametersweremanipulated along different ranges of continuous values (i.e.,
subranges of [0, 1]), and different sets of ranges were defined to produce different sets of
stimuli (to be tested in pilots). Colour was straightforward, being controlled through
separate ranges for each RGB value. For instance, ranges of [0, 1] for red, [0, 0] for green,
and [0, 0.2] for blue would produce triangles with fully varying amounts of red, no green,
and varying tinges of blue.
The corners of the triangles were also manipulated in such a way as to increase ambigu-
ity concerning whether or not the shapes were triangles. The details for these manipula-
tions were technical, and involved the determination of points used to smooth out each
triangle corner with a Bézier curve using Postscript’s ‘curveto’ operator. Intuitively, one
parameter determines the “size” of the corners, which determines how far along a tri-
angle’s sides the corner should start rounding (a value of 0 would mean that the triangle
was not rounded at all, while a value of 1 would mean that the sides of the triangle
would be replaced by three Bézier curves between the midpoints of the sides). The other
parameter could be thought of as determining the pointedness of the corners, as it de-
termined the control points for the curves (a value of 0 would mean that the corners
are chopped off with straight lines, while a value of 1 makes the curve go through the
original corner).
Thus, all the sets varied freely (within the general constraints mentioned) in terms of
the shapes, sizes, and orientations of the triangles, but they varied in terms of their ma-
nipulations of the colours and corners of the triangles. These then were tested in pilot
experiments as well as informally in discussions with colleagues in order to get an idea
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of the relative psychological salience of different dimensions. The goal was to choose
a stimulus set which exhibited a high degree of fluidity, as well as variation of roughly
equal salience on several dimensions.
Based on the outcomes of these pilots, a final set of 330 stimuli was chosen for the actual
experiment, from one particular parameter configuration. Since colour was an overly
dominant dimension in the pilots, the RGB values for the shapes were set to vary only
slightly along all three colour dimensions from solid black (along [0, 0.2] for all three
values). The corner size parameter range was set to [0.1, 0.3], meaning that the corner
rounding would begin 10-30% along the triangle’s sides from the corner. The corner
pointedness parameter range was set to [0.7, 1], so that the corners either went through
the original corners or nearly there. Figure 8.2 shows a random sample of 60 of the final
stimuli.
8.3.2.2 Allotment
The stimuli were randomly split up into thirty sets of eleven shapes each, one set for
each free classification task. An odd number of shapes was used to prevent participants
from following a potential bias towards necessarily making their categories be the same
size. Then five different random orderings of the thirty sets were defined. Each of these
task orderingswas assigned to two participant pairs of the same genders (female-female,
female-male, or male-male) in each condition.
The order of the stimuli within a set was also randomised, but again under certain con-
straints. For each of the task orderings above, two stimulus orderings were defined for
each task, and assigned randomly to the two participants in each pair. This was done so
that (1) participants could not use the order of the items within a task to coordinate their
categories, and (2) each participant would have a counterpart participant in a different
pair in the same condition who would not only carry out the tasks in the same order, but
would also see the items within tasks in the same order.
8.3.3 Conditions
The experiment has a 2x2 between-subject (or, more accurately, between-pair) design, as
shown in Table 8.1. The two binary variables identify what kind of feedback participants
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Figure 8.3: A random subset of the 330 stimuli used in Experiment 4.
receive of their partner’s categories after each task. One variable refers to label feedback,
and the other refers to grouping feedback. Crossing these variables gives four condi-
tions: labels (only label feedback), groupings (only grouping feedback), both (both kinds
of feedback), and neither (neither kind of feedback). Ten participant pairs were assigned
to each of these conditions.







Table 8.1: Conditions (between-subjects) for Experiment 4: grouping feedback and labelling
feedback.
8.3.4 Procedure
The experiment consisted of a series of joint categorisation tasks followed by a short
questionnaire. Pairs of participants were brought into the experimental lab and assigned
randomly to two separate computer cubicles.
After filling out a consent form, participants carried out one practice categorisation task,
as in Experiments 2 and 3. After that they did thirty joint categorisation tasks, which
followed the same procedure as in Experiment 3, with the following minor modifica-
tions. First, participants categorised the shapes into only two categories (which allowed
for a simplified user interface, as explained in the next section). Second, the maximum
number of items that participants could place in a category was increased from seven
to eight (which reflects the slight increase in the number of stimuli per task). Third,
category labels were required to consist of a single real English word, checked by the
program against a dictionary file.
8.3.5 Program
Since the tasks involved only two categories and eleven stimuli each in this experiment,
it was not a problem to have all of the stimuli appear relatively large on the screen.
Therefore, the categorisation interface mechanism was simplified (for both the practice
task and the main tasks). The focus box was removed, and participants categorised into
either a left side category or a right side category. This was achieved by clicking on a
stimulus with the appropriate mouse button: a left mouse button click categorised (or
recategorised) an item as a member of the left category, and a right mouse button click
placed it in the right category. Snapshots of the program at various stages during the
tasks are shown in Appendix D.3.
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After both partners were done the task, the program calculated the agreement score
between the two sets of categories, and was shown in fraction form (e.g., “3/5”). In
addition, depending on the experimental condition, the participants were also shown
their partner’s category groupings and/or labels underneath their own. The partner’s
categories were visually aligned to be in the order which gives the better category match
(and hence also which reflects the score). The participants then had twenty seconds to see
the score and study the category feedback (if any), and then the next task automatically
began.
Once participants had carried out the thirty joint categorisation tasks, the final step in
the program was to fill out a questionnaire. The questions were very similar to those
used in Experiments 2 and 3. Participants were asked for demographic information like
age, gender, and language background, as well as feedback questions concerning the
experiment, such as what they thought the experiment was about or what strategies
they used to align their categories.
8.4 Results
The results will be presented in the following order. First, I show a few examples of
actual categorisation outputs from the experiment. After that, I analyse the data in three
parts: conceptual convergence, lexical convergence, and the correspondence between
them.
8.4.1 Example task output
Before analysing the data, I show three examples of the categorisation outputs of parti-
cipant pairs. These are real examples from the experiment, and serve to illustrate how
lexical and conceptual alignment can dissociate. Note that, as explained in the next sec-
tion, the particular conceptual alignment measure used here is not the same as the one
used in my first three experiments. To preview, scores take on fraction values out of
5 (i.e., 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1), with 1 meaning perfect agreement and 0 being the worst
possible degree of agreement.
Figure 8.4 shows a case where a participant pair achieved a perfect score of 1. Both par-
ticipants partitioned the set of items in exactly the same way, with four smaller stimuli
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in one category and the remaining seven larger ones in the other. Notice, however, that
the participants used entirely different category labels for their categories. Participant
1 used “unequal” and “equal” (which seems to refer to whether the sides of the shapes
are of roughly equal lengths). In contrast, Participant 2 used “small” and “large”. While
these two pairs of labels concern different criteria, for this set of items and this pair of
participants they resulted in the same groupings. This example thus demonstrates how
participants can produce exactly the same categories despite using different labels.
Score: 1.0
PARTICIPANT 1 PARTICIPANT 2
unequal small
equal large
Figure 8.4: An example of a task for which the participant pair achieved a perfect score (1.0),
since they have partitioned the stimuli into exactly the same two groups (even though they have
used different labels).
Figure 8.5 shows a task for which participants achieved a score of 0.6. The partitionings
are fairly similar, except that one of the stimuli that Participant 1 treated as ‘round’ was
treated as ‘sharp’ by Participant 2, and vice versa for a second stimulus. Notice that,
in contrast to the previous example, here participants failed to achieve a perfect score
despite using the same labels.
Figure 8.6 shows an example of a task in which participants received a score of 0.0, which
is the worst possible score. The partitionings are as different as possible, so that five of
one participant’s items would have to be moved to their other category to make the
partitionings identical. The labels are also different from each other.
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Score: 0.6
PARTICIPANT 1 PARTICIPANT 2
round round
sharp sharp
Figure 8.5: An example of a task for which the participant pair achieved a middle score (0.6).
Notice that the participants’ categories differed even though they used the same labels.
Score: 0.0
PARTICIPANT 1 PARTICIPANT 2
round large
sharp small
Figure 8.6: An example of a task for which the participant pair achieved the worst possible score
(0.0). Five stimuli would have to be moved to make the partitionings the same.
8.4.2 Conceptual alignment
Themain hypotheses, as in previous experiments, concern conceptual convergence. How-
ever, on this occasion, I use a different measure of conceptual alignment between par-
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ticipants. Since participants in this experiment sorted stimuli into only two categories,
I adopt the score measure of Meila and Heckerman (2001) based on set-matching (see
Section 4.3.3 for a description of this measure and why I adopt it for two-category exper-
iments).
It can be easily verified that in the specific case of a set of eleven items being sorted into





where m is the number of stimuli that would need to be moved for one participant
from one category to the other to make the two partitionings identical. Thus, identical
partitionings yield a score of 1, whereas partitionings for which five stimuli would have
to be moved (which is the worst possible case) give a score of 0. The other possible scores
lie in between at 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8, where 1, 2, 3 and 4 stimuli would need to be moved,
respectively.
Figure 8.7 shows the raw convergence scores: for each participant pair, the thirty scores
of all ten participant pairs are shown, along with the average over them for each task.
Three features are noticeable from these plots. First, there is again quite a lot of variation
within pairs, with scores fluctuating substantially. It is not uncommon, for example,
for a pair to receive a high score on one task, and then a low score on the next one,
or vice versa. Second, despite the fluctuations in individual pairs’ scores, there does
seem to be an increase in scores across tasks in most of the conditions, except perhaps
the groupings condition. A longitudinal effect here would contrast with Experiment 3,
where no such effect was found. Third, scores appear to start highest in the groupings
condition, but to end highest in the both condition. However, these observations are
obviously impressionistic, and need to be evaluated further.
Table 8.2 gives a compressed view of the data, showing the mean conceptual alignment
scores for each task, by condition. A glance at these values too suggests an increase over
time in all but the groupings condition, but highest final scores in the both condition.
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Figure 8.7: Scores over time per pair by condition. The dotted lines represent the scores of
individual pairs. The bold lines represent averages across participant pairs.
In order to analyse the potential effects of grouping and label feedback across tasks, I
used linear mixed effects models. First, as for Experiment 3, I applied a simple model
with task as a fixed effect and score intercepts of participant pairs as random effects.
The t-value for the fixed effect was 5.14, which easily surpasses Baayen’s (2008) heuristic
threshold of around 2. This confirms that participant pairs did in general coordinate
with each other over time (in contrast to Experiment 3).
As a result, I continue with the mixed effects analysis. First, I compare a sequence of nes-
ted models, which all have task order as a fixed effect, but vary in their random effects
term. The key resulting output of the model comparison (from R’s ’anova’ function) is
shown in Table 8.3. I choose the best model based on the three criteria of AIC’s, BIC’s,
and p-values. (AIC and BIC are measures of the goodness of fit of statistical models,
which take into account the number of free parameters, and can be used to compare nes-
ted linear mixed models; see Pinheiro and Bates 2000). Based on these three criteria, the
best model appears to be the one which allows for pair-specific variation in score inter-
cepts and task slope effects, but without correlation between these two. This suggests
that there is substantial variation between participant pairs, in both their starting scores
and their improvement across tasks.
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Tasks neither labels groupings both
1 0.48 (0.34) 0.44 (0.35) 0.58 (0.29) 0.38 (0.24)
2 0.26 (0.28) 0.28 (0.40) 0.52 (0.29) 0.38 (0.35)
3 0.70 (0.40) 0.38 (0.39) 0.78 (0.27) 0.54 (0.39)
4 0.54 (0.30) 0.44 (0.31) 0.76 (0.32) 0.68 (0.21)
5 0.44 (0.32) 0.56 (0.31) 0.58 (0.32) 0.58 (0.43)
6 0.34 (0.31) 0.30 (0.25) 0.44 (0.36) 0.54 (0.25)
7 0.56 (0.37) 0.44 (0.31) 0.56 (0.42) 0.62 (0.30)
8 0.40 (0.28) 0.34 (0.37) 0.54 (0.37) 0.74 (0.37)
9 0.58 (0.39) 0.28 (0.30) 0.56 (0.30) 0.58 (0.33)
10 0.36 (0.40) 0.68 (0.32) 0.60 (0.28) 0.56 (0.32)
11 0.46 (0.31) 0.58 (0.35) 0.76 (0.28) 0.64 (0.37)
12 0.46 (0.41) 0.54 (0.31) 0.46 (0.30) 0.80 (0.13)
13 0.42 (0.26) 0.68 (0.30) 0.56 (0.36) 0.58 (0.37)
14 0.60 (0.37) 0.56 (0.23) 0.48 (0.37) 0.72 (0.29)
15 0.42 (0.38) 0.54 (0.28) 0.66 (0.35) 0.66 (0.30)
16 0.60 (0.37) 0.58 (0.36) 0.70 (0.29) 0.76 (0.25)
17 0.58 (0.37) 0.70 (0.27) 0.54 (0.40) 0.62 (0.27)
18 0.54 (0.27) 0.60 (0.31) 0.54 (0.37) 0.72 (0.25)
19 0.50 (0.36) 0.62 (0.30) 0.56 (0.43) 0.64 (0.36)
20 0.62 (0.32) 0.64 (0.23) 0.64 (0.34) 0.66 (0.23)
21 0.60 (0.34) 0.54 (0.40) 0.64 (0.35) 0.66 (0.30)
22 0.56 (0.32) 0.62 (0.38) 0.54 (0.35) 0.52 (0.27)
23 0.42 (0.38) 0.56 (0.30) 0.60 (0.44) 0.62 (0.42)
24 0.64 (0.36) 0.54 (0.31) 0.72 (0.23) 0.66 (0.30)
25 0.66 (0.38) 0.50 (0.19) 0.44 (0.28) 0.78 (0.26)
26 0.66 (0.28) 0.64 (0.34) 0.62 (0.37) 0.78 (0.22)
27 0.70 (0.34) 0.58 (0.39) 0.68 (0.34) 0.80 (0.25)
28 0.64 (0.39) 0.68 (0.29) 0.52 (0.38) 0.72 (0.19)
29 0.68 (0.32) 0.62 (0.29) 0.52 (0.37) 0.64 (0.25)
30 0.60 (0.44) 0.50 (0.25) 0.46 (0.27) 0.82 (0.32)
Table 8.2: Mean scores across all participants within a condition for each task. Standard devi-
ations are given in brackets.
Model AIC BIC p
Intercept only 700.08 720.44
Slope only 694.87 715.23 p < .001
Intercept + Slope 691.18 716.63 p < .05
Intercept * Slope 690.04 720.58 p > .05
Table 8.3: Comparisons between several nested linear mixed models, with a fixed effect term
of task order, used to determine the random effects term. The difference between the last two
models (marked by ’+’ and ’*’) is that the former does not model correlation between the pair-
specific intercept and slope, while the latter does. The combination of AIC, BIC and p-value
criteria suggests that we should adopt the Intercept + Slope model (shown in bold) at this stage.
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Next, I consider the possible effects of grouping and label feedback, one at a time. First,
I check whether there seems to be a fixed effect of grouping feedback, by fitting a simple
model with it as the only fixed term, but keeping the random effects just identified. The
t-value for the fixed effect was 3.81, which again is above Baayen’s (2008) threshold. On
the other hand, an analogous model for label feedback did not satisfy the criterion, with
a t-value of only -0.13.
Stepwise model comparisons support these conclusions. I first added a fixed effect of
groupings to the previous model with tasks as a fixed effect, and another model adding
also a task-groupings interaction. The comparison, shown in Table 8.4, suggestswe keep
the groupings factor. However, although the AIC decreases for the model with the inter-
action, I do not keep it, because the comparison does not yield a significant p-value and
the BIC increases. Table 8.5 shows the subsequent model comparison involving label
feedback. In this case, it is clear that label feedback is not improving the model, as the
more complex model fails on all three criteria. Therefore, a fixed effect for label feedback
is not kept.
Model AIC BIC p
Task only 691.18 716.63
Task + groupings 681.29 711.84 p < .001
Task * groupings 679.91 715.54 p > .05
Table 8.4: Stepwise comparison between mixed models testing for the effects of grouping feed-
back. The sequence incrementally adds a grouping feedback term and then a task-groupings
interaction term to the ’Intercept + Slope’ model adopted in Table 8.3. Together, the AIC, BIC and
p-values suggest that we keep the fixed effect term for groupings, but not the interaction.
Model AIC BIC p
Task + groupings 681.29 711.84
Task + groupings + labels 683.36 718.99 p > .05
Table 8.5: Comparison between the linear mixed model adopted in Table 8.4 and one which also
adds a fixed effect term for label feedback. As the output shows, label feedback is clearly not
making a significant contribution, and therefore should not be kept (as a result, I did not even
test models with interactions involving label feedback).
The final mixed effect model1, then, has fixed effects for task and grouping feedback,
but no label feedback and no interaction terms (although the task-grouping interaction
was noteworthy). This suggests that pairs who received groupings feedback were more
1The R lmer call: lmer(score ˜ task + groupings + ((0 + task) |session) + (1 |session))
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conceptually aligned, and that, regardless of condition, pairs converged conceptually
over time.
Note that this analysis is consistent in some but not all ways with my impressionistic
observations earlier. The adopted model is consistent with the claim that pairs increased
their scores over time, and that pairs in the grouping and both conditions (i.e., the con-
ditions with grouping feedback) achieved relatively high scores. However, the analysis
did not yield any evidence for an effect of labels, or for differential improvement over
time between the conditions. This seems surprising, since as we saw in Table 8.2, the
both condition appears to be achieving higher scores than the other conditions by the
final tasks.
In order to look into this further, I turn to a simpler analysis, in which I collapse across
tasks and consider mean scores. This has the drawback that it obviously cuts away the
sequential information and dependency of the scores. However, performing the analyses
based on the means also has clear statistical advantages, in that we can obtain more
normally distributed data, and we can use simpler andmore powerful analytic methods.
I begin with an analysis based on the mean scores across all tasks for each participant
pair, by condition. The means of those means (across participant pairs) are shown in
Table 8.6. A 2x2 ANOVA (grouping feedback and label feedback) was performed on the
mean scores. The results were consistent with the linear mixed analysis earlier: there
was a significant main effect of grouping feedback (F (1, 36) = 6.47, p < .05), but no
effects of label feedback (F (1, 36) = 0.83, p > .05) or of the grouping-label interaction





NO 0.53 (0.35) 0.53 (0.32)
YES 0.59 (0.34) 0.65 (0.31)
Table 8.6: Mean scores across all participants within a condition across all the tasks. Standard
deviations are given in brackets.
However, given the significant main effect of task reported earlier, averaging over the
whole set of tasks is not the most relevant analysis. In comparing the conditions in terms
of conceptual convergence, we should inquire rather into how well pairs are aligned in
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the latter stages of their interaction. Ideally, wewould just look at their scores on the very
final task. However, given the large fluctuations in scores, I use instead the means across
each pair’s final five tasks. Table 8.7 shows the resulting means by condition on the final
five tasks. Note that although the choice of five is rather arbitrary, the same significance
patterns reported below were found for each of the analogous analyses based on the





NO 0.66 (0.35) 0.60 (0.31)
YES 0.56 (0.34) 0.75 (0.25)
Table 8.7: Mean scores across all participants within a condition across the final five tasks. Stand-
ard deviations are given in brackets.
Another 2x2 ANOVA was then conducted, and yielded different results from previous
analyses. This time, therewere no significant main effects of either groupings (F (1, 36) =
0.20, p > .05) or labels (F (1, 36) = 1.47, p > .05), but the interaction (F (1, 36) = 4.47,
p < .05) was significant. The interaction appears to be of a cross-over type, as can be seen
from the plot in Figure 8.8. Therefore, I followed this up with simple effects tests, assess-
ing the effect of each factor for both levels of the other factor. And indeed, the effects
of groupings were not significant when there was no label feedback (F (1, 36) = 1.38,
p > .05), but were nearly significant when there was label feedback (F (1, 36) = 3.29,
p = .08); and, similarly, the effects of labels were not significant in the absence of group-
ing feedback, (F (1, 36) = 0.41, p > .05), but were significant when there was grouping
feedback (F (1, 36) = 5.54, p < .05). This is consistent with the fact that the mean of
the both condition is relatively distinct from the other three. In order to conduct one fi-
nal check of this, a t-test was conducted between the mean scores in the both condition
(M = 0.75, SD = 0.11) and themeans in the other three conditions combined (M = 0.61,
SD = 0.20). The difference was highly significant (t(28) = 2.88, p < .01), confirming that
the both condition does indeed have higher scores by the end of the experiment.
In order to help interpret these differences between conditions in the final tasks, it’s
useful to also make a simple comparison between the conditions on the first few tasks.
To that end, I conducted an ANOVA based on the mean scores across the first five tasks
of the experiment (analogous to the one above based on the last five tasks).























Figure 8.8: Interaction plot for mean scores over the final five tasks in the different conditions.
Table 8.8 shows the means by condition on the first five tasks. A 2x2 ANOVA (analogous
to the one carried out on the last five tasks) was then conducted, with interesting results.
There was a significant effect of groupings (F (1, 36) = 6.47, p < .05), a nearly significant
(but negative) effect of labels (F (1, 36) = 0.47, p = .06), and no effect of the interaction
(F (1, 36) = 0.47, p > .05). In other words, at the outset of the experiment, getting
grouping feedback was beneficial, while getting label feedback seems to actually have
been counterproductive.
Tasks neither labels groupings both
1-5 0.48 (0.35) 0.42 (0.35) 0.64 (0.31) 0.51 (0.34)
Table 8.8: Mean scores across all participants within a condition across the first five tasks. Stand-
ard deviations are given in brackets.
Finally, we can get a simple idea of whether scores increased in the individual conditions
between the beginning and end of the experiment by using t-tests comparing initial and
final scores. In particular, for each condition, I conducted a paired t-test between the
mean scores across the first five and last five tasks, respectively (therefore, these tests
were based on the same means as the two ANOVAs above). The results were highly
significant for the both condition (t(9) = 3.57, p < .01), significant for the neither condition
(t(9) = 2.91, p < .05), and nearly significant for the labels condition (t(9) = 2.18, p = .06),
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but not significant for the groupings condition (t(9) = 1.16, p > .05). In other words,
broadly consistent with the impressionistic observations earlier, pairs in the groupings
condition did not improve over the course of the experiment, while they did improve in
the other conditions, especially if they received both kinds of feedback (i.e., in the both
condition).
8.4.3 Lexical alignment
Just as we examined how conceptual convergence is dependent on the different kinds of
feedback, we can now turn to the same questions with regards to lexical convergence.
However, I again modify the measure used for calculating lexical alignment relative to
the previous experiments. In particular, this time I treat agreement as binary: parti-
cipants are said to agree on category labels for a particular task if they use exactly the
same two labels for their two categories; otherwise, they are said to disagree. Numeric-
ally, I assign agreement a score of 1, and disagreement a score of 0, which makes it pos-
sible to take meaningful averages across a number of tasks. Given such a binary score,
in what follows I will sometimes use the terms agreement and disagreement when re-
ferring to lexical alignment scores of 1 and 0, respectively.
Note that it could be argued that treating all possible discrepancies, large or small,
between two sets of labels equivalently is misleading and unnecessary. However, there
are good reasons for adopting this simplification. With only two categories labelled with
single words checked against a dictionary, it should be relatively easy for participants to
adopt identical label sets (compared to the previous experiments). Although it would
be possible to give an intermediate score if one label matched or to use tools like latent
semantic analysis to numerically compare non-identical terms, such methods may not
be meaningful in the context of a sorting task with a very restricted stimulus domain.
Moreover, a binary measure greatly simplifies analysis.
Although it’s not visually clarifying to show individual binary agreement scores graph-
ically (as I did for conceptual alignment), we can look at the number of participant pairs
(out of 10) in each condition which showed lexical agreement. This is shown for all four
conditions in Figure 8.9. Notice that the two conditions with label feedback have many
more agreeing pairs than those without label feedback, while there seems to be little or
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no difference made by grouping feedback. Thus, not surprisingly, label feedback seems
to enhance label agreement, while grouping feedback does not.































Figure 8.9: Label agreement over time, for each condition. The plots show the number of parti-
cipant pairs with label agreement for each task.
In order to confirm these observations, I applied logistic linear mixed models. This is
analogous to the analysis conducted in the previous section for conceptual convergence,
and was also done using R’s ’lmer’ and ’anova’ functions, but this time the output vari-
able is binary rather than numerical. I begin again by checking for a main fixed effect
of task, with intercepts for participant pairs as random effects. The t-value for the fixed
effect was 5.63, which is much beyond Baayen’s (2008) heuristic criterion of 2. Thus,
participant pairs did generally coordinate their category labels over time.
Consequently, continuingwith themixedmodel analysis, I compare several nestedmod-
els with task order as a fixed effect, in order to determine the random effects term. The
key output from the model comparison can be seen in Table 8.9. The highly significant p-
values and the decreasing AICs and BICs suggest that we should keep the most complex
random effects, with correlated pair-specific intercept and slope terms.
Now I consider the effects of label and grouping feedback, one at a time. First, I fit a
simple model with label feedback as the only fixed term, keeping the random effects I
have just identified. The t-value for the fixed effect was 5.24, easily surpassing Baayen’s
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Model AIC BIC p
Intercept only 720.80 741.16
Slope only 708.21 728.57 p < .001
Intercept + Slope 627.76 653.21 p < .001
Intercept * Slope 619.61 650.15 p < .01
Table 8.9: Comparisons between several nested linear mixed models, with a fixed effect term
of task order, used to determine the random effects term. The difference between the last two
models (marked by ’+’ and ’*’) is that the former does not model correlation between the pair-
specific intercept and slope, while the latter does. The AIC, BIC and p-value criteria all suggest
that we should adopt the most complex model (shown in bold) at this stage.
(2008) threshold. In contrast, the analogous model for grouping feedback did not, with
a t-value of only 0.53. This suggests the opposite pattern of results from those for con-
ceptual convergence.
I next conducted further stepwise model comparisons to verify these conclusions. I first
took the last model with the fixed effect of task, and added first a fixed effect of la-
bels, and then a task-label interaction. The comparison criteria, based on the values in
Table 8.10, strongly suggest to keep both. On the other hand, if we then try to add a fixed
effect of groupings, as shown in Table 8.11, there is clearly no improvement.
Model AIC BIC p
Task only 621.61 657.24
Task + labels 605.73 641.37 p < .001
Task * labels 592.16 632.88 p < .001
Table 8.10: Stepwise comparison between mixed models testing for the effects of label feedback.
The sequence incrementally adds a label feedback term and then a task-label interaction term to
the ’Intercept * Slope’ model adopted in Table 8.9. The AIC, BIC and p-values all suggest that we
keep both the main effect and the interaction.
Model AIC BIC p
Task * labels 592.16 632.88
Task * labels + groupings 594.04 639.85 p > .05
Table 8.11: Comparison between the linear mixed model adopted in Table 8.10 and one which
also adds a fixed effect term for grouping feedback. As the output shows, grouping feedback is
clearly not making a significant contribution, and therefore should not be kept (as a result, I did
not even test models with interactions involving grouping feedback).
Thus, the final mixed effect model2 has fixed effects for task, labels, and their interac-
tion, but no effect of groupings. This is, in a sense, nearly a mirror image of the model
2The R lmer call: lmer(sameLabels ˜ task * labels + (task |session))
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adopted earlier for conceptual convergence, where groupings had an effect but not la-
bels. However, in this case, the effects were stronger and the decisions of which models
to keep easier, as the different criteria were in agreement. Overall, this model suggests
that pairs who received label feedback aligned more lexically, and that pairs converged
over time, although the extent to which they did so depended on whether they got label
feedback.
I turn next to an analysis that collapses across the task variable. First, I calculate themean
lexical alignment scores for each pair across all tasks. The means of these means (across
participant pairs) are shown in Table 8.12. A 2x2 ANOVA (grouping feedback and label
feedback) yielded results in line with the earlier linear mixed model analysis: there was
a significant main effect of label feedback (F (1, 36) = 43.20, p < .001), but no effects
of grouping feedback (F (1, 36) = 0.01, p > .05) or of the grouping-label interaction





NO 0.03 (0.18) 0.55 (0.50)
YES 0.05 (0.22) 0.52 (0.50)
Table 8.12: Mean lexical alignment scores across all participants within a condition across all the
tasks. Standard deviations are given in brackets.
Recall that in the conceptual convergence section, I found that an ANOVA gives quite a
different result if focused on just the final five tasks, and that these are the most relevant
for a convergence hypothesis. Therefore, I also conduct an analogous second ANOVA
here, focusing again on the final five tasks (Table 8.13 shows the means by condition).
The results were just the same as when considering the whole range of all 30 tasks: a sig-
nificant effect of label feedback (F (1, 36) = 42.19, p < .001), but none for either grouping
feedback (F (1, 36) = 0.19, p > .05) or the interaction F (1, 36) = 0.19, p > .05). Thus,
in contrast to the counterpart pattern for conceptual convergence, grouping feedback
appears to be irrelevant for lexical convergence.
8.4.4 Correspondence between conceptual and lexical alignment
In the previous two sections, I have looked at the relationship between two kinds of
alignment in the categorisation tasks with two kinds of feedback. For the most part,





NO 0.02 (0.14) 0.66 (0.48)
YES 0.02 (0.14) 0.58 (0.50)
Table 8.13: Mean lexical alignment scores across all participants within a condition across the
final five tasks. Standard deviations are given in brackets.
the results showed a dissociation, so that lexical convergence depended on lexical but
not conceptual feedback, and vice versa (although the effects were much stronger in
the lexical case). Does this mean, however, that the two kinds of alignment bear no
relationship to each other? In this section, I address this question, by evaluating potential
correspondences and relationships between the two.
The analyses below are restricted to the participant pairs who received label feedback
(i.e., those in the label or both conditions). I proceed in this way because, as we saw in
Figure 8.9, participants almost never exhibited lexical agreement when they didn’t get
label feedback, which skews the overall distribution of lexical alignment scores enorm-
ously. On the other hand, when there was label feedback, lexical agreement happened
roughly half of the time, which keeps things relatively balanced for statistical analysis.
Moreover, as I noted, participants also seemed to treat labelling more seriously when
they got label feedback. Finally, focusing on label feedback is more relevant to the gen-
eral question of language’s role in conceptual coordination.
I begin by asking whether there was a general correspondence between lexical agree-
ment and high levels of conceptual alignment. Figure 8.10 shows the number of tasks
with label agreement and disagreement corresponding to each conceptual alignment
score. The ratio of lexical agreements clearly increases with increasing conceptual align-
ment scores, and this was confirmed by a linear regression analysis (β = 1.74, p < .001,
R2 = 0.99).
I look next at two different analyses based on participant pairs. The first analysis asks
whether pairs obtain higher scores when they achieve label agreement. To that end,
for each participant pair, I calculate the average conceptual alignment score for tasks
where they agreed on their labels, and a second average for tasks where they did not.
The averages were higher for label agreement (M = 0.69, SD = 0.13) than for label
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Figure 8.10: Numbers of label agreements and disagreements for each conceptual alignment
score.
disagreement (M = 0.46, SD = 0.16), and a paired t-test showed that the differences
were highly significant (t(19) = 8.22, p < .001).
We can also ask whether participant pairs who achieved lexical agreement more often
also tended to have higher conceptual alignment scores. In order to test this, I took the
mean lexical alignment scores and mean conceptual alignment scores for each pair, and
conducted a linear regression between them (modelling the conceptual in terms of the
lexical). The resulting data are plotted in Figure 8.11, along with the regression line.
First note how, interestingly, there seem to be two distinct clusters of mean lexical scores,
but there is no obvious difference between their conceptual alignment scores. In any
case, the analysis revealed no significant relationship between them (β = 0.09, p > .05,
R2 = 0.06).
Finally, I consider the relationship between stability in a pair’s set of labels and their
average degree of conceptual alignment. On one hand, it’s possible that pairs who settle
on labels early and stick to them may achieve higher scores over the tasks. On the other
hand, it may be that greater flexibility is more effective, so that participant pairs who
adapt their labels and categories to the current task stimuli are rewarded. Figure 8.12
investigates this possibility, plotting participant pairs’ mean scores by the total number
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Figure 8.11: Mean lexical alignment scores plotted against mean conceptual alignment scores
for each participant pair, along with a regression line.
of distinct labels they used between them across all of their tasks. Although there does
appear to be a slight decrease in scores with increasing variability in labels, a regression
analysis reveals no significant effect (t(18) = −0.37, p > .05).




















Figure 8.12: Mean scores of participant pairs who received label feedback against the total num-
ber of distinct labels they used between them over the course of all 30 tasks.
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8.4.5 Questionnaire data
Participants were asked the same feedback questions as in Experiment 3, except that
there was no question about how they judged similarity (since there was no similarity
judgement task), and they were not asked to rate the familiarity and naturalness of the
stimuli (since I was now using artificial stimuli). Since Experiment 3 had already run
smoothly, and Experiment 4 did as well and had the same kind of joint categorisation
tasks, I do not present the questionnaire data here in any detail.
However, given the different stimulus domain and the fact that there was evidence of
learning across the tasks, it is worth mentioning the kinds of answers that people gave
concerning the basis of categorisation (#2) and whether they changed it (#3) (the feed-
back question numbers marked with ‘#’ refer to Appendix D.2). Not surprisingly, unlike
Experiments 2 and 3, participants never mentioned functional properties of the stimuli.
Most (73 out of 80) participants referred to a variety of physical dimensions, including
shape, size, boundedness, pointedness, direction, angles, width, boundedness, corner
types, and thickness. Three participants referred to the requirement of having to split
the items into two categories. Two participants mentioned trying to agree with their
partner, and one mentioned the task scores as having an effect. When asked whether
they changed their basis for categorisation, 50 said that they did, 12 that they did not, 9
that they did originally but then stabilised, and the remaining 9 gave more ambivalent
responses (e.g., “sometimes”).
8.5 Discussion
8.5.1 Summary of results
Experiment 4 asked what role words play in conceptual alignment. The design pitted la-
bel feedback versus grouping feedback, and was meant to assess the relative importance
of each. I also asked how these two forms of feedback affected lexical convergence, and
how and to what extent the two types of convergence corresponded to each other.
The analyses yielded a variety of significant findings. First of all, unlike the previous
experiments, participant pairs did generally converge over time, not only lexically, but
also conceptually. Secondly, there was evidence for a dissociation between lexical and
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conceptual alignment. In general, conceptual alignment depended on conceptual feed-
back, and lexical alignment depended on lexical feedback. However, there was also a
difference between the two cases. While for lexical alignment, the effect of lexical feed-
back was enormous and absent for grouping feedback, the exclusivity was weaker for
conceptual alignment. Indeed, there was some evidence that by the end of the exper-
iment, lexical feedback also significantly improved conceptual alignment, as long as it
was provided in conjunction with grouping feedback. Thirdly, despite the general disso-
ciation between the two levels of alignment, they did also exhibit some correspondence
to each other. Tasks with higher conceptual alignment scores were also more likely to
show lexical agreement, and participant pairs tended to have higher conceptual align-
ment scores on tasks where they agreed lexically. On the other hand, the correspondence
also had limits: pairs who aligned lexically more often did not score higher conceptu-
ally, and relative stability in lexical choices also did not correspond to higher conceptual
alignment scores.
8.5.2 Conceptual and lexical alignment
The results of this experiment shed light on the role of words in conceptual coordination,
as well as the relationship between conceptual and lexical alignment more generally. I
address these issues in this section. I first discuss how the results for lexical and concep-
tual alignment mostly mirror each other and suggest a dissociation between them. I then
discuss the results that do not fit this pattern, and how they change the picture. Finally,
I relate the findings here to previous work. I cover this separately and last because the
first parts of the discussion are somewhat technical, and relating the finer details of my
experiment to previous studies is less fruitful.
8.5.2.1 A dissociation
The main conceptual and lexical alignment results seem to be straightforward mirror
images of each other. Both the linear mixed analyses and most of the ANOVAs col-
lapsing across tasks suggest that conceptual alignment depends on grouping feedback,
and lexical alignment depends on label feedback. When people were able to see each
other’s groupings after each task, they were better able to align them over time. And
similarly, when they saw their partner’s labels each time, they tended to converge with
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each other’s labels. Each type of feedback thus seemed to have a direct influence only
on the corresponding type of alignment.
Moreover, some of the analyses which more directly related participants’ conceptual and
lexical output also supported this separation. In particular, the wide variation found
between pairs in how often they agreed on labels was not reflected in their average
conceptual scores. In other words, pairs who rarely used the same labels coordinated
their categorisation just as well, on average, as those who usually agreed on their la-
bels. Moreover, stabilising on a set of labels, which might be interpreted as stabilising
on conceptual pacts (Brennan and Clark 1996), did not correspond to better conceptual
alignment scores either. Together, these results suggest a dissociation between lexical
and conceptual alignment.
8.5.2.2 Not entirely dissociated
However, as I hinted at before, there were also other results which do not fit a simple
explanation of a clean dissociation between lexical and conceptual alignment. In partic-
ular, the conceptual alignment results captured by the condition-specific paired t-tests,
and the ANOVAs based on the first or last few tasks, are at odds with this explanation.
These results are important, and I discuss them now in more detail, and assess how they
fit with the other results.
The t-tests revealed differences between the conditions regarding whether or not pairs
increased their conceptual alignment over time. The results showed that scores increased
significantly (or nearly significantly) in the both, neither and labels conditions, while in the
groupings condition there was no sign of improvement at all. But if conceptual alignment
is based primarily on grouping feedback, then why would such feedback not lead to
increasing scores?
The simplest explanation is that this is due to the fact that pairs in the groupings condition
obtained initially higher scores than in other conditions (as was determined by the AN-
OVA based on the first few tasks). Combined with the fact that the range of possible con-
ceptual alignment scores is bounded above, obtaining high initial scores limits the scope
for possible improvement. Indeed, particularly striking is that despite the different and
even seemingly opposing effects of grouping and label feedback in the early phase of the
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experiment (since the same ANOVA suggested that label feedback was actually counter-
productive at the beginning), by the end the differences between the neither, groupings
and labels conditions were not significant (as confirmed by the ANOVA conducted on
averages over the last five tasks). It appears that pairs in these conditions plateaued at a
certain level, beyond which they could not break through (at least not after thirty tasks).
As a result, pairs who did not receive grouping feedback eventually caught up to those
in the groupings condition, perhaps due to increasing adeptness in the task and feedback
on the task score. Indeed, the fact that score feedback was available to participants in
all conditions could explain why even pairs in the neither condition improved over time.
It’s interesting, however, that label feedback turned out not to contribute anything extra
when provided on its own.
On the other hand, participants in the both condition not only caught up to those in the
groupings condition, but also significantly surpassed them. In other words, in terms of
conceptual alignment by the end of the experiment, only a combination of conceptual
and lexical feedback produced any difference relative to the control condition. This was
not captured by the ANOVA based on the means over all the tasks, probably due to the
initial disadvantage that labels seemed to cause. But the ANOVA which relates to pairs’
convergence after they have had some time to interact, learn and converge (e.g., based
on the final five tasks) confirms this, as shown by the groupings-labels interaction and
simple effects analyses. As this is a key result, I stress that although the choice of basing
the ANOVA on the final five tasks is rather arbitrary, the same significance patterns were
found for each analysis based on the last seven tasks or less.
An interesting nuance in the results is that the high performance of pairs in the both
condition (and hence including label feedback) at the end of the experiment contrasts
with an apparent negative effect of label feedback at the outset of the experiment (as
shown by the ANOVA based on the first five tasks). In other words, labels appear to
have even been detrimental at first, even though by the end they were useful, at least in
conjunction with grouping feedback. Why would this be?
I speculatively appeal to the following practical explanation. At the outset of the ex-
periment, although participants are already aware that their task is to coordinate their
groupings and not their labels, they may be preoccupied by and unduly focused on the
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labels. As such they pay less attention to not only their partner’s groupings, but even
their own and their agreement score. In other words, the labels may be initially dis-
tracting, which is not surprising since in the real world, we normally use language to
communicate our conceptualisations.
What about lexical convergence? In contrast to the conceptual convergence results, there
is no evidence for any direct impact of conceptual feedback on lexical alignment. All
of the analyses relating to lexical convergence suggest that it is influenced exclusively
by lexical feedback. Participants tended to adopt each other’s labels more when they
saw them, but they did not induce those labels from their partner’s groupings. It should
be emphasised, however, that the goal of the task may make a difference here and bias
the results (but see Section 4.2.1). Perhaps if participants were asked to coordinate their
words rather than their categories, they would be able to use their partner’s groupings
to figure out their partner’s labels. However, at this stage, this is a matter of speculation.
Overall, then, my results do suggest a greater dissociation between lexical and concep-
tual alignment than is often assumed. To a large extent, conceptual coordination relies
on conceptual feedback, and, even more, lexical coordination on lexical feedback. How-
ever, the results also highlight how words can play a role in conceptual coordination,
as long as they are available in conjunction with samplings of the categories they are
associated with.
8.5.2.3 Relation to previous alignment results
Until now I have been discussing the results of Experiment 4 in isolation from other
work. In this section, I relate my experiment to previous dialogue and alignment re-
search, before looking further out in the next section.
As reviewed in Section 3.4.3.2, many dialogue studies have looked into lexical and con-
ceptual alignment in tasks where participants could communicate with language and
shared perceptual information (e.g., Garrod and Anderson 1987; Brennan and Clark
1996). These studies have generally shown that interlocutors collaborate and converge
on shared expressions for particular referents. Since different pairs converge on differ-
ent terms, and these terms conceptually frame the referents in different ways, this has
generally been taken as evidence that partners align both lexically and conceptually.
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Experiment 4 sheds further light on these issues and qualifies past conclusions. First of
all, consistent with the past studies, lexical feedback was shown to enormously increase
lexical alignment. This was the case even though participants were not engaging in full
dialogue but could only exchange category labels, a difference which was shown to be
very significant in Experiment 3. Also, while in most dialogue experiments, participants
needed to use language to figure out what they were referring to, here the instructions
explicitly emphasised that label coordination was irrelevant (to their task scores). Thus,
lexical alignment is not confined to full-fledged dialogue interaction, and it can occur
even when it is theoretically redundant. This finding is consistent with Pickering and
Garrod’s (2004) theory of dialogue, according to which alignment is usually automatic.
On the other hand, the results here conflict with an assumption of a clean correspondence
between lexical and conceptual alignment in particular. Even though participants may
converge on lexical choices which seem to reflect distinct ways of categorising items,
it does not automatically imply that they are conceptualising them in the same way.
We may still try to defend the claim that “labels reflect conceptualisations” (Brennan
and Clark 1996, p. 1482), by sticking to the individual’s mental lexicon, but we cannot
trivially then make the logical jump to maintain that lexical convergence entails concep-
tual pacts between individuals. The same word can correspond to different concepts
for different people, even among interacting native speakers of the same language (see
Section 2.4.3).
A few dialogue studies have shown that sharing visual information improved parti-
cipants’ performance in tasks with one participant directing another (Gergle et al. 2004;
Clark and Krych 2004; see Section 3.4.2). The visual feedback could be loosely related
to the grouping feedback in my experiment, and the results could be explained by one
participant having some kind of access to their partner’s conceptualisations. However,
this explanation is speculative, and those results could also be explained in a variety of
alternative ways.
As we saw in Section 3.4.3.3, a couple of dialogue studies have also looked more dir-
ectly at conceptual alignment, and whether it is increased after dialogue-mediated in-
teraction on a joint task (Markman and Makin 1998; Voiklis 2008). The main findings
of relevance here were that people who engaged in interaction categorised things more
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similarly with each other than those who did not. However, these experiments did not
separate linguistic interaction from other kinds of interaction. On the other hand, Ex-
periment 4 manipulated the type of interaction at a finer level: although all pairs carried
out the tasks in silence and received a coordination score after each task, they also re-
ceived, depending on the condition, linguistic and/or non-linguistic feedback. Recall
that the results revealed that conceptual coordination was primarily improved by con-
ceptual feedback, and only secondarily (and at later stages) by lexical feedback. This
suggests that although language can certainly enhance conceptual coordination, it may
actually play a secondary role in doing so when other kinds of conceptual information
are also available.
Overall, my results are consistent with previous research, although they caution against
unfounded assumptions regarding the relationship between lexical and conceptual align-
ment. With regards to the role of words in conceptual alignment, they suggest that words
do play a causal role, but a relatively small one.
8.5.3 Conceptual structure
The results of Experiment 4 also shed light on the relationships betweenwords, concepts
and conceptualisation. Concepts and words do not appear to be locked tightly together:
their relationships are not uniform across speakers of the same language, nor are they
stable over time. I will return to these issues in the next chapter (see Section 9.5), since
to some extent, these are stronger versions of conclusions that came out of the previous
experiments. In this section, however, I consider an issue which relates specifically to
the design of Experiment 4: the internal structure of concepts.
Although, strictly speaking, participants in Experiment 4 categorised items on their own,
the goal was of course to align conceptually with others. The fact that alignment gener-
ally increased across the tasks shows that, to some extent, participants were successful
at aligning with their partners. Since the same stimuli did not recur in subsequent tasks,
people could not just rely on remembering individual items and reproducing categor-
isations they had previously produced or seen (in the case of grouping feedback). Nor
could they simply reproduce the concept labels their partner had used (if they got la-
bel feedback). In order to converge conceptually, they needed to at least partially infer
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and adopt their partner’s concepts (unless their partner did so with theirs), from which
the subsequent categorisations would then be determined. The different conditions ma-
nipulated what information they had available after each task for carrying out these
inferences (as shown in Figure 8.2). 3
Therefore, we can now relate the results of Experiment 4 with the theories of conceptual
representations. This will be illuminating because the debate between different concept
theories or how they should be integrated has not been resolved, and my experiment
provides a novel way to shed light on it. In fact, it provides a potentially good battle-
ground between prototype and theory theories on one hand and exemplar theory on the
other, since wordmeaning has generally been handled better by the former and category
learning by the latter (Murphy 2002). Experiment 4 brings these two themes intimately
together.
So what’s the verdict? In brief, the main results of Experiment 4 could be interpreted
as suggesting that access to someone’s exemplars is more useful for conceptual align-
ment than access to their senses. According to this interpretation, we could argue that
exemplars form the primary basis of concepts (Medin and Schaffer 1978), at least when it
comes to conceptual coordination, since they are more intimately involved. Intuitively,
this brings to mind commonplace statements like “I don’t understand what you mean:
give me an example”.
However, this interpretation has a potentially significant weakness. In particular, it does
not acknowledge any asymmetry between words and categories as conceptual identifi-
ers. Indeed, I have brought together arguments and evidence (see Section 2.4) that con-
cepts and categories are locked in an intimate causal bond (Frege 1892/1948), but that
the relationship between words and concepts is more flexible (Geeraerts 1993). There-
fore, the stronger effect of grouping feedback could equally be a result of a category
subset giving a more accurate indication of someone’s concept (via the strong concept-
category link) than a label (via the weak concept-word link).
My experiment does not allow us to distinguish between these possibilities. However,
my main results suggest that at least one of these two claims should hold. Either words
3“Inference” is an unintentionally loaded term here: people might align without explicitly modelling
their partners’ mental states (Pickering and Garrod 2004); I use it here primarily for convenience.
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are not as reliable for getting at concepts as category subsets, or exemplars constitute the
more dominant component of conceptual structure, at least for the purposes of interact-
ive conceptual alignment.
We can also try to relate the time course of category learning to that of conceptual align-
ment. Smith and Minda (1998) showed in a series of experiments that a prototypemodel
generally fit categorisation results early in learning, but that an exemplar model took
over later on. This result is inconsistent with my findings, since in Experiment 4, exem-
plars dominated early on, but at later stages both exemplars and sense were important.
However, Smith andMinda’s study has been criticised byNosofsky and Johansen (2000),
who then showed that exemplar models could handle both stages.
More generally, on the basis of his extensive review, Murphy (2002) noted that exemplar
theory has done better in category learning experiments, but that this has particularly
been the case when they have dealt with small, unnatural sets of categories. My ex-
periment also uses an unnatural stimulus domain, but it is much larger than those of
most previous studies. While there were 330 stimuli in my experiment, and each was
only categorised once by every participant, many influential category learning experi-
ments supporting exemplar theory have only had a handful of items that are repeatedly
categorised over and over (e.g., Medin and Schaffer 1978).
Therefore, my perspective on the learning trajectory is like this: exemplar theory does
well when there are a limited number of items to dealwith, as then ourmemory canman-
age them and we can exploit their individual properties. However, if the set of stimuli
just keeps expanding (as in my experiment but unlike most category learning studies),
then at some point, memory starts to overload and a greater reliance on an abstraction
(like a prototype) begins to be more useful. If this is correct, then we might expect that if
my study had gone on longer, label feedback would not only “join” grouping feedback
as it did by the end, but would eventually take over.
As such, we should guard against assuming that Experiment 4 is the end of the story.
Although access to others’ concept exemplars seems to be more useful than access to
their corresponding concept senses, there is also some evidence that access to senses
becomes more important over time, and much more research is required to resolve this.
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In any case, these results show how, following Markman and Makin (1998), interactive
studies of communication can be fruitfully employed to study categorisation.
8.5.4 Methodological comments
Experiment 4 built off the methodological successes of Experiment 3, while also tweak-
ing the design. As I explained in Section 7.5.4, the framework seems both more suited
andmore needed for studying conceptual alignment during rather than after interaction.
As a result, Experiment 4 consisted exclusively of a series of joint categorisation tasks, in
which participants categorised sets of stimuli independently, but with condition-specific
feedback after each task.
However, since Experiment 3 did not show any effects of increased convergence across
tasks, or any significant difference in conceptual convergence between the control and
silent conditions, I made a few specific modifications, including reducing the number of
categories to two, increasing the number of tasks from ten to thirty, and switching to
a potentially more variably conceptualised stimulus domain. These changes were suc-
cessful, in that Experiment 4 showed a significant effect of task. In addition to clearly
showing that the framework could be used to study changes in lexical and conceptual
alignment over the course of short experimental sessions, this also made it possible to
study the time course of alignment, which yielded interesting results. The differences
between conditions in conceptual convergence were wider in the first few tasks of the
sessions than they were by the end. However, since the patterns of scores did not clearly
plateau, it would be interesting to see what would happen in such an experiment with a
much larger number of tasks (e.g., 100). It is possible that the rather arbitrary imposed
(due to practical constraints) cutoff of thirty only reveals a snapshot at a particular mo-
ment of generally complex and changing relationships.
A remaining issue with the framework is that, when dialogue is not permitted (as in Ex-
periment 4), there is actually no interaction between participants during the individual
tasks. Participants do get feedback after each task, but they cannot coordinate how to
act on it. In particular, this means that in cases where they do not get perfect scores, they
have to independently decide what to do on the subsequent task: stick to the way they
did things before, switch to what their partner was doing, or try something else entirely.
CHAPTER 8. EXPERIMENT 4 286
While this is not an intrinsic problem and can be considered part of the challenge, it
can slow down convergence. Fortunately, this issue was apparently not large enough to
eliminate interesting effects.
In general, the framework proved effective in Experiment 4, continuing off of the im-
provements seen in Experiment 3. However, I return to a general evaluation of it in
Section 9.2.
8.6 Conclusion
Although Experiment 3 showed that dialogue was hugely beneficial for conceptual con-
vergence, it left unanswered questions regarding the usefulness of category labels on
their own. As a result, Experiment 4 was designed to look into this in more detail,
and pitted conceptual feedback versus lexical feedback over a larger number of tasks
using a different domain of stimuli. The results primarily pointed to a kind of dissoci-
ation between lexical and conceptual alignment: lexical alignment depended primarily
on lexical feedback, while conceptual alignment depended mainly on conceptual feed-
back. However, a closer look at the data, especially when considering different stages
of the interaction, revealed that conceptual alignment was also sensitive to lexical feed-
back, and in a striking way. At first, lexical feedback seemed to be a distraction and
actually impaired conceptual alignment. But by the end of the tasks, pairs were using
it to increase convergence, as long as it was provided in conjunction with conceptual
convergence. Therefore, it appears that lexical and conceptual alignment, although not
in direct correspondence, are related, and that exchanging category labels (as opposed
to full dialogue) does (eventually) increase conceptual coordination.
CHAPTER 9
General discussion
In this thesis, I have set out to investigate a novel research question, proposed an empir-
ically motivated theoretical model to ground the investigation, developed a correspond-
ing experimental framework, and conducted four experiments which examined differ-
ent aspects of the question. It is now time to evaluate the results of my experiments as a
whole in terms of my general hypotheses, and to consider their broader implications.
This discussion is organised as follows. I first reviewmy four experiments, summarising
the designs, results, and interpretations. I then evaluate the experimental framework, as-
sessing its strengths, weaknesses and potential. I then integrate my results and past liter-
ature and discuss them in terms of language’s role in conceptual alignment and closely
related issues. After that, I consider the implications of my findings for other issues, in-
cluding those that my experiments have tackled directly, that lay the foundations for my
theoretical model, and that are intimately related with my work but have been hitherto
neglected. Finally, I draw my overall conclusions regarding the question I began with.
9.1 Summary of empirical findings
The experiments in this thesis have investigatedwhether language brings together people’s
categorisation. They have looked at different timescales of conceptual alignment and
manipulated the extent of language availability.
Experiment 1 focused on the possible effects of our native language on our categorisa-
tion, and in particular, on whether speakers of the same language categorised things
287
CHAPTER 9. GENERAL DISCUSSION 288
more similarly to each other than speakers of different languages. The experiment was
meant to partially replicate and extend the previous study of Malt, Sloman, Gennari,
Shi and Wang (1999) but also address my research questions more specifically. Native
speakers of English, Japanese and Polish carried out both naming and free classifica-
tion tasks with the same set of 60 dishes. Like the original study, my replication results
showed that there was divergence between the linguistic groups in naming, but much
less in sorting, and that naming and sorting patterns did not generally correspond to
each other. However, I also supplemented the original forms of analysis with methods
that were based on the degree of agreement between pairs of individuals, and these ana-
lyses qualified the original findings. The most important result for my thesis was that
speakers of the same language did categorise things more similarly to each other than
speakers of different languages, although the difference wasn’t nearly as large as it was
for the analogous analysis based on naming. However, I argued from the body of results
that the cross-linguistic differences in sorting were not in fact due to language, but were
more likely better explained by other cultural factors.
Experiment 2 shifted the focus to the role of linguistic interaction on conceptual align-
ment between individuals. It focused on whether engaging in a joint categorisation task
brought people’s conceptualisations together, and whether being able to talk freely dur-
ing the task increased the effect. To that end, pairs of participants carried out a sequence
of three free classification tasks. The first and third tasks were always carried out indi-
vidually, but the second depended on the experimental condition. In the control condi-
tion, the second task was an individual one, just as the first and third. In the other two
conditions, participants worked together to categorise the stimuli, taking turns through
a synchronised interface. In one of these two conditions, pairs were also allowed to en-
gage freely in dialogue during this task. Surprisingly, the results revealed no effects of
either feedback or dialogue on conceptual convergence. They did converge lexically, but
even then, there was no difference between the experimental conditions. However, the
experiment had several methodological shortcomings, which cast doubt on the results
and the shortage of differences between conditions.
Experiment 3 sought to address themethodological issues with Experiment 2, while also
expanding the scope of inquiry. The most important methodological modification lay in
the nature of the joint categorisation tasks, which was incorporated to permit the study
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of alignment during interaction as well. In particular, rather than sorting a set of items
together, participants now did so independently of their partners, but with the explicit
goal of aligning. In the control condition, they saw an alignment score after each task.
In the other two conditions, they were also given feedback on their partners’ categor-
ies. And as in Experiment 2, the difference between the latter two conditions was that
in one of them they were allowed to talk freely during the joint tasks. The experiment
consisted of a sequence of ten joint categorisation tasks of this kind, followed by an in-
dividual phase in which participants individually carried out similarity judgments and
categorisation tasks. This modified design revealed a very strong effect of dialogue on
conceptual convergence during interaction, but no effect of feedback, and no effect on
either similarity or categorisation following interaction. On the other hand, lexical con-
vergence did occur over the course of the tasks for interacting pairs, and the effect was
stronger if participants could talk to each other. Moreover, lexical convergence persisted
beyond the interaction, and was evident still in the individual categorisation tasks.
Experiment 4 shifted focus entirely to alignment during interaction, and eliminated the
availability of full-fledged dialogue. The experiment manipulated the availability of cat-
egory grouping and label feedback, inquiring whether they affected conceptual and lex-
ical convergence. In order to give pairs more time to learn and adapt to each other, the
individual post-interaction tasks were eliminated, and the number of joint categorisa-
tion tasks was expanded. Also, as the labels were now more in focus, they were restric-
ted to single English words. The results showed that lexical alignment was primarily
enhanced by lexical feedback, and conceptual alignment by conceptual feedback, sug-
gesting a dissociation between the two processes. However, lexical feedback did also
eventually increase conceptual convergence, as long as it occurred in conjunction with
conceptual feedback. Moreover, other analyses showed that there was some correspond-
ence between lexical and conceptual alignment, so the lexical-conceptual dissociation
should not be overstated.
9.2 Evaluation of the empirical framework
One of the main goals of this thesis has been to design an experimental framework suit-
able for empirically exploring my hypotheses. As I pointed out in Chapter 1, this was
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particularly challenging because it required the explicit rejection of two related, con-
venient and frequently adopted idealisations: that concepts are the same for different
people, and that there is a simple one-to-one relationship between words and concepts
(at least within a language). The serious rejection of these idealisations imposed sub-
stantial constraints on methodological decisions, which largely determined the features
of the experimental framework that I developed in Chapter 4 and subsequently used in
my experiments.
The resulting framework had several key features. First, the main tasks were free classi-
fication tasks, in which participants partitioned a set of stimuli into categories. Within a
few practical constraints, participants were generally free to decide on the number, sizes,
names and bases for their categories. Second, the experimental stimuli were sampled
from continuous perceptual domains, namely dishes (in Experiments 1-3) and triangles
(in Experiment 4). This allowed for multiple stimuli to be presented non-linguistically
and simultaneously, and increased the potential for variation between participants’ cat-
egorisation. Third, measures were carefully chosen for comparing the outputs from
two different participants in a task. The most important measures for my purposes
concerned comparisons of two category partitionings, but measures were also defined
for comparing category labels and similarity judgments. Fourth, the free classification
tasks involved varying degrees of interaction between participants. Sometimes, parti-
cipants simply sorted the items individually, with no interaction or shared goal; in other
cases, they sorted individually, but linguistic interaction was allowed or feedback was
provided to them; and in still other cases, they sorted things together, making joint de-
cisions on a single stimulus set. Fifth, the role of language was evaluated with specific
manipulations. In particular, I controlled whether participants were allowed to speak to
each other during the experiments, and whether they received feedback on their part-
ners’ category labels.
But how did the framework perform in practice? Some aspects of the framework cannot
be judged a priori, but only through actual application in experiments. In particular,
in order to be useful, the experimental tasks must be meaningful and straight-forward
for participants, they must have an appropriate level of sensitivity (being neither too
challenging nor too trivial), they must yield variation in output between participants,
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and they need to show at least some significant differences between experimental condi-
tions. After four different experiments and a few bumps on the way, it is now clear that
these criteria were generally satisfied. Experimental sessions generally ran smoothly
and efficiently, and questionnaire feedback consistently confirmed that participants un-
derstood the tasks and were comfortable with the program interface. There was plenty
of variation between the conceptual, lexical, and similarity outputs of different parti-
cipants, allowing for an examination of the conditions under which they could or would
align. And there were numerous interesting differences found between experimental
conditions in different experiments, shedding light on my hypotheses and raising new
questions.
It is important to point out, however, that the framework has proven to be better suited
to some theoretical questions than others. The main weak point is that it does not appear
to be very powerful at capturing alignment phenomena that persist beyond interaction.
In Experiments 2 and 3, most of the analyses which compared participant pairs’ outputs
on individual tasks following interaction yielded null results, especially for conceptual
and similarity convergence. However, previous studies have demonstrated such effects
of interaction (Markman and Makin 1998; Voiklis 2008), suggesting that this might be a
methodological weakness, rather than a theoretically valid result. In contrast, the use
of full-fledged dialogue during interactive tasks seems to make lexical and conceptual
convergence almost trivial. In particular, Experiment 3 yielded a very large proportion
of ceiling effects in the talking condition for the joint convergence tasks. While this was
very useful for the purpose of demonstrating the powerful role of dialogue, it may be a
potential worry when designing future experiments to explore the relationship between
dialogue and conceptual alignment in more detail.
The framework also has a couple more general concerns. First of all, while I describe
some of my experimental conditions as “interactive”, the actual interaction which is
supported and permitted is quite limited. Indeed, when dialogue is not allowed and
participants carry out tasks individually (as in Experiment 4, for example), interaction
is restricted to certain forms of feedback between tasks. In such conditions, participants
cannot speak to each other, cannot follow each other’s body movements and gestures,
and are not operating continuously within the same problem environment. A side-effect
of this is that participants cannot then negotiate anything while actually carrying out a
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task, which can lead to “cross-over” effects while attempting to coordinate categories,
as discussed in Section 7.5.4. In particular, both participants of a pair may successfully
adopt each other’s categories from the previous task, and yet see no increase in their
agreement score. However, these issues are not intrinsic limitations of the framework,
but could be addressed in different ways in future experiments (e.g., by embedding the
tasks in more natural interaction, where participants can see each other). Eliminating
these effects should help decrease the amount of tasks (and thus time from participants)
needed to study convergence under different conditions.
Also, the framework faces questions regarding the theoretical interpretation of concepts.
The free classification tasks yield categories of stimuli, which have been interpreted as
snapshots of participants’ concepts. However, as I arguedmyself in Section 2.4.1, there is
an important difference between concepts and categories, with categories being referen-
tial extensions of concepts, and multiple concepts potentially corresponding to a single
category. Moreover, seeing people’s category groupings tells us nothing absolute about
how they are thinking of the stimuli. My exclusive reliance on referential information
for identifying concepts also implies that the framework is not trivially applicable to ab-
stract or perceptually complex conceptual domains. However, note that these theoretical
issues are not unique to my experiments but apply to categorisation studies in general,
especially when there is a need to separate lexical from conceptual processes.
These concerns notwithstanding, the experimental framework offers a concrete solution
to an important methodological challenge which had not previously been met. Recall
(see Section 3.4) that past experiments have examined conceptual alignment either dur-
ing interaction but indirectly via lexical alignment (e.g., Garrod and Anderson 1987), or
directly and independently of language but after interaction (e.g., Markman and Makin
1998). The fundamental problem lay in how to query conceptual alignment during in-
teraction without relying directly on language. But this was precisely the strength of
the current framework. While the framework did not reveal much of interest when ex-
amining conceptual alignment in tasks that followed interaction, it did yield novel and
insightful results concerning online conceptual alignment during interaction. The key
feature that made this possible lay in embedding free classification tasks in interaction
between participants. Within this basic setup, we can control how participants interact,
if and how they can use language, what sorts of things they are categorising, and what
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the task goals are, while still getting conceptual snapshots independently of language.
Having participants also label their categories (as in Experiments 2-4) offers the addi-
tional possibility of independently measuring lexical alignment and comparing the two
phenomena or testing for correspondences between them. However, if we want to min-
imise the interference of language in the free classification task, we may choose instead
not to have participants label their categories (as in Experiment 1). In general, the frame-
work offers a lot of flexibility while allowing for the separation both between lexical and
conceptual processes and between individuals. As such, it provides a partial solution to
the fundamental problem emphasised by Nuyts and Pederson (1997): in order to study
the relationship between language and conceptualisation, we (researchers) need to be
able to separate them.
Indeed, the generality of the framework and its success in examining online concep-
tual alignment suggest that it could be fruitfully applied to many research questions
beyond the specific ones investigated in this thesis. The modifications and applications
could vary widely from minor extensions to major adaptations. Participants could be
allowed to talk, but only between rather than during the joint tasks (making the compar-
ison between the roles of label feedback and dialogue more “fair”). Different stimulus
domains could be used, and sampled in different ways. If the requirement of using
non-linguistic stimuli was relaxed (although this would have some other implications),
abstract domains could be studied as well by using words for stimulus items. Note that,
given the apparent domain-dependence of findings in linguistic relativity research (see
Section 3.3), the choice of stimulus domain might make a big difference. The kind of
interaction could be further manipulated, such as allowing participants to see each other
or where they were looking (perhaps with the use of eye-tracking technology). Issues
of partner-specificity and community conventions could be investigated by manipulat-
ing participants’ partnerships in particular ways (as was effectively done by Garrod and
Doherty 1994). Since the framework has been implemented as a server-client computer
program using a separate database for persistent data storage, experiments could easily
be done through the Internet, potentially helping to amass much larger amounts of data
from more participants and larger sequences of tasks. The specificity of effects to lan-
guage could be tested by offering participants other ways to communicate or label their
categories (Galantucci 2005). The importance of language proficiency or other bilingual
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issues could be tested by running the experiments with non-native speakers. Sociolin-
guistic questions could be investigated by focusing on how participants are paired up
(e.g., by gender, nationality, profession, etc.). And since the free classification paradigm
has been successfully used to study categorisation in animals and young children, the
paradigm could even be used to explore the debatable relationship between conceptual
development and language acquisition, or the equally debatable issue of what constitute
evolutionary cognitive preadaptations to language.
In summary, although methodological and theoretical challenges remain for the frame-
work to ultimately face, and despite not being equally successful on all fronts, the ex-
perimental framework I have developed marks one of the most important contributions
of this thesis. Not only has it allowed me to address my hypotheses, it also provides a
general and novel way to investigate conceptual alignment between people during in-
teraction, which does not rely on language. As such, it could be used as a tool for many
other important research problems, some of which I will mention more specifically in
the subsequent sections of this discussion.
9.3 Conceptual (and lexical) alignment
9.3.1 The unit of alignment
Before relating the alignment results of my four experiments to each other and to pre-
vious work, it is important to discuss an ambiguity concerning the unit of analysis in
alignment. The issue derives from the fact that the output of a single task in my experi-
ments did not consist of a single category and/or label being assigned to a single item,
but rather multiple categories and multiple labels which partitioned a relatively large
set of items. Although, as I argued in Chapter 4, this was necessary and appropriate
for investigating my research questions, it introduces ambiguity in what is meant by
alignment, especially lexical alignment.
In particular, there are at least three possible interpretations and corresponding bases
for measuring lexical alignment. Perhaps the most natural interpretation is where we
characterise the output as assigning each item to a particular label, and then assessing
the extent to which people agreed on particular labels for the particular items. This
way we incorporate both the labels and the items in the output. However, we could
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also focus exclusively on the items, ignoring the actual labels used, and measure the
extent to which people’s labels partition the stimulus space into the same groups (the
item-based approach). Alternatively, we could ignore the items and focus instead on the
labels, so that our measure only compares the sets of labels used by different people (the
identifier-based approach).
While the first method may seem the richest, there were specific reasons why I adopted
the item-based approach in Experiment 1 and the identifier-based in Experiments 2-4.
The main goal of Experiment 1 was to investigate the correspondence (or lack thereof)
between linguistic and non-linguistic categorisation. As I argued in Section 5.3.3.2, it
was important to make the measure of lexical alignment as analogous to the the meas-
ure of conceptual alignment as possible. Since the non-linguistic tasks and conceptual
alignment measure did not, by definition, involve any linguistic labels, they were neces-
sarily item-based. As a result, contra Malt et al.’s (1999) original analysis, my own lexical
alignment measure in Experiment 1 focused exclusively on the item groupings induced
by people’s labels.
In contrast, in Experiments 2-4, the research focus was quite different. In this case, I
wanted to study how conceptual alignment was influenced by various linguistic ma-
nipulations, and how it related to lexical alignment, both during and after interaction.
As a result, I needed to have a single task which provided both conceptual and lexical
output, and my solution to this problem was to adapt the free classification tasks so
that participants also labelled their categories. However, this wedding also meant that,
by definition, the labels and the categories partitioned the space up in identical ways.
As such, using an item-based interpretation of lexical alignment in these experiments
would make the comparison with conceptual alignment meaningless. Instead, the point
was to separate the labels from the groupings. Therefore, the tasks were interpreted as
yielding two distinct sets of output: a set of labels and a set of groupings. Comparing
the former was interpreted as measuring lexical alignment, and comparing the latter as
conceptual alignment. These two kinds of sets are fundamentally different things, and
so direct comparisons between the values, as in Experiment 1, would be inappropriate.
Fortunately, that was not required for the purposes of Experiments 2-4.
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Note that the ambiguity between different interpretations of lexical alignment could
also apply, in principle, to conceptual alignment. There too we could theoretically ask
whether we are concerned with the categories into which individual items are placed, or
whether we just care about the set of categories that is used to partition a set of items (or
both). However, in practice, the distinction collapses because, in the absence of external
category identifiers (like labels), I have chosen to actually identify categories by the set of
items that constitute them. Consequently, asking what categories a person used to parti-
tion a set of items intrinsically contained all the information about which items were put
into which categories. In other words, for conceptual alignment, there was effectively no
difference between the item-based and the identifier-based interpretations. In a sense,
in this case, we have the luxury of emphasising either interpretation, depending on our
purpose.
It is important next to consider how my interpretations of alignment relate to previous
work. The answer is again closely related to my adoption of free classification tasks for
my experiments. Notice that the three-way distinction I made between possible inter-
pretations of alignment also collapses if task output consists of only one item at a time.
In that case, the “partitioning” reduces trivially (in terms of analysis) to a single category
containing a single item, and the category label is inevitably associated with both that
category and that item. Of course, many previous experiments have also involved mul-
tiple stimuli that participants are dealing with at the same time. However, in most cases,
the tasks involve the identification (in production, comprehension and communication)
of particular items from larger sets, so that single items still constitute the focus and unit
of analysis (e.g., Horton and Gerrig 2002; Metzing and Brennan 2003; Brennan and Clark
1996). Yet despite the potential interpretative ambiguity concerning lexical alignment in
past work, it makes sense to interpret it as relating to both the items involved and how
they are lexicalised. The theoretical issue of lexical alignment is not normally whether
people merely use the same words or attend to the same items, but rather whether they
align on the same terms for the same items. As a result, although for the purposes of my
research questions it was appropriate to take different views of lexical alignment, the in-
terpretation and measure should be interpreted as less strict than in previous work, and
this must be borne mind when discussing my findings more generally (which I under-
take in the following section).
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This perspective also sheds light on the two different kinds of conceptual alignment res-
ults in the literature. As discussed in Sections 3.4.3.2 and 3.4.3.3, past work has used dif-
ferent methods to inquire into conceptual alignment during or after interaction, respect-
ively. In the case of alignment during interaction, concepts have been identified with
words, so that lexical and conceptual alignment were essentially equivalent, by assump-
tion (e.g., Brennan and Clark 1996). As a result, the unit of analysis was again usually a
single item, and the most natural interpretation of alignment concerns both an item and
its identifying label. In contrast, studies that have examined conceptual alignment fol-
lowing interaction have followed the same general free classification approach as I have
(Markman and Makin 1998; Voiklis 2008). Therefore, as in my experiments, alignment
in these studies could in principle be interpreted as either item-based, identifier-based,
or both. However, such studies are rare, and they have not looked at alignment during
interaction.
More generally, the usage of conceptualisation tasks in which the output consists of mul-
tiple categories (and labels) involves a certain idealisation that is not required in the in-
dividual case. In particular, the underlying assumption is that task output constitutes
a referential snapshot reflecting a person’s mental conceptualisations. However, this
abstracts away from the fact that each such task does involve the individual concep-
tualisations of different items, and that these may change slightly over the course of
the task. Indeed, giving participants the possibility of changing their categorisation de-
cisions before committing them explicitly acknowledges this. While such an assumption
is a necessary and justifiable compromise when our tasks depend on the categorisation
of multiple items at once, it may become important when we consider different task
conditions, which differ in terms of whether participants can interact within individual
tasks. I return to this point in the next section.
9.3.2 Prior, online and preserved alignment
My experiments have investigated conceptual and lexical alignment at several different
points in time relative to interaction. In order to avoid confusion, and to help structure
the discussion of my findings and how they relate both to each other and to other lit-
erature, I make a three-way terminological distinction concerning alignment along the
temporal dimension: prior, online, and persistent. Prior alignment is that which exists
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between speakers of the same native language who have not interacted directly with
each other (this is analogous to the role that background knowledge plays in common
ground; Clark 1996). Online alignment captures that which there is between people
while they are interacting with each other in some way. Persistent alignment is that
which remains between participants shortly after interaction. While these distinctions
are not precise when applied to the world at large, they are sufficient to clearly divide
up the relevant experimental results. In relation to my studies, Experiment 1 and the
pre-task in Experiment 2 measured prior alignment, the joint tasks in Experiments 2-4
addressed online alignment, and the post-task in Experiment 2 and the individual phase
in Experiment 3 attempted to capture persistent alignment. I now discuss each of the
three types in turn.
Prior alignment was measured in both Experiments 1 and 2. In Experiment 2, prior
alignment was measured strictly to provide a baseline for assessing preserved alignment
afterwards. As such, these taskswere not granted any theoretical value of their own, and
I do not discuss them further here. In contrast, in Experiment 1, prior alignment was a
major focus. The key results were that speakers of different languages diverge from
each other in their prior alignments, but that the divergence is greater for lexical than
for conceptual alignment. This finding is consistent with the growing consensus in the
linguistic relativity literature that language does not determine our thought, but that it
does affect it (Gumperz and Levinson 1996; see Section 3.3.5). As such, it is expected that
linguistic differences should have a stronger impact on linguistic than on non-linguistic
representations, but that the latter are still partly affected and aligned. However, such
an effect in an object domain but not based on formal grammatical distinctions such as
gender (Lucy 1992) is relatively novel. Nevertheless, as I argued in Section 5.3.4.3, given
the other results of my experiment, the relatively high degree of conceptual alignment
among speakers of the same language is probably best explained here by other, non-
linguistic cultural factors. I return to this issue in Section 9.4.
The investigation of online alignment took place in Experiments 2-4, and did so in quite
different ways. In Experiment 2, this involved a joint categorisation task where parti-
cipants worked together on the same stimulus set to produce a joint set of categories.
While this made the task more interactive, it did not allow for a separation between
the output of the participants, making it impossible to directly apply a measure which
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compares them. However, an examination of the audio data informally suggested that
participants (in the talking condition) used dialogue in various ways to align their labels
and conceptualisations, as has been demonstrated previously (e.g., Brennan and Clark
1996; Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs 1986).
In Experiments 3 and 4, participants carried out a sequence of joint categorisation tasks
in which they actually worked independently, but received feedback after each task.
However, the results were different in the two experiments. I discuss first the results for
lexical alignment, and then for conceptual alignment. Experiment 3 showed that dia-
logue could enormously increase conceptual alignment, but failed to find any effect of
feedback between the tasks or any improvement across tasks. On the other hand, Ex-
periment 4 did find a general learning effect, as well as an effect of feedback, especially
conceptual feedback. The appearance of a learning effect in Experiment 4 may have
been due to a large increase in the number of tasks (from 10 to 30), combined with a
reduction of the number of categories per task (from a maximum of 4 to 2). This combin-
ation gave pairs more time to learn to adapt to each other, while probably also making it
easier to process their partners’ categories and compare them to their own. The superior
advantage provided by conceptual feedback over lexical feedback points out that while
language can play a role in conceptual alignment, it is by no means the only cause, and
probably not even the strongest one. However, the effect of dialogue shown in Exper-
iment 3, on the other hand, was striking, showing a massive advantage over feedback,
even when that feedback included both groupings and labels. The strong online effects
of dialogue in Experiment 3 were among the clearest results of my experiments, and I
return to them in Section 9.3.4.
The results for online lexical alignment in Experiments 3 and 4 were similar to but
sharper than those for conceptual alignment. First, in Experiment 3, dialogue promoted
lexical alignment, but so did feedback, although to a lesser extent. However, Experi-
ment 3 confounded lexical and conceptual feedback (compare the control and silent con-
ditions in Figures 7.1 and 7.2, respectively). Experiment 4 thus separated the two, and
found that lexical alignment showed a strong dependence on lexical feedback, but none
on conceptual feedback. So, people seem to have an easier time aligning their labels than
their concepts. While participants’ convergence on lexical choices is consistent with pre-
vious work, the difference between the lexical and conceptual results warns us against
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assuming an equivalence between lexical and conceptual alignment, as is often done in
the literature (e.g., Brennan and Clark 1996). I discuss the lexical-conceptual dissociation
further in the next section.
Finally, Experiments 2 and 3 also looked at preserved alignment. Participants carried
out joint categorisation tasks (and, in the case of Experiment 3, similarity judgement
tasks) after interacting together, to see whether their interaction had a lasting effect on
their alignment. The results for both experiments found no such effects for conceptual
alignment. This is particularly striking given the sharp difference in online alignment
between the talking condition and the other conditions in Experiment 3: despite hav-
ing coordinated so well conceptually during interaction, the convergence disappeared
entirely afterwards. These results are in conflict with previous experiments that have
investigated preserved conceptual alignment, which have found that people who inter-
acted linguistically in a joint task were more aligned afterwards than those that did not
(Markman and Makin 1998; Voiklis 2008). As discussed in Section 7.5.3, this may have
been due to the properties of the stimulus domain in my experiment, since in contrast to
previous experiments, I specifically aimed to adopt stimulus sets that were as challen-
ging to categorise as possible.
Preserved lexical alignment showed different results. Experiment 2 found that some
lexical convergence did occur, but did so regardless of condition. However, this experi-
ment was generally not very sensitive, and the lack of difference between conditions here
could also be an artifact of that. Indeed, Experiment 3 found that interaction did help
convergence, although dialogue specifically did not enhance it further. Together, these
results suggest again that it is relatively easy for pairs to converge on the same labels,
which is consistent with lexical alignment results showing how participants sometimes
stick to the same referential expressions even after switching communication partners
(e.g., Brennan and Clark 1996; Malt and Sloman 2004). However, in conjunction with the
conceptual results, there seems to again be evidence for a lexical-conceptual dissociation,
although this might be partly explained by the unit of alignment issue I discussed in the
previous section.
In the next two sections, I take up two central themes surrounding these results. First, I
discuss the dissociation that has been repeatedly cropping up between lexical and con-
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ceptual alignment. Second, I return to the logically distinct but related question with
which I began this thesis: the role that language still plays in conceptual alignment.
9.3.3 Dissociation between lexical and conceptual alignment
Before continuing, it is important to clearly distinguish two quite different ways in which
language has been involved in my experiments. On one hand, the use of language has
beenmanipulated as an independent variable. In particular, the experimental conditions
in Experiments 2-4 varied in terms of whether people could use dialogue and whether
they received label feedback. On the other hand, linguistic output was measured as
a dependent variable. Participants’ category labels were compared to calculate lexical
alignment. The experiments have explored how the linguistic manipulations affect both
lexical alignment and conceptual alignment. As a result, the issue of the relationship
between lexical and conceptual alignment should not be confused with the question of
how language affects conceptual alignment. Consequently, I treat the two issues separ-
ately.
I begin, in this section, with the relationship between lexical and conceptual alignment.
I have emphasised from the beginning the importance of not assuming an a priori equi-
valence between words and concepts, and between lexical and conceptual alignment.
My experiments have demonstrated that this was not just a minor theoretical quibble,
but that once we manage to separate the two phenomena methodologically, we find a
real separation between the two.
Indeed, all four experiments in this thesis have found evidence that lexical and concep-
tual alignment are not equivalent, as argued by Schober (2005). Experiment 1 revealed
more lexical than conceptual alignment among speakers of the same language. In Ex-
periment 2, participants converged lexically, while showing no conceptual convergence.
Experiment 3 found that lexical alignment came more easily to participants than con-
ceptual alignment, both during and after interaction. And Experiment 4 discovered that
conceptual alignment was primarily dependent on conceptual feedback, while lexical
alignment was only affected by lexical feedback.
Of course, this does not imply that words and concepts have nothing to do with each
other, or that lexical and conceptual alignment never correspond. Clearly, that would be
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overstating the case, and there are also results in my experiments which qualify such an
untenably strong stance. Moreover, it would be unfair to summarily dismiss previous
work which has assumed equivalences between lexical and conceptual alignment. To
a large extent, it is probably a matter of precision. In my experiments, the differences
between stimuli were very small and the concepts that people used varied very subtly,
but in other experiments the stimuli tended to be more distinct, and the conceptual can-
didates more clear. For instance, Brennan and Clark’s (1996) experiment involved lexic-
alisations of footwear (among other things) at various degrees of specificity (e.g., “shoe”,
“loafer”). There can be little doubt that these terms do suggest different conceptualisa-
tions, at different levels of abstraction, and that these are at least partially shared by
speakers of the same language. Similarly, there is no doubt that the different description
schemes (e.g., “B3”, “top right”) that participants used in Garrod and Anderson’s (1987)
maze experiment reflected different conceptual bases of solving the referential challenge.
Words clearly tell us something useful.
Nevertheless, what we must be on guard against is the logical jump from vague reflec-
tion to solid equivalence. Lexical alignment seems to be more superficial and straight-
forward than conceptual alignment. In other words, people agree readily on expressions
for things, but that does not imply that they conceptualise them in entirely the same way.
I pursue the implications of this in Section 9.5.3 for the relationship between words and
concepts.
9.3.4 The role of language in conceptual alignment
We are now in a position to address the general research question that I posed way back
in Section 1.2: does language bring about conceptual coordination between individuals?
The results of my experiments, together with previous literature, suggest that it does.
When interacting linguistically, people’s conceptualisations of things in the world come
closer together, at least for the duration of the interaction. However, the extent to which
alignment occurs depends on the form of language that is available. If people can com-
municate freely using dialogue, then they can align quite precisely. But if they only have
access to the labels that their interactants assign to their categories, then alignment is
much weaker and is actually also (and more) dependent on perceptual support.
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Why should there be such a big difference between the effects of dialogue and label
feedback? After all, we might at first imagine that the main benefits of dialogue would
come from being able to share lexicalisations of the stimuli, which would trigger specific
conceptual associations. However, it does not appear that this was the case, since lexical
and conceptual alignment have revealed a dissociation, and since the combination of
lexical and conceptual feedback was nowhere near as beneficial as dialogue. Therefore,
it seems more likely that it was other rich features of dialogue that were responsible.
In particular, the possibility to describe items in detail, to focus on one at a time, and
to check decisions with each other may have been more important factors. In effect,
dialogue may have turned the problem from one of a single conceptual snapshot into
a gradual cumulative negotiation, during which participants converge and align their
conceptualisations. This is in line with the action view of language use developed by
Clark and colleagues (e.g., Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs 1986; Schober and Clark 1989; Clark
and Brennan 1991; Brennan and Clark 1996; Clark 1996).
This explanation of the extra benefits provided by dialogue raises a couple of import-
ant issues. First, one of the goals of my experiment designs has been to manipulate the
availability of language while maintaining interaction and a joint goal. Consequently,
the joint tasks in Experiments 3 and 4 asked participants to try to coordinate their cat-
egories, and gave them feedback, even when dialogue was not allowed. In some cases,
the feedback included both groupings and labels, so that after each task participants ef-
fectively had a complete conceptual and lexical snapshot of their partner’s categories.
However, this form of interaction was rather impoverished: participants could not actu-
ally interact with each other at all during the individual tasks.
As mentioned in Section 7.5.4, there are different ways in which this point could be
interpreted. On one hand, it could be argued that this places participants in the dialogue
condition (in Experiment 3) at an unfair advantage: while the difference between the
silent and talking conditions was only supposed to be the addition of dialogue while
keeping the interaction constant, the change also fundamentally enhanced some of the
features of the interaction itself. Under this interpretation, the manipulation failed to
control for interaction, and thus did not isolate the effect of dialogue.
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On the other hand, we could emphasise that the only mechanical difference between the
silent and talking conditions was that partners were allowed to speak, which entails that
we did isolate the role of dialogue. If dialogue has properties which result in a richer
form of interaction, then that is an important part of what dialogue brings to the table. If
we interpret in this way, then the manipulation, far from being a failure, is particularly
illuminating because it highlights some of the special mechanical features of dialogue.
I do not try to resolve this issue categorically, because the points are actually comple-
mentary. It would be fruitful to push the framework in future experiments in a way
which somehowmaintains a high level of interaction in non-linguistic conditions. But it
would also be useful to consider how the mechanical differences in such future experi-
ments may themselves be due to language.
These considerations are reminiscent of Clark and Brennan’s (1991) analysis of how fea-
tures of communication media can affect the development of common ground. Clark
and Brennan listed eight different dimensions along which communication media can
differ, and claimed that the further you get away from normal face-to-face conversation
along these dimensions, the more grounding is affected. Although it is not obvious how
the features they identify apply to experimental conditions inmy framework, the general
idea is compelling and can be recruited for the current problem.
These perspectives point to a specific overarching view of language’s role in conceptual
alignment. In particular, I propose that the extent to which language affects concep-
tual alignment depends substantially on the richness of the form of language use avail-
able. The more that this form resembles full, natural, face-to-face conversation, the more
people are able to exploit it to align their conceptualisations. This suggestion is reminis-
cent of Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark’s (1992) proposal that there are different levels of shared
information between speaker and hearer (or overhearer), depending on how intimately
they are interacting.
Analogous predictions can be incorporated with respect to other relevant dimensions,
such as time course, language proficiency, and non-linguistic information. In particular,
conceptual alignment would be predicted to be strongest during the course of interaction
(dissipating afterwards), for adult native speakers of a language, and with rich non-
linguistic information (e.g., category grouping feedback, seeing each other’s faces, etc.).
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The results that I have obtained concerning the temporal and non-linguistic dimensions
are broadly consistent with this proposal. While I did not test language proficiency, note
that similar predictions have beenmade by Costa, Pickering and Sorace (2008) regarding
alignment in non-native speakers.
The proposal has the advantage of making falsifiable predictions. As long as we could
reasonably specify in advance how different conditions rank along the key dimensions
above, we could test the model accordingly. And since my experimental framework
could be readily applied to many different problems which explore this parameter space
(see Section 9.2), the tools now largely exist to explore this further.
We can now also try to reincorporate lexical alignment, and what we have learned about
its relationship to conceptual alignment. It is useful to recall a few key findings in this
respect. First, we have seen that, at least for prior alignment, lexical alignment is much
higher than conceptual alignment (for native speakers of the same language). Second,
we have also seen that lexical alignment (at least of the identifier-based variety) seems to
happenmore easily and lasts longer than conceptual alignment. Third, despite the disso-
ciation between lexical and conceptual alignment, conceptual alignment scores correlate
strongly with lexical alignment scores.
In sum, putting these results together with my current proposal suggests the following
further predictions for future work. Lexical alignment should normally be higher than
conceptual alignment (if it were measured fairly based on both identifiers and items),
and the closer they are to full alignment, the closer they will tend to be to each other, both
in value (along the measure) and in correspondence (how they carve up the conceptual
space).
As such, this proposal extends the discussion in Section 7.5.2. There I argued that the
debate about the fit between lexical and conceptual alignment can be reconciled by con-
sidering the form and context of linguistic interaction. When people can resort to full
dialogue, conceptual and lexical alignment will coincide to a high degree. But to the
extent that the form of linguistic interaction at people’s disposal is impoverished and
lacking non-linguistic support, the two types of alignment dissociate from each other.
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9.4 Linguistic relativity
My work also sheds light and suggests a certain perspective on the issue of linguistic
relativity. Experiment 1 used cross-linguistic data to show how non-linguistic categor-
isation did not reliably reflect linguistic categorisation. However, it also revealed that
speakers of the same language were more conceptually aligned than speakers of differ-
ent languages. Nevertheless, I argued in Section 5.3.4.3 that this difference was probably
not due to language, but rather other cultural factors.
Moreover, my other experiments also have complementary implications for this issue.
Three clear conclusions that emerged from my findings were that there is substantial
variation in how native speakers of the same language conceptualise things, that con-
ceptualisation can change over a short period of time even within individuals (albeit
perhaps temporarily), and that the associations between words and concepts are not
fixed. To the extent that these claims are valid, they also cast doubt on a strong view of
the effect of language on thought.
However, as discussed in Section 3.3.5, such a strong static view of linguistic relativ-
ity has already been generally abandoned, and replaced by weaker and more dynamic
versions. In particular, Slobin (1996) suggested that perhaps our language only affects
cognition when we are actively using it, and Kay and Kempton (1984) proposed that
language is exploited as a strategy when solving otherwise difficult problems.
Notice that Experiments 3 and 4 could also be interpreted in these terms. In both exper-
iments, participants were explicitly given a difficult problem (i.e., trying to coordinate
their categories), for which language could be strategically used. Although only native
English speakers were involved, the stimulus domain was so finely sampled that lexical
patterns of individuals varied considerably. Therefore, we could think of participants as
speakers of different dynamic idiolects, rather than a single monolithic language, and the
experiments examine how they converge through interaction, both lexically and concep-
tually (Steels 1997). As Malt and Sloman (2004) pointed out, to the extent that linguistic
relativity effects do exist, they must ultimately originate from some form of interaction
with members of a language community. Experiments 3 and 4 could thus be interpreted
as investigating how linguistic relativity effects could emerge through interaction. Since
both experiments provided evidence for a linguistic manipulation impacting the degree
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of conceptual alignment between people, they show indirect support for a weak, dy-
namic view of linguistic relativity. In particular, our language does affect how we con-
ceptualise things, but it does so online through linguistic use and interaction.
It is important to acknowledge that this perspective implicitly reconsiders howwe think
of the source of words in linguistic relativity investigations. A priori, it is important to
distinguish whether we are examining the effects of hearing word input from others,
or of the words internally stored in our minds. However, if we conclude that linguistic
relativity effects are specific to instances of language use, and recognise that the funda-
mental arena of language use is social and interactive (Clark 1996), then the distinction
about the source of words begins to break down. After all, even when a change in how
we conceptualise something is brought about through the verbal input of someone else,
it must still be processed through our own minds. For words to affect conceptualisation
in explicit language use, they must still be triggered in the individual. How the trigger-
ing actually takes place, on the other hand, could be considered a separate issue, though
also a potentially illuminating one.
Therefore, while I am suggesting that my experimental results do provide support for
linguistic relativity, it is in the context of a particularly weak interpretation of it. While
this may be consistent with previous anti-Whorfian findings in the object domain (e.g.,
Malt et al. 1999), it is substantially weaker than some of the conclusions that have come
out of work in other areas (e.g, Levinson 2003; Roberson, Davies and Davidoff 2000).
How do we reconcile these differences? I suggest that these differences may come from
the nature of the domains and the cognitive constraints imposed by a language. The
colour domain, for example, is inherently continuous and can in principle be divided
up in any number of ways, which places language in a particularly fluid space. And
different linguistically encoded spatial frames of reference require different information
to be encoded, without which speakers could not express basic spatial propositions and
hearers could not understand them. Objects, on the other hand, are relatively concrete,
tending to cluster in natural kinds (Gentner and Boroditsky 2001), and do not need to be
placed in a special cognitive framework to support communication. Therefore, it is not
surprising that our native language does affect conceptualisation of objects too, but just
not as deeply or pervasively as in some other areas.
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9.5 Revisiting conceptual issues
In Chapter 2, I developed a simple model for the structures and processes involving con-
cepts, and then had it ground the experiments of my thesis. Now that the experiments
are behind us, it is time to reassess some of the major theoretical issues that underlay
that development.
9.5.1 Concepts and categories
One important theme has been the distinction between concepts and categories. I ar-
gued in Section 2.4.1 that although the distinction between these is often blurred, that
wasn’t to happen here. Concepts determine categories, but they exist in the mind, while
categories are constructs of the psychologist trying to make sense of them. However,
despite being adamant about the distinction, I also followed the psychological route in
using categorisation experiments to access people’s concepts (see Section 4.2). Since we
cannot access people’s concepts directly, I argued, and concepts determine categories,
then categories are still our best shot for accessing concepts. As a result, when I obtained
categorisation outputs from pairs of participants and quantitatively compared them, I
called the result a measure of “conceptual alignment”. Should I have been calling it
“category alignment”?
I think not, and stand behind my original decision. As I discussed in Section 8.5.3, for
people to align their categories, they have to go through concepts. Each task involved
a different subset of stimuli, so memorising the specific stimuli wouldn’t do. Instead,
participants had to try, at some level, to infer their partner’s concepts, which in some
cases was based on groupings, but in others (depending on their condition) would have
involved labels or just a task score. Their subsequent categorisation output remained
our best means of accessing the concept.
Notice that, in effect, Experiment 4 asked whether this reliance on the category as the
primary indicator of a concept was also to be found in participants. When people have
access to both categories and words, which do they manage better with for aligning
their conceptualisations? The experiment found that participants primarily relied on the
categories as well.
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On the other hand, it’s important to remember Frege’s (1892/1948) lesson: multiple con-
cepts can determine the same category, and so a category underdetermines its concept.
In other words, just because two people produce the same category groupings, doesn’t
mean that they actually have identical concepts. In fact, perhaps if we actually dis-
covered how to compare concepts without resorting exclusively to category informa-
tion, we might find that some other factor outweighs it, and that we have been getting
misleading comparisons all along.
Until then, however, we should continue using categorisation to access concepts. Both
the literature and experiment participants suggest that it is the best way. Indeed, we
should not shy away from interpreting such tasks conceptually, lest we revert to limiting
forms of behaviourism (Malt 2006).
9.5.2 Concepts, conceptualisation and variation
One of the first tasks of this thesis was to dismiss the assumption of conceptual uni-
versals. Since my thesis is in psychology, that was fairly easy. In fact, I did not even
have to prove that variation exists, but only argue that we must not assume universals
a priori. And conceptual variation in my experiments, though sometimes very subtle,
was pervasive, strengthening this position further. Indeed, the experiments suggest that
concepts are very dynamic and flexible, although perhaps not as flexible as words.
This has the potential to push us towards a radical theoretical position, in which there
are no fixed, static concepts (Smith and Samuelson 1997). Instead, we may conclude that
concepts are “created at themoment of use” (Croft and Cruse 2004, p. 75). This, however,
would be unfortunate, as it would lead us into a host of new problems, not the least of
which concerns what concepts would actually be created from (Hurford, personal com-
munication). Although there are proposals of how to deal with such dynamic concepts,
such as the recruitment of rich perceptual representations (Barsalou 1999; Prinz 2002),
they are still relatively new and radical.
A potential alternative solution comes from studies of howwordmeanings can bemodu-
lated by context (Murphy 2002). 1 For instance, Roth and Shoben (1983) got participants
1Note that since I merged word meanings with concepts (see Section 2.4.3.1), I can readily recruit such
findings for a view of concepts as well.
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to give typicality ratings on the interpretation of “beverage” in different contexts. They
found that the word tended to be interpreted quite differently in the contexts of secret-
aries or truck drivers, for example. More generally, Cruse (1986) claims that “A single
sense can be modified in an unlimited number of ways by different contexts, each con-
text emphasising certain semantic traits, and obscuring or suppressing others” (p. 52). In
otherwords, here we are having the best of bothworlds: many subtly different meanings
but subsumed under one unifying sense.
However, we could take this further. In fact, we could even try to take it as far as Fodor
(1998)’s conceptual universals. Recall that Fodor (1998) had argued that conceptual vari-
ation was unacceptable, because then we would never be able to say that we are talking
about the same thing. If we were feeling really adventurous, we could try to re-adopt
universal concepts seriously and just stipulate that they undergo massive contextual
modulation all the time. This could then account for all kinds of apparent conceptual
variation, including the variation in my experiments.
Trying to resolve this issue would be a mess, however, without more theoretical tools.
Fortunately, we can largely bypass this issue by focusing on instances of conceptualisa-
tion rather than concepts themselves. By doing so, we take a snapshot of a concept of a
particular person at a particular time, and are not bound to make any theoretical claims
about the integrity of the concept across people or time. Moreover, as we can see by
comparing Figures 2.5 and 2.8 (reproduced here as Figure 9.1), a particular act of con-
ceptualisation (in contrast to a concept in general) also has the advantage of having just
one specific word associated with it (if any), and normally identifies real objects in the
world. As such, it is easy to compare two people’s conceptualisations, provided they are







Figure 9.1: A concept’s relationship with words and its category (left), versus an act of concep-
tualisation labeled by a particular word and applied to particular objects (right).
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This is what my experiments and framework have sought to do. Conceptual snapshots
were taken of people at different times, and compared with their experimental partners.
By doing so, I bypassed the problem of conceptual identity or development altogether.
While this problem should ultimately be resolved, we can go a long way without doing
so, and thereby avoid all kinds of philosophical turmoil.
9.5.3 Concepts and words
The results of my experiments have shown that concepts and words do not seem to be
as intimately related as is commonly assumed. In Experiment 1, people’s non-linguistic
sorting was shown to differ from the way they named things, consistent with previous
findings (Malt et al. 1999; Ameel, Storms, Malt and Sloman 2005). Experiments 3 and
4 complemented these findings by showing that even when people aligned their lexical
choices, this did not necessarily correspond to aligning conceptually as well. This corrob-
orates results which have shown that people’s interpretations of words can be surpris-
ingly divergent (Schober, Conrad and Fricker 2004). Experiment 4 in particular assessed
the correspondence between lexical and conceptual alignment, and revealed that it was
not straightforward. Sometimes people used the same labels but categorised completely
differently, and conversely, sometimes they would categorise identically despite using
different labels.
Nevertheless, this dissociation should not be overstated. As was seen in Figure 8.10,
despite all of the divergent examples found in Experiment 4, these were still a minor-
ity. Indeed, there was still a highly significant correspondence between words and con-
cepts. Lexical alignment depended only on label feedback, and conceptual alignment
depended mostly on grouping feedback, but they were still closely related. As such,
despite all the variation, the connection is still constrained (Geeraerts 1993). We cer-
tainly don’t just say anything to refer to a particular item, and the more we diverge from
the prototypical meaning of a word the harder it is for listeners to process what we say
and understand us (Garrod and Sanford 1977).
However, the relationships betweenwords and concepts are arbitrary andmust be learned,
so it should not be surprising that they are less reliable than the deterministic connec-
tions between concepts and categories. Words may appear to be our best cue of others’
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concepts in our everyday lives, because we do not always have access to snapshots of
their categories (as in my experiments), especially for abstract concepts. Nevertheless,
the cases when we do are illuminating. Consider the example of going to the super-
market and looking for lemon juice. Do you look for the aisle with a certain label (e.g.,
“Juice”), or do you look for the kinds of things that are normally found near lemon juice?
Strategies no doubt differ and their relative effectiveness will depend on the particular
situation (e.g., going to a supermarket in China without knowing any Chinese) but in
any case, we are certainly not at the mercy of words all the time. These considerations
have implications for practical applications in the real world, from the labelling of recyc-
ling bins to the marketing of new car models.
Nevertheless, my results also add to our understanding of how hearing the words of
others can affect our conceptualisations. Although this was particularly true when dia-
logue was available (Experiment 3), it also applied to a lesser extent when only category
labels were exchanged (Experiment 4). These results are corroborated by previous find-
ings (see Section 3.2). Some experiments have shown how conceptualisation or memory
of visual stimuli can be affected by the linguistic label (if any) they are presented with
(e.g., Carmichael, Hogan and Walters 1932; Billman and Krych 1998; Feist and Gentner
2007). More recently, labels were shown to enhance category learning even when com-
pletely redundant (Lupyan, Rakison and McClelland 2007), and there is ample evidence
that such effects originate very early in development (e.g., Waxman and Markow 1995;
Plunkett, Hu and Cohen 2008). At the same time, it should be acknowledged that these
effects are generally subtle. As we have seen, language can help, but it seems to be too
“sketchy” to determine thought (Gleitman and Papafragou 2005, p. 636).
Consider now the opposite direction. Recall that my experiments, and Experiment 4 in
particular, did not show any evidence that access to other’s category groupings leads to
lexical alignment. Even when participants could see how their partner categorised the
items and were able to conceptually align with them, they did not align lexically as well
without lexical feedback. Therefore, they did not seem to be converging conceptually by
determining what lexical concept their partner had in mind, but did so independently
of language. This exemplifies how “conceptual preparation” in lexical production is
not automatically determined by the referent, but depends on a speaker’s intention and
conceptualisation (Levelt, Roelofs and Meyer 1999, p. 3), and how there are often many
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reasonable ways of referring to things (Brennan and Clark 1996; Malt and Sloman 2004).
The human mind is very flexible, of which our use of language is a particularly good
example.
So how shouldwe think of the dynamic relationship betweenwords and concepts? Geer-
aerts (1993) offered the metaphor of a floodlight which lights up slightly different areas
with different applications (see Section 2.4.3.2). However, this view does not naturally
mesh with the fact that words enter into all kinds of semantic relationships with each
other, while at the same timemoving dynamically on top of conceptual space. I therefore
propose the metaphor of a fishing net floating on the surface of the sea, while anchored
to the bottom, with each knot in the net representing a word. As the waves move up
and down, the net gets slightly displaced, and different weather conditions affect how
it moves, stretches and makes contact with the sea. Similarly, words relate to concepts
in a dynamic way, and the relationships depend on various factors. It does not mean
that variation is rampant or random. As long as your sea is similar enough to mine, and
you anchor and build your net in a similar way, we should still be able to communicate
effectively (Churchland 1998). Indeed, the plausibility of such variation is supported by
psychologically motivated multi-agent computer simulations which have yielded high
communicative success despite substantial divergence between individuals’ conceptual
systems (Smith 2005).
Acknowledging the dynamic and variable nature of the relationship between words
and concepts has implications for theories of meaning. First of all, although it can be
tempting to groundmeaning in universal objective categories (Putnam 1975), ultimately
this cannot be maintained. Putnam (1981) was right when he abandoned his original
view, because meanings “just ain’t in the world”. Similarly, theories which place mean-
ing in the mind but rely on fixed, universal concepts are also problematic (Fodor 1975;
Jackendoff 1983). Indeed, while some linguists have stressed semantic diversity across
languages (Evans and Levinson 2009), we need to additionally consider such diversity
within languages. To that end, linguists should focus on semantic theories which em-
brace variation and situate meaning where it belongs, in the mediating and dynamic
human mind. Such views are emphasised and developed in cognitive linguistics (Lakoff
1987; Langacker 1987; Croft and Cruse 2004).
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9.5.4 Internal structure
Earlier on in my thesis (see Section 2.5), I argued for and adopted a hybrid view of
internal conceptual structure, based on a fusion of prototype, theory and exemplar the-
ories. And in discussing Experiment 4, I interpreted some of my results within this view
(see Section 8.5.3). The conclusion, although tentative at this point, was primarily in fa-
vour of exemplar theory. Here, I do not reopen that analysis, but only briefly discuss a
more general point.
In particular, this thesis demonstrates how we can fruitfully investigate the interface
between the internal and external relationships of concepts, bringing together insights
from different disciplines. Philosophers, linguists and semioticians have long studied
how words seem to relate to both categories of things in the world, and concepts in the
mind. But in fact, analogous relationships exist in the human mind as well. Concepts
seem to be composed of relatively abstract senses together with stores of concrete ex-
emplars. With some important modifications, senses correspond to what concepts or
meanings have traditionally been considered to be (Frege 1892/1948). Exemplars, on the
other hand, are active in our mental models of the actual things in the world being (or
having been) conceptualised (Johnson-Laird 1983). Both are stored in themind, and both
play important roles in conceptual processes. Moreover, while word forms are public,
they too are stored in our minds, and are associated with concepts. Therefore, while se-
miotic triangles (see Section 2.4.4), for example, have traditionally been used to visualise
the relationships between words, concepts and categories externally to the mind, they
are also instantiated in a very real way inside each person’s mind. However, they take
on slightly different forms for each individual, and change over time. By integrating
these mind-internal and mind-external perspectives from different disciplines, we can
make important new steps in our understanding of language, mind and meaning.
9.6 Conceptual development, language acquisition, and language evolution
Although my experiments have used familiar stimulus domains, they clearly have an
important element of learning. In Experiments 3 and 4 in particular, participants were
asked to try to coordinate their categorisation as closely as possible with that of their
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partner. While we can argue about whether this involves conceptual acquisition, per-
manent change, or temporary modulation (see Section 9.5.2), some kind of learning is
required, whether implicitly or explicitly. Indeed, in Section 2.3.1, I reviewed how con-
cepts seem to vary at several different timescales. My experiments have dealt with inter-
cultural and online levels of variation, but a full account of language’s role in conceptual
variation would also encompass the developmental and evolutionary timescales. As
such, we should consider how the methods, findings and conclusions I have presented
here relate to developmental and evolutionary issues. Unfortunately, I do not have the
space to do justice to these massive themes, but I must at least accommodate a couple of
brief remarks.
An important question in children’s development concerns the relationship between
conceptual development and language acquisition. Which comes first, the concept or
the word? A lot of research has been devoted to the topic, and the emerging answer is
not simple. Concepts do not require language (Bermúdez 2003), and even pre-linguistic
infants have substantial conceptual abilities (Hespos and Spelke 2004). However, words
do help shape and augment conceptual development, although there are different per-
spectives on themechanisms and extent of that influence (Bowerman and Levinson 2001;
Carey 2009).
This general consensus is in line with my position that conceptualisation does not rely
on language, and yet can be affected by it. Moreover, my experimental framework offers
new ways in which these issues can be investigated. Because the framework is expli-
citly designed not to rely on language and does not presuppose what specific concepts
children have, we could readily test whether children align, both lexically and concep-
tually, and whether feedback or dialogue would have a different effect on them. Based
on the view that I have developed, I would predict that language should have a relat-
ively small effect on conceptual alignment in children, and that conceptual and lexical
alignment should be more dissociated than in adults, since language is not yet as deeply
entrenched in their minds. In fact, there is evidence that children align readily at the lex-
ical level, but are relatively unconcerned when they discover an underlying conceptual
misalignment (Garrod and Clark 1993).
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Similar issues exist concerning the emergence of language on an evolutionary timescale.
Although simple signaling systems do exist in some animal species, such as vervet mon-
keys (Seyfarth and Cheney 1990), human language appears to be unique in having an
enormous number of arbitrary, symbolic and learned associations between signals and
concepts. So how did words first emerge, and what effect did they have on the evolu-
tion of concepts? Again, researchers have made different claims concerning whether our
hominid ancestors already had “proto-concepts” (Hurford 2007), or whether conceptual
abilities were radically transformed with the emergence of a biological capacity for sym-
bols (Deacon 1997). However, these positions agree that language helped transform the
conceptual landscape.
While the above perspectives have offered biological explanations for language evol-
ution, an alternative approach has suggested that many features of human language
and cognition could have cultural origins (Tomasello 2000). Although this view is still
dependent on a base of biological prerequisites for language to be in place (Hurford
1999), it argues that the cognitive abilities which emerge in human ontogeny, together
with the social nature of human interaction, have themselves radically transformed our
minds. As a result, some researchers have begun to study the cultural emergence of lin-
guistic structure in the laboratory using chains of human participants (Kirby, Cornish
and Smith 2008). While such experiments have generally assumed a uniform concep-
tual space, continuous meaning spaces (as in my experiments) have also been adopted
recently with success (Matthews, Kirby and Cornish 2010).
My experimental framework could be applied to both biological and cultural explora-
tions of the role of language in conceptual evolution. Since free classification tasks again
do not rely on language or presuppose particular concepts, they are suitable for compar-
ative studies, and have been used with monkeys and apes (Spinozzi 1996). Experiments
could be conducted to see whether they categorised differently when hearing or utter-
ing communicative signals, whether they be those of their own species, human words,
or symbols acquired in previous training. It seems likely, though, that the relative lack of
cognitive and signal flexibility in non-human primates would lead to weaker alignment
in apes than in humans. On the cultural side, human cultural transmission experiments
could investigate whether conceptual alignment could carry over and grow from one
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generation to the next. In effect, this has parallels with dialogue experiments where par-
ticipants change partners (Garrod and Doherty 1994; Brennan and Clark 1996; Malt and
Sloman 2004). Based on those studies andmy own, I would predict that language should
affect conceptual alignment across such transmission chains, but that it would depend
on the richness of the linguistic interaction and shared perceptual information between
participants.
9.7 Conclusion
This thesis began with a seemingly simple question: does language bring about concep-
tual coordination? In a way, the answer seems obvious. We use language to communic-
ate with others, coordinate our behaviour in joint projects, and express our perspectives
on all kinds of things: so how could language not coordinate conceptualisation? On the
other hand, there are also good reasons for being suspicious of such a conclusion. In par-
ticular, given the private nature of concepts, we cannot assume a priori that words and
concepts fall into neat relationships that are uniform within language communities. But
if that uniformity turns out to be lacking, then perhaps language’s apparent effectiveness
at coordinating conceptualisation may be an illusion, and this warrants empirical study.
The experimental results confirm these suspicions. People with the same native lan-
guage divide up the world into very similar lexical categories, and when they commu-
nicate, they can adopt each other’s words with ease. But if we look closely enough, that
does not seem to be generally reflected in how they conceptualise things: coordination of
words does not imply coordination of concepts. In fact, conceptual coordination seems
to benefit much more from seeing how someone sorts things into categories rather than
how they label them. Indeed, in this sense, people’s priorities seem to parallel those
of cognitive psychologists, who assume a close correspondence between concepts and
categories, while shying away from trying to relate words and concepts (Murphy 2002).
Yet that is not the whole story. Under some circumstances, language certainly does help
conceptual coordination. But it is not trivial, and depends on the form of language use
and the degree of shared information. In fact, if language is used in full natural conver-
sation, it can greatly increase conceptual coordination. And to a smaller extent, coordin-
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ation can also improve even with more impoverished forms of language, as long as it’s
supported by alternative forms of feedback. But some form of grounding is essential.
As I have suggested throughout this chapter, a lot of work remains to be done to test
the emerging conclusions and explore the issues further. Moreover, the theoretical and
methodological challenges that needed to be faced in order to get this project off the
ground have resulted in other forms of contribution as well. In particular, a theoretical
model of conceptualisation and conceptual coordination was developed, along with a
corresponding experimental framework, both of which could be fruitfully recruited in
addressing many different research questions. In addition, although I have explored
various implications ofmy findings, limited space has not allowedme to do them justice,
so that I have barely touched on relevant themes like bilingualism, artificial intelligence,
semiotics and sociolinguistics.
Nevertheless, the main result is clear. Our language does not determine the concepts
that we have, and language use does not automatically bring people’s concepts together.
Merely throwing words around is generally useless. However, if language is set free in
its full forms of interactive usage, or is supported by rich alternative sources of informa-





Below are the instructions for the naming task in the three languages.
English
In this part of the experiment, your task is to individually label each of the object
pictures. Please choose a name that seems best or most natural to you. You do not
need to use a unique name for each object (i.e., it’s fine to call multiple items the same
thing). The name can consist of one or more words. Please write the number and
name on the form provided (the object’s number is written on the back of its card).
When you’re finished, please let me know.
Japanese
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Polish
W tej cze֒ści eksperymentu zadanie polega na nazwaniu każdego z obiektów, które
widzisz na obrazkach. Wybierz nazwe֒, która wydaje Ci sie֒ najlepsza lub najbardziej
naturalna. Nazwy moga֒ sie powtarzać i moga֒ składać sie֒ z jednego lub kilka słów.
Na formularzu zamieszczonym poniżej zapisz, wybrana֒ przez Ciebie nazwe֒ obiektu
i jego numer (znajdziesz go z drugiej strony obrazka). Poinformuj mnie, prosze֒, kiedy
skończysz.
Sorting task
Below are the instructions for the sorting task in the three languages.
English
In this part of the experiment, your task is to arrange the object pictures into 3 to 8
groups based on similarity. Please focus on the physical qualities of each object (i.e.,
what it looks like). Put together into piles all the objects that you think are very similar
to each other physically. When you’re finished, please let me know.
Japanese
Polish
W tej cze֒ści eksperymentu zadanie polega na uporza֒dkowaniu obiektów w grupy
(powinno grup być nie mniej niż 3 i nie wie֒cej niż 8). Skup sie na cechach fizycznych
(wygla֒dzie) tych przedmiotów - przyporza֒dkuj do tej samej grupy obiekty, ktore wy-
daja֒ Ci sie bardzo podobnewygla֒dem. Poinformuj mnie, prosze֒, kiedy skończysz.
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A.2 Questionnaire
Participants were asked for their name, age, gender, study program (i.e.,. degree, subject,
year), their length of stay in the UK, the languages they spoke (with self-rated proficien-
cies), the countries they had lived in (with the number of years), and their familiarity
with the stimuli (“How familiar were the objects to you?”) on a scale from 1 (very unfa-




Below are the instructions provided to participants, first for the interface in general, and
then for each task. They are divided up by condition where appropriate. Note that inter-
face instructions also came with a snapshot of the categorisation interface as it appears
at the beginning of the training task.
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Interface description
The tasks in this experiment involve sorting pictures of everyday objects into categor-
ies. In each task, you will sort the items into categories using the interface shown at
right.
Your job in each taskwill be to put each item from the black pool of items in the bottom
right into one of the nine blue category boxes on the left, and to label the categories.
You do not need to use all of the boxes, but please use at least three, with a maximum
of sixteen items per category (the programwill warn you if you try to putmore). There
are 6 basic actions you can perform, described below.
A paper copy of these instructions has also been provided to you. Please feel free to
refer to it at any time.
Actions
Naming a category Before putting items into a category, you must give the category
a name. This is done by typing a name in the place provided beneath each cat-
egory.
Adding an item to a category First click on the item, whichwill move it into the green
focus box in the top right andmagnify it for convenience. Then click on the ‘Add’
button underneath the category of your choice.
Magnifying a category You can magnify an entire category (or the pool) by clicking
on the ‘Big’ button beneath it. This will show you all the items in that category
in a larger size.
Changing the focus item If you have put an item in the focus box but change your
mind and want to categorise a different item, simply click on another item. The
original item will return to where it came from, and the new item will appear in
the focus box.
Renaming a category You can rename a category at any time by simply editing the
name you gave in the place below the category.
Changing the category of an item First click on the item, which will move it into the
green focus box, and then click on the ‘Add’ button underneath the category you
want to switch to.
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Training task
The first task is a short practice task. Please put all the items you will see in the black
pool of items into the blue category boxes, and name the categories.
Since the main purpose of this practice task is for you to become fully acquainted
with the interface, please try out each of the six operations at least once (i.e., naming
a category, adding an item to a category, magnifying a category, changing the focus
item, renaming a category, and change the category of an item). The program will
remind you at the end if you forget any of them.
First task
It’s time to start the first task. Please put the items into categories, and name the
categories. Remember that you CANNOT speak with the other participant.
Second task
Control condition
It’s time to start the second task. Please put the items into categories, and name the
categories. Remember that you CANNOT speak with the other participant.
Silent condition
It’s time to start the second task. In this task, you will again be putting items into cat-
egories and naming the categories, but this time you will be working with a partner.
Remember that you CANNOT speak with your partner.
You and your partner will take turns at putting the items into categories. It is your
turn when the focus window background is green, and your partner’s turn when it
is red. A turn ends when you put an item in a category (i.e., when you click on an
‘Add’ button). You cannot carry out any actions when it is not your turn (other than
observing your partner’s changes). As before, you can recategorise items or rename
categories, including those categorised or named by your partner. The task ends when
the pool of items is empty, neither partner wants to make any more changes, and both
partners click on ’Done’ in succession.
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Talking condition
It’s time to start the second task. In this task, you will again be putting items into cat-
egories and naming the categories, but this time you will be working with a partner.
This time, you MAY speak to your partner: please do so whenever you feel it would
help.
You and your partner will take turns at putting the items into categories. It is your
turn when the focus window background is green, and your partner’s turn when it
is red. A turn ends when you put an item in a category (i.e., when you click on an
‘Add’ button). You cannot carry out any actions when it is not your turn (other than
observing your partner’s changes). As before, you can recategorise items or rename
categories, including those categorised or named by your partner. The task ends when
the pool of items is empty, neither partner wants to make any more changes, and both
partners click on ’Done’ in succession.
Third task
Control condition
It’s time to start the third task. Please put the items into categories, and name the
categories. Remember that you CANNOT speak with the other participant.
Silent and talking conditions
It’s time to start the third task. In this task, you will again be working on your own.
Please put the items into categories, and name the categories. Remember that you
CANNOT speak with the other participant.
B.2 Questionnaire
Participants were asked for their name, age, gender, nationality, study program (i.e.,.
degree, subject, year), whether they knew their partner, and what languages they spoke
(with self-rated proficiencies). The feedback questions on the questionnaire were as fol-
lows:
1. What do you think was the purpose of the experiment?
2. On what basis did you categorise the pictures?
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3. Did this basis change between the different tasks?
4. How did you agree with your partner on categories for the pictures? pictures?
5. When you looked at an item, did you mentally label it with an English word?
6. How familiar were the pictures to you? (Options: very familiar, familiar, neutral,
unfamiliar, very unfamiliar)
7. How natural-looking were the pictures? (Options: very natural, natural, neutral,
unnatural, very unnatural)
8. Did you notice differences between the sets of pictures from the different tasks?
9. Do you have any comments about the program interface?
10. Do you have any other comments about the experiment?
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B.3 Program interface
Figure B.1: Screenshot of the program interface at the beginning of a task.
APPENDIX B. EXPERIMENT 2 MATERIALS 328




Below are the instructions provided to participants, for the interface in general, the train-
ing task, the sequence of joint tasks, the similarity tasks, and the individual categorisa-
tion tasks. They are divided up by condition where appropriate. Note that interface
instructions also came with a snapshot of the categorisation interface as it appears at the
beginning of the training task.
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Interface description
The main tasks in this experiment involve sorting pictures of everyday objects into
categories. In each task, you will sort the items into categories using the interface
shown at right.
Your job in each taskwill be to put each item from the black pool of items in the bottom
right into one of the four blue category boxes on the left, and to label the categories.
You do not need to use all of the boxes, but please use at least 2, with a maximum of
7 items per category (the program will warn you if you try to put more). There are 6
basic actions you can perform, described below.
A paper copy of these instructions has also been provided to you. Please feel free to
refer to it at any time.
Actions
Naming a category Before putting items into a category, you must give the category
a name. This is done by typing a name in the place provided beneath each cat-
egory.
Adding an item to a category First click on the item, whichwill move it into the green
focus box in the top right andmagnify it for convenience. Then click on the ‘Add’
button underneath the category of your choice.
Magnifying a category You can magnify an entire category (or the pool) by clicking
on the ‘Big’ button beneath it. This will show you all the items in that category
in a larger size.
Changing the focus item If you have put an item in the focus box but change your
mind and want to categorise a different item, simply click on another item. The
original item will return to where it came from, and the new item will appear in
the focus box.
Renaming a category You can rename a category at any time by simply editing the
name you gave in the place below the category.
Changing the category of an item First click on the item, which will move it into the
green focus box, and then click on the ‘Add’ button underneath the category you
want to switch to.
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Training task
The first task is a short practice task. Please put all the items you will see in the black
pool of items into the blue category boxes, and name the categories.
Since the main purpose of this practice task is for you to become fully acquainted
with the interface, please try out each of the six operations at least once (i.e., naming
a category, adding an item to a category, magnifying a category, changing the focus
item, renaming a category, and change the category of an item). The program will
remind you at the end if you forget any of them.
Joint categorisation tasks
Okay, it’s time to start the real thing.
There will now be 10 tasks which involve sorting pictures of shapes into categories. In
these tasks, you will work with a partner. Your partnership will get a score for each
task, and the partnership with the highest total scores will receive a bonus 5 pounds
each.
The goal in each task is to form categories that are as similar as possible to those
of your partner. The order and names of the categories do not matter for the score:
what is important is the item groupings. Note that, in each task, your partner will be
categorising the same items as you, but will initially see them in a different order on
the screen.
Control condition
At the end of each task, the screen will show you your partnership score for that task.
However, you will NOT see your partner’s category groupings or category names.
After 20 seconds, the next task will begin.
Please remember that you CANNOT speak with the other participant.
Good luck!
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Silent condition
At the end of each task, the screen will show you your partnership score for that task.
You will also see your partner’s category groupings and category names beneath
your own. After 20 seconds, the next task will begin.
Please remember that you CANNOT speak with the other participant.
Good luck!
Talking condition
At the end of each task, the screen will show you your partnership score for that task.
You will also see your partner’s category groupings and category names beneath
your own. After 20 seconds, the next task will begin.





The next part of the experiment consists of similarity judgments. You will see pairs of
pictures, one pair at a time, and are asked to judge pair based on how similar you find
the two pictures, on a scale of 1 (very dissimilar) to 7 (very similar).
Training
There will now be 2 pairs of pictures for practice. Please judge the degree of similarity
between each pair.
Main sequence
There will now be 60 pairs of pictures. Please judge the degree of similarity between
each pair.
Please remember that you CANNOT speak with the other participant.
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Individual categorisation tasks
Great, you’re done judging similarity. Now there will be a categorisation task. Please
put the items into categories, and name the categories. The interface will be similar to
the one you used earlier, except that this time there will be more pictures. Please use
at least 2 categories, with a maximum of 20 items per category.
Please remember that you CANNOT speak with the other participant.
C.2 Questionnaire
The participants were asked the same demographic questions as in Experiment 2. The
feedback questions on the questionnaire were as follows:
1. What do you think was the purpose of the experiment?
2. On what basis did you categorise the pictures?
3. Did this basis change between the different tasks?
4. How did you try to agree with your partner on categories for the pictures?
5. On what basis did you assess the similarity between pairs of pictures?
6. When you looked at an item, did you mentally label it with an English word?
7. How familiar were the pictures to you? (options: very familiar, familiar, neutral,
unfamiliar, very unfamiliar)
8. How natural-looking were the pictures? (options: very natural, natural, neutral,
unnatural, very unnatural)
9. Do you have any comments about the program interface?
10. Do you have any other comments about the experiment?
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C.3 Program interface
Figure C.1: Screenshot of the program interface at the beginning of a task.
APPENDIX C. EXPERIMENT 3 MATERIALS 335
Figure C.2: Screenshot of the program interface mid-way through a task.
Figure C.3: Screenshot of the program interface at the end of the task. This example
illustrates what happens in the silent and talking conditions, since both kinds of feedback
are provided.
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Figure C.4: A screenshot of the program during the similarity judment tasks. Parti-
cipants rated silmilarity betwen item pairs on a scale of 1 (very dissimilar) to 7 (very
similar).





Below are the instructions provided to participants, first for the interface in general, then
for the training task, and finally prior to the sequence of joint tasks. They are divided
up by condition where appropriate. Note that interface instructions also came with a
snapshot of the categorisation interface as it appears at the beginning of the training
task.
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Interface description
In this experiment, you will sort pictures into categories using the interface shown at
right. A paper copy of these instructions has also been provided to you: please feel
free to refer to it at any time.
In each task, you need to put each of the eleven pictures in the black area on the
left into one of the two category boxes in the top right. You also need to name the
categories. You can put a maximum of eight items in one category. The actions you
can perform with the interface are described below.
Actions
Naming a category Before putting items into a category, youmust give the category a
name. This is done by typing a name in the place provided above each category.
Category names must be in lower-case, and be valid words in a dictionary (the
program will check and remind you otherwise).
Putting an item in a category Click on the item to categorise it. Click with the LEFT
MOUSE BUTTON to put the item in the category on the left side, and with the
RIGHT MOUSE BUTTON to put it in the category on the right side.
Renaming a category You can rename a category at any time by simply editing the
name you gave it previously.
Changing the category of an item You can change your category decisions by click-
ing on the itemwith the appropriatemouse button, just as youwould for initially
categorising it.
Confirming your categories Once you have categorised all the items, a ’Done’ button
will appear on the left. When you are happy with your categories (i.e., you don’t
want to rename or recategorise anything), click on the ’Done’ button to finish the
task.
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Training task
The first task is for practice. Please put all the items you will see on the left into the
blue category boxes, and name the categories.
Since the main purpose of this practice task is for you to become fully acquainted with
the interface, please try out each of the operations at least once (i.e., naming a category,
placing an item in a category, renaming a category, changing an item’s category, and
confirming your categories). The program will remind you at the end if you forget
any of them.
Joint categorisation tasks
Okay, it’s time to start the real thing.
There will now be 30 tasks which involve sorting pictures of shapes into categories. In
these tasks, you will work with a partner. Your partnership will get a score for each
task, and the partnership with the highest total scores will receive a bonus 5 pounds
each.
The goal in each task is to form categories that are as similar as possible to those
of your partner. The order and names of the categories do not matter for the score:
what is important is the item groupings. Note that, in each task, your partner will be
categorising the same items as you, but will initially see them in a different order on
the screen.
Neither condition
At the end of each task, the screen will show you your partnership score for that task.
However, you will NOT see your partner’s category groupings or category names.
After 20 seconds, the next task will begin.
Good luck!
Groupings condition
At the end of each task, the screen will show you your partnership score for that task.
You will also see your partner’s category groupings beneath your own, but you will
NOT see your partner’s category names. After 20 seconds, the next task will begin.
Good luck!
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Labels condition
At the end of each task, the screen will show you your partnership score for that
task. You will also see your partner’s category names beneath your own, but you




At the end of each task, the screen will show you your partnership score for that task.
You will also see your partner’s category groupings and category names beneath
your own. After 20 seconds, the next task will begin.
Good luck!
D.2 Questionnaire
The participants were asked the same demographic questions as in Experiments 2 and
3. The feedback questions on the questionnaire were as follows:
1. What do you think was the purpose of the experiment?
2. On what basis did you categorise the shapes?
3. Did this basis change between the different tasks?
4. How did you try to agree with your partner on categories for the shapes?
5. When you looked at a shape, did you mentally label it with an English word?
6. Do you have any comments about the program interface?
7. Do you have any other comments about the experiment?
APPENDIX D. EXPERIMENT 4 MATERIALS 341
D.3 Program interface
Figure D.1: Screenshot of the program interface at the beginning of a task.
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Figure D.2: Screenshot of the program interface mid-way through a task.
Figure D.3: A screenshot of the program interface when feedback is being shown to
a participant. This example illustrates what happens in the both condition, since both
kinds of feedback are provided.
APPENDIX E
Triangle generation program
Below is the script that was written to generate sets of triangle-like stimuli and used for
pilots and Experiment 4.
#!/usr/bin/perl
### Generate sets of triangle-like shapes based on random values
### generated within certain parameter ranges.
use strict;
use Math::Polygon;
my $size = 600; # the width and height of the images
my $total = 50; # the number of images to create
my $dir = "/home/cyp/shapes"; # where to put the shapes
## The set of ranges from which to select random values for the
## colour and corner parameters, of the form (redmin, redmax,
## greenmin, greenmax, bluemin, bluemax, cornermin, cornermax,
## controlmin, controlmax). The first six specify the ranges
## for the RGB values. The 7th and 8th set the range for the
## "size" of the corner, and the 9th and 10th set the range for
## the "pointedness" parameter (called ’corner’ and ’control’
## here for technical reasons’). The variable can actually
## contain multiple arrays, in which case images will be
## generated for each configuration. Here the default values
## are the ones that were used for the stimuli in Experiment 4.
my @parameters =
([0.0, 0.2, 0.0, 0.2, 0.0, 0.2, 0.1, 0.3, 0.7, 1.0]);
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## create a random parameter value between $min and $max
sub make_parameter {
my ($min, $max) = @_;
if ($min == $max) {
return $min;
} else {
return ($min + (rand($max-$min)));
}
}




## find a point along the triangle edge from the corner
sub get_shifted_point {
my ($z, $za, $ratio) = @_;
return ($z + (($za - $z) * $ratio));
}
## find a control point for drawing the Bezier curves
sub get_shifted_control {
my ($z, $za, $zb, $ratio) = @_;
my ($zm) = ($za + $zb) / 2.0;
return ($zm + (($z - $zm) * $ratio));
}
## generate one set of $total triangles for each parameter set
for (my $j=0; $j < @parameters; $j++) {
## get the parameter ranges from @parameters
my @reds = ($parameters[$j][0],$parameters[$j][1]);
my @greens = ($parameters[$j][2],$parameters[$j][3]);
my @blues = ($parameters[$j][4],$parameters[$j][5]);
my @corners = ($parameters[$j][6],$parameters[$j][7]);
my @controls = ($parameters[$j][8],$parameters[$j][9]);
my $start = ($j * $total) + 1;
my $end = ($j+1) * $total;
for (my $i=$start; $i<=$end; $i++) {
## generate random parameter values within the ranges
## specified
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my ($red,$green,$blue) = (make_parameter(@reds),
make_parameter(@greens),
make_parameter(@blues));
my ($corner_ratio) = make_parameter(@corners);
my ($control_ratio) = make_parameter(@controls);
my ($x1,$x2,$x3,$y1,$y2,$y3,$ok);
while (!$ok) {
## generate random vertices




## centre the triangle
my $xdelta = ($size / 2.0) - (($x1r + $x2r + $x3r) / 3.0);
$x1 = $x1r + $xdelta;
$x2 = $x2r + $xdelta;
$x3 = $x3r + $xdelta;
my $ydelta = ($size / 2.0) - (($y1r + $y2r + $y3r) / 3.0);
$y1 = $y1r + $ydelta;
$y2 = $y2r + $ydelta;
$y3 = $y3r + $ydelta;
## make sure the shifted triangle still fits in the image
if (($x1 > 0 & $x1 < $size)
& ($x2 > 0 & $x2 < $size)
& ($x3 > 0 & $x3 < $size)
& ($y1 > 0 & $y1 < $size)
& ($y2 > 0 & $y2 < $size)




## manipulate the corners
my $x12 = get_shifted_point($x1,$x2,$corner_ratio);
my $x13 = get_shifted_point($x1,$x3,$corner_ratio);
my $x1c = get_shifted_control($x1,$x12,$x13,$control_ratio);
my $x21 = get_shifted_point($x2,$x1,$corner_ratio);
APPENDIX E. TRIANGLE GENERATION PROGRAM 346
my $x23 = get_shifted_point($x2,$x3,$corner_ratio);
my $x2c = get_shifted_control($x2,$x21,$x23,$control_ratio);
my $x31 = get_shifted_point($x3,$x1,$corner_ratio);
my $x32 = get_shifted_point($x3,$x2,$corner_ratio);
my $x3c = get_shifted_control($x3,$x31,$x32,$control_ratio);
my $y12 = get_shifted_point($y1,$y2,$corner_ratio);
my $y13 = get_shifted_point($y1,$y3,$corner_ratio);
my $y1c = get_shifted_control($y1,$y12,$y13,$control_ratio);
my $y21 = get_shifted_point($y2,$y1,$corner_ratio);
my $y23 = get_shifted_point($y2,$y3,$corner_ratio);
my $y2c = get_shifted_control($y2,$y21,$y23,$control_ratio);
my $y31 = get_shifted_point($y3,$y1,$corner_ratio);
my $y32 = get_shifted_point($y3,$y2,$corner_ratio);





my $area = $p->area();
if ($area < 20000) {
## if the triangle is too small, make a new one.
$i--;
} else {
## create a Postscript output file
my $outfile = "$dir/" . sprintf("%04d",$i) . ".eps";
open(OUTFILE, ">$outfile") || die "Die!";
print OUTFILE "%!PS-Adobe-3.0 EPSF-3.0\n";
print OUTFILE "%%BoundingBox: 0 0 $size $size\n";
print OUTFILE "\n";
print OUTFILE "/red {$red} def\n";
print OUTFILE "/green {$green} def\n";
print OUTFILE "/blue {$blue} def\n";
print OUTFILE "\n";
print OUTFILE "/x12 {$x12} def\n";
print OUTFILE "/x13 {$x13} def\n";
print OUTFILE "/x1c {$x1c} def\n";
print OUTFILE "/x21 {$x21} def\n";
print OUTFILE "/x23 {$x23} def\n";
print OUTFILE "/x2c {$x2c} def\n";
print OUTFILE "/x31 {$x31} def\n";
print OUTFILE "/x32 {$x32} def\n";
print OUTFILE "/x3c {$x3c} def\n";
print OUTFILE "\n";
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print OUTFILE "/y12 {$y12} def\n";
print OUTFILE "/y13 {$y13} def\n";
print OUTFILE "/y1c {$y1c} def\n";
print OUTFILE "/y21 {$y21} def\n";
print OUTFILE "/y23 {$y23} def\n";
print OUTFILE "/y2c {$y2c} def\n";
print OUTFILE "/y31 {$y31} def\n";
print OUTFILE "/y32 {$y32} def\n";
print OUTFILE "/y3c {$y3c} def\n";
print OUTFILE "\n";
print OUTFILE "red green blue setrgbcolor\n";
print OUTFILE "newpath\n";
print OUTFILE "x12 y12 moveto\n";
print OUTFILE "x1c y1c x1c y1c x13 y13 curveto\n";
print OUTFILE "x31 y31 lineto\n";
print OUTFILE "x3c y3c x3c y3c x32 y32 curveto\n";
print OUTFILE "x23 y23 lineto\n";




## convert to JPEG format
my $outimg = "$dir/" . sprintf("%04d",$i) . ".jpg";
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